

The American Political Science Review

VOL. XLV

SEPTEMBER, 1951

NO. 3

SCIENCE AND POLITICS

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I. REALITY AND VALUE

It is a commonplace to assert that science should be independent of politics. By this one usually means that the search for truth, which is the essential function of science, should not be influenced by political interests, which are the interests concerned with the establishment and maintenance of a definite social order or a particular social institution. Politics as the art of government, that is to say, the practice of regulating the social behavior of men, is a function of will and, as such, an activity which necessarily presupposes the conscious or unconscious assumption of values, the realization of which is the purpose of the activity. Science is a function of cognition; its aim is not to govern but to explain. To describe the world is its object. Its independence of politics means in the last analysis, that the scientist must not presuppose any value; consequently he has to restrict himself to an explanation and a description of his object without judging it as good or bad, i.e., as being in conformity with, or contrary to, a presupposed value. This implies that the statements by which a scientist describes and explains the object of his inquiry must not be influenced by values in which he himself believes. Scientific statements are judgments about reality; by definition they are objective and independent of the wishes and fears of the judging subject because they are verifiable by experience. They are true or false. Value judgments, however, are subjective in character because they are based, in the last analysis, on the personality of the judging subject in general, and on the emotional element of his consciousness in particular.

The principle of excluding value judgments from the field of science seems to have an exception. It is frequently maintained that there is

one value which science must presuppose, namely, truth, and that there is consequently one value judgment which a scientist may legitimately pronounce, the judgment that something is true or false. However, truth is not a value in the same sense as are the values at the basis of political activity, such as, for instance, individual freedom or economic security. The judgment that something is true or false is essentially different from the judgment that something is good or bad, which is the most general formula of a value judgment. Truth means conformity with reality, not conformity with a presupposed value. The judgment that something is true or false is the ascertainment of the existence or nonexistence of a fact; and such a judgment has an objective character insofar as it is independent of the wish or fear of the judging subject and is verifiable by experience of the senses, controlled by reason. That the statement "Iron is heavier than water" is true, and that the statement "Water is heavier than iron" is false, can be demonstrated by experiment; and the one is true and the other is false, even if the judging subject for some reason or another should wish the contrary. On the other hand, the statement that a certain social organization guaranteeing individual freedom but not economic security is good, and consequently better than a social organization guaranteeing economic security but not individual freedom, is not a statement about a fact; it cannot be verified by experiment and is neither true nor false. Rather, it is valid or invalid. As a value judgment (i.e., a judgment about individual freedom and economic security as values), it must not be confused with the statement that most men actually prefer individual freedom to economic security, which indeed is a statement about a fact, and may be true or false. If the statement that most men prefer individual freedom to economic security is false and the statement that most men prefer economic security to individual freedom is true, the latter statement logically excludes the first one; but it does not exclude the value judgment that individual freedom, although not preferred by most men, is a higher value, and hence "better," than economic security. Judgments about values cannot contradict judgments about reality. Indeed, only if their meaning is such that they cannot contradict or affirm judgments about reality are they value judgments in the specific sense of this term. In this sense, reality and value are always two different spheres.

However, the terms "value" and "value judgment" are frequently used in another sense. Such is the case when the statement that something is an appropriate means to a certain end is considered to be a value judgment. The meaning of such a statement is that something, as a cause, is able to bring about a certain effect, which is supposed to be an end. The statement refers to the relationship between cause and effect; and

it is just this relationship between facts that constitutes a specific reality, the reality of nature. Natural science describes its object as real by applying the principle of causality—that is, by statements that under a given condition a specific consequence certainly or probably will occur. These statements are the so-called laws of nature. The statement that something is an appropriate means to an end is true or false; and in order to be true it must be verifiable by experience. If the statement that a communistic organization is “good” means only that it is an appropriate means to bring about economic security for everybody, and the statement that a capitalistic organization is “bad” means only that it has not this result, neither statement is, in itself, a value judgment in the specific sense of the term. Both statements are judgments about reality; and, if they are classified as value judgments, such value judgments are not different from judgments about reality, but only a special type of such judgments, and hence not to be excluded from the sphere of science. However, the statement that something is an appropriate means to a certain end preserves its scientific character only so long as its meaning is that *if* something is presupposed as an end, something else is an appropriate means; the scientific statement must not imply that something *is* an end. Thus a scientist may legitimately state that communism is, or is not, an appropriate means, *provided* that economic security for everybody is presupposed as an end. But he transgresses the field of science when he states that economic security for everybody *is* an end, or *the* end, of social life; for science can determine the means, but it cannot determine the ends.

The statement that something is an end is not identical with the statement that an individual, especially the judging subject, or several individuals want it. The latter is a statement about a fact, about the actual state of mind of human beings. If by “end” that which an individual actually desires is meant, the term signifies the intention of the individual, the purpose that he is actually pursuing. But in its specific sense the statement that something is an end, for instance, the statement that economic security for everybody is the end of social life, expresses the idea that something—here economic security for everybody—*should* be pursued as an end even if it is not actually pursued. In this sense, the concept of “end” is identical with that of a “right end.” The statement that something should be done or, what amounts to the same, that men should behave in a certain way, expresses the meaning of a *norm* prescribing this behavior. Hence the statement that something is an end in the sense of a right end is equivalent to the statement that it is prescribed by a norm. A norm claims, according to its meaning, objective validity. (Whether this claim is founded, we shall see later.)

Hence, in the statement that something is an end in the sense of a right end, the term "end" has an objective meaning. It does not merely signify the end pursued by a definite individual. In this sense "end" means "value"; and in this sense a norm constitutes a value. To put it another way, only as a statement about what should be done in accordance with a norm presupposed to be valid, is the statement that something is an end a value judgment in the specific sense of the term, in contradistinction to a judgment about reality as a statement about what actually is done or probably will be done. Only if the judging subject presupposes a norm prescribing something as valid, is his judgment that something is or is not in conformity with this norm a genuine value judgment; only then does he approve or disapprove the object of his judgment.

In this respect we must distinguish between an end which may be considered as a means to a further end and an ultimate end, or, what amounts to the same, a value constituted by a basic norm, i.e., as a supreme value. The statement that something is an end is a value judgment in the specific sense of the term only when referring to an ultimate end (as a judgment about a supreme value), not to an end as a means to a further end. Only then is it impossible for the statement to contradict a judgment about reality. To the question "Why is a particular value judgment or a particular norm valid?" the answer can be only another value judgment or another norm, never a judgment about reality—the ascertainment of a fact; and thus the question must lead to a judgment about a supreme value or to a basic norm. To the question "Why should a child honor his parents?" the correct answer is not "Because God has commanded children to honor their parents," but "Because we should obey the commands of God, who has ordered children to honor their parents." But to the question "Why should we obey the commands of God?" there is no answer. To obey the commands of God is an ultimate end, or what amounts to the same, a supreme value, the content of a basic norm. The statement that science can determine the means, but not an ultimate end, is equivalent to the statement that science must not presuppose the validity of a basic norm. Scientific statements about appropriate means can be made only as conditional propositions: *if* a basic norm constituting an ultimate end is presupposed to be valid, then something is an appropriate means. That is to say, then, as a cause, it is able to bring about as an effect that which is determined as an ultimate end by a basic norm, presupposed as valid—not by science itself but by the acting individual, who intends to bring about this effect.

It is of the utmost importance to be aware that within a rational process referring to the relationship of means to ends, the assumption

of an ultimate end is inevitable. Without such an assumption it is not possible to interpret the relationship between cause and effect as one of means and end. The reason that this is not self-evident is that most men are not conscious of the necessity for such an assumption. If, for instance, someone declares democracy to be a good, or the best, form of government, his explanation, when queried, may be that democracy is the only form of government by means of which the greatest possible degree of individual freedom can be brought about. This answer implies that he considers the guarantee of individual freedom as the end of government. To the question why he considers individual freedom to be an end, he will probably answer that it is because all men wish to be free. As a statement about a fact, this answer is highly problematical; and even if the statement were true, it is not an answer to the question. Why democracy is a good form of government is not a question of what end men actually pursue, but one of what they should pursue, of what is the right end to be pursued by men. Hence, the correct answer to the question of why democracy is a good form of government is, "Because men should be free"; and this answer means that freedom is a supreme value. This value judgment may seem so self-evident to the judging subject that he is not conscious of it as the fundamental presupposition of his judgment about democracy.

Since the judgment about individual freedom, or economic security, or something else presupposed as an ultimate end or supreme value does not allow a justification by a further value judgment, the only question that may be asked with respect to such a value judgment has to do with the fact that one individual presupposes freedom, another security, and a third something else as a supreme value. It is a psychological question, that is, a question concerning reality, rather than one concerning value. Inquiry into this problem can hardly be pursued beyond the ascertainment that the choice among the different presuppositions is in the last analysis determined by the personality of the judging subject in general and by the emotional component of his consciousness in particular. A man with strong self-confidence may prefer individual freedom, whereas one suffering from an inferiority complex may prefer economic security. If a man has strong metaphysical inclinations and if fear of death makes him believe in the immortality of his soul, concern for the fate of his soul in the other world may cause him to consider the so-called spiritual values, the "welfare of the soul," more important than the so-called material values; whereas a man of more rationalistic habits of thought, with an unhampered desire to enjoy his earthly life, will consider the material values as the only ones that count. In this sense, judgments about ultimate ends or supreme

values are, in spite of their claim to an objective validity, highly subjective. They thus differ from judgments about reality, which, being verifiable by experience and completely independent of the personality of the judging subject, particularly of his desires and fears, are by their very nature objective. This objectivity is an essential characteristic of science; and because of its objectivity, science is opposed to, and hence must be separated from, politics, an activity ultimately based on subjective value judgments.

II. SCIENCE OF POLITICS AND "POLITICAL" SCIENCE

The principle of objectivity applies to social science as well as to natural science, and in particular to so-called political science. The object of political science is politics—the activity directed at the establishment and maintenance of a social order, especially the state. In describing the phenomena concerned, the political scientist must, of course, take into consideration the values which men presuppose in their political activities. But in doing so he has to restrict himself to ascertaining the fact that the establishment and maintenance of the different political systems presuppose different values as ultimate ends, and to finding out these different values which are at the bases of the different systems; in describing the systems, he himself must not presuppose the one or the other of these values, or, what amounts to the same, he must not consider the norm constituting the value as valid—i.e., as binding upon himself. In other terms, he must neither approve nor disapprove of the object of his analysis lest his work, instead of being a science of politics, become a "political" science in the sense of an instrument of politics. Then it is no science at all but a political ideology.

The separation of science from politics, which means abstention from value judgments within a science the object of which is, so to speak, impregnated with value judgments, is not so paradoxical as it seems, if it is admitted that ascertaining the fact that men are consciously or unconsciously determined in their political activities by definite value judgments is quite different from endorsing these value judgments. It cannot be denied that it is much more difficult to separate social, and especially political, science from politics than to comply with this postulate in the field of natural science. But the latter is by no means immune from the danger of being politicized. It is well known that the Church tried to suppress the Copernican theory, not because it could be proved false, but because it endangered the authority of the Holy Scripture and thus the authority of the Church. And even in our time, the bolshevik government prohibits the Mendelian theory only because this theory

does not support belief in the inheritability of acquired qualities, which is an essential presupposition of the political system enforced by that government. This and other evidence indicate that there is no sufficient reason for differentiating between natural and social sciences regarding the postulate of separating science from politics.

Those who deny the legitimacy of this postulate with respect to political science accept—at least in part—one of the most characteristic principles of Marxian philosophy: the dogma that science cannot be separated from politics because science is only part of the “superstructure” of an economic (and that means, according to this philosophy, a political) reality, and consequently is never really more than a political instrument. This dogma denies the possibility of an independent science. But the splendid development of modern natural science may be attributed largely to its emancipation from political powers, and especially from the power of the Church. It is a characteristic feature of this political power that it assumed authority over science; and in this respect the bolshevik state has the character of a church, just as communism has the character of a religion. The fact that in the past natural science *has* been able to achieve complete independence is due—it is true—to a powerful social interest in its victory, an interest in that advance of technique which only a free science can guarantee. Social science does not lead, or does not yet lead, to such direct advantage afforded by improvement of technique as physics and chemistry produce on the acquisition of engineering knowledge and medical therapy. In social science there is still no influence to counteract the overwhelming interest that those residing in power, as well as those craving for power, have in a theory pleasing to their wishes—that is, in a political pseudo-science, which is nothing but a political ideology. If such a political science cannot free itself from politics, there will never be a real political science.

Although science must be separated from politics, politics need not be separated from science. It stands to reason that a statesman, in order to realize his ends, may use the results of science as a means. Science in general and political science in particular may furnish these means, and only science can furnish the appropriate means; but, as pointed out, it cannot determine the ultimate ends of politics. However, to admit that these ends are in the last analysis based on subjective value judgments seems to be too difficult for those who—for political reasons—look for an absolute justification of the political system which they try to establish or to maintain. If they are not willing to find such justification in religion, they try to get it from science. This tendency, too, is characteristic of Marxian philosophy, which claims to establish a “scien-

tific" socialism. True science, of course, refuses to be a substitute for religion and cannot but destroy the illusion that judgments of value can be derived from cognition of reality or, what amounts to the same, that values are immanent in the reality which is the object of scientific study. The view that value is immanent in reality is a characteristic feature of a metaphysical-religious (and this means non-scientific) interpretation of nature and society. It necessarily implies the assumption that both are the creation of God as the personification of the absolute good. This view leads inevitably to the insoluble problem of theodicy, that is, to the unsurmountable contradiction of a reality which, as the creation of God, is to be considered good but in which, nevertheless, evil is also immanent.

III. NORMATIVE SCIENCES

The postulate of the separation of science from politics presupposes that the object of science is reality, that scientific statements are statements about reality as opposed to value judgments in the specific sense of the term. There are, however, sciences, or disciplines usually considered to be sciences, such as ethics and jurisprudence, the object of which seems not to be reality but values. They describe norms constituting values, and in this sense may be called "normative" sciences. Morals, the object of the one, and the law, the object of the other, are indeed systems of norms, or normative orders, determining a definite human behavior by prescribing or permitting such behavior. In order to consider them as sciences, we must take into consideration the fact that there are two different kinds of norms, just as there are two different kinds of value judgments: there are positive norms, which are created by acts of individuals, and norms that are not created in this way, but are only presupposed in the minds of the acting and judging individuals. The act by which a norm is created may be performed in different ways: by spoken or written words, by a gesture, by conventional symbols, and the like. The norms of a positive moral order may be established by the sermons or writings of a religious founder or by custom, that is, by the habitual behavior of the members of a social community; the norms of positive law may be established by custom, by acts of legislation, by judicial decisions, by administrative acts, or by legal transactions. The acts by which the norms of a positive normative system are created are always facts manifested in the external world, perceptible to the senses. The followers of Christ could hear the voice of their Master when He, in the Sermon on the Mount, ordered them to love their enemies. We can read the Holy Scripture reporting this as a fact. We can also read a statute imposing upon us the obligation to pay taxes. As soldiers, we can hear the command of our superior officer ordering

us to do or to forbear from doing something, and, as drivers of cars, we can see the green traffic light permitting us to cross an intersection. To say that a norm is created by a fact, is a figure of speech. The norm is the specific meaning of the fact, and this meaning, not perceptible by our senses, is the result of an interpretation. To interpret the meaning of a fact as a norm is possible only under the condition that we presuppose another norm conferring upon this fact the quality of a norm-creating fact; but this other norm, in the last analysis, cannot be a positive norm. Thus what Christ ordered us to do in the Sermon on the Mount are norms binding upon us only if we presuppose that Christ is the supreme moral authority, and to do this means that we presuppose a norm that we should obey the commands of Christ. But this norm is not, as are the commands of Christ, a positive norm, that is to say, the meaning of a fact, a norm-creating act performed in space and in time, but rather a norm the validity of which is only presupposed in our mind.

The difference between a positive and a non-positive norm is particularly clear in the field of law. The fact that a man orders another man to pay a certain sum of money is interpreted to have the meaning of a norm issued by the one and binding on the other, and not an attempt of a gangster to extort money from another, if the one issuing the order is considered to be an organ of the community, a tax officer for instance, acting as authorized by a statute. The act by which the statute has been adopted that confers on the official his authority, has the meaning of a binding norm only if it is performed in a way determined by the constitution. But the historically-first constitution has the character of a binding norm only if we presuppose a norm that we should behave as those who established the constitution ordered us to behave. If we do not suppose that the fathers of the constitution had their authority from God, this norm is a basic norm. It is not established, as was the constitution itself, by the acts of human beings; it is only presupposed by those who want to interpret certain human relations as legal relations, or as relations determined by legal norms.

Jurisprudence as a *science* of law has positive norms for its object. Only positive law can be the object of a science of law. This is the principle of legal positivism as opposed to the natural-law doctrine, which pretends to present legal norms not created by acts of human beings but deduced from nature. To deduce norms from nature, that is to say, to consider nature as a legislator, presupposes the idea that nature is created by God and is thus the manifestation of His will, which is absolutely good. Hence the natural-law doctrine is not a science but a metaphysics of law.¹ Positive law may be national law, the law of a def-

¹ Cf. my article, "The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 481-513 (Dec., 1949).

inite state based on its constitution and created by law-making acts of legal authorities instituted by this constitution; or international law created by custom, i.e., the habitual practice of the states, based on the presupposition that the states should behave as they regularly behave, which presupposition is the basic norm of international law. But the norm on which the validity of a positive legal order is based is, as a matter of fact, a non-positive norm, and the principle of legal positivism can be maintained only as restricted by this fact. This restriction, however, does not abolish the opposition between legal positivism and natural-law doctrine. The basic norm of a positive legal order—in contradistinction to the substantive norms of natural law prescribing a definite human behavior as in conformity with nature (and that means as just) and prohibiting a definite human behavior as contrary to nature (and that means as unjust)—has a merely formal character. It serves as a basis for any positive legal order, regardless of its conformity or non-conformity with natural law; and it has, within the science of law, a merely hypothetical character. The statements by which the science of law describes its objects as positive norms have the character of conditional propositions. As a science, it cannot state absolutely that individuals or states are obliged or entitled by legal norms to behave in a certain way. It ascertains only that *under the condition* that the basic norm conferring on the fathers of the constitution a law-making authority is presupposed as valid, are individuals obliged or entitled, by legal norms based on the constitution, to behave in a certain way; and only that *under the condition* that the basic norm instituting the custom of states as a law-creating fact is presupposed as valid, are states obliged or entitled, by legal norms created by custom, to behave in a certain way. A science of law cannot itself presuppose either of these basic norms as valid, nor can it decide that any non-positive norm is valid. To ascertain the validity of the non-positive basic norm of a positive legal order is beyond the sphere of a science the object of which is this positive legal order.

Positive legal norms can be the object of a legal science because the existence—and this means the validity—of a positive norm depends not only on the presupposed validity of a basic norm but also on the existence of a fact, on the existence of such norm-creating acts, which take place in space and time as the custom of individuals or states, a legislative, judicial, or administrative act, or a legal transaction. In describing its object as norms, the science of law refers to these facts; and the positivity of the law consists just in this relation to the law-creating facts. If it is assumed that norms prescribing or permitting specific human behavior (implying also acts of state) constitute a value, and that consequently the statement that the human behavior (or

perhaps the act of state) is or is not in conformity with a norm of positive law (that is, is legal or illegal) is a value judgment, it must be remembered that this value is not opposed to reality. Such a value judgment is—like a judgment that something is an appropriate means to a presupposed end—not a judgment essentially different from a judgment about reality, but a special kind of judgment about reality. The statement that a certain human behavior (or a certain act of state) is legal or illegal may be true or false; it is verifiable by experience. Such a statement is possible only with respect to a definite national, or the international, legal order. The statement, for instance, that it is illegal under a definite national law not to fulfill a promise of marriage is false if within this legal order there is no norm attaching a sanction to the non-fulfillment of a promise of marriage; and it is true only if there is such a norm. There exists such a norm only if it is created in accordance with the constitution which is at the basis of that law. The creation of the norm is a fact which can be ascertained by the science of law, just as facts can be ascertained by the science of nature. Hence the statement that norms are the object of the science of law does not mean that the object of this science is not reality. It means only that this object is not a natural reality as described by natural science. But the object of legal science may be characterized as legal reality. The difference between natural reality and legal reality is that legal reality as described by legal science consists of facts which have—under the condition that the validity of the basic, non-positive, norm is presupposed—a specific meaning: the meaning of positive norms.

Natural science describes its object as real in statements that under certain conditions (causes), certain consequences (their effects) necessarily or probably take place. These propositions are, as pointed out, the so-called laws of nature, which are laws of causality. Causality is not a force immanent in reality; it is a principle of cognition, the specific instrument by which natural science describes its object. Since norms determine human behavior, the science of law, in describing the law as a set of norms is also describing human behavior; but it does not describe it as it takes place as cause and effect in natural reality. It describes behavior as it is determined, i.e., prescribed or permitted, by legal norms. The statements by which the science of law describes its object are not an application of the principle of causality; they do not have the meaning of the laws of nature, although they have the same grammatical form. They are propositions connecting a condition with its consequence, but this connection has another meaning than that expressed in the laws of nature. Their meaning is not that under a certain condition a certain consequence actually, i.e., necessarily or probably, takes place; but that under the condition of certain human behavior, other human

behavior as consequence *ought* to take place. These statements are the rules of law. In the rule of law that "If a man commits theft, another man ought to punish the thief," the punishment is not described as the effect or the theft as the cause. The term "ought" expresses the specific meaning of the connection between condition and consequence established by a legal norm (a prescription or permission) as different from the connection between cause and effect. It may be designated as imputation. It is the principle according to which the social sciences, the object of which are norms determining human behavior, describe their object. It is the principle which, in the field of certain social sciences, such as ethics and jurisprudence, corresponds to the principle of causality in the field of natural sciences. It is necessary to remember, of course, that when the principle of imputation is applied, and when it is stated that under the condition of certain behavior, other behavior *ought* to take place, the term "ought" has not its usual moral, but a purely logical, meaning. It designates, like causality, a category in the sense of Kant's transcendental logic.²

IV. SCIENCE OF LAW AND POLITICS

If the propositions by which the science of law describes its object are called rules of law, they must be distinguished from the legal norms described by the science of law. The former are instruments of the legal science, the latter are functions of the legal authority. In describing the law by rules of law, the science of law does not exercise the function of a social authority, which is a function of will, but the function of cognition. Although the legal norms issued by the legal authority may be considered as constituting a specific value, namely the legal value, the rules of law are not judgments of value in any possible sense of this term, just as the laws of nature by which the natural science describes its object are not value judgments. If the statement that something is or is not in conformity with a legal norm may be classified as a value judgment, it is such a judgment only in the same sense as is the judgment that something is an appropriate means to a presupposed end—that is to say, it is a value judgment not in the specific sense of this term as essentially different from a judgment about reality, but rather a special type of judgment about reality. As such it is, by its very nature, not incompatible with a science of law, just as the judgment that something is an appropriate means is not excluded from the science of nature. But as the result of a peculiarity of positive law of which we shall speak later, even the judgment that something is legal or illegal has no place within the science of law.

² Cf. my article, "Causality and Imputation," *Ethics*, Vol. 61, pp. 1-11 (Oct., 1950).

The judgment that something is legal or illegal must be distinguished from the judgment that something is just or unjust. These two judgments differ from each other in the same way as do the statements that something is an appropriate means to a presupposed ultimate end and that something is an ultimate end. If the statement that something is an appropriate means and the statement that something is legal are considered to be value judgments, they are, as pointed out, at the same time judgments about reality; whereas the statement that something is an ultimate end and the statement that something is just, are genuine judgments of value, essentially different from judgments about reality. Their meaning is not that something is or is not in conformity with a positive norm, but that it is or is not in conformity with a non-positive norm. Consequently they are excluded from the field of science—of nature or of law.

The only non-positive norm that the science of law may take into consideration, not as its object but as a condition of its statements describing its object, is the basic norm of the legal order which is its object. The specific function of the basic norm of a positive legal order constituting the legal value, is to serve as the ultimate source of law, that is, as the reason for the validity of the constitution of a legal order; and the constitution is that positive legal norm (or set of norms) which regulates the creation of the other norms of the legal order. Hence the basic norm of a positive legal order has, as pointed out, a merely formal character; it does not constitute a substantive value as, e.g., the non-positive norm that men ought to be free, or that men ought to live in security—which constitute the value that we call "justice." In fact, the positivity of the law consists in that its validity does not depend on its conformity with justice, but in that it is created in a definite way determined by the basic norm. A positive law may be just or unjust; the possibility of being just or unjust is an essential consequence of its being positive. The judgment that something is legal or illegal, as pointed out, necessarily refers to a definite legal order valid for a certain space and at a certain time. What is legal according to one legal order may be illegal according to another. In this sense, the value constituted by positive legal norms is always a relative value. But the idea of justice, in its specific sense, designates an absolute value, constituted by a non-positive norm claiming to be valid everywhere and at all times, a substantive norm with an unchangeable content. Even if the statement that something is just or unjust means that it is or is not in conformity with a norm of a positive moral order established by custom or by the commands of a religious founder, it is excluded from the field of a science of law. For the validity of such a positive normative order depends on a basic norm different from the basic norm of positive law, which is

the only condition under which the science of law may describe its object as a set of valid norms constituting the specific legal value.

Other values, especially the value of justice, which is the specific value according to which the positive law as the legal reality may be evaluated, are properly called political values in order to distinguish them from the legal value. The differentiation of law and politics means the differentiation of two normative systems. When politics is opposed to law, the term "politics" is used in a narrower sense than in the postulation of the separation of natural science from politics, where politics means any normative system whatever. The postulation of the separation of the science of positive law from politics means that the legal scientist, in describing his object, must refrain from political value judgments as judgments referring to norms other than norms of positive law, especially from evaluating his object as just or unjust. It is not for the legal scientist but only for the legal authority to prefer something as just to something as unjust.

But although the science of law can and must be separated from politics, that is to say, although the legal scientist must refrain from political value judgments, the law-making process, which is the function of the legal authority, cannot be separated from politics. For this function is determined not only by legal norms but also by norms of another normative system which, in order to distinguish them from law, are, as pointed out, called "political." It is a peculiarity of the law to regulate its own creation. Just as the constitution regulates the creation of statutes or institutes custom as a law-creating fact, statutes and rules of customary law regulate the creation of individual norms by the courts in the judicial decisions. In creating a norm, the legal authority applies a higher norm determining the creation and the content of the lower norm. But because a norm can determine the creation and the content of another norm only to a certain extent, the norm-creating authority always has a certain degree of discretion in his norm-creating function. Insofar as his norm-creating function is left to his discretion, the legal authority may be, and actually is, determined by other than legal norms—and *insofar* his function has a political character; whereas it is a legal function *insofar* as it is determined by legal norms. Normally, the legislative organ is legally bound by the constitution only with respect to the law-making procedure. The content of the norms to be created by the legislative organ is only exceptionally determined by the constitution. This is the case when the constitution prohibits or prescribes a certain content for these norms, such as when the constitution prohibits restriction of religious freedom. Insofar as the legislative function is not determined by the constitution, the legislator may be, and actually is, determined by political principles, especially by his idea of justice. He may prefer

one regulation to another in the same field because he considers the one to be just, the other to be unjust.

The legal scientist does not have the choice between accepting or rejecting the law, as established by the legislator, on the basis of his judgment about what is just and unjust. The scientist has to describe the decision of the legislator as the existing law, whether he considers it in conformity or not in conformity with what he considers to be justice. He may only examine whether the norms created by the legislative organ are or are not in conformity with the positive norms of the constitution, and the result of this examination is in the last analysis the objective ascertainment of a fact, not a subjective value judgment. But even the statement by the legal scientist that a statute is or is not constitutional, is of no legal importance. For the question as to whether a statute is or is not constitutional is not to be decided by the science of law, but by the legal authority on which the law confers this power. The same applies to a judicial decision with regard to the function of a court. It is normally much more closely determined by a higher legal norm—a statute or a rule of customary law—than is the legislative function by the constitution. But there is always a wider or narrower sphere of discretion left by the higher legal norm to the law-creating function of a court, and within this sphere of discretion the judicial decision may be, and actually is, determined by norms other than those of positive law. In creating an individual norm by the judicial decision, the court has always the choice between different decisions which are possible within the framework of the general norm determining the judicial function. The court may prefer the one to another because it considers the one to be just and the other to be unjust. But the legal scientist has no such choice. He has to take the decision rendered by the court as the existing law, valid for the concrete case. He may examine whether the judicial decision is or is not in conformity with the general legal norm to be applied by the court, and may come to the conclusion that it is or is not legal. But this judgment—in the last analysis a judgment about a fact—is legally irrelevant. For the decision on the question as to whether the decision of a court is legal or illegal is not within the competence of the science of law, but is within that of the legal authority on which the law has conferred this power.

The application of the law by a legal authority, as well as the description of the law by the legal scientist, implies an interpretation of the law. To interpret a legal norm is to find its meaning. It is a requirement of legal technique that a legal norm shall be formulated as clearly as possible, so that its meaning is unquestionable. However, since legal norms are mostly expressed in human language, and human language is frequently ambiguous, this requirement can only approximately be

complied with. Hence, very often more than one meaning can be found in a legal norm. The doctrine that a legal norm has actually only one meaning and that there is a scientific method which enables us always to find this single correct meaning of it, is a fiction used by traditional jurisprudence in order to maintain the illusion of legal security.

There are, of course, different methods of interpretation which are as follows: an interpretation according to the intention of the law-maker or according to the wording of the legal instrument; a historical or a logical interpretation; and a restrictive or an extensive interpretation. If the law itself does not prescribe one of these methods, each of them is applicable and may lead to a result different from that of another. Even if one method of interpretation is obligatory, it may furnish different and contradictory meanings. In applying a norm, the legal authority chooses one of these meanings and thus attributes to it the force of law. This may be called an authentic interpretation, although in traditional language this term is used only to designate a legal norm the express purpose of which is to interpret another, previous norm, not the interpretation implied in the application of a norm. The choice of one of the several meanings of a legal norm by a legal authority in its law-applying function is a law-creating act. Insofar as this choice is not determined by a higher legal norm, it is a political function. For the choice between the different meanings of a legal norm, if not determined by a higher legal norm, may be, and actually is, determined by norms other than legal, and this means by political norms. Hence the authentic interpretation of the law by a legal authority may be characterized as a political interpretation. On the other hand, the task of a legal scientist interpreting a legal instrument is to show its possible meanings and to leave it to the competent legal authority to choose in accordance with political principles the one which this authority thinks the most appropriate. In showing the possibilities which the law to be applied opens to the legal authority, the legal scientist scientifically serves the law-applying function; and in revealing the ambiguity, and thus the necessity for improving the wording, he serves the law-creating function in a scientific way. If the legal scientist recommends to the legal authority one of the different meanings of a legal norm, he tries to influence the law-making process and exercises a political, not a scientific, function; if he presents this interpretation as the only correct one, he is acting as a politician in the disguise of a scientist. He is veiling legal reality. But science has to unveil reality; only political ideologies try to veil it. Hence the scientific interpretation of the law, which is the interpretation of the law by a legal scientist, may be characterized as a legal interpretation—in contradistinction to the interpretation applied by a legal authority. By preferring one of several possible interpretations to the exclusion of the

others, the latter offers what may be characterized as a political interpretation.

V. THE "LEGAL" AND THE "POLITICAL"

The distinction between the legal and the political functions as a function determined by legal norms and one determined not by legal norms but by political norms, is often of considerable importance. A typical example is the problem of recognition of a community as a state, or of a body of individuals as the government of a state. The fact that traditional doctrine does not distinguish between a legal and a political recognition has caused the confusion prevailing among the writers who have treated this problem. According to some writers, recognition has only a declaratory character; that is to say, it has no legal consequences. Hence a community is a state, and a body of individuals a government, if each fulfills the requirements of international law, regardless of whether the community or the government is or is not recognized as such by the governments of other states. According to others, recognition has a constitutive character, which means that it has essential legal consequences. They assert that a community is a state and a body of individuals the government of a state, only when recognized as such by the governments of other states, and only in relation to the recognizing states. But, in truth, recognition is both a constitutive and a declaratory act; or, more precisely formulated, the act called recognition comprises two functions—a legal function which is constitutive and a political function which is declaratory.

Recognition of a community as a state or of a body of individuals as the government of a state means, in the first place, the ascertainment of the fact that a community is a state or that a body of individuals is the government of a state. This recognition is determined by norms of general international law, which stipulates the conditions under which a community is a state and a body of individuals the government of a state. Hence this recognition, as a function determined by the law, is a legal function and may be called legal recognition. The ascertainment of a legally relevant fact always has a constitutive character, since in the realm of law a fact to which the law attaches legal consequences exists legally only if ascertained in the way the law prescribes. International law confers upon the governments of the states the power to ascertain the existence of the facts "state" and "government" in the sense of international law. Hence the legal recognition of a community as a state or of a body of individuals as the government of a state has a constitutive character, just as the decision by which a court ascertains that a definite individual has committed a definite crime is by its very nature constitutive, insofar as the individual is a criminal and hence punishable only if

the court has ascertained this fact. However, by recognition is meant not only the act by which the existence of the facts "state" or "government" is ascertained, but also the act by which the government of a state expresses its willingness to enter into the normal relations with the recognized community or government. This act is not determined by norms of international law; it is left to the discretion of the existing states, who may for any reason whatever enter, or refuse to enter, into the normal relations with another state or with the government of another state. This act may be—and actually is—determined only by political principles, and hence it may be called political recognition, in contradistinction to the legal recognition. Insofar as it has in itself no legal consequences, it is not constitutive and insofar has merely a declaratory character. Usually both functions, the legal and the political recognition, are combined in one and the same act called "recognition," which, with respect to its legal function is constitutive, and with respect to its political function is declaratory.

As useful and necessary as is the distinction between the "legal" and the "political," it is capable of misuse fully as harmful and objectionable. Such misuse is, unfortunately, quite frequent in the traditional theory of law. A characteristic case is the distinction between two branches of national law, one of which is opposed as "political" law to the other as "legal" law, or law in the strict and genuine sense of the term. This is the significance attributed to the traditional dichotomy of law into public and private law, the definition of which concepts is one of the most controversial of questions. Whatever the difference between so-called public law and so-called private law may be, it certainly does not consist—as the distinction between a political and a non-political law pretends—in the fact that public law is "law" in a lesser degree than private law. In this sense, law cannot be "political." Law being by definition opposed to politics, a political law is a contradiction in terms. The fact that so-called public law regulates the organization of the state and the competence of its organs, that is political matters, is no reason to assume that this law is, as law, inferior to private law regulating the economic and family relations among the subjects of the state. The attempt to minimize the legality of public law (as compared with private law) by defining public law as the regulation of the relation between the state and its subjects, as a relation of superiority and inferiority and hence a "power" relation, and by defining private law as the regulation of the relation among the subjects of the state, as a relation among equals and hence as a non-power or a true "legal" relation, has been proved again and again to imply a logical fallacy. The state as a legal person can be conceived of only as subjected to the law like all other persons; and a relation between legal persons established by the law can be conceived of only as a legal

obligation or a legal right one person has in relation to another, and hence not as a "power" relation but only as a legal relation, that is to say, as a relation between subjects equally subjected to the law establishing the obligation or the right, whatever their content may be. If the doctrine that public law is "political" law and as such less law than private law, has in spite of the contradictions demonstrated by its critics, been obstinately maintained by many writers, it is still not based on scientific grounds. The insensitivity of its proponents to logical contradictions shows that the purpose of this doctrine is not to describe the law in an objective and consistent way, but to furnish an ideology justifying non-observance of the law. If public law, especially the norms regulating the jurisdiction of the organs of the state, is not law in the strict sense of the term, the government is not bound by these norms as a private subject is bound by the law. The government may then always act as it considers it politically expedient to act, even if such action is not authorized by the law. The doctrine that public law has a political and not a strictly legal character is not a scientific theory; it is a political ideology.

In close connection with this doctrine is the frequently advocated view that the constitution of a state, or the constitution of an international community laid down in a treaty, is not a legal but a political instrument, which, consequently, must be interpreted not juridically but politically. An instrument is a legal instrument if it contains legal norms establishing legal obligations and legal rights. Hence there cannot be the slightest doubt that the constitution of a state or the constituent treaty of an international community is a legal instrument. The only question is whether they are at the same time also political instruments. If the answer is affirmative, it is certainly not based on the content of the instruments, which by its very nature is law and nothing but law—constitutional law in one case and international law in the other. The instrument in question may be called political only with respect to the purpose of the law it contains. But if it is admitted that the purpose of a state constitution or a treaty constituting an international community is "political" such an admission does not alter the fact that this purpose is to be achieved by law as the only and specific means; otherwise the establishment of a constitution would be superfluous. The political purpose by no means deprives the instrument of its legal character. There is no legal instrument which has not an extra-legal purpose, for the law, seen from a teleological point of view, is always a means and not an end. That a loan contract has an economic purpose, and therefore can be designated as an economic instrument, has not the slightest effect on its legal character. Hence the political or economic purpose of a legal norm cannot exclude a juridical, i.e., a legal, interpretation, all the more since

a legal interpretation includes—as pointed out—all possible interpretations of a legal norm. But the view that a constitution is a political, not a legal, instrument, evidently has the same tendency as the doctrine that public law is political, not legal law: it tries to justify actions of the organs of the state or of the international community which no possible interpretation of the constitution warrants.

The same tendency is involved when an unconstitutional action of the organ of a national or an international community is justified by the statement that this organ is not a legal, but a political, agency. In view of the fact that the function of any organ of a legal community is legal insofar as it is determined by the law, and political insofar as it is not determined by the law but left to the discretion of the organ, each organ is at the same time a legal and a political organ. But the function of some organs is much more closely determined by the law than that of others; consequently, in the exercise of their function, they have much less discretion, and hence political character in much lesser degree, than the others. Most courts are so restricted, while most administrative organs are not. But this rule has important exceptions. There are courts which have a far-reaching discretion and administrative agencies whose functions are very much restricted by administrative law. Who can deny that, e.g., the Supreme Court of the United States is not only a legal but—in this sense—to a great extent also a political agency? There is no organ of a legal community to which the law does not leave at least a certain degree of discretion in the exercise of its function, and hence no organ that is a legal, and not at the same time a political, agency. But however wide the sphere of discretion may be which the law leaves to an organ in the exercise of its function, this function can be conceived of as the function of an organ of the legal community only if it is performed within the discretion conferred upon the organ by the law; i.e., if the function is in conformity with the law, it is legal.

One of the worst cases of abuse of the distinction between the legal and the political is its ill-famed but widespread application to international disputes. There are, it is argued, both disputes which refer to legal matters and disputes which refer to political matters. The former, as legal disputes, are justiciable; the latter, as political disputes, are not. That is to say, only legal, but not political, disputes can be settled by the application of international law and hence by decisions of international tribunals. If it were true—as this doctrine pretends—that there are disputes to which, because of the nature of their subject matter, existing international law cannot be applied, the distinction between legal and political disputes would be justifiable. But there are no such disputes. For any dispute consists in the claim of one party that the

other party is obliged to behave in a certain way, and in the rejection of this claim by the other party. In this respect there are only two possibilities. Either the existing international law establishes the obligation disputed by the parties or it does not. In both cases, existing international law is applicable to the dispute. In the first case the dispute has to be decided in favor of the plaintiff; in the second case, in favor of the defendant. In the first case the international tribunal, in applying existing international law, has to decide that the defendant is obliged to behave as the plaintiff claims; and in the second case, likewise applying international law, it must decide that the defendant is not obliged to behave as the plaintiff claims, that this claim has no basis in international law and that, consequently, the defendant is legally free to behave in this matter as he pleases. This freedom is legally guaranteed; for it is a principle of every legal order that what is not legally forbidden to the subjects of the legal community constituted by the legal order, is legally permitted to them. In applying this principle to the case, the tribunal applies existing law. Hence there is no dispute to which the existing international law is not applicable, and no dispute which, for this reason, is political and therefore not justiciable.

It may be, however, that the application of existing international law, although logically possible, is from one or another point of view politically unsatisfactory. This means that according to norms other than those of existing law, the dispute might be settled in another way than it has to be settled according to existing law—e.g., that it might be decided not for the defendant, but for the plaintiff. But the judgment that the application of existing law to a dispute is unsatisfactory is a value judgment of a highly subjective character; what is unsatisfactory to one party may be very satisfactory to the other. Anyway, the judgment refers to a value different from the legal value. The doctrine that there are non-legal, or political, disputes, not justiciable because of the inapplicability of existing international law, misinterprets that which from a non-legal point of view is an inadequacy by labeling it a legal impossibility. Its purpose is not to interpret the law in an objective way but to justify the attempt to exclude the application of existing law, in contradiction to its scientifically ascertainable meaning. The doctrine thus is not a scientific theory, but an instrument of politics.

The misuse of the distinction between the legal and the political is one of the most effective, although not the only, means employed to confound the science of law with politics. To avoid the mingling of these two heterogeneous spheres is as essential for the preservation of the scientific character of jurisprudence as the separation of science from politics is a vital condition for the existence of all independent science.

FREE SPEECH, SEDITION AND THE CONSTITUTION

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The state of modern jurisprudence is not inaptly reflected in the range of considerations to which this title might give rise. If the illusion of certitude still survived as a legal premise, if the judicial process were conceived in terms of "tidy formulas,"¹ one could feel more assurance that the enterprise itself is meaningful and potentially fruitful. But if the past fifty years have taught us nothing else, they have made us aware of the complex and ambiguous evaluation of alternatives that underlies the judicially enforced command. Even the word "constitutionality," which once seemed to express a coherent idea, has lost its definable contours as understanding of public law has progressed. The salutary result of all this is that we recognize the great network of imponderables which we must assess before declaring with confidence that a given exercise of governmental power conflicts with our fundamental law. But by the same token uncertainties have been multiplied, and flat statement and prediction have become increasingly hazardous. The penalty of understanding is doubt.

These generalizations are nowhere better illustrated than in the body of constitutional doctrine that has grown up around freedom of speech. The judicial starting point, some thirty years ago, was the premise that a just society must tolerate freedom of utterance, unless there was reason to believe that the speaker's words would precipitate dangerous action. Thus stated, the issue seemed fairly clear-cut. But the concept was hardly verbalized before it began to be elaborated, qualified and amended. As T. R. Powell once pointed out, the logic of constitutional law is what the judges regard as the commonsense of the matter.² In an effort to realize this deceptively easy-looking ideal, the courts have been compelled to take account of judgment-factors which, though not always explicit in earlier formulations, must play a part in the rational treatment of the problem. The result is that the determination of questions in the free speech field can no longer be thought of as a matter of applying a rule, or even rules. The court's treatment of federal sedition legislation must depend rather on the weights assigned to complex and numerous decision components, no one of which can be regarded as independently conclusive. This means, of course, that the difficulties and uncertainties of the analyst are considerably enhanced, but it does not mean that his task is fruitless. Commonsense intuitions are hardly a judicial monopoly. If judicial criteria are social wisdom in thin disguise, it should be possible to translate them into the more ordinary language of human discourse and organize them into intelligible form. And it should be both possible and desirable to criticize them on general ethical and political grounds. It seems reasonable, then, to hope that the main categories of judgment in the free speech field can be, at least tentatively, so articulated and evaluated.

¹ *Wolf v. Colorado*, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).

² See his "The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law," in *Selected Essays on Constitutional Law* (5 vols.; Chicago, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 474.

I

It is usually said, particularly in the newspaper press, that the validity of a statute impairing freedom of speech will depend upon the application of "the clear and present danger rule."³ Like most popular interpretations of the political process, this generality slides over more than it reveals and is meaningful only if duly amended. In the first place, recent decisions have made it apparent that the term "clear and present danger" is shorthand for an elaborate and complex process of judgment in which a variety of factors are weighed. Although the rubric may be more than "a literary phrase,"⁴ it is certainly no longer truly descriptive of what goes on in the adjudication of free-speech issues. In the second place, there is some reason to doubt whether the test, even in its elaborated form, will actually be applied as a measure of constitutionality. The doctrine of the *Gillow* case⁵ was to the contrary; and the presumptive vitality of that precedent was still so great in 1943 that a Court of Appeals regarded it as controlling,⁶ and the government leaned heavily upon it more recently in the oral arguments for the Smith Act.⁷

To consider the second point first, the majority opinion in the *Gillow* case contained both a minor and a major premise. The minor premise was that when the legislature has specifically forbidden certain speech which has a tendency to produce evil results, such speech is constitutionally punishable without a specific showing of imminent danger.⁸ This part of the *Gillow* holding is now apparently defunct, though it still lacks "the obsequious respect of a funeral oration." The high prestige of Justices Holmes and Brandeis,⁹ the contrary tenor of court decisions over the past thirteen years,¹⁰ and very recent opinions

³ For an exhaustive examination of the concept's genesis and its appearances in court decisions, see Chester J. Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 48, pp. 811 ff. (1950); Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger: Its Meaning and Significance," *Notre Dame Law Review*, Vol. 25, pp. 603 ff. (1950).

⁴ Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in *Pennekamp v. Florida*, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946).

⁵ *Gillow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

⁶ *Dunne v. United States*, 138 F. 2d 137 (1943).

⁷ 19 *United States Law Week*, 3163-3167.

⁸ "In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration." *Gillow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925).

⁹ See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in *Gillow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925), and in *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); and the concurrence of Mr. Justice Brandeis in *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).

¹⁰ Beginning with *Herndon v. Lowry*, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), wherein the *Gillow* case was ostensibly distinguished, the Supreme Court has undermined the doctrine in decisions involving a variety of substantive issues—*Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); *Taylor v. Mississippi*, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); *Thomas v. Collins*, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)—although it has never been clearly overruled.

of Judge Hand¹¹ and Chief Justice Vinson¹² have conspired to scuttle the doctrine beyond all hope of salvage. But the major premise of the *Gillow* case was that the legislative determination of danger is entitled to "great weight," that "the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation,"¹³ to quote a later Court, is profoundly relevant to the constitutional issue. And this premise of legislative indulgence cannot be ignored when the validity of the federal sedition laws is being considered. Before even attempting to deal with the assortment of criteria subsumed under the clear and present danger rule, therefore, it is necessary to examine this general prior question as to the deference that might be accorded a congressional finding.

It would be fatuous to suppose that the precise meaning of the ancient presumption of legislative wisdom can be pinned down and objectified for the purpose of convenient analysis. Historically honored both in breach and observance, it has furnished at best an uncertain standard of guidance.¹⁴ Yet a few comments about its bearing on current free-speech questions are in order. Two rather extreme views of the matter have been presented. One is the position ordinarily associated with Mr. Justice Frankfurter—that the legislative will, if reasonable, should be indulged, even when freedom of conscience is involved, if "all effective means of inducing political changes are left free from interference."¹⁵ The explicit assumption here is that the judicial veto is basically undemocratic¹⁶ and that "deeply cherished liberties"¹⁷ are best preserved if the problem of legislative power is fought out "in the open forum of public opinion."¹⁸ The contrary view is that summarized by Mr. Justice Rutledge in *Thomas v. Collins*. He argued that when "the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment"¹⁹ are threatened, the usual presumption in favor of the legislation does not hold.

It might have been expected that the issues raised by sedition laws in the 1950's would lead to a qualification of both these stands and bring their proponents closer to convergence. And, indeed, there is some reason to believe that this development has occurred. Concurring in *Dennis v. United States*,²⁰

¹¹ *U.S. v. Dennis*, 183 F. 2d 201 (1950).

¹² *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

¹³ *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941); *Dennis v. United States*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388 (1951).

¹⁴ See Note, "The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 36, p. 283 (1936).

¹⁵ *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).

¹⁶ *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 650 (1943).

¹⁷ *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, at p. 600.

¹⁹ 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); also see *United States v. Carolene Products*, 304 U.S. 144, 152, note 4 (1938); *Schneider v. State*, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Note, "Presumption of Constitutionality Not Applicable to Statutes Dealing with Civil Liberties," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 40, p. 531 (1940); Note, "Judicial Review and the Feinberg Law: The Presumption of Validity," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 45, p. 274 (1950). Especially see Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).

²⁰ 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4407.

Justice Frankfurter seems to suggest that his standard of "reasonableness" is not intrinsically at variance with conclusions reached by the Court in such extreme libertarian decisions as *Thomas v. Collins*²¹ and *Martin v. Struthers*,²² although he would presumably still disagree with the precise holdings in those cases. And, while he continues to reiterate that the legislative discretion must be respected, "unless outside the pale of fair judgment,"²³ some of his recent opinions seem to define that pale more narrowly than his dicta in the *Gobitis* case would suggest.²⁴ His reliance on the therapy of popular discussion may have been somewhat modified in view of the widespread and immediate threat to freedom of expression. In times of relative tranquility, we can afford to wait while minor aberrations from our libertarian tradition are corrected by popular processes, and we can perhaps profit from the "training in liberty" that is a by-product of the controversy. But when, to put an old idea to new uses, the danger to free speech is so imminent and serious that the harm may occur before there is opportunity for full discussion, the Frankfurter point is less persuasive, and some revision of the tenet of legislative toleration seems justified. On the other hand, the presumption against the legislative judgment implied in the *Thomas* case may be subject to amendment in the light of present conditions, especially when a congressional judgment is under consideration and when the danger apprehended is said to involve the military security of the nation—a province in which the competence of the judiciary is highly questionable.²⁵ It is not insignificant that no national statute touching seditious utterance has ever been upset by the Courts. The same judges who held that Mississippi had no right to abridge freedom of utterance to coerce loyalty might well hesitate to substitute their views for those of Congress on an issue of national defense.²⁶

We can anticipate then that neither of the extreme doctrines will rule the course of decision and that the legislative finding will be regarded as neither irrelevant nor conclusive. In spite of the *Gillow* precedent, the validity of a statute limiting free speech does depend on a judicial determination that peril exists, and the "clear and present danger" rule is a constitutional, rather than a statutory, standard. At the same time, the judicial process will continue to be influenced to an indeterminate degree by "a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body."²⁷

²¹ 323 U.S. 516.

²² 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

²³ 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4407.

²⁴ E.g., *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 415; *Garner v. Board*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4351, 4353 (1951).

²⁵ Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in *Dennis v. United States*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4397.

²⁶ *Taylor v. Mississippi*, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). I am mindful of the contrary suggestion made by Mr. Justice Holmes in the *Gillow* case, 268 U.S. 652, 672. But if free speech is to be abridged for reasons of military security, it would seem that the decision should be made by Congress, not by the states.

²⁷ *Ogden v. Saunders*, 12 Wheat. 213, 270 (1827).

II

But to say that "the clear and present danger" principle will be employed is not in itself very illuminating. The term is merely an abbreviation for an intricate array of judgment components which have been regarded as germane to the free-speech question. These ingredients of decision are not uniformly respectable; some are well established and secure; others are parvenus whose status is more or less doubtful. Not all are likely to be applied in any given litigation. Yet each of them can be found, at least by inference, in the precedents of the past thirty years; and each of them is, therefore, a potential criterion.

These possible decision standards can be classified for purposes of analysis under two broad headings. In one category can be grouped the factors having to do with the speech itself, its nature and context; in the other category can be assigned those considerations which are relevant to the restraint imposed upon speech by the law in question. That is, in considering a law impinging on free expression, the Court will weigh the danger elements inherent in the speech against the restraint elements inherent in the statute.²⁸ To put it simply, a mild public need would not justify a far-reaching invasion of liberty, whereas a more compelling necessity or a less stringent restraint might change the color of the legal litmus paper. Let me first mention and comment on those factors which might be considered in appraising the speech itself.

To begin with, we can expect to find the Court taking account of a variety of determinants which center upon the concept of *intent*. These "subjective"²⁹ features of the proscribed speech have an uncertain but conceivably important bearing on the constitutionality of a sedition statute. Is the evil intention revealed by the speech clear-cut and specific, or is it generalized and constructive? The Court has sometimes hinted, though it has never explicitly said, that it will be readier to approve a prohibition of utterance if the speaker clearly intended to cause substantive trouble.³⁰ As to just how obvious the intent must be in order to be constitutionally determinative, we have little guidance in the precedents. Mr. Justice Murphy adopted a strict definition of the term "wilfully" in *Hartzel v. United States*, but the implications of his holding may be limited to questions of statutory construction, and, in any case, the sharp dis-

²⁸ "In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congressional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce" *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950).

²⁹ *Hartzel v. United States*, 322 U.S. 680, 686 (1944).

³⁰ "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned." Holmes, J., dissenting in *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 628. "As applied to the defendants [the law] punishes them although what they communicated is not claimed or shown to have been done with an evil or sinister purpose, to have advocated or incited subversive action against the nation or state, or to have threatened any clear and present danger to our institutions or our government." *Taylor v. Mississippi*, 319 U.S. 583, 589, 590.

sent of Mr. Justice Reed for the four-judge minority raised weighty counter-arguments.³¹ The notion of intent, however, is clearly implicit in the distinction the Court has drawn between "mere prophecy" or "persuasion," on the one hand, and "advocacy" or "incitement," on the other; we can take it as conceded that "prophecy" or "statement" can be punished only under very special circumstances, and that "persuasion" also enjoys a special status.³² Belief is apparently privileged to some extent, though not altogether beyond the legislative reach.³³

Included under this intent heading too is an issue of immediate relevance to recent federal sedition legislation—the problem of guilt by association. Such a guilt standard has traditionally been regarded as peculiarly distasteful because it sweeps together the willful wrongdoer and the innocent dupe.³⁴ Mr. Justice Jackson has argued that this stricture has little bearing on the problem of punishing communist party members, since they are tightly disciplined and, by definition, are subscribers to the conspiratorial party program.³⁵ But such reasoning can hardly apply to the so-called "communist-front organizations" which are penalized under the McCarran Act,³⁶ and, in considering these provisions, the Court will be faced squarely by the intent problem and, *a fortiori*, by the problem of "guilt by association." In a word, then, intent probably is and certainly should be³⁷ an issue of constitutional dimension in free-speech cases, but its bearing may be limited to distinctions between such ideas as "prophecy" and "incitement," or "persuasion" and "advocacy," or personal guilt and guilt by combination.

Second, in addition to the question of intent, we may assume that the Court will consider the imminence of the threatened danger. This notion of immediacy has been a constituent of the clear and present danger rule from the first, and

³¹ 322 U.S. 680, 690.

³² *Gilow v. New York*, 268 U.S. 652, 661, 664, 665; *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (concurring opinion); *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 396; Judge Hand's opinion in *United States v. Dennis*, 183 F. 2d 201, 206, recognizes that persuasion is distinguishable, if not separable, from a call to action, and that the difference is of constitutional significance, at least when political or religious speech is involved. The concurrence of Judge Chase repeats the well-known distinction between advocacy and prophecy; and Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes much of the distinction between "advocacy and the interchange of ideas" in the *Dennis* case, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4409.

³³ *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 400–406, 408–412; *United States v. Ballard*, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944).

³⁴ See e.g., *Schneiderman v. United States*, 320 U.S. 118, 154; Z. Chafee, *Free Speech in the United States* (Boston, 1946), pp. 471–482.

³⁵ *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 422 (concurring and dissenting, each in part).

³⁶ Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Public Law 831, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

³⁷ Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in the *Dennis* case, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4415, objects that, if freedom of speech turns not on *what is said* but on the *intent* with which it is said, "we enter territory dangerous to the liberties of every citizen." The criticism is valid if intent is the only criterion of judgment; but when it is combined with other criteria, intent is substantially helpful in assessing the degree of danger.

its rationale was perhaps best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his *Whitney* concurrence: "No danger flowing from freedom of speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."³⁸ Of course, it is one thing to acknowledge that the immediacy of the evil is relevant and another to explain *how* immediate it must be in order to validate the statute. But this is merely to say that the question of imminence, like others in this field, is "a question of proximity and degree" not subject to precise calculation.

These considerations do not justify the substitution of "probable" for "present" in the catch-phrase, which is the gloss proposed by Judge Learned Hand³⁹ and approved by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in the Supreme Court.⁴⁰ Much less do they warrant the holding of Judge Medina that the jury need only find that the defendants meant to overthrow the Government "as speedily as circumstances would permit."⁴¹ These emendations, which reject time as a determinate factor in the equation, undermine the central premise of the clear and present danger principle. The ground for these revisions seems to be that the corrective by discussion, on which Brandeis relied, is not effective against the Communists, who pursue their ends secretly and mask their intention with fair words.⁴² But, as Professor Nathanson has pointed out, the right of private dis-

³⁸ *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 377.

³⁹ *United States v. Dennis*, 183 F. 2d 201, 212.

⁴⁰ 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4392.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1949, p. 15.

⁴² This may also be the meaning of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's words in *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 396: "The Board does not contend that political strikes, the substantive evil at which §9(h) is aimed, are the present or impending products of advocacy of the doctrines of Communism or the expression of belief in the overthrow of the Government by force. On the contrary it points out that such strikes are called by persons who, so Congress has found, have the will and power to do so *without* advocacy or persuasion that seeks acceptance in the competition of the market. Speech may be fought with speech. Falsehoods and fallacies must be exposed, not suppressed, unless there is not sufficient time to avert the evil consequences of noxious doctrine by argument and education But force may and must be met with force. Section 9 (h) is designed to protect the public not against what Communists and others identified therein advocate and believe, but against what Congress has concluded they have done and are likely to do again." Quaere: if the advocacy and belief in communist doctrines is not the trigger that detonates the political strike, then why should advocacy and belief be penalized? Why should not the law punish those who foment, or conspire to foment, political strikes? Of course the evil apprehended by the legislature is not the belief or membership itself, but its probable results; but that is true of all free speech statutes, and furnishes no ground for distinguishing this from any other. Cf. *Dennis v. United States*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4391, 4392, in which the Chief Justice explains that the clear and present danger rule was not applicable in the *Douds* case, because the sanction on speech was "indirect"; Congress had not intended to punish

cussion is at least as sacrosanct in our tradition as the right of soapbox oratory, and is equally deserving of judicial solicitude.⁴³ And if the conclave takes on the character of seditious conspiracy, it can be punished as such, rather than under a free-speech statute. As for the "fair words" argument, it need only be said that the Constitution was designed to protect sophisticated as well as naive forms of argument. The democratic postulate is that, given time, the people will glean the wheat from the chaff.

Finally, and still on the speech side of the balance, is to be found the range of considerations having to do with the seriousness of the apprehended evil. Again, Mr. Justice Brandeis has said the best word on the subject: "Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of [freedom of utterance] unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. . . . There must be the probability of serious injury to the State."⁴⁴ The principle of this addendum to the clear and present danger rule has now been reiterated often enough in majority opinions to warrant the conclusion that it is an accepted criterion of judgment,⁴⁵ and within the past year or so it has been again affirmed by the Chief Justice⁴⁶ and by Judge Learned Hand.⁴⁷ But approval of the principle leaves the question of degree undetermined. It is little help to learn that the evil must be "extremely serious"⁴⁸ or "relatively serious."⁴⁹ Nor is it very enlightening to be told, on the other hand, that the danger need not be so comprehensive, vague, and serious as "a threat to the safety of the Republic or 'the American way of life.'"⁵⁰ Neither the grammarian nor the semanticist can objectify the imponderable. Of course, the legislative judgment will be given great weight on an issue so closely related to national defense, although a mere legislative preference will not settle the matter.⁵¹ And external factors, both domestic and international, will influence the judicial conclusion.⁵² But these dicta at best establish ambiguous outer boundaries and preserve a wide latitude for subjective reckoning.

belief, but only to regulate union affairs. The "direct-indirect" distinction has often obscured clarity of judgment in the commerce clause area, and little purpose is served by importing it into the realm of free speech.

⁴³ N. L. Nathanson, "The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 63, pp. 1167, 1171 (1950).

⁴⁴ 274 U.S. 357, 377, 378.

⁴⁵ E.g., *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252, 263; *Thomas v. Collins*, 323 U.S. 516, 530; *Pennekamp v. Florida*, 328 U.S. 331, 334.

⁴⁶ *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U.S. 382, 397; *Dennis v. United States*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4392.

⁴⁷ *United States v. Dennis*, 183 F. 2d 201.

⁴⁸ *Bridges v. California*, 314 U.S. 252, 263.

⁴⁹ *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 377.

⁵⁰ *Pennekamp v. Florida*, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (concurring opinion).

⁵¹ *Schneider v. State*, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).

⁵² Holmes, J., dissenting in *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616, 627, 628.

III

These, then, metaphorically speaking, are the elements to be weighed on the speech side of the scales of justice. Against their cumulative weight will be counterpoised a similarly complex and subtle assortment of criteria having to do with the character and incidence of the repressive statute. The precedents suggest that in this connection the judicial calculus might be concerned with three broad classes of determinants: the range of the statute, its nature, and the time of its impact on freedom of expression.

The idea that the range of the repression is a germane consideration has been explicitly adopted by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, who seems impressed by the fact that the anti-communist oath of the Taft-Hartley Act "touches only a relative handful of persons, leaving the great majority . . . completely free from restraint."⁵³ But this notion that the command of the Constitution is less imperative when the rights of only a few are involved, surely has dubious warrant in our tradition,⁵⁴ and the nub of the matter cannot be reduced to an arithmetic enumeration. The true question of range is a quite different one: whether the statute is narrowly drawn and focussed so as to deal with the specific evils aimed at or whether, on the contrary, it is couched in such vague and sweeping terms as to draw within its ambit speech that is constitutionally privileged. The mischief of the latter indiscriminate statutes, as Justice Frankfurter has shown, is not merely that the innocent may be punished for innocuous behavior, but that they may be deterred from acting or speaking at all out of uncertainty as to the scope of the law's proscriptions.⁵⁵ A statute which would be valid if carefully drawn to cope with definite threats, might be invalid if the vagueness or generality of its language suggested the possibility of wider repression. The law must prescribe a reasonably definite and ascertainable standard for both the administrator and the courts to follow, both to forfend the danger of arbitrary enforcement and to give the citizen fair notice as to what conduct is forbidden.⁵⁶

The nature of the suppression accomplished by the statute is a second factor of consequence in weighing the law's repressive features. Again, the Chief Justice has given a dubious interpretation to this determinant in the *Douglas* opinion. He acknowledges that prohibition of speech and "discouragement" of speech may be effectively synonymous. But he goes on to find that the coercion

⁵³ *American Communications Association v. Douglas*, 339 U.S. 382, 404.

⁵⁴ See the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).

⁵⁵ *American Communications Association v. Douglas*, 339 U.S. 382, 420, 421 (dissenting in part); *Garner v. Board*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4351, 4354; cf. *Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 97; *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948).

⁵⁶ The Chief Justice has held that a charge of vagueness cannot be sustained against the Smith Act; the addition of "clear and present danger" to the proscriptions of the law lends it sufficient definiteness. *Dennis v. United States*, 19 *United States Law Week* 4388, 4394. Considering the judicial uncertainty as to the meaning of the "clear and present danger" phrase, this may seem doubtful reasoning. But the law does not demand the impossible.

of the anti-communist oath in the Taft-Hartley Act is mitigated by the fact that "it leaves those few who are affected free to maintain their affiliations and beliefs subject only to possible loss of positions."⁵⁷ A labor union official might well regard a statute that costs him his job as no less coercive than one that fines or imprisons him. This distinction between governmental action that makes speech criminally punishable and action that merely deprives the speaker of his livelihood, is legal hair-splitting in the least tolerable sense and deserves to be categorically repudiated. Nevertheless, it would not be surprising to find the Court recognizing that coercion *can* be a question of degree and that the degree may make a constitutional difference. The state may sometimes regulate the time, place, and manner of an activity which it could not validly prohibit altogether.⁵⁸ Perhaps there is a rational distinction between a law which prohibits discussion and a law which imposes restraints or conditions upon it, provided always, of course, that these discouragements are not equivalent to prohibition and that they are justified by grave public need.

Finally, the time of the statute's impact on freedom of speech may be constitutionally significant. The special abhorrence with which "previous restraint" is regarded in our constitutional tradition is too well known to merit elaboration.⁵⁹ It is one thing to punish a speaker whose rantings clearly and immediately threaten important societal interests; but it is another to prohibit or discourage his speech before it is uttered. The special vice of "previous restraint" is that it adds an extra layer of conjecture to the legal process. The ordinary repressive statute punishes speech because of an apprehension that it may lead to a substantive evil. Previous restraint muzzles the speaker because of an apprehension that he may, if left free, utter words which may *in turn* produce a substantive evil. The law is always treading shaky ground when it deals with potentialities rather than with actualities. When it strikes at a potentiality twice removed, its warrant is doubly questionable.

To summarize: in judging statutes in the speech field, the Court very probably will base the constitutional question on a judicial finding as to whether the danger of the speech justifies its restraint. The justification itself may rest on the interplay of a variety of complex criteria. The proscribed speech may be appraised in terms of the imminence and seriousness of the danger it threatens. The repression may be assessed on the basis of its range and the nature and time of its incidence. The statute, as a whole, can then be evaluated by counterbalancing the one set of considerations against the other to arrive at a constitutional holding.

IV

It would be the greatest of mistakes to suppose that by organizing and labeling these elements of judgment we have objectified the process of judicial

⁵⁷ 339 U.S. 382, 404.

⁵⁸ *Schneider v. State*, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 161; *Saia v. New York*, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1947); *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77, 87.

⁵⁹ *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); *Lovell v. Griffin*, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).

decision and reduced it to a formula. The terms themselves are pregnant with ambiguities and variables which leave wide range for interpretation. In connection with the problem of intent, for example, how close-knit and disciplined must a party be before the guilt of the group can legitimately be imputed to the individual member? Or at what point does a discouragement to freedom of expression take on the character of a prohibition? No rule of thumb can regularize these determinations. Nor is it possible to reduce to certainty the process by which speech factors are counterbalanced against repressions. We can feel sure, as previously stated, that the legislative conclusion will be respected and that it will help tip the scales in the direction of affirming the law. But how far will it tip them? How much in the way of suppression will a serious danger justify? How much vagueness does it take to impeach a statute, even though it strikes at a substantive evil? Such matters defy precise statement. The terms of this analysis define not the rules of judgment, but its categories; and the ultimate conclusion will depend on an intuition "more subtle than any articulate major premise."

Yet these decision categories, though not self-executing, can provide us with a measure of guidance in evaluating sedition laws. We can say with some assurance that a statute becomes more suspect as it multiplies and intensifies the repressive features outlined; and, conversely, the presumption in its favor becomes stronger as the speech in question takes on the qualities that warrant the restraint. For example, a strong case could be made for a statute imposing conditions on an individual who, with specific intent, advocated force and violence under probably dangerous circumstances. If the law punished prophecy or belief, or if it imputed the guilt of the group to an individual member, the law's constitutionality might be more questionable; and the courts might ask that the apprehended danger be more imminent and serious before such an application of the statute could be upheld. If the penalty amounted to outright prohibition of the speech, an even stronger showing of danger might be required; and if, in addition, the law was vaguely drawn and applied in such a way as to impose prior restraint, nothing but the most convincing showing of grave public necessity could possibly give it the stamp of constitutional approval. Even in a democracy, community security may sometimes require that government intrude upon the sphere of conscience and expression. But the participants in the governing process—executive, legislature, courts and people—must be scrupulously careful that the intrusion does not exceed the boundaries dictated by public need. They must strive, within the limits of human capacity, for the assurance that the law touches only those who are truly dangerous, and that it penalizes them in such a way as, and to the extent necessary, to protect the public value which is imperilled.

To repeat, the judgment elements outlined here will furnish no ready-made solution to this delicate problem of constitutional right and wrong. Questions of degree and balance remain undetermined and perhaps undeterminable. The courts must, by the nature of their commission, respect the legislative judgment on a question of public policy. But unless they would abdicate in the legisla-

ture's favor, they must ultimately face the free speech question themselves. As categories of this decision problem, these criteria are far from meaningless. They define the channels within which the judicial process may move to its conclusion. And though masked as legal precepts, they are not peculiar to the realm of adjudicated law. Their underlying rationale is the assumption that, in a democratic society, only grave public need can excuse a restriction on freedom of utterance. They are, by and large, the same factors to which any rational man must give consideration when he frames a governmental policy on this central premise. For him, as for the judges, the intent, the imminence, and the seriousness of the peril must be weighed against the range, the nature and the occasion of the restraint. For them, as for him, these judgment components are ultimately no substitute for that discriminating common sense which is the highest form of statesmanship.

THE SENATORIAL REJECTION OF LELAND OLDS: A CASE STUDY

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One of the most important powers of the United States Senate—but one largely neglected in studies of Congress—is that of passing upon presidential appointments. At its regular session in 1950, the Senate granted its “advice and consent” to 25,590 nominations and rejected 4; in addition, 6 nominations were withdrawn by the President and 99 were not acted upon. The great bulk of these cases, some 23,056 of them, involved the promotions of military and naval officers, and were routinely approved. Another 1,197 nominations were of postmasters, now appointed after a civil service examination, whose approval by the Senate is *pro forma*. The remaining 1,446 nominations submitted by the President were for “other civilian” offices.¹ It is with regard to this last group that the function of senatorial confirmation takes on importance. Even this number is much too great for the Senate as a body to consider, and during each session of Congress there are ordinarily less than a dozen contested confirmation cases which require consideration by the Senate itself. In general, no other function of the Senate is so completely delegated to its committees, which in turn act largely on the recommendations of individual Senators with regard to federal appointments within their states.

By well established custom, rarely departed from, the Senate accords the President a free hand in the selection of the members of his cabinet. Only four Presidents—Jackson, Tyler, Johnson, and Coolidge—have had a nomination to the cabinet rejected, although James Madison was prevented by the opposition of a small group of Senators from nominating Albert Gallatin to be his Secretary of State. In view of the fact that the members of the cabinet are the chief policy-determining officials under the President, it is somewhat anomalous that their nominations are usually approved by the Senate with little question or inquiry, while nominations to lesser offices are often the occasion of bitter contests. In justification of the special practice, it is frequently said that the President should be permitted to select the persons who are regarded as his official family and who serve as his immediate advisers and chief assistants.

Another group of federal officials whose nominations must be approved by the Senate are those serving within individual states, that is, district judges, district attorneys, marshals, collectors of internal revenue and customs, postmasters, and some others. These offices are by long tradition regarded as the patronage of the party in power, and the President customarily accepts the recommendation of the Senators from the state where the office is located, if they belong to his party. (The appointment of postmasters, however, has always been regarded as the special patronage of members of the House of Repre-

¹ These statistics appear in the *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., p. D1009 (daily ed.; Oct. 20, 1950).

sentatives, except in the home towns of Senators, though their selection has been modified to some extent by the law establishing a form of civil service examination.) Unless an objection is raised against a nominee, the Senate committees do not ordinarily conduct hearings or make any investigation of any of the nominees to federal offices in this group, with the exception of candidates for district judges. The fact that they are sponsored by one or both Senators from the state, or by the party organization in states represented by Senators of the opposition party, and that their qualifications and records have been investigated by the department concerned before they are nominated, is ordinarily taken as sufficient indication of their fitness for the office.

The role of the Senate in passing upon nominations to offices in this group is acquiescent unless there is a contest, which rarely occurs unless a member of the Senate enters an objection to a nominee. If the administration fails to consult a Senator of the majority party about a nomination to an office in his state, or, having consulted him, fails to name his candidate, it is his privilege, under the well-established custom of senatorial courtesy, to enter a personal objection to the person nominated, alleging that the nominee is "personally offensive and obnoxious" to him. In such case the Senate almost invariably honors the objection and rejects the nomination. A personal objection need have nothing to do with the qualifications of the nominee (the objecting Senator often concedes that he is fully qualified) and, as a rule, it is not grounded on any personal considerations or genuine animus against the nominee by the Senator making the objection. It is usually made simply because the Senator has another candidate who was not accepted by the President.

The effect of the unwritten rule of senatorial courtesy has been virtually to transfer the nominating function for many of the federal field officers from the President to the Senators of each state, provided they are of the same party as the President. Senators of the opposition party are also free to enter a personal objection to a presidential nominee to office in their states, but rarely do so since they are not accorded the federal patronage and have little incentive to block the approval of such persons. Thus senatorial courtesy is usually invoked when the President attempts to cut off the patronage of a Senator of his party who has not supported his legislative program or when the two Senators from a state have a dispute over the distribution of federal patronage. To sum it up, presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation of the group of officers under consideration, many of whom hold distinctly minor administrative posts, is a political anachronism, and serves to retain under the patronage system many offices which should be placed under the civil service. Fortunately the practice is limited to the older civilian departments with field services—Treasury, Post Office, and Justice—and has not been extended to the field services of other departments.

The nominations which the Senate scrutinizes with greatest care are those of members of the federal judiciary, particularly members of the Supreme Court and circuit courts of appeals, and of members of independent boards and commissions. The contest over the confirmation of Leland Olds, nominated for a

third term to the Federal Power Commission in 1949 and rejected by a vote of 53 to 13, affords a striking illustration of the forces which may influence the Senate in passing upon nominations to independent regulatory bodies, as well as the close relation between appointments and legislative policies.

The confirmation of presidential nominations is always of especial importance with regard to the members of independent regulatory commissions, which are regarded as having a special relationship to Congress. The function of the Senate in passing upon the nominations is not limited to the technical qualifications of the nominee and his fitness for the office; it is appropriately concerned with his stand on broad policies and the effect which his appointment may have upon the functioning of the commission. Often the character and attitude of the officers who head an agency have as much to do with its policies as the legislation under which it operates. The Senate must therefore consider whether a nominee to a regulatory commission is in sympathy with the objectives of the laws which he will be called upon to administer, and whether he will support policies which are agreeable to the majority of the Senate. Legislative battles over governmental policies may arise not only when new legislation is under consideration, but equally well when appointments or appropriations are being considered; contests won at one stage are often lost at another.

I. THE TESTAMENTS AND THE ISSUES

Early in June, 1949, President Truman submitted the nomination of Leland Olds for a third term as member of the Federal Power Commission. His nomination was not proposed until nearly the end of his term of office because another nomination to the Commission, that of Thomas Buchanan, had been held up in the Senate for about a year and the President desired to have it acted upon before submitting that of Olds. Both men were known for their support of effective public regulation of utilities and were opposed by the public utility, oil and natural gas interests which were regulated by the Commission.

Leland Olds had served for ten years on the Federal Power Commission, was for several years its chairman, and was widely recognized as one of its most able and effective members. His professional standing in the public utility regulation field was attested to in the hearings by Professor James C. Bonbright of Columbia University, who said:

Leland Olds, in my opinion, is one of the country's most distinguished and most outstanding figures in the field of public utility regulation. . . . In Leland Olds, the Federal Power Commission has enjoyed the services of a man who has devoted almost his entire professional life to becoming an expert in the exceedingly complex problems of utility regulation. Were it to lose these services, the Commission would lose a good part of the distinction that it now enjoys as a guardian of the public interest . . . in my opinion, millions of people in this country today are presently paying lower utility rates than they would be paying but for the presence of Leland Olds on the Federal Power Commission, and that has taken place along with not a deterioration but a positive improvement of the financial standing and soundness of the private-utility industry.²

² *Reappointment of Leland Olds to Federal Power Commission*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1949), p. 13. Hereafter cited as *Hearings* (1949).

During the ten years that he served as a member of the FPC, Mr. Olds took a leading part in the development of federal regulation of electric power, hydroelectric developments, and natural gas moving in interstate commerce. When his nomination came up for a second term, he was opposed by the electric power group; but the charges against him were adequately answered. A number of state public utility commissioners whose close relations with the industry were well known testified against him, alleging that he favored federal centralization of utility regulation at the expense of the state utility commissions; but public utility commissioners from other states who favored effective regulation came to his defense, testifying that the FPC had been most helpful to the state commissions. In an attempt to charge him with communist leanings, some references were made then to his earlier writings, which were to play such a prominent part in the 1949 contest; but neither the committee nor the Senate took any stock in such charges, and he was readily confirmed.³

Because of the prominent part which he had played in the development of federal regulation of the natural gas industry and his leadership in the opposition to the Kerr bill and earlier bills designed to cripple federal regulation, the reappointment of Leland Olds in 1949 was vigorously opposed by the oil and natural gas interests. The electric utility interests publicly took no part in the opposition, although it was generally assumed that they also opposed him. All of the witnesses testifying against the appointment of Olds, as will appear below, were directly or indirectly connected with the oil and gas industry, and most of them came from the great natural gas producing area of the Southwest. The members of Congress from both houses who had spearheaded the drives to pass the Kerr bill or similar measures, now led the opposition to Leland Olds. Indeed, his principal opponent was Senator Kerr of Oklahoma, wealthy oil man and author of the bill which Olds had effectively opposed just before his nomination went to the Senate. Senator Kerr did not appear as a witness before the Senate committee, and did not participate prominently in the Senate debate on the nomination; but he was generally credited with being the leading member of the group determined to block the reappointment. Senator Lyndon Johnson, chairman of the subcommittee which considered the nomination and leader of the fight against Olds in the Senate debate, came from Texas, the leading oil and natural gas producing state. Representative Lyle, also from Texas and the author of a bill in the Eightieth Congress to exempt the natural gas industry from effective federal supervision of prices, led the attack on Olds at the hearings, where he introduced the charges of Communism.

While the opposition to Olds centered in the delegations from the oil and gas producing states of the Southwest, his support came principally from the states which are consumers of natural gas, and hence desirous of maintaining effective federal regulation of prices. Those favoring his confirmation were principally representatives of consumer groups, public officials of cities which had received

³ *Leland Olds' Reappointment to Federal Power Commission*. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1944).

lowered gas rates, and several distinguished authorities in the field of public utilities. "Clearly the battle over the confirmation of Leland Olds as a member of the Federal Power Commission," declared Morris L. Cooke at the hearing, "is a battle between the great body of people who are consumers, on the one side, and the monopolistic power and oil-gas interests on the other. It is a part of the battle which has been going on for years to bring these vital interests under some measure of public control. This battle must go on if democracy itself is to survive."⁴

The real issue in the Olds case was the Kerr bill. For several years the natural gas industry, joined by the oil industry which produces natural gas as a by-product, had made a determined effort to amend the Natural Gas Act of 1938 to remove any effective federal regulation of the price of gas moving in interstate commerce. In 1948 and again in 1949 such measures had passed the House by large majorities, but had been defeated in the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce by a divided vote. Mr. Olds, speaking as chairman of the Federal Power Commission, had been the outstanding opponent of these proposals before the committee. And despite the powerful backing of the Kerr bill, Olds courageously opposed it in the spring of 1949, just three months before his renomination came before this same committee. The supporters of the Kerr bill accordingly believed that his removal from the Federal Power Commission was essential to the passage of the measure.⁵

⁴ *Hearings* (1949), p. 187. Commenting editorially on the case on September 9th, while the nomination was still bottled up in the subcommittee, the Republican *Kansas City Times* put it this way: "This looks like a drive to get at the Power Commission one way or the other. If its control can't be weakened by a new law, then the next best thing (for the big companies) is to block the man who has been carrying out the intention of the present law . . . The real issue is the Kerr bill, which would remove the authority of the Commission from the producing end of the pipe lines. We believe that the bill will be very expensive to gas users, but if the natural gas Senators can win in an open fight, that's that."

⁵ It may be noted that the following year, after Olds' nomination was rejected, Congress passed the Kerr bill, only to have it vetoed by President Truman. The Senate debate on the Kerr-Thomas bill in 1950 afforded a striking, if not intentional, tribute to Olds. Although he had not been a member of the FPC during the preceding year, both sides referred to him repeatedly during the course of the debate, and the opponents of the bill, led by Senator Douglas, followed closely the case which he had earlier made for retention of federal regulation of natural gas prices. Senator Douglas declared that if Olds had gone along with the gas industry in its move to secure exemption from federal price regulation, no objection would have been made to his nomination; and that when he opposed the Kerr bill, he did so with the knowledge that "his old writings of over 20 years back would be dug out and used against him, and that he would be at once smeared and probably defeated for confirmation" (*Congressional Record*, 81st Cong. 2nd sess., Vol. 96, pt. 3, p. 3717 [March 21, 1950]). Senator Kerr also paid his respects to Mr. Olds, saying: "Mr. President, Leland Olds is gone. His dream of the socialization of a great industry died a-borning, but his memory lingers on in the efforts for unauthorized and unsound regulation. There are Senators who knowingly or unknowingly would resurrect his dream—his dream to confiscate through regulation, his dream to regulate without legislative authority" (*ibid.*, p. 4021 [March 24, 1950]).

II. BACKGROUND: THE DRIVE TO AMEND THE NATURAL GAS ACT OF 1938

In order to understand the Olds case, some knowledge of the background of the development of federal regulation of the natural gas industry, including the efforts of the industry to avoid federal price control, is essential. Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, the Federal Power Commission was authorized to regulate the movement of natural gas in interstate commerce. This jurisdiction included the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity for the laying of new interstate pipe lines and the regulation of sales in interstate commerce. The production of natural gas was specifically exempted from federal regulation, as was local distribution to consumers, both of which were subject to regulation under state laws. Local officials and state utility commissions, however, had found that they were unable to secure rate reductions so long as the wholesale rates charged by interstate pipe companies to local distributing companies were unregulated; and it was to correct this situation that the Natural Gas Act had been passed.

Acting on complaints lodged by local officials and state utility commissions, the Federal Power Commission, starting about 1940, undertook to regulate the prices charged local distributors by interstate pipe line companies. In determining what were reasonable rates, the Commission allowed the price paid for gas in the field, plus a reasonable charge for its transportation to the market. In 1940, however, the large interstate pipe line companies were also large natural gas producers, drawing forty per cent of their gas from their own wells. The Commission found it necessary to determine not only what were reasonable charges for transporting the gas, but also the prices which these companies could pay to themselves for gas at the well mouth; for if they had been free to fix the production price, regulation of transportation charges alone would have had virtually no effect in protecting the consumer. By similar reasoning the FPC ruled that sales by subsidiary and affiliated companies to a parent pipe line company were subject to federal regulation.

The field prices paid by interstate pipe line companies to so-called "independent" or nontransporting producers for natural gas have not been regulated by the FPC.⁶ Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in *Interstate Natural Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission*⁷ in 1947, it had been assumed that the provision of the Natural Gas Act exempting local production and the gathering of natural gas from federal regulation prohibited the FPC from regulating the field prices paid to independent producers. But in this case the Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that all sales in interstate commerce were subject to federal regulation. At each step federal regulation has been contested in the courts, but in a series of decisions the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of the Commission.

⁶ The term "independent," it should be noted, refers to producers who do not own and operate interstate pipe lines; it has nothing to do with the size of the company or its affiliation with other companies. Some of the largest natural gas producers, with holdings worth hundreds of millions of dollars, are termed "independent" producers.

⁷ 331 U.S. 682 (1947).

Until recently the market for natural gas in the field was decidedly a buyer's market. The production greatly exceeded the available market, and small producers were virtually forced to sell at whatever price they could get from interstate pipe line companies. However, during and following World War II, with the laying of great pipe lines to tap the urban and industrial markets of the East and Midwest, the situation changed rapidly. The demand by interstate pipe line companies now exceeded available supplies, and the field prices steadily mounted. Although the FPC did not regulate field sales by independent producers, its regulation of the prices which interstate pipe lines could pay for gas from their own wells proved to be an effective bar against runaway prices.

The FPC has ordered reductions in the rates for natural gas totaling approximately \$40,000,000 annually, reductions which have been passed on to the consumer. Although field prices rose rapidly in the years following the war, they did not rise so rapidly as the prices of competing fuels—oil and coal. And although the industry has experienced great prosperity, including both high profits and a tremendous expansion with the opening up of new markets and the laying of giant pipe lines, it would reap far greater profits if the threat of federal regulation were removed.

Evidence submitted in the Senate hearings on the Kerr bill also indicates a high degree of concentration of gas production in the hands of a relatively few large producers. Three companies (Phillips Petroleum, Shamrock Oil and Gas, and Canadian River Gas) own one-half of the great Texas Panhandle field, which contains one-seventh of all known reserves in this country, and the 33 largest companies own 62.2 per cent of all known reserves. These large companies would receive tremendous profits if federal control were removed from the price of gas, and prices rose. It has been estimated that an increase of five cents per thousand cubic feet in the field price of natural gas would increase the value of the holdings of the Phillips Petroleum Company alone in the Texas Panhandle and Hugoton fields by \$389,000,000.

In view of these tremendous stakes, it is not surprising that the large natural gas companies strongly opposed the confirmation of Leland Olds. Failing in their fight to invalidate federal regulation in the courts, and unable to obtain the passage of legislation which would cripple or remove federal control over prices, they were anxious to secure a Commission which was more sympathetic to their position than the previous one. Two members of the Commission had come around to the industry point of view; the appointment of a third member, Mr. Buchanan, who favored federal regulation, was held up by the Senate Committee for a year, but finally had been approved. If Mr. Olds could be rejected and a person who was sympathetic to the industry's point of view appointed, the way would be paved to secure the enactment of the desired amendments to the Natural Gas Act to remove federal regulation of the field price of gas.

III. THE HEARINGS ON THE NOMINATION

On September 27, 1949, approximately four months after the nomination was submitted and three months after the term of Mr. Olds had expired, the

subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce opened its hearings. Normally Congress would have adjourned before this date; but when the session dragged on, and after a good many columnists and editorial writers had criticized the subcommittee for its evident intention of bottling up the nomination without any action, it was finally decided to hold hearings. Chairman Lyndon Johnson announced at the opening session that it was definitely planned to report the nomination to the Senate, even if the committee recommendation was unfavorable.

Other members of the subcommittee were McFarland, O'Connor, and Edwin Johnson (Democrats), and Bricker, Capehart, and Reed (Republicans). To persons familiar with their records, it was apparent that the Committee began its hearings unfriendly toward Olds and opposed to the policies which he advocated. Every member of the subcommittee (with the exception of Senator Reed of Kansas, who died in the autumn of 1949) voted for the Kerr bill when it came before the Senate the following year. The composition of the subcommittee, of course, greatly affected the course of its hearings. While opposing witnesses were aided in their testimony and asked leading questions, witnesses favoring the nomination were treated politely, but were usually asked no questions. Quite a different public impression would have been made had there been a single member of the subcommittee to ask searching questions of both sides. In attempting to refute the charges which were made against him, Olds always faced a hostile committee whose intention to reject his nomination was apparent.

A number of nationally prominent witnesses appeared in support of the nominee, including Professor James C. Bonbright of Columbia University and Morris L. Cooke, whose testimony has been referred to above, Adolph A. Berle, Ordway Tead, and Charles M. LaFollette. They reviewed Olds' record in public utility work in the State of New York and as a member of the Federal Power Commission and urged his confirmation because of his distinguished record, his devotion to the public interest, his technical qualifications in the public utility field, and his courage as a public official. All stated that he was needed on the Commission to carry out policies to protect the consumer.

Miss Anne K. Alpern, city solicitor of Pittsburgh and past president of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, was one of a group of municipal officials who appeared in behalf of Olds. In her testimony before the subcommittee, she declared that "consumers of this country have a very vital interest in men like Leland Olds, and in seeing that he is retained in the public service. . . . Democracy flourishes when men of this caliber are in high administrative positions and administer the law of our country so that capital may prosper and so that consumers can be protected." She also praised Olds for the courage which he had displayed as a member of the Commission in protecting the consumer by taking the leadership for effective public regulation of utilities.⁸

⁸ *Hearings* (1949), p. 215. "It is very difficult," said Miss Alpern, "to be a courageous public servant. The courageous ones are the ones who are decapitated; the ones who are amenable, the ones who go along, those are the ones who have no difficulty with their confirmations."

Other groups whose representatives appeared in support of Olds included the CIO, several other labor organizations, the National Grange, Americans for Democratic Action, and associations of cooperatives. The same groups and the same witnesses had appeared earlier in the opposition to the Kerr bill, and their testimony was very similar at both hearings. They regarded the fight over the confirmation of Leland Olds as a part of the struggle to end federal regulation of the price of natural gas, which they contended would increase the cost to the consumer by over a hundred million dollars annually.

Those columnists and editorial writers who had earlier condemned the Kerr bill as a "gas grab" to benefit the oil and natural gas companies at the expense of the consumer, now denounced the opposition to Olds as coming from the same interests. The members of the Senate subcommittee quite naturally smarted under the accusation that they were the willing tools of the public utility, oil, and natural gas lobby, and that they were about to reject an able and courageous public servant to serve the ends of these selfish interests; and their hostility to Leland Olds was due in part to the fact that they considered him responsible for this attack upon them.

IV. THE COMMUNIST SMEAR

The opposition to Mr. Olds was begun by Representative John E. Lyle of Corpus Christi, Texas, who based his attack on certain writings of Olds, prepared twenty-five years earlier when he was industrial editor of the Federated Press, a news service sold to the labor press and to labor unions. Selections from these writings in the 1920's were introduced to support the charge that Olds was either a Communist or a fellow traveler, and that he had bitterly attacked various aspects of the American capitalistic system. The real reason for Representative Lyle's attack, however, as he made clear at the outset, was the fact that Olds had led the opposition to the Kerr and similar bills. At the opening of the Eighty-first Congress, Lyle had introduced such a bill (H.R. 79), and a similar bill introduced by Representative Harris (H.R. 1758) passed the House by a large majority. These bills had the active support of the oil and natural gas interests. Representative Lyle, who comes from a district in which oil and natural gas are the leading industry, and whose law firm, according to reports, represents large oil and gas companies, accused Olds of having presented "misleading statements, half truths, distorted statistics, and a multitude of devices designed and utilized to obscure the issue at hand." Mr. Olds, he declared, had "launched a bitter and vicious attack on these bills and those proposing them, inferentially characterizing the bills as an attempt to mulct ultimate consumers of millions of dollars."⁹

With respect to the writings of Olds during the period from 1922 to 1929, Representative Lyle made twenty-four charges against him and submitted fifty-four photostatic copies of the articles to support these charges. "I am here to oppose Mr. Olds," he said, "because he has—through a long and prolific career—attacked the church; he has attacked our schools; he has ridiculed the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

symbols of patriotism and loyalty such as the Fourth of July; he has advocated public ownership: he has reserved his applause for Lenin and Lenin's system; and he has found few words of praise for our American system; and, yes, gentlemen, he has seen fit to attack the men who serve as elected representatives in our Government—men such as you. He has characterized you as mere administrative clerks handling administrative details for 'an immensely powerful ruling class.'"¹⁰

Throughout his testimony Representative Lyle endeavored to establish that Olds was a Communist, or at any event followed the communist line. The Federated Press was labeled a "left-wing labor press service, closely identified with communist movements and groups." Most of the articles which he placed in the record were taken from the *Daily Worker* or *Industrial Solidarity*, communist publications, though they also had appeared in about seventy-five other publications. The impression was created that Olds had been a writer for the *Daily Worker*, which he took pains to deny. In one of these articles Olds had advocated paid vacations for workers and praised the practice in Russia, widely commented on at the time, of setting aside large estates as rest and recreation centers for workers. In several other articles Olds had made favorable comments about certain developments in Soviet Russia, and they were cited by Lyle to show that he had favored the communist system.¹¹

The articles which Olds wrote for the Federated Press dealt with economic problems during the period of the 1920's. For the most part, they summarized and interpreted studies and reports of government and private research agencies, even including summaries of articles appearing in the *Wall Street Journal*. Those placed in the record by Representative Lyle were highly critical of economic policies and practices of the time. A number dealt with the sick coal industry, suggesting, but not actually advocating, some form of public ownership or nationalization. Others criticized the railroads for their anti-union policies, and included some statements favorable to public ownership. On the basis of these articles, Representative Lyle accused Olds of advocating not only public ownership of railroads and coal mines, but of all private industry.

In another article Olds had attacked the keynote speech of Senator Fess at the Republican national convention of 1928, a speech which cited, with approval, statistics to prove that industrial production had increased while labor costs had declined. Referring in the article to Andrew Mellon, Olds attacked the Republican party for its close association with big business and asserted that the policies of the government were being dictated by the "immensely powerful ruling group," while government officials merely carried out the administrative details. Representative Lyle charged Olds with attacking the government as being the servant of business, and with accusing the legislature

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹¹ One article, which has appeared in the *Daily Worker* under Mr. Olds' name and to which Mr. Lyle drew particular attention, gave an account of communist classes which were starting, and urged comrades to enroll. In his rebuttal testimony, Olds categorically denied that he had ever written the article and offered the explanation that it was a case of a misplaced byline.

(whom Olds had not mentioned) of merely handling administrative details for an immensely powerful ruling group.

In another article Olds had maintained that the policies of certain endowed universities were dictated by wealthy donors and trustees, which was interpreted by Mr. Lyle as a blanket attack on all universities, and, indeed, on all education. Still another article concerning Bishop Cannon's reported speculations in the stock market, criticized the church for passively accepting social and economic injustices and for not taking a more aggressive stand for economic reforms. On the basis of this, Mr. Olds, a deeply religious man, was accused of attacking all churches and all religion.

All of the articles, written in the intellectual climate of the 1920's and dealing with financial, economic, and labor problems and abuses of the time, were made to appear extremely radical. It should be borne in mind that they were written for a labor audience, to which they probably appeared entirely appropriate, and that similar criticisms of economic abuses were voiced by many prominent persons of the period, though not in so pungent a manner. Many of Olds' articles carried a punch sentence, which taken out of context appeared much more radical than the entire article. Only by the most flagrant distortion, by lifting sentences out of context and by actual misquotation, was Representative Lyle able to support his contention that Leland Olds was a Communist at heart, one who was opposed to private ownership and to the entire capitalistic system, and who had condemned the church, sneered at the flag, and looked with scorn upon government, particularly the legislative body, as the tool of big business.

Senator McFarland said that he was shocked by the charges and that they were the most serious he had ever heard in Congress. During Representative Lyle's testimony, Senator Reed broke in to say that here was a man whose writings showed him to be a "full-fledged, regular Communist."

Anticipating the attack which would be made upon him, Olds obtained permission to appear before the subcommittee and read a lengthy statement covering his entire career. In this statement he attempted to explain the philosophy which led him to produce what he admitted were "radical writings," but it did not meet the charges and it did not deal directly with the real issue at stake—the Kerr bill and federal regulation of the price of gas. It included a brief review of the record of the Federal Power Commission during the preceding ten years, but for this account Olds was criticized by the chairman of the subcommittee on the ground that he claimed the credit for all of the accomplishments of the commission.

During his testimony Olds was frequently interrogated by members of the subcommittee concerning his writings, and especially was asked to explain and defend key sentences which were objectionable. His favorable references to Russia came in for a good deal of comment and questioning, although Olds categorically denied that he had ever favored Communism. In fact, Olds denied each of the Lyle charges and asked the subcommittee to judge the articles in their entirety, rather than on the basis of single sentences or parts of sentences lifted out of context. When asked whether he still held the same

beliefs, he replied that the New Deal legislation had corrected many of the social and economic ills of the 1920's which he had described, and that on some subjects, particularly Russia, he had changed his mind.¹²

The charges of communism and radicalism against Leland Olds were not new. Some of the same articles had been used to oppose him in 1944, but the charges then were not taken seriously. The chairman of the subcommittee which conducted the hearings on his nomination for a second term stated in reply to these charges: "I do not think that anyone believed that Mr. Olds was a Communist. I do not think that the Senator from Oklahoma believes that Mr. Olds is a Communist. I do not think anyone believed that."¹³

V. THE OPPOSITION OF THE OIL AND GAS INTERESTS

Of the fifteen opposing witnesses, all came from gas-producing areas, and all were directly or indirectly connected with the gas industry. Seven represented gas-producing companies or associations of producers, and the connection of the other eight opposing witnesses with the gas interests was readily apparent, though not always stated.¹⁴ Most of the industry spokesmen represented small producers; representatives of the largest gas companies were significantly absent in the line-up of opposing witnesses.

¹² During his testimony Olds was asked by Senator Lyndon Johnson whether he had ever addressed the Trade Union and Educational League, sharing the platform with Earl Browder, to which he replied that he remembered once speaking before this organization, but could not recall where the meeting was held or who the other speakers were. Senator Johnson thereupon inserted in the record a copy of the *Daily Worker* of March 29, 1924, which he had at hand, giving an account of the meeting, at which Browder and Olds were the principal speakers. The appearance of Mr. Olds on the same platform, twenty-five years earlier, with Earl Browder was shocking to the Senators. Lowell Mellett pointed out, in his column on October 1, that the Senators might have been shocked even more had they examined Elizabeth Dilling's book, *The Roosevelt Red Record*, for on page 59 appears the smiling picture of Senator Taft with Earl Browder and two others just after they had addressed a National Youth Congress.

¹³ *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 90, pt. 6, p. 7692 (Sept. 12, 1944). The same charges of communistic associations and leanings were also made on the floor of the Senate on May 27, 1943, by Senator Bridges, with quotations from some of the writings later used by Representative Lyle. At that time Senator Aiken stated in defense of Mr. Olds: "I wish to say to the Members of the Senate today that of the Federal officials who have impressed me as being conscientious, honest, hard-working and sincere, one of the foremost of them all is Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission. He did have work to do in my state . . . I think he did it well by forcing down some of the outrageous write-ups in utility values which existed in Vermont and in other States. I know of one single instance where property valued at \$50,000 for the purposes of assessment was written on the books of the utility company at a million and a quarter dollars; and that was not an isolated instance . . . I believe him to be one of the most honest, courageous and hard-working public servants we have today" (*ibid.*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4942 [May 27, 1943]).

¹⁴ The opposing witnesses who were not directly connected with the gas and oil industry included a representative of the East Texas Chamber of Commerce, an attorney representing the association of county commissioners of Texas, three representatives from colleges located in Texas and Arkansas, the chairman of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, and two members of Congress from the Southwest.

The opposing witnesses offered the following three major arguments against the confirmation of Leland Olds: (1) he stood for the regulatory policies which were harmful to the gas industry; (2) his writings indicated that he was a Communist and unfit for office; and (3) the nominee was personally unfit for the office. "We believe that his confirmation would be against the best interests of the producers of gas and also of oil," said Russell B. Brown, General Counsel of the Independent Petroleum Association of America.¹⁵ "If Mr. Olds is reappointed," stated James A. Upham, President of the Ohio Oil and Gas Association, "we face but one destiny—full extinction. . . . So, our earnest prayer presented to you now is to give us some new Commissioner, not Mr. Olds, as we deeply feel the retention of Mr. Olds as a member of the FPC is a full threat to the free-enterprise system of this life in these United States."¹⁶

Most of the witnesses who appeared to oppose Olds repeated the charges of Representative Lyle that the nominee was a Communist, a radical, and unfit for office because of his opposition to the free enterprise system. Several were unwilling to rest their opposition on these grounds and went on to abuse and vilify the nominee in language seldom heard in nomination hearings. One witness, who represented the Southern Minerals Association, declared: "Mr. Olds is boring from within; Mr. Olds is a termite; Mr. Olds is gnawing away the very foundations upon which this Government exists."¹⁷

VI. OBSERVATIONS ON THE HEARINGS

From the outset it was apparent that the subcommittee was opposed to Olds, and it is doubtful that the public hearings altered their opinions; but the communist charges made by Representative Lyle, which were characterized by the *Washington Post* as "preposterous and despicable," undoubtedly influenced the vote of the Senate. Even though they were based upon gross misrepresentations of the writings of Olds, nevertheless there was enough partial truth in them to cause some members to change their votes. They also afforded those who were opposed to Olds because of his record and his fight against the Kerr bill with other grounds on which to justify their votes. The communist

¹⁵ *Hearings* (1949), p. 262.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245. Mr. Guy I. Warren, President of the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association, summarized the opposition of the industry as follows: "Mr. Leland Olds now proposes to take from the States the authority to regulate the production of natural gas. He proposes to subject every producer of natural gas, who sells his gas to an interstate pipe line, to the status of a utility. He would reduce the income of every producer of natural gas to what he deems would be a reasonable return on the investment of the producing property. He would leave nothing for reinvestment and the hazardous business of continuing to exploit and drill wildcat wells Gentlemen of the committee, this kind of regulation amounts to complete Federal dictatorship of business operations. No producer of natural gas could survive and continue to develop new reserves which are necessary to the future progress of this country" (*ibid.*, p. 255).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 281. The most unbridled personal attack on Olds was voiced by an attorney from Houston, Texas, who asserted that Olds was "a traitor to our country, a crackpot and a jackass wholly unfit to make rules or regulations or to sit in judgment in any matter pertaining to privately owned property . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 259-261).

smear had nothing to do with the real issue—federal regulation of the price of natural gas—or with Leland Olds' qualifications and record for ten years as a commissioner.

In the hearings little or no attention was given to the record Olds made as a member (for several years chairman) of the FPC during the preceding ten years, or to his stand on policies affecting federal regulation of the natural gas industry. The hearings were devoted instead almost entirely to consideration of his writings twenty years earlier. Under the circumstances, it would appear that these earlier writings were largely irrelevant, or at least of little importance, in comparison with his long record as a member of the commission to which he he was now renominated.¹⁸ No question was raised by any member of the subcommittee concerning the relevance of these writings; on the contrary, they were cited by the committee to justify its vote against confirmation. There was little in Olds' record which the committee could openly attack. He was known for his able and courageous administration of the federal laws under the jurisdiction of the FPC, and he could not be criticized for defending the legislative policies which Congress had passed and which the Supreme Court had upheld in a unanimous decision.

The defense of Olds in the hearings was relatively weak and ineffective, although with such a hostile committee an effective defense would have been difficult. The communist smear, which had been anticipated, might have been answered more forcefully. Too much of the defense was carried by Olds himself, despite the fact that others would have been better able to answer the unjust accusations made against him, and to have forced the hearings back to the real issues involved. Apparently no attempt was made to line up favorable witnesses from the natural gas industry, who would have carried great weight.

VII. PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S INTERVENTION

Early in October, while the nomination was before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, President Truman wrote to Chairman Edwin Johnson, urging the confirmation of Olds. "Mr. Olds," the President wrote, "is a nationally recognized champion of effective utility regulation; his record shows that he is also a champion of fair regulation. . . . The powerful corporations subject to regulation by the Commission have not been pleased with Mr. Olds. They now seek to prevent his confirmation for another term. It will be most unfortunate if they should succeed. We cannot allow great corporations to dominate the commissions which have been created to regulate them."¹⁹

Senator Johnson replied that the subcommittee "was shocked beyond description by the political and economic views expressed by Mr. Olds some years

¹⁸ In the Senate debate on Mr. Olds' renomination in 1944 Senator Hill declared that these old writings were "immaterial, incompetent, and irrelevant" (*Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 90, pt. 6, p. 7693 [Sept. 12, 1944]).

¹⁹ Reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 95, pt. 10, p. 13759 (Oct. 4, 1949).

ago. We cannot believe that a person under our democratic capitalistic system holding such views is qualified to act in a quasi-judicial capacity in the regulation of industry."²⁰ Despite the President's support, the subcommittee voted unanimously to reject the nomination; and the vote of the full committee was two for and ten against confirmation.

After the full committee made its report to the Senate, President Truman, undaunted, took the extraordinary step of calling upon the Democratic Party to support the nomination. On October 5, Chairman Boyle of the Democratic National Committee, acting on instructions from the President, sent a telegram to all state chairmen, requesting them to urge their Senators to vote for the confirmation of Mr. Olds. His defeat, it was stated in the telegram, "would be a defeat for the millions of Americans who are entitled to fair power rates, and a victory for the power lobbyists and the Republican Party."

At his press conference on the same date the President defended his action in making a party issue of the appointment on the ground that party discipline was essential to party responsibility.²¹ Two days later Senator Byrd placed the Boyle telegram in the *Congressional Record*, declaring that he was "shocked that the President of the United States would attempt to coerce the Members of the United States Senate in the exercise of their function in the confirmation of an appointment. . . . By implication, at least, Chairman Boyle threatens every Member of the United States Senate with the loss of patronage if the orders given in this telegram are not obeyed."²²

Editorial comments were generally unfavorable to the Boyle telegram and to the attempt of the President to make a party issue of the appointment. The telegram, it may be noted, contained no threat or intimation that patronage would be withdrawn from Senators who did not vote for confirmation. The final vote of the Senate, rejecting the nomination by 53 to 15, indicated that the President's appeal had little effect on the Democratic Senators, though it may have contributed to the practically unanimous vote of Republican members against confirmation.

VIII. THE SENATE DEBATE

The renomination of Leland Olds came before the Senate on October 12, 1949, but Senator Murray, who was unable to be present on that day, spoke in behalf of Mr. Olds on October 11. He maintained that the real issue was federal regulation of the price of natural gas, and placed in the record a series of statistical tables taken from the reports of the FPC showing the huge profits of the natural gas industry since the end of World War II, the high degree of concentration of gas holdings by a few large companies, and the estimates of the profits of these companies if federal regulation were removed. He asserted that the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13760.

²¹ An account of the President's press conference was given by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times* on October 6, and it was reprinted in the *Congressional Record* on the following day.

²² *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 95, pt. 11, pp. 14121-122 (Oct. 7, 1949).

large companies might well have the value of their holdings enhanced by over sixteen billion dollars if federal control over field prices were removed. The thesis that natural gas was a public utility, and as such subject to public regulation, was sharply challenged by Senator Kerr, who inquired why the price of natural gas should be regulated if the price of copper produced in Montana, or of coal, is not regulated.²³

The Senate debate was opened on October 12 by Senator Johnson of Colorado, speaking in opposition to the appointment. He charged Olds with Communism and radicalism, as well as with association with leading Communists when he was the industrial editor of the Federated Press. As a feature writer on the Federated Press, the Senator said Olds had stooped to the vilest kind of rabble rousing. Senator Johnson also stated that Olds was "slippery and evasive," that he "hedged and quibbled, but that he was not repentant." He went on to declare that, in his judgment, "Mr. Olds has not changed his offensive views regarding capital one iota, and . . . today, as when he was forty years of age, he believes capital should be confiscated and the profit system destroyed. A man having this kind of a warped mind is so far out of step with America that he is not qualified to sit in the seat of judgment and regulate our great utility industries."²⁴

The most able statement in behalf of Olds was made by Senator Morse, who asserted that Olds and the two other members of the FPC who joined with him in policies were only attempting to carry out the provisions of the Natural Gas Act for the regulation of the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce. The authority of the Commission under the Act to do this, he pointed out, had been upheld by the Supreme Court in the *Interstate* case. "The oil and gas interests," said Senator Morse, "have tried unsuccessfully to have the law amended so that the Commission can not regulate their sales of gas to interstate pipe lines. They know that they can not get such legislation enacted, so I believe that they are now engaged in a last-ditch effort to accomplish the same purpose by opposing the reappointment of a Commissioner who refuses to interpret the act and circumscribe his powers and obligations to the public in accordance with the purposes of those interests."²⁵ The real test which should be applied in passing upon the renomination of Leland Olds, Senator Morse contended, was his record during two terms as a member of the Federal Power Commission. On this test he declared that Olds ranked with the ablest public utility commissioners in the country, and was so regarded by many businessmen who appeared before the FPC while he was a member. His rejection, the Senator concluded, "will discourage other men, devoted to the public interest, from running the risks of entering Government service."²⁶

Also speaking in defense of the nominee, Senator Langer reviewed the de-

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 14212-226 (Oct. 11, 1949).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14357 (Oct. 12, 1949).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14360.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14364. One of the most favorable testimonials for Olds which Senator Morse placed in the record was of more than usual interest, coming, as it did, from a prominent New York attorney, Mr. Roderick Stephens, who had represented interstate pipe line companies before the FPC (*ibid.*, p. 14361).

bate in 1944 when Olds' nomination came before the Senate, and pointed out that the identical charges of radical and communist leanings then made by Senator Moore were dismissed as unfounded. "These 25-year-old charges," said Senator Langer, "... are now dug up and dusted off again in the attempt to discredit an honest, sincere and capable public servant who has given the best years of his life in attempting to bring about an equitable regulation of public-utility rates in the interest of the common people. . . ." The Senator also maintained that "the case against Leland Olds smells strongly of oil," and that "during the extensive hearings . . . not one iota of information was brought out which reflected on the record of this man as a public-power commissioner."²⁷

Senator Humphrey placed in the record a number of editorials from newspapers throughout the country, many of them Republican, commenting on the case and supporting the confirmation of Olds. Practically all of these editorials pointed out that the real issue involved was the regulation of the price of gas. Senator Humphrey also defended Olds for his writings, criticizing the economic conditions and practices which prevailed in the 1920's.²⁸

The principal speech in opposition to Leland Olds was made by Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas, chairman of the subcommittee which had considered the nomination. In his opening remarks he declared that the reputation of Leland Olds was a myth, "a clever, appealing fiction, which is not supported by the record. It is a fiction which the man himself has labored skillfully and tirelessly through ten years in public office to impress on the public mind." Senator Johnson stated that he proposed to reveal the record of Olds, which he said was almost unnoticed and unknown, in order to disprove "the myth of Leland Olds, the knight in shining armor, doing tireless battle with the dragons of 'special privilege.'" The first myth to be exposed, said Senator Johnson, was that Olds was being opposed by the power lobby. He reported that not a single representative of the power interests had appeared in opposition to Olds, and that not one of the hundreds of letters and telegrams which he had received opposing confirmation had come from a representative of an electric utility. What Senator Johnson did not point out was that the opposition to Olds had come from the oil and natural gas interests, and that the electric utilities, while not openly opposing him, had quietly but none the less effectively thrown their influence against him.

Despite the fact that Leland Olds had had twenty years of experience in the public utility field, ten years as a commissioner of the FPC, Senator Johnson asserted that he lacked practical experience, and accused him of prejudice and bias against the utilities which he regulated. In his words, "Leland Olds' record is an uninterrupted tale of bias, prejudice, and hostility, directed against the industry over which he now seeks to assume the powers of life and death. Never once in his long career has Leland Olds experienced, first-hand, the industries' side of the regulatory picture."²⁹

Senator Johnson accused Olds of conducting an "insidious campaign of

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14368.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 14370-375.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14379-380.

slander," of directing public criticism, of making "vile and snide remarks" to "undermine and discredit" the members of the Commission who did not agree with him. This accusation was not supported by any evidence in the record. A similar accusation that Olds had also "forced the Commission staff into a goose-step march under the whip of his deliberate public abuse" appears equally unfounded. Finally, Senator Johnson charged Mr. Olds with building a political empire for his own insidious purposes. He then summed up his argument in the following words: "In the twenties he scoffed at private property as just another myth; in the thirties he said our democracy had been made a sham; in the forties he has intimidated his staff, discredited his fellow Commissioners, fostered a smear on Congress, and taken the law into his own hands to substitute irresponsible confiscation for responsible regulation."³⁰

The intemperateness of the attack on Olds in the Senate debate may be attributed largely to the fact that those who opposed him were smarting under the blistering criticism which they had received at the hands of editorial writers and columnists. Olds' record was that of an able, intelligent and scrupulously fair public official. His ability and effectiveness as a commissioner and his devotion to the public interest, rather than his radicalism, caused him to incur the bitter enmity of the natural gas and oil industry.³¹ In the Senate debate, as in the hearings, those who opposed Olds were not content to rest their case with smearing him as a Communist and a radical, but engaged in personal abuse as well.

IX. CONCLUSION

The contest over the nomination of Leland Olds for a third term as a member of the Federal Power Commission affords a striking illustration of the importance of the confirmation of appointments in the determination of governmental policies. He was rejected not because of his radical writings some twenty-five years earlier, or the charge of Communism, although these caused some newspaper support to be withdrawn and made it easier for his opponents to bring about his defeat. The real issue was federal regulation of the price of natural gas, and his rejection was a victory for the gas and oil interests. Their opposition to Olds was due to the vigorous and effective role which he had played in the development of federal regulation and to his determined opposition to the Moore-Rizley bill, the Kerr bill, and similar ones for which they had pressed in Congress.

The rejection of the nomination of Leland Olds was similar in many respects to the refusal of the Senate in 1834 to confirm the nomination of Roger Taney as Secretary of the Treasury. Both were bitterly opposed by a strong business group because of the policies which they had carried out. Taney had incurred

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14384.

³¹ During the debate in the Senate many testimonials of his fairness and ability as a commissioner were placed in the *Congressional Record*. A number of these were editorials of conservative newspapers, including the *Kansas City Star and Times*, the *Milwaukee Journal*, the *Portland Oregonian*, and the *New York Times*.

the wrath of Nicholas Biddle when, acting under instructions from President Jackson, he had withdrawn federal deposits from the Bank; and his defeat was regarded by the Bank and its supporters as essential to the renewal of its charter. Similarly, the defeat of Olds was regarded by the oil and gas industry as essential in its fight for the removal of federal regulation of the price of natural gas. It is highly significant that after Olds was defeated for a third term, the oil and natural gas forces were able to push the Kerr bill through Congress the following year.

The opposition of the oil and gas interests to the reappointment of Olds is understandable; and Senators identified with the industry doubtless had warned the President that he would be unable to secure Senate approval of Olds, and had recommended others for the position. His rejection by such an overwhelming vote of the Senate is not so readily explained, although the vote in favor of the Kerr bill the following year indicated that the policies which Olds advocated were not agreeable to a majority of the Senate. In addition, he was pictured in the senate debate, as well as in private discussions, as a fanatical zealot with pronounced radical ideas. In a period of nation-wide hysteria over Communism, perhaps it is not surprising that he was unable to withstand the attack which was made on him. The Senate vote also indicates that it is much easier for a determined and well-financed interest group to block the reappointment of an official who stands in its way than to secure a revision of federal law. As the city attorney of Pittsburgh declared in the hearings, his defeat serves as a warning to members of regulatory commissions not to incur the hostility of the interests which they regulate, if they value their jobs.

An especially unfortunate aspect of the fight over Olds was that an able, intelligent, and courageous public servant, devoted in an extraordinary degree to the public interest, was forced to submit to public abuse and vilification of a kind which makes public service unattractive to men and women of the highest ability. In appraising the consequences, Senator Aiken declared during the Senate debate: "Certain public utilities of the country are out to destroy a man for performing his duty. I do not know of anything worse than that. I do not know of anything more detrimental to good government. I do not know of anything to make it more difficult to get men and women to perform the duties of public office."²²

²² *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, pt. 11, p. 14377 (Oct. 12, 1949).

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL POWER

POWER: ITS UBIQUITY AND LEGITIMACY

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To depreciate politics—and of course diplomacy—because it is a thing of power, is to engage in the doubtful sport of “criticism without a fulcrum,” if it be not indeed to impute “guilt by association.” Of course, politics is a power-phenomenon: no power, no politics; much politics, much power. We must take it or leave it at that; for politics is, willy-nilly, a pulling or a pushing around of somebody. To be sure, there are degrees of both pulling and pushing and proprieties of each; but complete avoidance of both, there never is. Other things being equal, to be pulled is better, I suppose, than to be pushed. For one’s face to another’s back is safer, under power tactics, than one’s back to another’s face. Better still is it to march abreast, all faces forward, even though that formation, too, involves some lateral shoving for deference in a line that is never entirely even.

Nevertheless, democratic politics, of the persuasive, the pulling, sort, is better than Nazi geo-politics, which is the apotheosis of pushing. It is better, too, than Communistic neo-politics, which is a pushing of all who will not be pulled by the ideal of classlessness, involving a lethal kick now and then from Big Brother to all the deviant little brothers up and down the line. In short, power *for* is less poisonous than power *against*; and power *with* makes for more perfection for more persons than does power *over*.

Power itself, however, is ubiquitous. Its definition makes that much clear; for power is no mysterious and elusive phantom; it is, forthrightly speaking, *the capacity to effect results*. No domain is immune from it. If it seems to be absent from the cemetery, even there it only seems so; for the graveyard is but a sad and conspicuous sign that inanimate potency is having its way with the vital. Resident in the womb, power stands guard also at the tomb. Beginning before the beginning, power does not end with any known ending. Not only is there ubiquity of power, but our hypothesis is that there is continuity between that form of it which in nature reveals itself terribly as tidal waves, earthquakes, and survival of the fittest and that form which in society abounds little less terribly in the feline ferocity of gossip, in the cut-throat competition of rapacious business, and in the bloody carnage of war.

There is an intriguing analogy between a tycoon and a typhoon, or between a ranting Hitler, who levels Germany in a decade, and Mexico’s bellowing Paracutín, which intermittently blows its top and chronically devastates the countryside. What manifests itself as destructive in nature may erupt as convulsive in man; what shows itself as growth there, may flower beneficently here through all the rungs of culture. Self-perfection may best be thought of as self-preservation extended, and self-preservation as self-sustenance extrapolated.

How this ubiquitous and continuous phenomenon called power came to be

we do not know, though we ebb with its ebbing and flow with its flowing. From out the womb of the primordial, by processes undisclosed to our dim vision, the world of power has arisen and functions coincident with the very world of being. But what makes power legitimate we think we can elucidate. That power is sometimes poison, we have been told, and do for ourselves observe. That power is also the very process of perfection, we affirm and would demonstrate. Power is legitimate as it minimizes its poison and maximizes its function for the perfection of being, of any being. "Any power," says Plato, is "a sufficient definition of being." As to definition we are thus impartial, knowing, with Emerson, that "No god dare wrong a worm." But having defined impartially, we acknowledge a functional preference for man. Our imagination follows the Cheerful Cherub of yesteryear:

Hear the early birds rejoicing,
How they twitter and they sing,
While the early worm, poor fellow,
Never says a single thing.

Our loyalty is to our own species. As between gods and worms, we elect men; and so we shall here pursue legitimacy as power which perfects man.

With man, then, and with his perfectibility through power we are here concerned. Since power is the capacity to produce results, we distinguish between results unintended and those intended. It is with power as progenitor of intended results that we engage ourselves; for this is the aspect in which perfection has its regal residence and career. Power, which is any and every capacity to produce results, passes from mere causation to super-causation when it becomes conscious of its effects. When consciousness, in turn, becomes conscientiousness, power passes from the cognitive to the conative. Let a reason become the cause and power reaches its motivational maturity; but when the reason for intended results becomes a demand for rightness, power has ascended to its zenith. That is personal power at the prime and political power at the summit. We can see dimly at least, from the very outset, that there is a certain distinction between conscience and causation, between, let us say, ethics and interest; or, politically speaking, between morality and "national interest." But we will also see, in the event, that this distinction, though important, need not fritter itself away in radical dualism suggested by Bishop Butler's characteristic moral plaint: "Had [conscience] strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." The fact that conscience *would* do just this is perhaps enough to suggest that its own complexion is not alien to the power-motif, which motif it here demeans and bemoans. Given power-ubiquity, we must find perfection in power, or no perfection ever known. The pathos of power—and we suspect in the event its poison, too—arises from our having to accept results that were not intended though they were inevitable all the while. To be slipped up on by oneself is for man the final slip-up. We laugh to keep from crying over the story of the humble trainman, at a banquet felicitated by the superintendent for having saved many lives through the humdrum but faithful tapping of the wheels. Before the banqueters, the

trainman thanked the superintendent profusely; for said he, he had been wondering all his life why he had to tap the d—n wheels!

In our efforts to maximize the "intendability" of power by spelling out the continuity of causation in general and its continuity with conscience in particular, we cannot, without dishonor, allow ourselves the leeway of the theologian, who holds power to be legitimate when divine, or the leniency of the idealistic philosopher, who holds that power is legitimate when rational. Power that is poisonous on earth is poisonous in heaven, as Robert Frost's *Masque of Reason* makes out from the fate of Job; and power that is rationalized, as in Nazidom, may be more odious than power in the raw. Legitimacy must be found, if at all, in what is indigenous to power, not in what is adventitious. No mere change of the venue of power can effect its legitimacy. The divine and the diabolical are justly suspected of connivance behind the thin semantic veil that separates them. Nor are we prepared, with certain saints—Jesus perhaps, Gandhi more certainly—to assume that all power is *illegitimate*; for we must reaffirm, with Plato, that "power . . . is a sufficient definition of being." Not only is it the definition of being; it is also, as we have said, the means of perfecting any given being whatsoever. How can what perfects being, be itself illegitimate? The entitlement of legitimacy, then, we must independently undertake; and this we shall do through the strategy of this triune affirmation:

- I. Conscience is itself a bid for power, and so cannot provide criterion for legitimacy.
- II. Morality matures through political power, since consciences-in-conflict find no resolution save in compromise of power-claims.
- III. Civilization is, therefore, the progressive enlargement of compromise-areas.

1. *Conscience itself is a bid for power.* The *prima facie* evidence for this first thesis is so strong that no *ultima facie* evidence against it suffices. The simple evidence is that equally authentic consciences are sometimes in conflict with one another. It would be simple-minded, indeed, even to the point of presumption, to try to argue here the large thesis that conscience is in its very nature a power-phenomenon. However, for our purpose, perhaps it may be sufficient to *illustrate* what has historically been well set forth, and is indeed argued at great length in my book *Beyond Conscience*, now reissued, as "Power and Conscience," as the third part of *A Study of Power*.¹

Illustrations of the thesis are everywhere at hand. Let us pass by the obvious Christian examples of how power winds its serpentine way through the Eden of conscience—Cromwell and Cotton Mather, not to allude to the present and persistent logistics of the Roman Church—in order to concentrate upon one outside theological example and then upon one secular example inside our own national history.

¹ (Glencoe, Ill., 1950). The other two studies included in this reissue are Harold D. Lasswell's "World Politics and Personal Insecurity" and Charles E. Merriam's "Political Power."

Maimonides tells the story of the Mohammedan conquest of Spain. A certain conquering hero, one Ibn Tamurt, came to the gates of Cardova, a city in which lived the ancestors of Spinoza. He demanded, did Tamurt, as Maimonides reports it, the death of all Jews [even as St. Thomas at the same general period was invoking death against his own preferred types of Christian heretics] if they did not immediately proclaim their conversion to the opportune orthodoxy. "It is because I have compassion on you," Tamurt assured the supplicating Elders of the Jews, "that I command you to become Muslim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment." When they pleaded with him further and even invoked the lethal fruits of their "heresy" to fall upon their own heads, not his, he reaffirmed his edict in the universal idiom of a conscience fully poisoned with power, and closed the dire colloquy in these classic words: "I do not desire to argue with you, for I know you will argue according to your own religion."

So much for a capital example from the field of religion of the thesis that conscience is itself a snake in the grass of legitimacy, with no disinterested criteria for self-judgment. Men everywhere and at all times have thus used claims of rightness to effect priority for their own beliefs and to secure dominance for themselves. More significant, perhaps, though no clearer, is an illustration from the secular field of politics.

It is a common notion, and certainly one with strong support, that the Civil War in the United States came as a result of the power-impasse between consciences of the North and the South. Though slavery had been an issue, one may say a dominant issue, since the foundation of the Republic, it did not for three-quarters of a century lead to internecine strife. It did not lead to war, in fact, until it became such a bone of contention between adamant consciences—abolitionists on the one side and apologists on the other—that the politicians were no longer able, North or South, to meet on common ground. Partisan consciences had turned all disinterestedness into prowess.

Perhaps this is enough—since my purpose is to illustrate rather than here to argue the matter—enough, I say, to recommend the hypothesis that the dicta of conscience represent the continuity of the power principle, being themselves always claims for the primacy of certain beliefs and, of course, for the dominance of preferred believers. There appears to be, in fact, a fearful undertow of power in all projected claims made by earnest men in the name of duty. Conscience cannot provide a criterion for legitimacy because it is always an interested party, nor can any change of venue, from earth to heaven, for instance, clothe it with disinterestedness. From the throne of omniscient judgment conscience annihilates its enemies and intimidates the world with its *ought* and its *ought not*; and it follows hard upon its verbal thunderbolts with the artillery of action, clearing a path for duty by coercion. In short, the ubiquity of power leaves conscience so crucially exposed that we do well, I suggest, to impute to conscience an invariable will to coercion. Thomas Hobbes, who of course mightily argued this notion, combines the sacerdotal and the secular motif in one of the most impressive exemplifications of our thesis. Replying to his three major

types of critics, each of whom thought to monopolize the high-ground of disinterestedness, Hobbes devastated them all together with one fell sentence:

These things I found most bitterly excepted against: That I made the civil power too large, *but this by ecclesiastical persons*. That I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience, *but this by sectaries*. That I had set the princes above the laws, *but this by lawyers*. [*Italics supplied.*]

The ubiquity of power restored by this effective imputation of universal partiality, Hobbes had only to draw the inevitable conclusion: that so-called "private conscience," by the very fact of its privacy, becomes a power-claim rather than a cognitive demonstration. And so of course, as he says, "in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sovereign Power, farther than it seem good in his own eyes." Power is here made to appear poisonous not in its essence but in the plurality and so in the conflict of its drives. And, so saying, we are already brought to our second thesis.

2. *Morality matures through politics, since consciences-in-conflict find no resolution save in compromise.* This priority of politics in the spiritual life, Abraham Lincoln, our secular saint, took for granted. Any man of the world will be driven to accept it eventually if not initially. The *prima facie* evidence prevails, by default if not otherwise. The fact is observable, and stubborn, that never have all good men been agreed upon all goodness, nor all just men been agreed upon all justice, nor even all holy men on all holiness. Since there is an indigenous duty to make given high values prevail, and since these values, however high, are debased to conflict by being diversely defined in different minds, politics must effect some agreement before duty can prevail over duties, unless we make as prime the simple, sinister duty of each man to do all men to the death over differences as to what duty is. I say "politics" must effect the agreement, because politics is, by, historic derivation, the undisputed king of all that is in serious dispute among men.

Moralists do differ; and when the difference persists, moralists are quickly at extremity. When the assertion of a duty arouses a counter-assertion, a situation has arisen in the very moralizing process which morality alone is not equipped to resolve, save lethally through liquidation. It is, again, the pluralism of power which converts this agency of perfection into a poison prescribed in the name of each monistic claim. Moralists, by the very impotence of their method to effect monism, beg the question of agreement. When what they beg is not bequeathed, moralists are at an impasse. The politician cannot beg the ambiguous question; he must *create* an acceptable answer. So it is that the moralist's extremity becomes, willy-nilly, the politician's opportunity.

There is here a difficulty deeper than semantics, which we must acknowledge and mitigate if not resolve. The inherited morality of any age is the sum-total of agreements which have arisen through custom or have been created in legislation. It is easy for the moralist to assume universal agreement, because much is inherited by each generation. The question of agreement can be begged, however, only after the question has been raised and laid and forgotten. Where it is

raised but not laid, to beg the question does not suffice; it only exasperates the asker of the question. Where the exasperation is mutual because each is trying to beg the question, which neither will allow the other to lay, there arises necessarily the extremity already remarked. Politics exists to break impasses created by answers from one set of partisans which are still questions to other insistent partisans.

"I am approached," said Lincoln, the moral middleman, to a group of moralists who were also Christian ministers, "with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men who are equally certain that they represent the divine will." His, we may interrupt to remark, is the chronic predicament of the politician, acting as medicine man for the moralists. The politician may hope, as Lincoln did, that if God has a duty for him, God will reveal it to him, not to somebody else. He may fear, with Lincoln, that his conscience is no more infallible than that of men who are busy cancelling out one another's conscience. If he is wise, he will not expect, any more than did Lincoln, a miracle in his behalf. So he will do well, with Lincoln, to soften conscientious recalcitrance, to beget generous open-mindedness, and to formulate agreements firm enough to become the floor under new moral intuitions. He must, in any event, as Lincoln put the matter, "study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right." He must at least, that is, do the best he can.

That best for Lincoln was a mere political compromise. If such poor best could not be achieved, then war would have to come, as war did come. While still arguing for the better to prevail over the worse, Lincoln stated with some finality the case for this medium-sized accommodation, remarking that "It was this spirit of compromise which first gave us the Constitution, and which has thrice saved the Union." By continuing to invoke that spirit, he went on to say, "We . . . restore the national faith, the national confidence, the national feeling of brotherhood. We thereby reinstate the spirit of concession . . . that spirit which has never failed us in past perils, and which may be safely trusted for all the future."

The compromise technique failed Lincoln in that future, only to have war restore to us the very same technique for our future, as Lincoln saw was inevitable. It remains as the only star of hope for any future that does not sink lower than war. War is low but not the lowest. Liquidation is the lowest form of accommodation known to man. Love of course in the highest. But political compromise remains the mighty middle way for men to get along with one another. War comes when compromise fails, and war is power run to riot. Compromise is also power, but under control. Only those see no ethics at all in war who think to find all ethics fulfilled in love. Universal benevolence, not to mention romantic love between the sexes, is idyllic; but it is rare, is precious, and is passing. Two is company, and that is understanding; three is a crowd, and that is tension; four is politics, and that is recrimination.

Not all is confusion, however, which confuses the simple. Groups with a common purpose have historically enlarged their extension even while narrowing

thereby their intension. Men may still function in an orderly way, moreover, who have but a single purpose in common. They are held together by things much more formal than affection—a constitution and by-laws, public relations counsels, and legal advisers—and always by the push of fear to augment the pull of hope. The free world is filled with organizations operating well below the ceiling of love but well above the floor of hate. They come to be on the principle that sustains them: a balance of power. No member is assessed more than he can pay. On mutual abnegations all manage to articulate their several drives by a division of labor and a distribution of authority which each and all respect.

Truth to tell, lovers come themselves to depend at length upon a certain balance of power, or love meets Nemesis at the threshold of that marriage where “you and I is one, but I is de one.” Or, as put by the poet:

... love's no laughing matter,
 Never was a free gift, an angel, a fixed equator.
 Love's the big boss at whose side forever slouches
 The shadow of the gunman: he's mortar and dynamite;
 Antelope, drinking pool, but the tiger too that crouches.
 Therefore be wise in the dark hour to admit
 The logic of the gunman's trigger,
 Embrace the explosive element, learn the need
 Of tiger for antelope and antelope for tiger.

—C. Day-Lewis.

An ethics of benevolence is precious; but an ethics which does not know how to deal with malevolence as well, is an ethics too precious for this world. Political ethics catches up interpersonal ethics where the scale of conflict has become so large that the powers which must be balanced in order to maintain agreement are those between unlikeminded groups. Not wholly unlikeminded, of course, but adamantly and stridently so. The national state is made up of groups so unlikeminded—often in religion, ever in economics, frequently in art—that each tends naturally to cancel others out. Political compromise becomes the cement of sociality which alone can—when it can—bridge the chasms created by diversity of power drives. The principle of business—that competition is also cooperation—becomes the enlarged principle of politics as well. Consent is achieved only through concession.

Consent born of concession is a power manifestation, but it is not coercion; it is a pull of advantage calling to its constant aid the steady push of prudence. In the ubiquity of power, power is poison only to the extent that it destroys; it is perfection to the extent that it perfects. The self-fulfillment offered to men by the development of the national state so completely outweighs what is destroyed through its formation that the balance of power known as nationalism is, up to this point, the hardest and the finest achievement of the human race.

The balance of power has thus far been achieved at three great levels: the lower, the upper, and the middle. There is, first, the minimal level of accommodation known as *liquidation*. At the very bottom, as Andrew Marvell has poetically epitomized it, “The grave's a fine and private place, / But none, I think, do

there embrace." This level is for the undisciplined and is, in general, illegitimate. The first victim of liquidation is, indeed, legitimacy itself. Liquidation makes the worst of the bad. There is, second, the maximal accommodation known as love. It is for the beatific. It makes the best of the better. But love is only for the lucky, as liquidation is for the lost alone. Love comes not by request nor stays for the asking. It is precious but precarious. Finally, however, there is the medium accommodation known as compromise, though its spread covers such stages as acquiescence, assent, consent, coalition. This type is for the disciplined, and marks the whole range of the legitimate, below the level of love. Compromise becomes, indeed, the standard form of human accommodation in a world of ubiquitous and continuous power. If too civilized to liquidate 'em and too finicky to love 'em, then let your motto be to "jine 'em". Compromise is a sort of universal common-law marriage. It is much less good than the best, love, and much less bad than the worst, liquidation: it makes the better of the bad. It is just the right size for common living because it has leeway enough for men too little to stand constant lyricism and leniency enough for the normal let-downs of the strong. "Compromise," as an undergraduate has defined it, "is the highest of evils and the lowest of goods."

It is sufficient for morality that we can kick an opponent without wanting to kill him and can kill an enemy without kicking his dead body. Let us, then, concentrate upon compromise as our standard form for the balancing of powers. Love lacking, compromise still spells legitimacy. This outcome brings us to our third thesis.

3. *Civilization is the progressive enlargement of compromise-areas.* In the clinches of collective life, politicians become our moralists. Diplomats are, of course politicians, *in extremis*. They are practitioners of the art of "strategic obfuscation," where the concessions that condition consent depend more upon push than pull. In other words, diplomacy is the calculated risk of politics, as politics is the calculated risk of ethics. Risk or stagnate; calculate or fail. Theoretically, the moral terrain ahead is not different in kind, not even in an atomic age, from that already traversed and surveyed first by politicians. The provincialism which long delayed the coming of the national state, even of our own federal republic, seemed at times as impossible to surmount as do the obstacles now in the way of world peace through new international agreements. Unquestionably, we need a new ethics for an age of atomic power; but, since there is no virgin birth for ethics, any improvement must be founded on agreements which await creation by the same sort of uncalled hands and the same sort of forked tongues that have always been attributed to diplomats.

It is clear that one obstacle which stands in the way of this denouement is the notion (I do not say *fact*) that "national interest" and morality are incompatibles. There is between them a distinction indeed; but the difference is deeply disturbing only to those who forget or disbelieve the ubiquity and continuity of power. Every accommodation is of power, and every form save that of liquidation offers something positive. "National interest" represents the high water mark of morality up to date. It maximizes the balancing of power

from liquidation toward love through compromise. Nationalism is morality at as yet its highest, though not yet at its best.

Best would be universal benevolence, I suppose; but the better which we must take in its stead is the extension of the compromise principle throughout the whole earth. Such better is our best. If we allow ourselves the luxury of conceiving morality as being somehow the final culmination of perfectibility, rather than the process of successively culminating, then we have on our hands an ethics calculated to defeat its own end by sabotaging its only means. It is easy for us thus to crucify ourselves upon the cross of perfectionism.

To prevent such outcome, it is prudent to distinguish "prosaic" ethics and "poetic" ethics, and to divide the labor between them. Both prose and poetry are worthy, but prose is the more immediately useful. Prose-morality is agreement already achieved, firm enough to support collective action. Poetry-morality is imaginative projection of the achieved, beautiful, desirable and corrective. It can support itself but cannot, as yet, support action. To renounce the achieved is ungrateful indeed. To renounce the conceived would be to belittle our human vocation. The one is imprudence, the other is impudence. But to hold fast to the firm, working through it for the ideal—this is both prudence and wisdom.

The first requirement of such a happy union of the two moralities is to appreciate the magnificence of the already achieved. We cannot go back on nationalism, for instance. It is our highest moral achievement. As we prize this towering resultant, so we are prepared to promote its principle at any and every opportunity. Those alike who eschew power and who use it only to suppress, are both enemies of the balanced way. No parthenogenesis of power is called for. Power, which can become poison, is already perfection so far as it does not, through criss-cross, neutralize itself. The capacity of intending results and of harmonizing them through synthesis with other results and intentions, this has brought us far on the long path of civilization. It can carry us farther, and farther still.

If on the way we meet those who have achieved selfhood only through ascetic suppression of their own impulses and who, therefore, will allow no further step save through the perpetration of the only principle they themselves do know, then we must invoke the ethics of malevolence to save, if not ourselves at least our principle of balance. Compromise is only for accommodative men. As for others, who better than those who insist upon liquidation are entitled to become its first recipients?

In summary, then, let this be our conclusion: that the principle of legitimacy is such balance as prevents the cancelling out of forces by one another and such, furthermore, as enables maximum energies to flow forward, commingling, to the perfecting of whatever segment of being is involved. Such balance is essential to legitimacy because it is indispensable to perfectibility. Otherwise power poisons power; and this is the evil genius of its very fecundity, the easy fate of self-checkmating.

It makes no difference what the level. It is the same, and alike, for the

somatic, the psychomatic, and the sociomatic levels. Only in equilibrium of moving energies is there health: for the soul, for the psyche, for the society. There is catharsis for the poison of power in every synthesized advance to perfect. Personalities formed upon the suppressive mold are not good materials for the accommodation we have called legitimate. Love is above them, and tolerance is beyond them. Societies based on compromise, in turn, produce personalities indulgent of differences and magnanimous in composing conflicts arising over differences. As touching legitimacy, therefore, all is of a piece; and the pattern of the piece is such dynamic equilibrium as enables all impinging forces to combine in a synthesis for the entelechy at hand. Legitimacy is ubiquity of power disciplined to the uses of perfection.

REASON AND POLITICAL POWER

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In times of crisis and transition the common man is a political philosopher. An example of how, as part of the widespread concern with the basic problems of our politics, the learned world and the world of practical politics today find themselves close neighbors, was the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy. That this Congress, meeting in Amsterdam in August, 1948, has been described by Professor F. H. Heinemann of Oxford in an article entitled "The West in Search of a Metaphysics,"¹ may also indicate how those who think in terms of practical political leadership for the West and those concerned with wider inquiries concerning life and nature have not yet found acceptable common answers. On the one hand at the meeting were the Thomists, or Neo-Thomists, who had already at their disposal some twenty-five Thomist periodicals and who were, in general, "the best organized contemporary philosophical school." There were also the Marxists and socialists, who, although they had recently gained some professorships in the French and Italian universities, aroused no very great interest. A third organized element was that of Unesco, the leadership of which achieved for itself an organizational control to extend over future Congresses and their affiliated activities; yet Unesco, with its attempted promotion of a scientific humanism, failed to make progress toward either the integration of a western outlook or the building of a bridge between East and West. The speech of its director-general, Julian Huxley, advocating his well-known evolutionary humanism, "fell flat," evincing, as Dr. Heinemann put it, that "this sort of naturalism . . . is totally inadequate for the solution of the spiritual crisis of our time." It appeared also that a spiritual regeneration probably cannot be achieved by means which are largely political.

Recent empirical research in the realm of philosophy seems to show that persons of learning and persons of common sense, including men representing the most diverse of the world's principal religions or ways of life, experience in their sense of values a marked degree of kinship. To the careful reader of the philosophies of the past, this fact should come as no great surprise; yet it is something new to ears that have heard little else than the insistencies of the modern schools of relativistic thought. There is actually great need to correlate modern thinking with what has been thought before. For although the modern is often afraid to quote the classics, lest he show himself behind the times, a degree of reflection in the thought of the masters—as well as in that of writers of our own day—will tend to correct or confirm, in many cases to extend and deepen, insight into the problems of our times. How often does some departure in method of inquiry, or, in respect of content, some truism, or alternatively, some proved error, pretend to a newness of insight that is, in fact, not justified!

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 47, p. 132-137 (Jan., 1949). I have depended upon Professor Heinemann's account for much of the material of this paragraph.

An example of thinking which would be more useful if more integrated with past thought, is the present-day tendency to think and to speak of the state almost exclusively in terms of power. By power is meant not the power of mutual attraction among men, which includes the inclination to give as well as the desire to get, but the power of one individual or group *over* another, to the material advantage of the stronger interest. Thus Thurman Arnold, who has done more than most men to promote in practice a just use of power, is nevertheless led intellectually to the view that "social philosophies have no significance at all except with reference to the conflicts out of which they arise."² Hence, in defending the ultimacy of decision vested by statute in an administrative commission, he departs from his otherwise persuasive argument to suggest that justice is in any case simply what the stronger party says it is. This emphasis is not *only* the same as that of the Marxists and the Nazis, who described the foundation of the state as consisting ultimately of the friend-enemy relationship,³ but it is a view rather commonly held.

By defining the state as power more is meant, no doubt, than just physical coercion. The power of propaganda, of prestige, and the like are variously documented and analyzed in the search for political realities. Yet, although the concept of political power is sometimes attenuated to suggest even its opposite, namely a moral power, on the whole identification is made with a material interest either of the individual or of some more or less restricted group self. Even Hans J. Morgenthau, a student of power who eschews much of the point of view here referred to, identifies politics with the evil lust for domination over men. This aspect of human nature, he would say, must be accepted if we are to accept human nature at all. But there should be no illusion about the state as the embodiment of rational good. Accordingly, we are asked to recall Lord Acton on the subject of power, Jacob Burckhardt on politics as the "absolute evil," Emerson in the opinion that "every actual state is corrupt."

The critics—some of them—have been less than fair to Morgenthau's stimulating little book, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, though they are right that it is necessary in part to take issue with him. One aspect of the book's argument may be summarized in the following paragraph from it:

Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and ethics into harmony. We have no choice between power and the common good. To act successfully, that is according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny. That this conciliation is nothing more

² Thurman W. Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven, 1937), p. 340.

³ See the extract in William Ebenstein (ed.), *Man and the State* (New York, 1950), pp. 299-302, from Carl Schmitt, "The Concept of the 'Political,'" *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 68 (Sept., 1927). Schmitt, who became a Nazi, is considered by Ebenstein to have been "one of the two or three ablest German political scientists of the twentieth century . . . [whose] brilliance was surpassed only by his lack of character."

than a *modus vivendi*, uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical, can disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and to distort the tragic contradictions of human existence with the soothing logic of a specious concord.⁴

The scientific rationalists of modern times, this argument says, "misunderstand the nature of man, the nature of the world, and the nature of reason itself, with the result of an impotence to cope with the inevitable corruption . . . that is manifest in all action in the social world and particularly in the realm of power politics."⁵ It is suggested that the heart of this misunderstanding has been a failure to see that man's nature has three dimensions: biological, rational and spiritual. By neglecting the biological impulse as well as the spiritual aspiration, the Enlightenment, and the modernism which followed it, have misconstrued "the function reason fulfills within the whole of human existence." Hence, the author's thesis is that there is need to reexamine the problems of the present in the light of the pre-rationalist western tradition, and that, "This re-examination must start with the assumption that power politics rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is, for this reason, inseparable from social life itself. In order to eliminate from the political sphere not power politics—which it is beyond the ability of any political philosophy or system to do—but the destructiveness of power politics, rational faculties are needed which are different from, and superior to, the reason of the scientific age."⁶

It is true that the goddess Reason did not bring to men the blessings which her devotees expected. It is also true that a calculating scientism in recent times has served to implement, and in places, perhaps, to augment, a wicked streak in human kind. It may be agreed that the present time has need of an insight that is greater than man's rational faculty. Yet some points are to be set down against this discounting of the rational ideal.

A minor objection, first of all, may be lodged against the charge of neglect, by modern scientism, of the biological reality. Is not the whole background of the Nietzschean view, for example, a biological scientism? And is not Nietzsche, indeed, part of the corruption under complaint?

More serious is the contradiction of characterizing politics, all politics, as evil and corrupt by nature, and, in the same argument, of urging the elimination "not [of] power politics—which it is beyond the power of any political philosophy or system to do—but [of] the *destructiveness* [italics ours] of power politics." Where politics is creative and not destructive, it cannot be characterized as corrupt by nature. Now, if there is something paradoxical in this, it might be said—to give the argument full weight—that the further reference to "rational faculties . . . different from and superior to the reason of the scientific age" sufficiently recognizes the existence of this phenomenon of paradox, which appears so often at the farthest reaches of human comprehension. Yet it is a mistaken emphasis which points to the inadequacies of this day, such as may be attributed to the cocksure egoism of scientific rationalism, without sufficient

⁴ (Chicago, 1946), p. 203.

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.

account of the less cocksure, and therefore more profound, claims of that reason which has some awareness of its limitations, together with a sense of its affinity with the more than human. For example, the Wilsonian ideal of a rationally ordered world, opposed to the irrationality of war, is *not* to be regarded as utter lack of realism, derived by a merely logical deduction from those abstract principles which in the liberal era replaced "the pragmatic decision of political issues." Or, to give another example of what, from over-emphasis upon the rational, is considered bad politics, reference is made to the foreign policy of the Comintern as "based upon an ideological alliance among Communists everywhere . . . the complete failure [of which], from the viewpoint both of international Communism and of Russian national interests proves again the practical impossibility of founding a successful foreign policy upon ideological affinities rather than upon a community of political interests."⁷ Against this judgment it might be said that the Kremlin has not failed, from the point of view which it has in mind, to make rather good use of communist parties abroad. At the same time, the prediction may be ventured that it is the lack of reason in the police-state method that *will* lead eventually to failure—both at home and abroad.

It is to be observed, in any case, that in the various critiques of the rational ideal, *reason itself is being applied to reveal the limitations of reason*. And this same reason, which shows up the limitations of human mind, is that which indicates also the failures of power politics, as sovereign rather than as servant, to give human satisfaction.

What, then, is just? Will this question never be answered? Or was it answered long ago? "Now what is just or right," said Aristotle, "is to be interpreted in the sense of 'what is equal'";⁸ and again; "All men think justice to be a sort of equality."⁹ Rights, therefore, are mutual. The mutuality which has represented, always, man's need—though it would appear to have been violated as much in recent times as ever in the past—depends upon man's full realization of his distinctive nature as man. The intolerable excesses of the modern police state can be met only by an understanding of this truth, *truth* being simply *comprehensive fact*. It can be met only by the prior assumption, therefore, that truth *is*—and that it exists in the sphere of the social, the political and the moral, no less than in physical nature.

The widespread error of thinking that in certain areas, where human inquiry nevertheless persists, nothing can be known, seems to have come mainly from that "genetic fallacy" born of the historical and evolutionary points of view—however often that fallacy may have been exposed. The account of historical or psychological origins of institutions or beliefs is thought to be, in a determining way, the measure of their validity. "Despite repeated refutations of psychologism [often by the psychologists themselves], the assumption is widely and often unwittingly made that whatever is 'psychologised' is thereby

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁸ *Politics* (trans. B. Jowett,) Bk. III, Ch. 13, §12.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Ch. 12, §1.

cognitively discredited."¹⁰ Even the natural scientists have been unduly influenced by this historical and psychological relativism and certain of the physicists have hastened to assure us that "the days of the billiard-ball universe are past"—as if any such notion of things had been responsibly held in recent times. On the other hand, an idea of the universal reality as no less an objective than a subjective reality, including somehow ourselves, may not unreasonably be entertained without the connotation that any such reality can be known *in toto* or *ab externo*. In the natural sciences this relativism has not had serious consequences because the *facts* in this sphere will not so easily escape. The situation is otherwise in the sphere of social fact or moral principle.

This "genetic fallacy" has been most pervasive. To the common man, as to anyone else, "science would suffer no loss of its glitter for having its roots in primitive magic exposed," because "the fruits [of science] are tangible." Whereas "the psychologist's account of the [emotional, intellectual or] mystical experience [is regarded] as definitive of its essence and as in some sense undermining its validity. With respect to the things of the spirit, there is the feeling that to explain is to explain away."¹¹

This is not to say that we ought now to turn back from the present-day, naturalistically-oriented political science to its antithesis, which was once the methodological ideal of many German thinkers. These thinkers, wont to base the political upon the mental and the moral sciences, thought thereby "to transform political history from a series of causal events into a syllogism of concepts; from cause and effect relationship into a complex of ideational meanings."¹² The result was often an over-abstraction and a loss of the sense of reality, the passing of which no one regrets. But thinking about the law of nature has returned in new forms, with renewed vitality, in continental Europe long before now, and has appeared recently in this country, too, notably in the works of Morris Cohen.

The force of the discredit which came upon the law-of-nature conception in this country has owed more to the little essay on this subject by Justice Holmes than the brevity of that effort might indicate. Anyone who reads the Holmes-Pollock correspondence for the light cast by these two great legal luminaries on the law of nature is not easily persuaded that the distinguished American jurist was at his best on this subject. In this controversy, one may even venture the judgment that Pollock had the better of Holmes. The present day, indeed, has more than begun to bear out the statement by Lord Bryce, in his still vital essay on "The Law of Nature": "Who can say that an idea so ancient, in itself simple, yet capable of taking many aspects, an idea which has had so varied a history and so wide a range of influence, may not have a career reserved for it in the long future which still lies before the human race?"¹³

¹⁰ Bernard Phillips, "The Psychology of Irreligion," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 46, p. 129 (Jan., 1948).

¹¹ *Idem*.

¹² Herman Heller, "Political Science," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, p. 213.

¹³ James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (New York, 1901), Vol. 2, p. 606.

It is a tribute to this forecast by Bryce that a few years ago even Harold Laski should have given to this ancient thought his own, though belated, approval.

Laski, like Rousseau, was more consistent in the total impact of his personality than in the logic of his argument. In his *The State in Theory and Practice*, after acknowledging his debt to Morris R. Cohen's "remarkable book" *Reason and Nature*,¹⁴ and after arguing the ultimacy of individual conscience, he goes on to the view that

despite all the difficulties in the way of natural law, the need to postulate it as an essential part of the philosophy of political obligation cannot be avoided. None of the arguments by which its critics have so far sought to destroy it have so far been successful. The historical attack on natural law has broken down simply because an issue which dwells in the normative realm cannot be decided upon the issue of fact alone. The attack of the positive lawyers broke down simply because it became clear that positive law cannot provide for all possible cases. . . .

Nor is the Metaphysical attack in better case. It is argued that all questions of justice are relative. Time and place can alone give meaning to their substance. . . .

This view, however, is far less satisfactory than appears at first sight. To begin with, as Professor Cohen has pointed out, it is built upon a simple misunderstanding of the logic of science; "The objection," writes Professor Cohen, "ignores the difference between a substantive code and a science of principles, a distinction which ought to be as clear as that between the directions of the engineer to the builder, and the science of mechanics." The variety of opinion we encounter about justice no more renders impossible a science of justice than the variety of farming practice renders impossible a science of agriculture.

And we must be careful not to exaggerate the variety we do in fact encounter Notable as are our differences in value-judgments, at least equally notable are our agreements.¹⁵

Laski did not well relate his statement of the ultimacy of individual conscience to his affirmation of natural law, in the way that this reconciliation is achieved in the works, let us say, of his mentor, Morris Cohen, as well as in more classical sources.

This doctrine, however, and some of its sources are roundly attacked by Hans Kelsen in his article entitled "The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science."¹⁶ It may be worth-while for the purpose of this paper briefly to refer to his argument. The absolute distinction which Kelsen insists upon between the scientific laws which describe the conditions and relations of nature, and "the rules by which ethics and jurisprudence describe their objects, which are morality and law," is the difference between the "is" and the "ought," the difference between "causality and normativity." The norm of the "ought" is not scientific law, says Kelsen, as witness the conflicting claims made in the name of the law of nature,—by, for example, Hobbes and Locke on the subject of obedience, Locke and Morelly on the matter of communal versus private property right, etc. One wonders if it is not possible to penetrate somewhat farther than do these observations to the underlying degree of agreement. However, we are told that "The reason why the natural-law

¹⁴ *The State in Theory and Practice* (New York, 1935), p. 80, note 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 78–80.

¹⁶ *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 481–513 (Dec., 1949).

doctrine, in spite of its obvious fallacies, has had, and probably always will have, great influence on social thinking is that it satisfies a deeply rooted need of the human mind, the need for justification." We may wonder why this thought does not lead on to something quite different from what follows. The same simple fallacy—the inference from the "is" to the "ought"—is then made to appear also in the conclusions of the most outstanding representatives of nineteenth century sociology, August Comte and Herbert Spencer.¹⁷ While Comte envisaged, in the future of the fundamental law of evolution, a collectivist social order, according to Spencer's interpretation of the same progressive law "the transition from the military to the industrial type is the transition from bondage to freedom, from statism to political and economic liberalism,"¹⁸ and thus "from a lower to a higher stage of morality." And as the founders of modern sociology are thus convicted of natural-law thinking, so is the same charge laid against "the two most outstanding representatives of the philosophy of history as developed in the nineteenth century," G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx.¹⁹ The Hegelian "Theodicaea, the Justification of God in History," and the materialist dialectic of Marx alike assume the immanence of value in reality in a way that "from the point of view of science . . . is entirely worthless." Kelsen closes his presentation with a gesture toward Plato: "That the natural-law doctrine, as it pretends, is able to determine in an objective way what is just, is a lie; but those who consider it useful may make use of it as of a useful lie."

The thought that it is a lie, and the disposition to make use of it as lies are used, is at the heart of the present chaos—social and moral. In reply to this denial of the doctrine, it would hardly serve the aim of a due perspective to emphasize to excess the evidence of a *consensus philosophorum*; it may be urged that a less logic-chopping attention than is here given to the classics of political thought would reflect more agreement among the different schools than is indicated; often, too, there is less inconsistency on the part of the particular philosopher. Locke, for example is quoted as saying at one point that, in the established commonwealth "all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire by settled standing rules . . . [of the violation of which the] judge is the legislative [authority], or magistrate appointed by it,"²⁰ while elsewhere the same philosopher concludes that ultimately "the people [in their individual capacities] shall be judge."²¹ Of course, while he defended the right of revolution, Locke knew that the private individual cannot be regarded as in every circumstance the judge of his own rights; to this extent he was in agreement with Hobbes, yet the sense of right seemed to him to have, in general, a recognizable identity in the human being wherever found.

There is not space here thoroughly to assess the argument; but at least it may be pointed out that there is more consistency among natural-law writers than Kelsen shows. For example, as a part of his evidence, Kelsen rightly

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 501 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 507 ff.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

²¹ *Idem.*

points out that, among the overwhelming majority of the writers, there has been a tendency to say that while a conflict between positive and natural law is possible, such conflict can only exceptionally occur, and that if it does occur the validity of the positive law usually is not to be doubted. Pufendorf's attitude is, as Kelsen says, typical. Pufendorf regards all positive laws as "in principle" in conformity with natural law, but he emphasizes that "a civil law *could*, of course, be passed which is opposed to natural law." This leads Kelsen to conclude that "Although Pufendorf decidedly opposes Hobbes' identification of positive with natural law, he accepts one of his arguments which inevitably leads to this result." How does this come about? Hobbes holds, as is well known, that from differences of value judgments arise both a natural state of war and a consequent need for the political sovereign to determine, without limitation, what is to be called right or wrong. Therefore, it is never for the private individual, but always for the sovereign, to say what the law of nature requires; although strictly considered, he says, we should not speak in this connection of laws of nature but of theorems of experience or dictates of reason.²² Aside from showing the inadmissibility of this Hobbesian absolute, Kelsen's purpose is to prove that the argument of Pufendorf leads to the same conclusion; for he would stress Pufendorf's statement that, while civil laws may be passed that are contrary to natural law, "yet none but an insane man, and one who had in mind the destruction of the state, would wish to pass legislation of this kind."²³ This, asserts Kelsen, means that "a conflict between positive and natural law, although theoretically possible, is practically excluded."²⁴

I do not think that Pufendorf meant (though he says that only an insane man could *wish* to do so) that, in legislating the positive law, none but the insane, will ever pass laws contrary to natural law. For, as Kelsen admits, Pufendorf elsewhere, almost as clearly as Locke, rejects the thesis of Hobbes that the state can do no wrong. To hold that positive law in general, or in principle, will reflect the natural law, is not the same as, with Hobbes, to identify the two completely. Pufendorf's essential position that the degree of order necessary to right, and therefore the right itself, requires a *presumption*—which is nevertheless not the presumption of an absolute—in favor of the established positive law, is the position of common sense. And his rejection of the individual judgment as an ultimate does not, as Kelsen says it does, by a necessity of logic lead to the extremity of the position of Hobbes. The reconciliation of an individual sense of right, which often errs, with the necessities of a public authority, which also may err against right, is to be found in that general good, which, though never wholly susceptible to the human understanding, has manifested itself in the generality of human experience. This generality

²² Yet in the next sentence Hobbes goes on to say: "But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes" (*Leviathan* [Everyman's Library], Ch. XV, p. 83).

²³ Pufendorf, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*, Bk. viii, Ch. 1, Sec. 2; quoted by Kelsen, *loc. cit.*, p. 489.

²⁴ *Idem*.

of experience is that of a kinship which includes the perception of common men *in the long run*, together with, on a higher level, the insight of the wise. The latter includes more that is common to a variety of schools of thought than has been observed in recent times. Underlying his uncompromisingly rigid logic, even what Hobbes had in mind as the essence of a human well-being was not altogether different from that envisaged by Pufendorf, by Locke or by Rousseau. The concepts of individual right, of a general will, of a sovereign power somehow bound up with justice—have not these an inner core of identity, difficult though it is to lay hand on that core?

If it may be agreed that all societies have, let us say, experienced the value of mutuality within the community, as opposed to civil war, of consideration for others as opposed to pervasive hatred and cruelty, in short, of the sharing of rights—then *this is an observation of fact that has relevance and meaning*. For example, although it is true that the Spartans permitted *some* of the infant females to perish, no society has ever willingly dispensed with *all* of them. It is also true that, before the British stopped the practice, the widows of India were exhorted by their priests to throw themselves upon the funeral pyres of their dead husbands, urged on by frenzy and by the rationalization that they would be happier following their husbands to another clime; yet we may reasonably suppose that there underlay this conduct a profound regret, a sense of human inadequacy, and an aspiration for something better. This regret may be similar to that which elsewhere accompanied the sacrifice of a first born; or which accompanies our own taking of the life of a criminal in this day, now that we begin at least to know that we share his guilt. We sense, however vaguely, the fact of our ignorance in such shortcomings. We share a community of values with societies that have existed, and that will exist, on planes of morality both lower and higher than our own. And we may note, in passing, that the students of social cultures who have been impressed by social diversities quite generally speak of the various moralities—though, at times, without realizing the philosophical implications—as being of *higher* or *lower* order. Perhaps we might conclude that nothing is more common than to be blinded by the newness of diversity to the identical that lies beneath.

In any judging of standards, a doctrine of the second best seems indispensable. To the question of whether human slavery is to be condoned at any time or under any circumstance, for example, a modern consensus probably would not differ from the opinion of the medieval philosophers, i.e., human slavery may be both right and wrong. Certainly enslavement was better than the previous practice of slaughtering captives of war. Just as certainly it is a *higher* acceptance which holds that human slavery is *altogether wrong*, but it remains true that, at times, too much may be expected too soon. We must appeal from Aristotle's defense of slavery, to Aristotle's own ruling that "what is just is equal." If equality is considered with due regard to proportionate capacities and needs, no principle is more democratic. Aristotle's mistake was to overestimate the biological and to underestimate the social inheritance. Again, as to whether capital punishment is at any time to be justified, modern

criminology would say, "No, not where we have learned how to heal the illness." Still, it is possible that the commander on the field of battle may have to resort to this extremity, lest the alternative be chaos. Such social surgery, then, may be justified just as therapeutic surgery is justified, namely, as a second best only, where no way has been found to heal the part.

Thus is recognized the human right to life, even while no way may be seen to achieve the maximum of that right—which is not, be it stressed, a mere right to exist, but this *at least*, as the necessary basis for some share in the *good* life; for there emerges more generally the principle of the just and equal, even though we know that we shall inevitably fall short of the aim. The moral assumptions of the society which replaced the killing with the enslavement of captives of war, were not different in kind from those of the society which today, as an improvement upon its past, has decided to guarantee full employment to its members. The communities that sacrificed their first-born to the demanding gods were trying only to learn the same lesson that, on a higher level of experience, was propounded by Francis Bacon when he said that only by first obeying nature can men command nature. Like the man of science, the primitive man with his ignorant willfulness learned not to knock his head against the impossible.

Men in general, at whatever level of development, show that they recognize injustice—at least in its grosser forms. A recent book entitled *The Sense of Injustice*, by Edmond N. Cahn,²⁵ indicates how much easier it is to perceive the utter wrong than the ideal right. Yet any sense of wrong must at the same time be derived from a sense of right. I shall not describe in detail here Cahn's anthropocentric view of justice, except to mention his testimony that the sense of injustice (which he describes as "an indissociable blend of reason and empathy") is "an awareness that is not necessarily lulled by mere disparity of culture, law or ethical tradition, for Socrates' fate haunts every generation. The criterion is whether the circumstances permit imaginative interchange. If the specific threat be such as to project itself out of history and into the radius of possible experience, it becomes real, it calls for action. For example, corrupt judges and mob passion are ominous in every age."²⁶ This observation contains nothing new. Yet what elaborate and expensive undertakings are now being sponsored by numerous foundations in this country, to investigate the problem of whether human values have any objective validity or not! What may seem to be the excesses of the present-day empirical scholasticism will do no harm, however, in confirming as true something that was also asserted by the deductive scholasticism of the Middle Ages. If, with regard to man's distinctive nature, diverse methods of inquiry converge upon similar conclusions, something has yet been gained. We need not say that it is the whole of a man's obligation, but at least a primary obligation is his duty to his fellow man; the record will show that knowledge of this obligation has never since the beginnings of the Hellenistic-Christian tradition been wholly forgotten.

If one pole of the state is justice and the sense of justice, it might be said that

²⁵ (New York, 1949).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

the other pole is power and the command over power. Yet this statement is not exact. Aristotle was right when he maintained that the end and the meaning of the state is justice. Grotius was also right when he said that "only in this sense may we properly accept the statement that law is that which pleases the stronger party: namely, that we are to understand that law does not attain its external end unless it has force as its servant."²⁷

Law, in one sense, is reason *and* will. Without reason, the will remains chaotic; without will, the reason is impotent, as Kant held. Power may constructively serve the will that is informed by reason. Blind will in the assertion of power is not statehood, but anarchy. The state exists, however, in varying degrees of actuality. With reference to power, the lowest level of state power is that which requires continuous application of force, as in the power of a conquering army. From this it rises through degrees of consent to a point at which consent becomes altogether active and preponderant. "As the force of the state rises from brutality to consent and ultimately to intelligent assent," as Edmond Cahn points out, "it finally attains the same heights as the sense of injustice itself; for the perception of social wrong and the impulse to cure it is a great and potent force."²⁸ Power exercised over others for the material advantage of the exploiter, and power sought solely for the love of power, may be properly described as evil. At the same time, power exerted over others *in some circumstances*, as for example by parents over children, may be good if it is for the good of those who are governed by it. There is some sense after all in Rousseau's paradox about men being forced to be free. And power exercised for the good of others becomes a good also to those by whom it is exercised. Self-control is a good, whether it is self-rule by the individual or control over the individual by the group.

Whatever the logical or psychological implications of the concept of government over self may be, at least it may be said that the self of concern to a reasoned politics must lie within the polarity, at the one extreme, of the individual human being and his rights, and, at the other, of all mankind. The practical difficulties of realizing the greatest potentialities of this self in the present-day world are obvious. Whatever the particular merits of the Soviet system as a practical means to an individual good, it is not founded on that philosophy of trust in the human spirit which promises to unite men. It is true that this promise, as it exists in the Christian faith, is in need of revival and strengthening. A few years ago Harold Laski even argued that Christianity is in fact no longer viable, and that any new faith, to move men, must begin with the assumption that the only way to improve mankind is through an increasing mastery of nature to the end of greater material well-being.²⁹ However, we

²⁷ Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. The passage is from the Prolegomena 19, as published in James Brown Scott (ed.), *Classics of International Law* (Oxford, 1925), Vol. 3, p. 16.

²⁸ Cahn, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁹ See his *Faith, Reason and Civilization* (New York, 1944). Laski maintains, in one of his more superficial arguments, that the present need for a faith points to only two alternatives—Communism or Christianity; and he says that "the regeneration of values which [Christianity in the time of its rise] . . . effected . . . is more likely to be secured in our own

may well ask whether an exclusively materialist hypothesis will not bring us to idolize her whom Laski himself castigates, in William James's phrase, as "that bitch-goddess Success." Charles Malik, the scholarly representative from Lebanon to the Assembly of the United Nations and one-time president of that body, has deplored the fact that the West seems to be competing with Communism for the world's favor mainly with the promise of double the material blessings that Communism has to offer.³⁹ This, as he says, is not *primarily* what the world wants or needs. What modern man needs is something in which he can believe. Millions in the world today are devoted to Communism, not because they have received already their material rewards, nor because they see these things around the corner for *themselves* as individual persons, but because they have been made to feel that they live for a cause. In the intensity of their faith, they do not see that millions among them, disillusioned, have grown despondent or are ridden with fear. In the long run, to be sure, the fatal weakness of Communism is that it tends ideologically to accept base means in the service of what seem to be desirable ends, not knowing how soon the means chosen will overshadow the ends sought. Eventually this overshadowing by what is base is more or less recognized for what it is; then faith is gone. The strength of the West lies, not (in any decisive measure) in its having thus far, lived up to the Christian principles on which its culture is based, but in the fact that, in considerable part, it *has* continued to disavow the materialist creed. As recent events have made reasonably clear, this creed breeds a brutality in human relations and eventually—when what is consistently professed has become, in the long run, an integral part of the social reality—the destruction of the community.

This is not to say that the Christian idea is not subject to change and growth. Is there, indeed, empirical evidence, as Toynbee thinks there is, that the spiritual nature which that idea reflects has risen, and may yet rise, as civilizations decline? Or again, empirical evidence, as Reinhold Niebuhr thinks, that man's destiny lies beyond history? Also, it is not to say that man's freedom is in any wise secure where the problem of bread is ignored by those who have the larger share. In the ideological warfare today, particularly throughout

age by the central value of the Russian Revolution than by any alternative principle we are in a position to choose . . ." (p. 58); that "given the fact of victory by the United Nations, it seems to me inescapable that the Russian idea will play the same part as the principles of 1789 in reconstituting the outlook of the next age. Unless we claim that the Churches will renew their hold on men's allegiance—and there is no serious evidence for the validity of such a claim—the Russian idea seems likely to be the pivotal source from which all values will find the means of renewal . . ." (p. 63); and that although the dignity of the individual reflects a continuing value of the Christian idea, still Christianity remains, except for what is a secularization of the Christian religion peculiar to the United States, essentially as it has been in the past—an otherworldly view of life such that, judging by "the normal canons of proof, . . . the cumulative burden of some two centuries of critical examination is to leave nothing standing of the traditional edifice of Christianity" (p. 109).

³⁹ In an address to the American Political Science Association in convention, Chicago December 28, 1948.

Asia, recognition of this fact has been Communism's strongest selling point. At the same time we may be sure that many who have lived in the totalitarian states during recent times have come to the more or less conscious conclusion that, important though the question is of how, or by whom, property is owned, it may be of small consequence compared with whether a man may have his day in court, or whether he must live always in terror of the secret police. No man is free who lives in fear; and no man is quite free who knows of any other man who lives in fear, because in the realm of moral freedom, where politics has its roots, the good of each and the good of all embrace each other.

In any case, man has never lived without political power, and political power has wrought both good and evil, often necessarily less than the ideal good. We cannot, merely by wishing, greatly improve the savage politics which is war, whether "hot" or "cold"; but it is *fact* that we can, in all politics, pursue the more reasonable course of action, knowing that while, as Goethe said, "the reason of man and the reason of the divinity are two very different things," yet the former partakes of the latter, and it is not wise to discount the possibilities of that participation. It is true that both the study and the practice of politics must attend to the facts of conflict. Political pressures are not unlike mechanical forces in combat, whereby the heaviest and the strongest prevail. Yet we miss the most vital side of political reality when we confine our observations to what might be called the underside of politics, the *how of conflict*, and and do not attend sufficiently to the *how of the creative, and at times sacrificial, fulfillment of the human being himself*; which is to say, to those deeper aspects of the political which are *in fact* of a spiritual nature. Ideas are more than weapons; they are ends *and* means embodied together in a universal which includes human purpose. The nature of the idea, whether explicit or implicit, is of great consequence. It matters greatly that it has been made to seem merely naive to observe how often the poet's simple statement goes deeper than the philosopher's speculation. Nonetheless, when we recall Aristotle's observation—for there was a little of the poet even in him—that "friendship is the foundation of states" or Goethe's that "kindness is the golden chain that binds society together," there is still need to explore the comprehensive fact so expressed.

HYPOTHESES FOR A THEORY OF POLITICAL POWER

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I. THE PROBLEM

What social conditions are prerequisite for given forms of community-wide political behavior ("democracy," "dictatorship," etc.)? What transitions are possible between one such form of power exertion and another? What social conditions are necessary to, or determinate of, a given type of transition? Working hypotheses for the exploration of these problems are presented in this article.

An understanding of the factual limits on the effectiveness of political aspiration and exhortation has suddenly become essential in the struggle for survival of the free areas of the world against totalitarian domination. The discussion and appraisal of foreign policy is dangerously confused because of the failure of political knowledge authoritatively to define the real areas of choice. We no longer have time to embark upon policies merely because they are sentimentally acceptable, if it is possible to determine in advance their probable failure. With the accelerated transformation of age-old social structures caused by industrialism and by the spreading specialization of tasks, a similar necessity for political knowledge is bound to arise in domestic policy as well.¹ The time is here when the broader policy choices must be confined within a practicable range by established theories correlating power behavior with social conditions.

II. THE FORM OF THE HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM

Statements are offered which relate types of community-wide political behavior with social structures involving generalized social classes. A brief descriptive statement indicates for each term a single specific meaning. All other connotations which such a term may have in popular or in technical usage are rigidly excluded. Such restrictive redefinition of terms is essential if an hypothetical system is to be testable. Only a subjective judgment may be made as to whether "democracy," for instance, in its ordinary complex meaning is present or absent in a given situation.

Hypotheses have deliberately been stated baldly and without qualification in order to facilitate their testing. In hypotheses intended as tools of intellectual exploration, the ordinary qualifications of prudent exposition are inappropriate. Indefinite qualifying phrases, such as "generally" or "in most cases," would operate only to disarm criticism and to conceal gaps in knowledge.

The present hypotheses have reference only to what *is* or to what *can be*. Questions of what *ought to be* are excluded from the system.

¹ See especially Peter F. Drucker, *The New Society; The Anatomy of the Industrial Order* (New York, 1950).

Postulates are offered as organizing the hypothetical system. They assert a minimum body of assumptions from which the rest of the system, the theorems, may be rigidly deduced. The theorems which have been stated take the form of answers to the questions propounded in the initial discussion of the problem. Any other statements rigidly deducible from the postulates are also a part of the system.

The system, in the main, states possibilities and impossibilities rather than rigid causal sequences. An area of indeterminacy is left which might be considered the range of volition as cause.

Footnotes indicate some of the author's hunches and approximate hypotheses and some of the sources which have influenced the construction of the system. This material is no part of the formal logical system of the postulates and theorems, nor should it be read as amending or qualifying in any way their verbal form.

Proof of hypotheses having empirical reference can consist only of their failure over time to encounter disproof by empirical data. Any unstated implications rigidly deducible from the postulates must likewise conform with empirical data if the system is valid.

III. THE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE

The hypothetical system has reference only to events within a political community. By a community is meant a territorial segment of society bounded by barriers to free social intercourse. A community is considered political if its culture renders value-laden, comprehensible, and normally acceptable the formal administration of justice, the exercise of executive powers by police or military formations, and some degree of centralization of the control of these functions for the whole community. The boundaries of a political community will be considered to be marked by the enforcement of customs and immigration regulations. A political community may, therefore, be a state, the home area of a state, a detached dependency of a state, or an area under military occupation.

Excluded from reference in the hypotheses, accordingly, are (1) such tribal communities as have lacked true political institutions, (2) events (such as wars) which embrace more than one community, and (3) events immediately precipitated by the termination of a community, as by annexation or conquest. When a larger community receives accretions which are relatively small in either area or population, however, the continuity of the larger community and, therefore, the relevance of the hypotheses will be assumed.

IV. DEFINITION OF EMPIRICAL REFERENCE OF TERMS

Political Behavior. Political behavior prevailing in a community is to be classified into six forms as follows: (1) Democratic Constitutional, (2) Traditional Constitutional, (3) Traditional Autocratic, (4a) Totalitarian Revolutionary of lesser duration than N, (4b) Totalitarian Revolutionary of at least

duration N, and (5) Totalitarian Dictatorial.² To classify the behavior of a particular community at a particular time the following key is to be employed:³

- I. It is generally believed in the community that elections open to mass suffrage will be held periodically and that the displacement of important governmental leaders as a result of the voting in such elections is a practical possibility: *Form 1*.
- II. Not so: *Forms 2, 3, 4, 5*.
 - A. All important governmental decisions appear to be made by, or under specific delegation from, several definite agencies among which powers of action are believed in the community to be distributed by established rules: *Form 2*.
 - B. Not so: *Forms 3, 4, 5*.
 1. Debates in which governmental leaders take divergent positions on important policy questions never come to public attention: *Form 5*.
 2. Not so: *Forms 3, 4*.
 - a. Within wide geographical or structural areas, verbal conformity to a belief-system that is not largely traditional is demanded under severe social or governmental penalties: *Form 4*.
 - (1) No more than one political personage has a genuine and independent popular following: *Form 4b*.
 - (2) Not so: *Form 4a*.
 - b. Not so: *Form 3*.

It should be noted that what is loosely called "revolution" (civil war or the presence of rival governmental regimes within a community) is compatible with the specifications for either Form 3 or Form 4 but probably incompatible (empirically if not logically) with those for the other forms. It is intended to segregate the major social convulsions under Form 4, leaving the instances of warfare as a semi-institutionalized means of succession to a chief office without specific diagnostic value in the classification.⁴

Social Classes. Three types of social classes will be referred to: a V (verbally skilled) class, an A (high deference status) class, and a counter-A class.⁵ Reference

² The numbering of the forms is thought to measure the degree to which public expression of group interests affects policy decisions, *Form 1* having the highest, and *Form 5* the lowest, value. This would be an important evaluative criterion, according to the theory of R. M. MacIver in *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), but it is no part of the definition of the terms as here used.

³ Specifications for *Forms 2* and *4* refer to the existence of certain forms of belief-systems, in the former case what is usually called a "constitution," in the latter an "ideology." For an exploration of what can be meant objectively by the existence of a normative system, see the author's "Law as an Objective Political Concept," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 229-249 (April, 1949).

⁴ In naming the forms, "constitutional" has been used for both Form 1 and Form 2 and "totalitarian" for both Form 4 and Form 5, on the assumption that empirically the specification for Form 2 would be likely to be true for instances of Form 1, and that for Form 4 for instances of Form 5. Both Form 2 and Form 3 are designated "traditional," on the assumption that no instances of the other forms occurred before very recent times, unless possibly in some city-states. Form 2 is probably rare or non-existent today. The foregoing considerations are essentially literary and none of these linkages is asserted in the definitions.

⁵ It seems expedient to refer to social classes in analysis by symbols rather than words, in an effort to preserve the extreme abstraction with which they are defined. For a hundred years analysis by social class has been the most obvious lead to effective political explanation. It has failed to produce reliable knowledge because of the character of the classes

will be made to the A class as being "closed" under certain circumstances and to the V class as "increasing" under certain circumstances. X, Y, and Z will be used as placeholders for numerical values for the sizes of these classes. They may be thought of tentatively as in the neighborhood of 2, 5, and 10 per cent of the labor force, respectively.

The size of a V class is to be measured by the following indices:

1. In a generally illiterate community the V class will be considered to be of approximately the same number as those literate persons who have regular occupational occasions to read and write.
2. In other cases, the V class will be of approximately the same number as the members of those occupational groupings in which propaganda, record-keeping, or the issuance or drafting of instructions or explanations addressed to others is a major part of the work.

A V class will be regarded as "increasing" when it can be shown to be proportionately increasing by a historical series of statistics under the preceding specifications or when the proportion of persons attending the higher levels of educational institutions can be shown to be increasing.⁶

The A class may be thought of as consisting of those persons who have a status in which they constantly receive deference, including deference from organizational superiors (if any) as well as from inferiors, and who may be presumed to have confidence in retaining such a status indefinitely. Its size is to be measured from data indicating the net size of the following groups, after allowing for estimated duplications of individuals and subject to the qualifications stated:

1. Holders of high directive positions in public and corporate bureaucracies.
2. Well-known political figures with a considerable following on a nation-wide basis.
3. Members of families of high prestige having nation-wide connections in the other categories.
4. Persons of sufficient private wealth to be able to live lavishly without a regular occupation.
5. Persons widely reputed in influential circles to have exceptional competence or learning in subjects regarded in such circles as useful or honorific.

Any such category or any definable part of such a category is to be excluded, or included at a nominal numerical value, if (1) under the prevailing culture or under an official or a widely popular ideology, membership in it carries disrepute; or if (2) recent instances are well-known and numerous in which individ-

specified. They have been equally identifiable by a variety of attributes. "Proletariat," "bourgeoisie," "elite," etc., have either been common linguistic terms ambiguously defined by the culture, or, at most, they have been "historical individuals" in Weber's sense and unsuitable for causal explanation involving the passage of time.

⁶ It is believed that empirically an increase in the V class steadily accompanies technological progress, the increase attaining a very rapid rate in the late historical stages of industrial development. While a society of simple technology requires verbally skilled persons only for managing its religious and political affairs, in an advanced industrial society economic production can be carried on only with the stimulation and direction afforded by countless pen-pushers and talkers. This is because technological progress constantly breaks down tasks into units whose social relations are less and less directly intelligible either to the participants or to the public.

uals of such category came to be excluded, for any reason except natural death, from all the above categories.⁷

An A class will be understood to be closed if there is evidence that persons rarely enter it in adult life, or only do so through certain very definite career patterns which must be begun in the first few years of adult life or earlier.

The counter-A class will be understood to comprise such V class persons as have become formulators and rationalizers of cultural orientations other than those of the A class. Its members presumably secure a moderately assured deference in certain circles by this substitute for more normal V class avenues of advance toward A class status. Its membership will be assumed to amount to the value of X when several distinct schools of thought on social or political questions are encountered in currently produced literature (broadly conceived) and have significant popular followings.

Transition between Forms. A direct transition from one of the forms of political behavior to another will mean a transition in which no classifiable form of behavior intervenes and in which at most a few weeks of confusion occur between definite identifiable behavior of the initial and of the final state.

V. POSTULATES

1. When there is behavior of the form stated at the left, the sizes of the classes are as indicated:⁸

<i>Form</i>	<i>A Class</i>	<i>Counter-A Class</i>	<i>V Class</i>
1. Democratic Constitutional	at least Y	(not postulated)	at least Z
2. Traditional Constitutional	at least Y	(not postulated)	(not postulated)
3. Traditional Autocratic	at least X	(not postulated)	(not postulated)
4a. Totalitarian Revolutionary of less than Duration N	null	at least X	(not postulated)
4b. Totalitarian Revolutionary of at least Duration N	null	less than X but not null	(not postulated)
5. Totalitarian Dictatorial	less than X but not null	null	(not postulated)

⁷ Restriction of the A class to persons of the most assured deference represents an attempt to get around the road block that has obstructed the development of previous "elite" and "ruling class" theories, as well as other social class theories of politics: multiple and ambiguous reference of the terms selected. Most serious attempts at a science of politics have used some sort of elite concept. A valuable selection and presentation of such theories is James Burnham's *The Machiavellians* (New York, 1943).

⁸ Recent knowledge is tending to show that the assumed normal income-orientation of behavior (based on the popularization of formal economics in the nineteenth century) is pure social myth, and that deference and assured status are more nearly universal human goals. Industrial management studies have particularly contributed to this insight. See F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941). Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Power, a New Social Analysis* (New York, 1938). The relation between a class of

2. There is always behavior of one, and only one, of the forms referred to.
 3. When there is behavior of a form for which the size of the counter-A class is not postulated, either the counter-A class is null or there is an increasing V class equal in size to twice the A class and the A class is closed.⁹

4. An existing class can gradually increase or decrease in size except (1) that a counter-A class cannot increase while there is behavior of Form 4a or Form 4b or a transition between them and (2) that an A class cannot gradually become less than X without disappearing.¹⁰

5. When a direct transition from one form of behavior to another takes place,

- (1) No change in the size or existence of any class can take place at the time of transition, except
- (2) that a one step increase or decrease in the size of a class can take place at the time of transition among the steps "less than X but not null," "at least X but less than Y," "at least Y but less than Z," and "at least Z,"; and
- (3) that an A class can disappear at the time of transition if a counter-A class of at least X is present before and after the transition; and
- (4) that, if no A class is present in the initial state, a counter-A class can be transformed at the time of transition into an A class of commensurate size.

VI. THEOREMS

1. Direct transitions are possible or impossible as shown in the following table, where I means impossible, (1) means possible under the first clause of Postulate 5 (no change in class composition at the time of transition being necessarily involved),¹¹ and (2), (3), and (4) mean possible under the exceptions so numbered in Postulate 5:

	FROM					
	1	2	3	4A	4B	5
	DEM.	TRAD.	TRAD.	TOT.	TOT.	TOT.
	CON.	CON.	AUT.	REV.	REV.	Dict.
				NOT N	N	
TO						
1. Dem. Con.	—	(1)	(1)	(4)	I	I
2. Trad. Con.	(1)	—	(1)	(4)	I	I
3. Trad. Aut.	(1)	(1)	—	(4)	I	(2)
4a. Tot. Rev. Not N	(3)	(3)	(3)	—	I	I
4b. Tot. Rev. N	I	I	I	(2)	—	I
5. Tot. Dict.	I	I	I	I	(4)	—

assured deference and the more constitutional political forms in these hypotheses is suggested by this trend of thought.

⁹ This is suggested by Crane Brinton's analysis of the events preceding the major revolutions in *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1938).

¹⁰ The first exception is suggested by the aphorism: "The Revolution eats its children." Positive demonstration of "loyalty" or "orthodoxy" is always impossible. More and more persons are likely to be discredited when public attention centers on such questions. The second exception turns out to be logically necessary in order that the system may postulate that totalitarian dictatorship arises only out of prolongation of the revolutionary process. Cf. Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1942).

¹¹ In determining possibilities, it should be noted that a condition postulated for a final state could exist in an initial state if it does not contradict any condition postulated for the initial state, regardless of whether it is positively postulated for the initial state.

2. In all cases of transition designated (3) (which may be called "revolution"), in the initial state there must be an increasing V class equal to twice the size of the A class, a closed A class, and a counter-A class amounting at least to X.

3. In all cases of transition designated (4) (which may be called "stabilization of revolution"), the counter-A class must at the time of transition become an A class of commensurate size. If the transition is to Form 1, there must be in the initial state a V class at least equal to Z, or else such a class at least equal to Y which increases to Z at the time of transition. If the transition is either to Form 1 or to Form 2, there must be in the initial state a counter-A class at least equal to Y.

4. In a transition from Form 4a to Form 4b, the counter-A class in the initial state must amount to less than Y and at the time of transition must come to be less than X.

5. In a transition from Form 5 to Form 3, the A class at the time of transition must come to equal X.

6. In all cases of transition designated (1) each class postulated for the final state must exist in the initial state either in the size postulated for the final state or else in a size one step removed among the steps stated in Postulate 5 from that postulated for the final state and, in that case, it must increase or decrease by that required step at the time of transition.

7. Whenever under Form 5 the A class becomes equal to X, a transition to Form 3 will take place.

8. Whenever under Form 1 or Form 2 the A class ceases to equal Y, a transition will occur to either Form 3 or Form 4a.

9. Whenever under Form 1 the V class ceases to equal Z, a transition will occur to Form 2 or to Form 3 or to Form 4a.

10. Whenever under Form 3 the A class ceases to equal X, a counter-A class amounting to X will have been present (together with an increasing V class which has been twice the size of the A class) and the A class will have been closed; the A class will disappear and a transition will occur to Form 4a.

11. Whenever under Form 4a the counter-A class ceases to equal X, a transition to Form 4b will occur.

VII. HISTORICAL VALIDATION

Validation of the foregoing hypothetical system can take place only by the examination of sequences of historical data. Time sequences in which successions of forms of community-wide political behavior appear to have occurred might be examined to determine whether all the transitions are such as are possible under the foregoing hypotheses. Four suggested schemata follow. As presented, they are sequences conformable with the theory. Upon examination of detailed data, are the ascriptions of successive characterizations acceptable? If not, would revised schemata agreeable to the data involve transitions impossible under the theorems? Note that legalistic and cultural usage of terms is ignored (revolution being, for instance, not necessarily coincident with a

breach of legality). For Russia, it is suggested that behavior may be characterized as traditional autocratic until 1917, as totalitarian revolutionary until 1928, with the duration N ensuing in that year, and as totalitarian dictatorial since 1928. For Japan, it is suggested that traditional autocratic behavior prevailed until 1919, traditional constitutional until 1931, totalitarian revolutionary until 1936 (without duration N being attained), and traditional autocratic again until 1945. The present theory is inapplicable to the transition in the latter year since the fact of conquest abruptly ended the community, the universe of discourse of the present hypotheses. For Germany, the following sequence is suggested: traditional autocratic to 1917, totalitarian revolutionary in 1918 (without duration N being attained), constitutional democratic to 1930, totalitarian revolutionary to 1934, with duration N ensuing in that year, and totalitarian dictatorial from 1934 to 1945. As in the case of Japan, conquest in the latter year terminated the universe of discourse within which these hypotheses are applicable. For Great Britain, the sequence of behavior in terms of the present theory would appear to be the following: traditional autocratic until 1640, totalitarian revolutionary until 1660 (without duration N being attained), traditional autocratic again until 1687, totalitarian revolutionary to 1689 (without duration N being attained), traditional constitutional until 1832, and democratic constitutional thereafter.

THE EUROPEAN SCENE

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE¹

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The venerable city of Strasbourg has long been famed for its stately Cathedral, its University, its baroque palaces, the quaint houses of its medieval quarter known as *La Petite France*—and for its greatest single gift to European culture: the invention of printing by Johann Gutenberg five centuries ago. During the past year its people have proudly displayed a new edifice symbolizing what many regard as the greatest single step toward European unity. *La Maison de l'Europe*, built in five months on land given by the municipality, was formally opened on August 7, 1950.² It stands in the northeast quarter of the city at *Place Lenôtre*, facing the pleasant park of *l'Orangerie* across the tree-lined *Allée de la Robertsau*. The long white structure, with fifteen flags floating in the breeze before its central portal, is strictly functional, having been planned, with a view toward efficiency and economy, as a temporary headquarters to last ten years.

The work which goes on within this "House of Europe" resembles, on first view, that of a "government," with legislature, cabinet, and ministries. The handsome *Salle des Séances* contains a wide semi-circle of two hundred desks and chairs beneath commodious galleries for pressmen, dignitaries, and the public. The chamber, with ear-phones at every place for simultaneous translation into English or French, is a model of lighting, ventilation, and acoustics. Here, since their first meeting in 1949 in the *Palais Universitaire*, the members of the Consultative Assembly foregather twice a year—to deliberate in committees, to confer in the lobby or the bar, to debate issues in public plenary sessions, and to vote their conclusions after full and free discussion. The Committee of Ministers ordinarily meets thrice a year, always in private within its own well-appointed hall. The numerous rooms in the far-flung wings of the building, flanking the gardens to the rear, are occupied by the officials of the Secretariat, now some two hundred in number and headed by Secretary-General Jacques-Camille Paris.

Whatever else it may be—and here in truth is "something new under the sun"—the Council of Europe is not a "government," despite appearances and anticipations. This circumstance may explain the relative indifference hitherto shown toward the Council by most American publicists and political leaders.

¹ I am indebted to the Foundation for World Government for a grant to finance a larger project, in pursuit of which I was able to visit Strasbourg in May, 1951, during the first part of the third session of the Consultative Assembly. I am also grateful for numerous courtesies to Franklin Roudybush, Cultural Attaché of the United States Consulate in Strasbourg, and to Nic. M. Athanassiou and Noel Salter of the Council's Secretariat. All opinions here expressed are, of course, entirely my own, save where other sources are cited.

² A full account of the planning of the building (by Bertrand Monnet, architect), its construction, and its formal opening is contained in the fourth issue of *Saisons d'Alsace (Revue Trimestrielle)* (Aug., 1950).

Yet this novel institution is worthy of the close scrutiny of all political scientists concerned with trends of change in structures of power and patterns of decision-making. It likewise merits more general attention as a fulfillment, albeit tentative and incomplete, of age-old visions of the unity of Europe and of newer demands for European "integration." Here is a living entity which must be taken into account in all future efforts toward more perfect union. Here also is a concrete illustration of "the art of the possible" and of the difficulties and dilemmas besetting all attempts to establish supra-national government in the human community, whether on a regional or global basis.

The origins, machinery, and activities of the Council have received little systematic analysis on the American side of the Atlantic.³ Within the confines of an article, matters of such scope and gravity, fraught with widely divergent hopes and fears, cannot be given that amplitude of treatment which they so richly deserve. An introduction—and I here pretend to no more than this—may nevertheless prove useful to non-initiates.

I. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

That the morphology and metabolism of organisms and institutions are implicit in their heredity is an assumption common to most biologists, historians, and social scientists. This premise is peculiarly applicable to the phenomenon here in hand. For centuries past, innumerable schemes have been advanced for the unification of Europe. The best known are those of the Duc de Sully, William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham, Kant, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, Herriot, and Briand. That none bore fruit, or even came to flower, was due not to lack of wit or will on the part of their authors but to lack of receptivity on the part of those whom the authors addressed.

Politically effective support for European Union did not materialize until three new factors combined to produce a new market for an old proposal—i.e., the grim impact of World War II on Western European life and thought; the menace of an expanding Soviet totalitarianism; and the moral support of the United States. Misery alone was insufficient as an incentive, until threats from the East and proddings from the West fostered a widespread change of mind and heart. No visible results accrued from Winston Churchill's plea, born of despair, for "Union Now" with France (June 16, 1940); nor from his secret memorandum of October, 1942, born of prophetic apprehension, wherein he argued that a "United States of Europe" would be necessary to protect civilization from "Russian barbarism";⁴ nor yet from his later public appeal

³ See, however, the excellent summaries and bibliographies in *International Organization* and in the *News Letter* of the American Committee on United Europe, New York, City.

⁴ This communication to the British War Cabinet was first made public on September 5, 1949, in an address by Harold Macmillan to the Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg. Mr. Churchill had written: "It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe. Hard as it is to say now I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will

(March 22, 1943), born of foresight and hope, for a Council of Europe.⁵ More heartening was the reception given his address in Zurich on September 19, 1946, in which he commented on past horrors and warned of worse to come:

But for the generosity of the United States, which have now realized that the ruin or enslavement of Europe would involve their own fate as well, the Dark Ages would have returned with all their cruelty and squalor. They may still return. . . . Yet all the while there is a remedy which . . . would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and happy as Switzerland is today. . . . We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The process is simple. . . .⁶

Experience was to show that the process was by no means simple. What Churchill here proposed was a Continental regional group within the U. N., with Britain, America, and Russia outside as "friends and sponsors of the new Europe" and champions of its "right to live and shine." Comment was widespread but confused. Propaganda activities were intensified by the United Europe Movement (Chairman, Winston Churchill), the European Union of Federalists (Dr. Hendrik Brugmans), the Economic League for European Cooperation (Paul Van Zeeland), the French Council for a United Europe (Raoul Dautry), the Socialist Movement for United States of Europe (Michel Rasquin), and *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (Robert Bichet). In December, 1947, these groups coordinated their efforts through an "International Committee of the Movements for European Unity," with Duncan Sandys as Executive Chairman and Dr. J. H. Retinger as Secretary-General.

These signs of public interest, coupled with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Red putsch in Prague, the Berlin blockade, and other developments of the "Cold War," fostered cautious but definite official endorsement of the goal on both sides of the Atlantic. John Foster Dulles observed on January 20, 1948, that there was "vital need for some sort of customs and monetary union of the Western European States, including Germany." "I believe the time is ripe," declared Ernest Bevin on January 22, "for a consolidation of Western Europe." The State Department expressed approval. While hinting at difficulties, Mr. Attlee asserted on May 5: "I have often said that ultimately I believe we must come to a Federation of Europe." This objective was more vigorously endorsed by Paul-Henri Spaak, then Premier of Belgium, Count Sforza, and Georges Bidault. The American Congress declared, in the

be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council of perhaps ten units, including the former Great Powers. . . ."

⁵ In a broadcast to the world, the Prime Minister declared: "One can imagine that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations there should come into being a Council of Europe. We must try to make this Council of Europe into a really effective league, with all the strongest forces woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes, and with armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce these decisions and to prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars. This Council, when created, must eventually embrace the whole of Europe, and all the main branches of the European family must someday be partners in it."

⁶ Authorized text in *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 140, pp. 297-301 (Dec., 1946).

Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, that it was "the policy of the people of the United States to encourage these countries through their joint organization to exert and sustain common efforts to achieve speedily that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity" and in the amended ECA Act of 1949: "It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe. . . ." The Brussels Pact of March 17, 1948, was to prove the precursor not only of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, but also of the enterprise at Strasbourg.

In March, 1948, a group of British M.P.'s, whose example was followed by similar groups in France and the Netherlands, endorsed the establishment of a provisional Council of Europe, to be made up of representatives of the Marshall Plan countries, and the convening of a constituent assembly of parliamentarians to consider full federation, with common citizenship, currency, defense forces, and foreign policy. The "International Committee" now convoked an unofficial "Congress of Europe" at the Hague, May 8-10, 1948. Some three hundred participants, many of them distinguished public figures, were welcomed by Princess Juliana in the Knights' Hall of the Netherlands Parliament Building. A "Message to Europeans," adopted by acclamation, asserted: "Human dignity is Europe's finest achievement, freedom her true strength. Both are at stake in our struggle. The union of our Continent is now needed, not only for the salvation of the liberties we have won, but also for the extension of their benefits to all mankind. Upon this union depends Europe's destiny and the world's peace." The Hague Congress pledged itself to work for a united Europe, a Charter of Human Rights, a Court of Justice, and a European Assembly, to be chosen by the parliaments of the participating States, to devise measures for attaining a full political and economic union "open to all European nations democratically governed."⁷

II. DIPLOMATIC GENESIS

During the following year private pressures evoked the public decisions which led to what Spaak was to call "a dream come true" and "a great new experiment in European politics." In the wake of the meeting at the Hague, the "International Committee" brought into being the "European Movement," with Winston Churchill, Léon Blum, Alcide de Gasperi, and Paul-Henri Spaak as Honorary Presidents. At a conference in Brussels, February 25-28, 1949, the leaders of the Movement organized it on a permanent basis⁸ and

⁷ The Congress was divided into Political, Economic and Social, and Cultural Sections. The full texts of the Resolutions, along with the principal speeches and photographs of the participants, are to be found in *Europe Unites* (London, 1949). For other aspects of the background, see Andrew and Frances Boyd, *Western Union* (London, 1948).

⁸ The European Movement consists of National Councils, represented roughly in proportion to the population of their countries on an International Council, which also includes a representative of the Holy See, and two representatives each of democratic leaders-in-exile from Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia, and Spain. The Chairman of the International Council is Léon Jouhaux, leader of the *Force Ouvrière*, and the Chairman of the International Executive Committee is Paul-Henri Spaak. Many members of the Council later became delegates to the Consultative

adopted further resolutions for transmission to their governments.

The Consultative Council—i.e., the five Foreign Ministers—of the Brussels Treaty Powers had meanwhile met in July, 1948. Here Bidault officially proposed the creation of a European parliament, to consist of delegates chosen by national legislatures. Spaak and Bevin were not yet prepared to commit themselves. The British Foreign Secretary, in his sponsorship of "Western Union" (a term of many meanings), had been vague as to details, preferring to describe what he had in mind as "more of a brotherhood and less of a rigid system." His words left the impression, as one commentator aptly put it, of "judiciously considered imprecision."⁹

Intergovernmental consultation and collaboration, in both the economic and military fields, grew apace during 1948. But American enthusiasm for the "integration" of Western Europe, repeatedly voiced by ECA Director Paul Hoffman and other Washington spokesmen, was not shared by all European Cabinets. Rome urged the extension of the OEEC into other areas of cooperation. Paris on August 18, announced its "active support" of the European Movement's memorandum, proposing that the Brussels Treaty Powers hold a preliminary conference to discuss the establishment of a European Assembly. London was cautious. The publication on August 26 of correspondence between Attlee and Churchill, indicating marked lack of ardor for the French initiative on the part of the Prime Minister, led the State Department to declare that "the United States Government strongly favors the progressively closer integration of the free nations of Western Europe."

Appeals for full federation continued to flow from various private or quasi-public groups. In September, 1948, some two hundred Western European legislators belonging to the European Parliamentary Union, of which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was Secretary-General, came together at Interlaken to draft a federal plan which closely resembles the proposals set forth by R. W. G. ("Tim") Mackay, M.P., in his challenging book, *Western Union in Crisis*.¹⁰ What was here contemplated was an elective bicameral legislature with delegated law-making powers, and an executive Federal Council responsible to the lower chamber—which, in cases of conflict, could override the upper house by a two-thirds vote. With minor variations, this same conception was to find new expression a year later in the "Draft of a Federal Pact" formulated by the Extraordinary General Assembly of the European Union of Federalists in Paris on October 29–31, 1949, and submitted for consideration to the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly.¹¹ But the European Cabinets and the dominant elements in the European Movement were by no means prepared as yet to accept the federalist position.

Assembly. The full membership list, along with an account of the activities of the European Movement and the texts of its resolutions, is available in *European Movement and the Council of Europe* (London, 1950).

⁹ Nicholas Mansergh, "Britain, the Commonwealth, and Western Union," *International Affairs*, Vol. 24, pp. 491–504 (July, 1948).

¹⁰ (Oxford, 1949.)

¹¹ For details of these and related projects, see Alan de Russett, *Strengthening the Framework of Peace* (London, 1950), pp. 116–217.

In October, 1948, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Powers decided to establish a "Committee for the Study of European Unity." When its members met in Paris on November 26, under the chairmanship of Herriot, they found the French-Belgian proposals for a European Assembly matched by a British counter-proposal for a Council of Ministers, to be named by Cabinets, to meet periodically, and to consider "all matters of common concern" *except* defense and economic issues within the scope of the OEEC. After weeks of discussion, agreement was reached to establish both projected bodies. New disputes arose, however, over the nature of the proposed Assembly. The British insisted that Communists be excluded and argued for appointed national delegations, which would uniformly uphold the views of their governments. French and Benelux representatives favored an elected body of celebrities, who should be free to express their individual opinions. When the Committee adjourned on January 20, 1949, these differences were unresolved, despite the tentative choice of Strasbourg as the site of the new organization. Bevin, on January 25, strongly denied that the British Government was engaging in delay or obstructionism, adding that he wanted "a practical organism in Europe" and not "a mere talking-shop for the passing of resolutions."¹²

On January 28, 1949, the Brussels Consultative Council (Bevin, Schuman, Spaak, Dirk U. Stikker, and Joseph Bech), meeting in London, was able to announce an accord to establish "a Council of Europe consisting of a ministerial committee meeting in private and a consultative body meeting in public," with delegates to the latter to be chosen in whatever fashion each country might prefer. The Permanent Commission of the Brussels Union disclosed further agreements on February 5: the Consultative Assembly would be purely advisory, would meet only once a year, and would be forbidden to discuss defense problems. Spokesmen for Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Eire met with the Brussels Powers in March to discuss a draft constitution and to pave the way for a full conference of Foreign Ministers. Throughout these proceedings, the European Movement was regularly consulted and exercised appreciable influence on the final result through sundry memoranda. The Movement brought together at Church House, Westminster, April 20-26, an unofficial European Economic Conference which prepared detailed recommendations for the achievement of full economic union.¹³ The Foreign Ministers of the ten States concerned met in St. James Palace, London, on May 3. Two days later they attached their signatures to the "Statute of the Council of Europe." Less than a year had passed since such a step had been urged by the "Congress of Europe" at the Hague. The green-and-white "E" flag of the European Movement, hitherto the sign of a hope, was now to become the symbol of an institution.

III. STATUTE AND STRUCTURE

Buildings correspond to their blue-prints more closely than do governments to their constitutions, since things alive are ever in flux. The Council of Europe,

¹² Cf. R. G. Hawtrey, *Western European Union: Implications for the United Kingdom* (London, 1949), pp. 26ff.

¹³ Cf. *European Movement and the Council of Europe*, pp. 51-110.

though not a government, is yet a living, and therefore, changing organization. Its Statute, though not a constitution, is yet a source of basic law, already modified in operation and certain to be modified further under the pressure of experience. Yet, thus far, those inside and outside the Council who have urged drastic alterations have been thwarted by those satisfied with the *status quo*, or at least somewhat disposed to endure acknowledged defects rather than risk unknown perils. Practice and theory are in consequence more closely akin in Strasbourg than in some other capitals. Hence, no violence will be done to truth if the Council is described in terms of the provisions of its charter, with notice taken *en passant* of how the major stipulations have been applied.

The Statute of May 5, 1949, is a multilateral treaty of forty-two articles, formally ratified by the signatory governments, with the original signed copy in English and French deposited in the British archives.¹⁴ Parenthesized numbers below refer to its articles. The Preamble reaffirms faith in "the spiritual and moral values which . . . are the true source of individual freedom, political liberty, and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy," and asserts the necessity of bringing European States "into closer association." The aim of the Council is described (Art. 1) as "greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." The goal is to be furthered by "discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal, and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Participation is not to "affect the collaboration of its Members in the work of the U. N. and of other international organizations." But "matters relating to national defense do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe" (Art. 1, d).

Members "must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within their jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realization of the aims of the Council" (Art. 3). Any European State able and willing to meet these conditions may become a member, on the invitation of the Committee of Ministers, through deposit with the Secretary-General of an instrument of accession to the Statute (Art. 4). Associate members are entitled to be represented only in the Consultative Assembly (Art. 5). Greece, Turkey, and Iceland were admitted as full members in August, 1949. The Committee agreed in November, 1949, to

¹⁴ The text, published in pamphlet form in Strasbourg, is reprinted, among other places, in the *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 43, pp. 162-172 (Oct., 1949), and in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (New York, 1950), pp. 435-445. Those desirous of investigating in detail the work of the Council of Europe should peruse the Council publications (all available through the Columbia University Press), particularly the *Agendas and Minutes of Proceedings*, *Official Reports*, *Working Papers*, and *Compilation of Recommendations and Resolutions of the Consultative Assembly*, along with both T. G. B. Cocks, *Procedure of the Consultative Assembly* (Strasbourg, 1951), which contains the full texts of the Statute and the Rules of the Assembly, and British Command Papers of 1949, Nos. 7687, 7720, 7807, 7780, 7838.

consult the Assembly before inviting new States to membership. On March 30, 1950, it invited Western Germany and the Saar to become associate members. The Government at Bonn was invited to become a full member on May 2, 1951. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer forthwith took his place on the Committee of Ministers. Members may withdraw or be suspended or expelled for violation of obligations, but no such instance has occurred to date. At the time of writing, only five European States outside of the Soviet orbit are non-members: Austria, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.

The Committee of Ministers consists of the ministers of foreign affairs of the members, or their alternates, with each state entitled to one vote (Art. 14). Subject to the right of the Assembly to manage its own affairs within the limits of its powers, the Committee of Ministers "shall decide with binding effect all matters relating to the internal organization and arrangements of the Council of Europe," including financial and administrative regulations (Art. 16). "Unless the Committee decides otherwise," it meets in Strasbourg in private "before and during the beginning of every session of the Consultative Assembly and at such other times as it may decide" (Art. 21). Meetings were held in Paris during 1949 and in Rome during 1950. The presidency is rotated. Save for minor exceptions (cf. Art. 20), all resolutions of the Committee "require the unanimous vote of the representatives casting a vote, and of a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee."

"The Consultative Assembly," declares Article 22, "is the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe. It shall debate matters within its competence under this Statute and present its conclusions, in the form of recommendations, to the Committee of Ministers." Its agenda must be approved by the Committee (Art. 23). Representatives, all of whom may have substitutes, are "appointed in such a manner as the Government of (each) Member decides," but all must be nationals of their States and none can at the same time be a member of the Committee of Ministers (Art. 25). In practice, all are parliamentarians. Some have been named by cabinets (e.g., the British, German, Benelux and Scandinavian) and others (e.g., the French and Italian) elected by parliaments, though election is to be the rule after 1951. Along with the Secretary-General and his Deputy, all enjoy the equivalent of diplomatic immunities, under the accord signed in Paris on September 2, 1949. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy are each entitled to eighteen representatives; Turkey to eight; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden to six each; Denmark, Eire, and Norway to four each; and Iceland, Luxembourg, and the Saar to three each. Save for the exclusion of Communists by common consent, the representatives within each delegation are expected to reflect the strength of major party groups, though they are seated neither by countries (as at a gathering of diplomats) nor by parties (as in a parliament) but in alphabetical order of their names, and they speak and vote as individuals.¹⁵

¹⁵ See the list of 216 Representatives and Alternates published on February 1, 1951 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe). Senators and Deputies, men and women, liberals and conservatives, socialists and capitalists, cabinet members and "back-benchers" are all to be found on the floor of the Assembly. The British delegation in 1951 consisted of ten

This body of 125 Representatives is neither a diplomatic conference, since its members do not speak for their governments, nor a legislature, since they cannot make law. In organization and action, however, it resembles the latter far more than the former. It is at least a "parliament" in the pristine sense of "speaking-place." It meets once a year for not longer than one month, unless the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers concur in a longer session (Art. 32). Since 1949, when the Assembly met continuously from August 8 to September 8, the annual sessions have been divided into two parts of a fortnight each, several months apart—i.e., August and November, 1950, May and November, 1951. The Committee of Ministers, with the concurrence of the Assembly President, may convoke extraordinary sessions of the Assembly at other times and at places other than Strasbourg (Art. 34).

The Preparatory Commission of 1949 named Edouard Herriot (President of the French National Assembly) as Provisional President of the Assembly. On August 11, Paul-Henri Spaak was unanimously elected permanent President, following his resignation as Belgian Premier and Foreign Minister and his consequent withdrawal from the Committee of Ministers. He was re-elected, though not unanimously, in 1950 and 1951. The President "shall control the proceedings, but shall not take part in the debate or vote" (Art. 28). He represents the Assembly in dealing with the Committee of Ministers and with outside bodies or persons. Under the Rules of the Assembly, the President and six Vice-Presidents, constituting the "Bureau," are elected by secret ballot and majority vote. The Bureau arranges the day-to-day work of the Assembly within the terms of its agenda—which comprises reports from the Committee of Ministers, subjects referred to it by the Ministers for an opinion, and items approved by the Ministers on the proposal either of the Standing Committee or of the Assembly itself.

Save for matters of internal procedure, where a simple majority suffices, all acts of the Assembly require a two-thirds vote (Arts. 29, 30). Such acts take the form of "recommendations," addressed to the Committee of Ministers, "resolutions," addressed to its own committees as directives, and "declarations," addressed to the world at large as expressions of opinions, preferences, or hopes. Such acts in 1949 and 1950 were so numerous—"fifty resolutions in twenty-four hours," as one speaker put it—as to preclude adequate consideration either by the Assembly itself or by those to whom they were addressed.¹⁶ On November 21, 1950, the Assembly accordingly directed its Committee on Rules to take steps to limit the number of recommendations and resolutions, with results still uncertain in mid-year of 1951. All such acts ordinarily involve

Laborites, seven Conservatives, and one Liberal (Lord Layton), all save the latter members of the House of Commons. On June 13, 1951, Churchill criticized Attlee for not sending representatives of ministerial rank. The Prime Minister replied that representatives should speak and vote in a personal capacity, without committing the Government or reflecting its views. See also House of Commons, *Debates*, 5th Ser., Vol. 472, pp. 1259-1262 (March 16, 1949). Turkey's representation has recently been increased to ten.

¹⁶ In 1950, the Assembly passed 58 recommendations and 22 resolutions and declarations, filling 122 large pages in the published *Compilation*.

preliminary general debate, reference to a committee, discussion of the committee's report, and a final vote.¹⁷

Aside from special committees, the Assembly's formal organization is as follows. A Standing Committee, established in September, 1949, and now comprising the President, the six Vice-Presidents, the six Chairmen of the general committees *ex officio*, and fifteen other representatives, meets at least four times a year, in intervals between Assembly sessions, to coordinate reports, resolutions, and recommendations and to facilitate the work of the Assembly. A Joint Committee, formally created August 26, 1950, consists of five members of the Committee of Ministers and seven of the Assembly, including its President, and acts, without reaching decisions by means of a vote, "to maintain good relations between the two bodies and to coordinate their activities." A Credentials Committee of twenty is chosen by lot. The six general committees deal with General Affairs (i.e., political), Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Economic Questions, Social Questions, Cultural and Scientific Questions, and Legal and Administrative Questions. Each comprises a score or more of Deputies, distributed among the member States in rough proportion to their Assembly representation. The composition of the committees is proposed by the Bureau and usually approved without change by the Assembly. Each elects a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, and a *Rapporteur* for each subject. Committees may meet jointly and may name sub-committees. Procedure reflects various compromises between British and Continental practices. Witnesses have not thus far been called, nor is there any power to summon them *sub poena*. When committee conclusions are not unanimous, minority reports are often submitted, as in most legislative bodies.

The Secretary-General and his Deputy are named by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers. He appoints the staff of the Secretariat, all of whose members solemnly affirm that they will serve the Council conscientiously, "uninfluenced by any national considerations" or by any government or other external authority, and none of whose members may hold any other salaried public post or be a member of the Assembly or of any national legislature (Art. 36). The Secretariat serves both the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, but is answerable for its work through the Secretary-General to the Committee (Art. 37). The member States pay the expenses of Ministers and Representatives. All other common expenses, including the cost of the Secretariat, are shared on the basis of population. The annual budget (585,445,000 French francs for 1950) is prepared by the Secretary-General and approved by the Committee of Ministers, with its costs being met by contributions from the member States (Arts. 38, 39). The Statute may be amended, on proposal of the Assembly or of the Committee of Ministers, through a Protocol approved by the Committee and ratified by two-thirds of the member States (Art. 41).

¹⁷ Procedural rules and practices are fully set forth in T. G. B. Cocks, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 43-81, and in the *Chairman's Handbook on the Practice of Committees* (Strasbourg, 1950).

IV. FUNCTIONALISM CONQUERS FEDERALISM

The Council of Europe, like many other political constructs in man's long striving to replace coercion by persuasion in the settlement of disputes, offers to observers and participants alike the spectacle of a kaleidoscopic and somewhat bewildering drama, suffused with divergent views, interests, anxieties, and hopes. The theater and the stage are visible and tangible, simple and clear. But the play itself lacks these attributes. No consistent plot inspires the motions and words of the actors. The lines of cleavage and the patterns of emergent consensus are blurred. Yet a few persistent themes can be discerned through the clouds of verbiage.

National antagonisms find little voice at Strasbourg, for most of the players are "good Europeans" who are of one mind in believing that Western Europe must, somehow, unite or perish. Only the age-old feud of Frenchmen and Germans finds occasional expression.¹⁸ "Neutralism" here finds no following. Neither are there "parties" or "blocs" of individualists and collectivists, though "free enterprise" and "socialism" are both ably represented. Their disciples are agreed that human dignity, civil liberties, and democratic processes have priority over all issues of economic policy.

More vivid and actual is the quarrel between the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly. The relationships between these two bodies are plainly not comparable to those between the two chambers of a legislature, nor do they resemble those between a cabinet and a parliament. Their roles approximate more closely those of independent branches of government under the American principle of separation of power, with concomitant frictions and deadlocks.¹⁹ The Assembly, from the outset, was reluctant to accept the humble function of "consultant"—amid complaints, continued into 1951, that nobody consulted it!—and resented the treatment accorded its recommendations by the Committee of Ministers. As early as August 11, 1949, the Assembly, with Churchill as vigorous champion of its dignity, challenged the Committee's right under the Statute to determine its agenda. When the Committee in September, 1949, disposed of most of the voluminous advice of the Assembly with such formulas as "considerable difficulties," "reserves its position," "unable to accept," reference to other bodies for "examination" or "study," President

¹⁸ On the morning of May 11, 1951, in the course of an Assembly discussion of the Schuman Plan, Ernst Roth, German Social Democrat, denounced French refusal to permit a plebiscite in the Saar, asserted that Germany could never consent to separate representation for the Saar in the High Authority or the Council of Europe, and condemned the prohibition of a planned press conference in Strasbourg with Saar leaders, designed to reveal "actual political conditions" in the area. President Spaak suspended the session when Herr Roth collapsed in the middle of his address. Three days later he died in a local hospital of a second stroke. Cf. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 15, 1951. This personal tragedy impressed many of those who witnessed it, including the present writer, as having more than personal significance. The Assembly endorsed the Schuman Plan, eighty to seven, with nine abstentions (May 11, 1951). Only the German Socialists voted in opposition.

¹⁹ Cf. Sydney D. Bailey, "European Unity and British Policy," *American Perspective*, Vol. 4, pp. 411-420 (Fall, 1950).

Spaak, reflecting the prevailing Assembly attitude, described the Ministers' response as "wretched." In November, 1950, the Assembly complained: "It would appear that. . . lack of effective liaison between the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly has prevented the Committee from grasping the immense importance that the Assembly attaches to consideration being given to its Recommendations. The Assembly regrets. . ."

Thanks to the establishment of the "Joint Committee" in 1950 and a slow amelioration of ministerial views toward the Assembly's bid for a larger voice in Council affairs, these frictions had been reduced by 1951—but without any revision of the Statute, or any expansion in principle of the Assembly's authority. Dirk U. Stikker of the Netherlands opened the morning meeting of May 10, 1951, with a statement, which went unchallenged, that the relations between the Committee and Assembly had improved and with a plea that the Assembly should "bury the hatchet." He also noted that the debate over the "federalization" of Europe had subsided and that the Assembly had accepted the "functional" approach.²⁰

This latter comment marks the terminal point, at least for the present, of the most absorbing single question debated at Strasbourg. On September 5, 1949, Mr. Mackay, seconded by André Philip, moved "that this Assembly considers that its aim and goal is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers."²¹ The Assembly approved, eighty-eight to two, thereby seeming to commit itself to the federalist conception of European unity. But the problem of defining "real powers" in acceptable fashion proved insoluble. In grappling with it, the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly solicited the views of the European Movement and received a somewhat vague reply on January 21, 1950, urging that a "Political Authority" (not very clearly defined) should be supplemented with "functional institutions" of more limited membership and with a "federal organization" within the larger Union for such States as desired to establish one.²² The European Union of Federalists, as already noted, had meanwhile drafted a pact for a full federation of Europe.²³ In an effort to dispell doubt and further the cause of "integration," the American Committee on United Europe, headed by William J. Donovan, requested, received, and published the views of over thirty European leaders—all of whom,

²⁰ Foreign Minister Stikker is also Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the OEEC. He was speaking to the Assembly on May 10, 1951, on behalf of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See his article, "The Functional Approach to European Integration," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, pp. 436-444 (April, 1951).

²¹ For federalist commentaries on these issues, see J. Keith Killby's "Strasbourg, 1949" (mimeographed; London, Federal Union, Ltd.) and *Federal News*, the monthly bulletin of Federal Union Ltd., for October, 1949. An amusing and penetrating account of the 1949 Assembly is offered by Susan Strange, in "Strasbourg in Retrospect," *World Affairs*, Vol. 4, pp. 3-21 (Jan., 1950). On some of the difficulties in the way of federalism, cf. H. H. Spitzer, "Problems of the Organizations of Europe," *American Perspective*, Vol. 4, pp. 402-410 (Fall, 1950).

²² Cf. Alan de Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

²³ Cf. its pamphlet, *From the Powerless Consultative Assembly to a European Pact* (Paris, 1949).

with varying degrees of enthusiasm, were in favor of "union," but few of whom were prepared to give concrete definition to the term.²⁴

In August, 1950, the Assembly, despite the statutory ban on discussion of defense, was moved by the eloquence of Churchill and Reynaud, and by the far thunder of guns in Korea, to urge a European Army under a single European defense minister—though the proposal suffered attenuation in subsequent committee debates and encountered the flat refusal of the Ministers to consider it.²⁵ On the broader issue, the final conclusion of the General Affairs Committee fell far short of federalist hopes. Its proposals were limited to urging a few procedural changes and arguing for the amalgamation of the Council of Ministers of the OEEC with the Strasbourg Committee of Ministers. This modest report, described by Bidault as a "step," though not a "jump," toward "the creation of Europe," was approved on August 18, ninety-four to eight. But all the British Labor delegates abstained.

It was by now evident that most of the Britons at Strasbourg (Conservatives and Laborites alike, though some of the former preferred polemics to candor) were reluctant to move toward any supranational or genuinely federal authority.²⁶ In this they were ultimately joined by the Scandinavians and many of the Beneluxers. Talk of a possible Continental federation without these States evoked French objections, even from federalists, that France could scarcely federate with the two former Axis powers—and German objections that such a union would be "Latin-dominated." On November 17, 1950, Guy Mollet resigned as *rapporteur* of the General Affairs Committee, contending that Continental federation without Britain, still championed by Bidault and Reynaud, was impossible. Two days later the Committee voted, eleven to ten, in favor of European federation, with or without Britain—with the Britons and Scandinavians voting in the majority and explaining that their own governments, while unprepared to yield any of their sovereignty, were quite willing that others should do so if they so desired. A "European Council of Vigilance" set up in Strasbourg by EUF and other federalist groups was unable to alter the final outcome.

On November 23, 1950, by a vote of eighty-two to nineteen with sixteen abstentions, the Assembly approved a committee report endorsing "function-

²⁴ *The Union of Europe: Declarations of European Statesmen* (New York, 1950). Cf. *The New York Times*, February 21, 1950.

²⁵ Russell Hill commented, in the *New York Herald Tribune* on August 17, 1950, that the fate of many Assembly resolutions was "death by a combination of attrition, exposure, shock, malnutrition, and if necessary a thin stiletto in the small of the back."

²⁶ Anthony Crossland, M. P., in "Prospects for the Council of Europe," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (April-June, 1951), observes that British policy toward the Council has "veered uneasily between maternal affection and a barely repressed instinct toward infanticide." See also Maurice Edelman, M. P., "The Council of Europe, 1950," an address at Chatham House, October 31, 1950, in *International Affairs*, Vol. 27 (Jan., 1951); Miss F. L. Josephy, "Hope Deferred," *Federal News*, Oct., 1950; and Alzada Comstock, "Great Britain: Functionalism Preferred," *Current History*, Vol. 20 (Jan., 1951). The shift in the Netherlands position is revealed in Stikker's addresses of October 18, 1950, and of January 18, 1951, found in the *Late News Digest from Holland* (New York, Netherlands Information Bureau.)

alism" as the road to union—i.e., intergovernmental accords to set up "specialized authorities" in specific fields (e.g., transport and agriculture), possessed of no supranational or federal powers. This result was widely attributed to British policy—which at Strasbourg, as at Paris in connection with the Schuman Plan, rejected participation in any arrangements which seemed likely to deprive Westminster of its sovereign powers of decision. As for explanations of this policy, many strands are woven into the web: traditional British empiricism, vestiges of insularity, Laborite distrust of Churchill, Socialist doubts of the viability of any federation dominated by Continental conservatives championing "capitalism," etc. In the last analysis, however, the British position is most easily explicable by reference to the impossibility, whether real or alleged, of gearing together in workable fashion British membership in any true European federation and Britain's special relations with the other members of the Commonwealth and of the Sterling Bloc.²⁷

Recommendation 54 on reform of the Statute (also voted November 23, 1950, seventy-three to seven with sixteen abstentions) appeared to reopen the door to federalism at Strasbourg, but the gesture turned out to be little more than a consolation prize to the vanquished. This long document was blessed by Spaak as the solution to the puzzle of how to achieve "limited" federation. Apart from proposing the fusion of the Brussels Treaty powers organization and the OEEC with the Council of Europe, it embodied in its text the ingenious "Mackay Plan," whereby the Assembly would become a lower chamber with authority to initiate and pass bills, while the Committee of Ministers would become an upper chamber, still acting by unanimity, with power to accept or reject bills. An executive council of ten Ministers, chosen from the lower house, would be responsible to both chambers. Any measure approved by both would supersede any conflicting national legislation and would "become in its entirety part of the law of each and every member and have legal and binding effect upon the members and upon all their subjects or other persons over whom they have jurisdiction." Within the delegated powers thus transferred—each, be it noted, by a separate vote—the Council of Europe could enact supplementary legislation which would similarly be binding on individuals throughout Europe.²⁸ This adroit formula to achieve federation by stages and, as it were,

²⁷ The issue of functionalism vs. federalism is an old one in British public debate. See James Avery Joyce (ed.), *World Organization-Federal or Functional?* (London, 1945); David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (London, 1946); Robert Boothby, M. P., *What Do You Think About Western Union?* (London, 1949); L. S. Amery, *The Framework of the Future* (London, 1944); Walter (Lord) Layton, *United Europe* (London, 1948). The Labor Party position is set forth in a pamphlet, *Feet on the Ground* (London 1948), and in the National Executive's policy statement of 1949, *European Unity*. For a reply by federalist Laborites, see *Let the Argument Proceed* (London, 1950). The nature of the dilemma is well put by Paul-Henri Spaak in "The Integration of Europe: Dreams and Realities," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, pp. 94-100 (Oct., 1950).

²⁸ See the Council's *Compilation, etc.* (Strasbourg, 1950), pp. 7-21, containing recommendation 54, a resolution and draft protocol of twenty-eight clauses for amendment of the Statute and a draft recommendation on the consultative functions of the Assembly. See also *The Strasbourg Papers*, No. 5 (London), containing the full text of the Statute as

through the back door was not supported by the Committee of Ministers, which told the Assembly in a message of May 5, 1951, that "it would be inadvisable, if we wished to preserve solidarity amongst the free countries of Europe, to pursue plans which by some are considered too ambitious and premature." The project was not further discussed on the floor during the first part of the third Assembly. In such matters as these, involving the expectations and demands of hopeful multitudes, no requiem is ever quite final. But the auguries and portents of 1951 strongly suggest that the "Mackay Plan," and with it the prospects of a federated Europe, will not soon nor easily be resurrected.

V. RECORD AND PROMISE

The developments which have been recounted above are well calculated to convince federalists that the Council of Europe is a failure; to persuade anti-federalists and "functionalists" (sometimes called "unionists" through an unhappy semantic confusion) that national sovereignty remains pure and undiluted at Strasbourg; and to cause many non-partisan observers to suspect that the "House of Europe" is no more than a hall of echoes. Careful analysis and reflection will indicate, I believe, that none of these judgments is justified.

Strasbourg provides a forum where Free Europe's responsible policy-makers and ablest parliamentarians can and do discuss together, on a high level of probity and insight, the unity and destiny of the Continent. If the Council were no more than this, it would still be performing an indispensable function. But much more than this emerges from *La Maison de l'Europe*. Concrete conclusions and proposals grow out of study and debate. They are transmitted to cabinets and parliaments by the very Ministers and law-makers who have taken part in their formulation. At worst, they are ignored, or exert an almost imperceptible or very gradual influence on political leadership and public opinion in the direction of European solidarity. At best, they contribute to the shaping of national legislation or, more significantly, lead to the elaboration of international conventions which, in turn, establish new definitions of shared values and purposes and create new institutions for dealing with common problems.

Space is lacking for a survey of such achievements. Two years, moreover, is too brief a time for appraisal, since the processes here operating are necessarily slow. Yet, it must be noted that at least one important international convention has already taken shape from the work at Strasbourg and is currently in course of ratification. On November 4, 1950, after more than a year of devoted labor, there was signed in Rome, by the agents of fifteen governments, the "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," designed to realize and enforce many of the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the U. N. General Assembly on

it would read if thus amended and the Report of the Committee of Seven (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Chairman and R. W. G. Mackay, M. P., *Rapporteur*; Dec., 1950) charged by the Assembly with the task of putting the above documents in final form for submission to the Committee of Ministers. For a favorable commentary, see Miss F. L. Josephy, "Grow As You Go," *Federal News*, Feb. 1951; and for an unfavorable one, Anthony Crossland, M. P., *loc. cit.*, *supra*, n. 26.

December 10, 1948. This instrument of sixty-six articles synthesizes British and Continental conceptions of substantive and procedural rights, though with less precision and more qualifications than some libertarians might wish. Its unique feature is its provision for a European Commission of Human Rights, elected by the Committee of Ministers on nomination of the Consultative Assembly, to receive and investigate complaints of violations from governments, groups, or individuals after domestic remedies are exhausted. Provision is further made for a European Court of Human Rights, elected by the Assembly on nomination of the Committee of Ministers, to which the Commission and the signatory States may bring cases.

Although no other major project at Strasbourg has come so far as this toward realization, the range of proposals discussed and acted upon is indicative of the breadth of view with which Ministers and Representatives have approached their work. In its first year the Assembly made recommendations (apart from procedural and organizational issues) for European economic integration, freer trade, interconvertibility of currencies, a European patents office, a European passport, uniform social security laws, expanded cultural interchange, etc. These and related questions were further studied by the committees of the Assembly during 1950 and 1951 and discussed in plenary sessions, along with collective security, a European Army, measures to maintain full employment, the Schuman Plan, the annual Report to the Council of the OEEC, European High Authorities for transport and agriculture, a draft convention for reciprocal treatment of nationals, and a European convention for the control of international cartels.²⁹

In all these affairs, there are—quite inevitably in the democratic process as it operates on the international level—more words than deeds, more hopes than accomplishments, more aspirations than fulfillments. Scarcely a problem is touched upon which is not already within the purview of one or more of the numerous international alphabetical agencies which have mushroomed so abundantly and confusingly in Western Europe during the past five years. Despite the resistance of each bureaucracy to any diminution of its “sovereignty,” experts and laymen alike cannot but sympathize with the hope of many of the

²⁹ Apart from official Council publications and the useful quarterly summaries of Council activities in *International Organization*, helpful reports of day-to-day news are to be found in *Le Monde* (Paris) and in *Les Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace* (Strasbourg). See also Paul Reynaud, *Unite or Perish* (New York, 1951), pp. 189–210, and the excellent summary of the spring sessions of 1951 in *Europe and Tomorrow* (International Bulletin of the European Movement), No. 5 (June, 1951). In a recent interview (*New York Times*, July 30, 1951), Edouard Bonnefous, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, commented on the rejection by the Committee on Economic Questions of the Consultative Assembly of the project for a supranational European transport authority (which he had vigorously championed at Strasbourg in May) as follows: “European unity is dead, and the European Assembly at Strasbourg is dead, too, and it is the British who killed them . . . I won’t go to Strasbourg any more.” This harsh judgment, however, poses a question different from the famous question of “who killed Cock Robin?” In this case, with all respect to M. Bonnefous, the corpse is still very much alive and kicking.

men of Strasbourg that most, if not all, of these organizations can somehow be brought together under the Council of Europe. Whether or not this proves feasible, the work of the Council, with all its impotence, friction, and frustration, nevertheless comes closer to a government of Europe than anything ever before attempted on any basis of free choice and voluntary collaboration. It likewise serves, albeit often indirectly and painfully, the human needs and common interests of free Europeans more effectively than they have ever before been served on a European level. It is therefore certain that the Council of Europe will not die but live. And it is probable that, in living, it will grow in prestige, authority, and capacity for action, regardless of whether a full federal union ever comes to flower or the less dramatic processes of discussion and agreement gradually transfer, in fact if not in form, more and more tasks of policy-making and administration to the representatives of an entity larger than the nation-states.

This outcome, which is by no means visionary, suggests that it would be desirable, if not indeed imperative, that more Americans learn more about the Great Experiment in Strasbourg. On May 12, 1951, the Consultative Assembly unanimously resolved that "it would be of the greatest interest for public opinion in the democracies if these problems of common interest were to be discussed by delegations from the two Houses of Congress of the United States and from the Consultative Assembly," and instructed its Bureau to take steps looking toward such a discussion, "preferably in Strasbourg" or, if need be, in Washington. Four days later, President Spaak announced that Lord Layton, British Liberal and one of the Assembly Vice-Presidents, would visit Ottawa and Washington by authorization of the Standing Committee to discuss plans for an autumn conference, presumably at the time of the second part of the third Assembly session.

Such meetings of legislators from both sides of the Atlantic will be advantageous to all. Americans, whatever their divergent views on international federation, will recognize in the Council of Europe a partial realization in the Old World of a dream long since come true in the New. The far horizon of its ultimate fulfillment was perceived by Victor Hugo³⁰ more than a century ago: "A day will come when these two immense groups, the United States of America and the United States of Europe, shall be seen placed in the presence of each other, extending the hand of fellowship across the ocean. . . . In our ancient Europe, England took the first step, and by her example declared to the people 'You are free!' France took the second step, and announced to the people 'You are sovereigns!' Let us now take the third step, and all simultaneously, France, England, Germany, Italy, Europe, America—let us proclaim to all nations 'You are brethren!'"

³⁰ "The United States of Europe," Presidential Address at the International Peace Congress in Paris on August 22, 1849. Trans. from World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Ser., Vol. 4, No. 6, Pt. II (Oct., 1914).

THE STRUGGLE FOR ELECTORAL REFORM IN FRANCE*

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The French Constitution does not regulate the precise mode of election to its principal legislative chamber, the National Assembly, beyond stipulating (Art. 3) that it shall be elected on a territorial basis through direct and universal suffrage. This general provision was until recently implemented by a law¹ which established a proportional list system based in general on the principal unit of French local government, the *département*.²

The Assembly which enacted these electoral laws was completely dominated by the three big parties of the Left, the Communists, the Socialists, and the Popular Republican Movement (MRP).³ These groups favored proportional representation for a variety of reasons. First of all, devotion to proportionalism was part and parcel of left doctrine—an important point in a country in which political battles are carried out to a very large extent on the plane of ideas and doctrines. The Communists thought that PR would assure them a large representation in the dominant branch of government, i.e., the Assembly, while the MRP, an essentially new party⁴ without local organizations and experience with precinct work,⁵ considered it more favorable to its interests than a system in which its largely unknown candidates would have been hard-pressed in a struggle of personalities against older, and therefore better-known, men of such traditional parties as, for instance, the Radicals.⁶

Moreover there existed a widespread tendency among the Resistance movements to condemn most of the institutions which had characterized the Third Republic, and sharp criticism was directed against the allegedly “immoral” blocs and cartels among different parties which were the rule under the electoral system before 1940. The period of the Resistance had been a time of soul-searching during which the French leaders, already mightily inclined toward

* The author is indebted to the Social Science Research Council and to the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation for having made possible the research on which this paper is based.

¹ This law was passed on October 5, 1946; see *Journal Officiel*, Oct. 8, 1946.

² Different systems prevailed in the overseas territories which send Deputies to the National Assembly. See Law No. 46-680 of April 13, 1946, *Journal Officiel*, April 14, 1946.

³ This domination could not be considered complete, by French standards, in view of the fact that a dividing line between Right and Left was traditionally drawn on the church question. The MRP, although “left” on social and economic issues, is actually a catholic party.

⁴ The MRP had its pre-war antecedents in two small groups, the Popular Democratic Party (*Parti démocrate populaire*) and the Young Republic (*La jeune république*).

⁵ This is of course an American term. In most French parties, with the exception of the Communists, the smallest organizational unit is based on the *arrondissement*.

⁶ A large number of contemporary French leaders emerged from the Resistance. Since the Resistance was, of course, a clandestine movement, most of its leaders were virtually unknown to the population at large in 1945 and 1946. This applied particularly to the MRP, which was largely a product of the Resistance.

doctrinaire views, were filled with great ideas and theories. Proportional representation made it possible for them to have each party present its own program without having to compromise through electoral coalitions—although coalition governments continued to be inevitable.⁷

Finally, the logical mind of the French took well to the idea of “justice” which PR supposedly represents, inasmuch as theoretically it grants each party the exact proportion of seats in the legislature to which its popular vote entitles it. In actual practice, the proportional system adopted in 1946 favored the larger parties considerably.

However, the National Assembly which was renewed on June 17, 1951, had been elected in November, 1946, and the five years between elections had produced significant political changes. General Charles de Gaulle had organized his own party, the Rally of the French People (*Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, RPF) in 1947, and had since gathered considerable popular support. At the same time, the electoral strength of the MRP had suffered a drastic reduction; the Radicals and various right-wing groups had rallied; and the Left had been forced into a permanent minority position because of the unbridgeable gulf between the Communists and the non-communist Left. In the second half of its term, the National Assembly of 1946–1951 was one of the least representative France has ever had.

In view of this state of affairs, it became highly possible, even probable, that if proportional representation were retained, the new National Assembly would produce a “negative majority,” i.e., a majority of Communists and RPF. These two extremist groups could not, of course, join to form any coalition government, but they could effectively make all orderly government impossible.⁸ This frightening picture of a “Weimar” France thus presented itself to all non-communist parties and caused them all to admit, with more or less enthusiasm, that proportional representation had to be abandoned. Even the MRP adopted a resolution to this effect at its annual convention at Nantes in 1950. The RPF has always opposed PR.

It was clear to all that some system had to be found which permitted electoral coalitions and utilized them to impose a disadvantage on the Communists, who were unable to ally themselves with any major group. However, agreement on a specific mode of election proved extraordinarily difficult and frequently impossible. The sharpest conflict existed within the ranks of the coalition government itself, expressing itself most succinctly in the opposing views of the Radicals and of the MRP. The Radical and Radical-Socialist Party, the dominant element in the roof organisation called Rally of the Republican Left

⁷ During the resistance period and shortly thereafter, there was hope of a new political synthesis, free from the party system of the Third Republic. These ideas quickly evaporated in the light of post-liberation political realities.

⁸ The Communists have voted without exception against every measure proposed by the government. The RPF Deputies have nearly as negative a record, having supported the government only once and abstained twice up to date.

(*Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines*, RGR)⁹ advocated a return, pure and simple, to the electoral system of the Third Republic, the single-member district with run-off election (*scrutin d'arrondissement à deux tours*). The mechanics of that system were very simple. The electoral district was the small *arrondissement*. Each party presented a single candidate. If one candidate then received an absolute majority of all votes cast, he was declared elected. But in view of the multiplicity of parties, such an outcome occurred in only a minority of *arrondissements*. In the far greater number of cases, special run-off elections had to be held. At these second polls there occurred the famous building of blocs and cartels, i.e., agreements among groups of parties or candidates to support the strongest among them.

In the opinion of the Radicals, the *arrondissement* system with run-off elections presented definite advantages. In the first run, all parties have an opportunity to make the best of their program and to win the voters over to their arguments. If they are not entirely successful, they will at least learn which among their candidates have the largest relative following; and those groups which find that they have a certain affinity for one another may then cooperate to get one of their candidates elected. In both elections the voter knows precisely for whom he is casting his ballot. This is thus an honest, aboveboard system which would have achieved the principal purpose of reform, namely to place the Communists in a hopeless minority position.

Beyond these arguments there were also certain political considerations. The Radicals are primarily a "party of manoeuvre." Their political principles, which have not greatly changed since the Belleville program of 1869, are broad enough to include some Deputies who are more "left" than the Socialists and some who are more "right" than the PRL,¹⁰ although the prevailing tendencies in the party are conservative on social and economic questions and "left" only on the issue of state and church.¹¹ As such, the Radicals are able to form coalitions with the Left or the Right as the case may require, which gives their party a superb degree of suppleness.

Another advantage for the Radicals would have been the abandonment of the larger *département* as an electoral district and a return to the much smaller *arrondissement*. The Radicals are an *old* party. Their adherents are found on all levels of government. In most areas they have a considerable number of mayors, city and (departmental) general councilors, Deputies and Senators.¹²

⁹ It is generally known that the "left" designation of the RGR is not to be taken too literally. Even outright conservative groups have called themselves "Left." The RGR tends to go farther to the Right than the Radicals would like, causing much friction, but on the question of electoral reform there was unanimity.

¹⁰ The Republican Party of Liberty (*Parti républicain de la liberté*) actually is a bloc of right-wing Deputies and Senators.

¹¹ But less bitterly so than in the past. The Socialists are now the standard bearers of the "lay state"—in which the school question is paramount.

¹² Members of the Council of the Republic are now officially called "Senators."

Many prefects and sub-prefects are in their ranks;¹³ and although these officials are supposed to be non-partisan in the exercise of their duties, there are obviously many ways in which a prefect can be helpful to his own party. These officials are the real core of the Radical party and of Radical strength. (It must be remembered that all parties except the Communist are very loosely organized and that electoral strength outside the biggest cities is often a matter of personal influence and following.) And since the larger *départements* are plural-member districts, in which it is difficult for candidates to be known well all over the district, the Radicals clearly stood to gain by returning to the system of single-member districts in which their well-known and frequently respected key men might bring their personalities to bear on the electorate.

The Socialists (SFIO) had much sympathy for the Radical viewpoint on this question. They, too, are an old party with many members in elected and appointed office on all levels of government. Among the civil servants their number is now very substantial, perhaps predominant, and among the teachers in the public schools they hold a very decided majority. Thus, like the Radicals, they have much local talent to work with. However, the Socialists are always torn between their theoretical-doctrinaire upbringing and a profoundly democratic and humanitarian devotion which leads them to consider the more practical side of politics. Perhaps in each militant French Socialist there is a bit of the conflict between the principles of Jules Guesde and those of Jean Jaurès. At any rate, many Socialists still believe in the theoretical excellence of PR but have regretfully admitted the necessity for its abandonment, at least temporarily.¹⁴ They supported the Radicals on the whole but were content to let the Radicals do most of the fighting.

Totally different was the attitude of the MRP. Although this party had emerged from the resistance movement¹⁵ to become the largest non-communist party of France, its growth "from rags to riches" bore within itself the seeds of impermanence. In 1946, when the present National Assembly was elected, the MRP was the party most closely associated with the name of De Gaulle and was called the "Party of Fidelity." Moreover, the right-wing parties and the Radicals being nearly crushed under the leftward trend and the shadow of collaborationism, the MRP emerged as the principal anti-communist party. It thus attracted many voters who had otherwise little sympathy or understanding for its political and philosophical principles. When General de Gaulle organised his RPF in 1947, a large number of such people left the MRP for it, while others went over to the other right-wing and independent groups. Still other members were lost to the Radicals and even to the Socialists. The result of these losses was first shown in the catastrophic defeat of the MRP in the communal elections of 1947. The MRP leadership was therefore desperately

¹³ By contrast, not a single prefect and only a few sub-prefects are adherents of the MRP.

¹⁴ A resolution to this effect was adopted at the national Convention of Lille in 1950.

¹⁵ Georges Bidault, the principal leader of the MRP, was president of the clandestine National Council of Resistance, which embraced nearly all groups.

trying to make every vote count and to retain as much strength as possible. The party is still convinced of the theoretical excellence of the proportional system and would probably fare best under it; but its leaders have had to accept the abandonment of that system¹⁶ under the threat of a negative majority.

The MRP opposed the run-off election (*deuxième tour*) because it would tend to aid the establishment of "left" versus "right" blocs, and in France "Left" is still associated with an anti-catholic tradition. Such blocs would mean essentially a Socialist-Radical coalition which would squeeze the MRP out and force it into a coalition with the Right, compromising the left economic and social ideology of the MRP. In fact, since the existing right-wing parties are already on record as favoring the church viewpoint, an MRP closely associated with the Right would lose all reason for existence. The fears of the MRP concerning its own predicament were particularly valid in that the question of possible state support to parochial schools promised to be one of the principal issues in the campaign.¹⁷ Much as the Socialists and Radicals may disagree on economic policy, they see eye to eye on the issue of the "lay school"; and France being France, the school issue very often has overshadowed economic questions.

The MRP feared that the adoption of an electoral system with run-off elections would produce a number of situations prejudicial to its interests. In areas where the catholic element¹⁸ is not decidedly dominant, the significance of the school issue would produce a Socialist-Radical alliance against the MRP, leaving before the latter the unenviable choice of remaining isolated or being forced to join hands with the Right. In either case, the MRP candidates would be likely to find themselves submerged. On the other hand, in strongly catholic regions where the parties of the traditional left would not be inclined to make much of the school question, the MRP would have to face such formidable opposition of the RPF and of other right-wing and independent groups,¹⁹ that a possible alliance with Socialists and Radicals might not be sufficiently strong to produce success; in some areas such an alliance might even be fatal to the MRP. Like all simplifications, these conditions do not apply to all parts of the country; but they are prevalent in a large number of areas in which the MRP hoped to elect members to the Assembly.

Another element which contributed to the opposition of the MRP to the run-off election is the existence of important divergent tendencies within the MRP itself. These tendencies, which often reflect opposing trends within

¹⁶ However, there is a fairly strong minority view among MRP Deputies of lower than top rank who want to retain PR.

¹⁷ The fact that the greatly increased post-war generation has now come of school age has sharpened the problem in that the public primary schools have proved incapable of accommodating this mass and the private schools have had to take the overflow. On the other hand, private teachers receive lower pay than public school instructors, causing inferior instruction at times in private schools.

¹⁸ Practising Catholics who follow the social teaching of the Church are here intended. Most Frenchmen are nominal Catholics for census purposes only.

¹⁹ The significance and influence of independent candidates should not be underestimated. Their influence is dominant in the recently elected National Assembly.

French Catholicism at large, might well be heightened if MRP candidates in one part of the country would habitually ally themselves with left groups while others formed more or less permanent ties with the Right. Emphasizing its ideological line of thought as it does, the MRP would be threatened in its very existence if a unified body of doctrine were rendered impossible by permanent cleavages.

In addition to these views, the MRP also expressed the fear that a "lay" or "republican" alliance (Socialist-Radical) might have to cater to the communist vote in the run-off election. In that case, argued the MRP, the strongly anti-communist stand of Socialists and Radicals, whose continued participation in future coalition governments will probably remain indispensable, might be seriously compromised.²⁰

All of the well-justified fears of the MRP might have been largely mitigated if the principal government parties, the Socialists, the MRP, and the Radicals-RGR, could have agreed on a *national* electoral coalition. But the extreme political and regional diversification of the country, which is frequently overlooked abroad, made this quite impossible. For instance, in one agricultural *département*, Seine-Inférieure, the MRP found it extremely difficult to enter into an electoral alliance with the Socialists because the peasants of that region objected strongly to the 1946-47 policies of the Ministry of Agriculture under Tanguy-Prigent, a Socialist. Yet in the neighboring *département* of Oise which has a similar social composition, there are far fewer objections to a Socialist-MRP coalition. Similarly, while the MRP leaders in Haute-Savoie endeavored to avoid Socialist entanglement, their colleagues met with no such difficulty in Isère, which is next door. Like instances could be cited for every part of the country. The presumption that the government parties would naturally support each other, where necessary, all over the country, is without foundation.

Finally, the MRP objected to the reinstitution of the small *arrondissement* electoral district because the same factors concerning the extent to which the party and its candidates were known locally, which favored the Radicals, would have operated against the MRP.

Undoubtedly the MRP would have preferred single-run, plurality elections in plural-member districts (based in principle on the *département*) with a single inter-party coalition list. This system would have produced considerable pressure upon the government parties to work together and would have secured a sizeable representation for the MRP. However, such a proposal never had a chance of being approved by any of the other parties.

Therefore the MRP pushed a second plan, called *apparentement* (associ-

²⁰ Despite strongly worded recommendations to the contrary by the communist leadership, there are now on record a number of cases where an appreciable number of communist voters have shifted to a left coalition in run-off elections for local councils. This constitutes some evidence to the generally-held belief that only a minority of the communist voters fully accept the discipline of the party.

ation),²¹ which would operate in a single-run election. This ingenious scheme was to work in the following fashion. In a given plural-member district (usually a *département*), each party would run its own slate of candidates; but, at the same time, several parties would also file with the election authorities their intentions to enter into a coupled-list arrangement with each other. Such combining is called *apparentement*. If a single-party list were then to obtain a majority, its entire slate would be declared elected, the other parties receiving no representation. If no single-party list achieved a majority, then all the votes cast for parties belonging to a given *apparentement* would automatically be added together and counted as supporting the *apparentement* list. If no *apparentement* list were able to win a majority or if it were impossible in a given *département* to establish an *apparentement*, the seats would be distributed according to proportional representation. But it was expected that wherever candidates of the communists were strong, public opinion would exert pressure in the interest of *apparentement*.

The MRP proposal met with a cool reception in other quarters. The Commission on Universal Suffrage of the National Assembly repeatedly rejected the principles both of run-off elections and of *apparentement*, without arriving at any positive counterproposals. In vexation over its own failure to make any progress, the Commission, reversing usual parliamentary procedure, reported back to the Assembly that it was unable to report and asked for guidance. The Assembly, being equally unable to agree on any guiding principles, requested the Commission to try some more.²²

The opponents of the single-election *apparentement* system, especially the Radicals, maintained that this proposal constituted an essentially dishonest scheme. It not only required the voter to support one party, one doctrine, one slate of candidates—which is perfectly acceptable because the voter himself makes this choice—but also stipulated that his vote be counted to support other parties and candidates, without giving him an opportunity to express his wishes in the matter. Thus a man who voted Radical or Socialist because he was against the local *curé* might find the next morning that he had helped to elect the candidate of the *curé*. Of course, in run-off elections there are coalitions, but then the sovereign voter is free to support the coalition expressly or not. In a single-run *apparentement* election, he lacks such freedom.

There was also another, weightier argument against single-run *apparentement* which has since proved well founded. If combinations, *apparetements*, have to be concluded *before* the first test of strength is made, they are often too feeble to be effective, and in a number of important areas it may prove impossible to bring them into being at all. For example, because of the school issue, there is hesitation in a great many *départements*, on the part of the Radicals and the Socialists on the one hand and the MRP on the other, to form pre-election cartels. In workers' districts the Socialists are reluctant to form an

²¹ Project Roques-Taillade.

²² For a good detailed report, see *Le Monde*, Dec. 22, 1950.

apparentement with the Radicals because of the latter's conservative economic policy. In some rural areas, on the other hand, the Radicals may consider an *apparentement* with the Socialists dangerous because of resentment against the real or alleged agricultural policies of the latter.

In some areas a communist victory might be prevented only by the united action of all major non-communist groups, *including* De Gaulle's RPF. Yet it would be absolutely impossible for the Socialists to enter into a pre-election *apparentement* with the Gaullists, and their National Congress of Paris, 1951, has specifically condemned their doing so. It is not only that their party doctrines make this impossible, but that the Communists would make the most of this strange alliance—which would be serious indeed for the Socialists in their strenuous, though as yet none too successful, attempts to regain the support of labor.

One might ask why pre-election combinations or *apparentements* are certain to fail in many areas, while the same combinations may possibly have greater success in a run-off election. The answer lies in the fact that only after a first-run election are the facts clear. The first run of a two-run election would produce three main categories of electoral districts. The first category would be composed of a minority of constituencies in which a majority has been achieved by a single party; the second would be composed of those districts in which no majority has been achieved but in which the Communists are running ahead; the third would include the districts in which no majority has appeared but in which the Communists are not likely to carry the field. The existence of the first category would mean that the election would already have been decided. The third group is of secondary importance, although combinations might still be formed in order to defeat, for instance, an RPF slate.

That leaves the districts in which only a combination of non-communist forces could prevent the election of Communists. In the face of such an alternative, powerful pressure would be brought to bear on all non-communist parties to forget other differences and work together. The Socialists may hate the RPF, but to be accused of having caused the election of Communists would be of serious, perhaps fatal consequences for them. The MRP may feel strongly about the subsidies for parochial schools, but church pressure would undoubtedly emphasize the paramountcy of defeating the Communists.

Apart from the *apparentement* proposal, other schemes for reform were presented. As we have seen, the Radicals advocated a return to the *arrondissement* single-member district with run-off election—a system which is widely believed to be preferred by the majority of French voters. In addition, the Barrachin proposal would have extended it to the departmental level, requiring only plurality in the second run to declare an entire slate elected. The Coty proposal suggested the same approach, but with majority required in both runs. The Buron proposal submitted a system of preferential voting in which the extremes were designed to cancel each other out, thus favoring the center groups.

The government of Premier René Plevén, which had received Radical par-

ticipation on the promise of electoral reform, contributed its own scheme, worked out by the late Paul Giacobbi (Radical); but it succeeded merely in combining the objectionable features of all other proposals, and was rejected. Then, upon the suggestion of the Socialist minister Guy Mollet, an inter-ministerial committee was formed to work out a solution. This move seemed to be ingenious because of the committee's composition. It was headed by a Radical (Giacobbi), but the Radicals were in a minority. The most important group in it was that of the MRP ministers, but they were headed by the highly respected Robert Schuman, who was believed to be willing to compromise. The committee's proposal, however, also failed in the National Assembly, and in its wider ramifications caused the fall of the Pleven cabinet.

In this struggle, the MRP had one considerable tactical advantage over the Radicals and right-wing groups: it was prepared to defend the single-run, departmental election at any cost—even at the price of retaining the proportional system. (After all, that system was deemed to be advantageous to the MRP—though hardly to the Republic.) The Radicals and right-wing groups wanted to abandon PR at any price, and they finally had to swallow the bitter pill of paying the price which the MRP demanded. The Socialists played a curious role in this long-drawn-out struggle; they supported, at one time or another, practically all important proposals, so long as the latter showed promise of providing ground for compromise.

The end did not come easily. Premier Henri Queuille (Radical), who succeeded Pleven, had come to the conclusion that the MRP would have to be appeased, but he met great resistance among his party colleagues. This resistance was especially strong in the Council of the Republic, where the Radicals and Independents predominate. Because of the constitutional provision requiring the National Assembly to override the Council of the Republic by an absolute majority if the negative vote of the Council has also been adopted by such a majority, the final plan was twice defeated—despite Premier Queuille's skill in obtaining a majority in the Assembly.²³ After its second defeat,²⁴ the electoral reform project was rescued only by action of the President of the National Assembly, Edouard Herriot, who, on highly questionable constitutional and parliamentary grounds, recommitted it to committee examination instead of taking it off the calendar.²⁵ The committee (Commission on the Universal Suffrage) manufactured the required change in the project in order to have it resubmitted to a vote in the Assembly. In the meantime, the parties of the majority made every effort to gather the few extra votes necessary²⁶

²³ A majority of all members voting, but not of all members.

²⁴ In the second vote in the National Assembly the project was adopted by a vote of 308 against 270. However, 311 votes were required to override the negative decision of the Council of the Republic.

²⁵ President Herriot quoted three recent precedents to sustain his decision. For a verbatim report of the debate and of the president's decision, see *Le Monde*, April 29, 1951.

²⁶ In the second vote on April 27, 14 Socialist Deputies voted against their colleagues. They were reprimanded by the party's executive committee (*comité directeur*). Most Socialist Senators had also voted against the government's proposal.

to override the Council of the Republic; and on May 7, 1951, the new electoral law was finally adopted.²⁷ Since the government parties wanted a June election,²⁸ it was just about time.

The new electoral law follows closely the plan advocated by the MRP. There is only one election, with no run-offs. The basic electoral district is the *département*²⁹ and there can be subsidiary, coupled lists (*apparentement*). In each constituency, which is naturally a multi-member district, each political party may submit a list of candidates containing as many names as the district has Deputies to elect. At the same time, and necessarily before the election, some of the parties may also register with the *prefecture*³⁰ a coupling-of-lists arrangement (*apparentement*). However, only those parties may list themselves as members of an *apparentement* which are designated as "national," which means that each one of them must have candidates running in at least thirty *départements*.³¹

These lists of candidates, submitted by the respective parties, show the names of the candidates in their order of rank. Thus, if four candidates were to be declared elected out of a list of seven, it would be the first four who would win seats. It is true that, under the new electoral law, the voter may change the order of listing and may even replace an "official" candidate by a "write-in" name of his own choice. However, this right is almost certain to be meaningless because the law decrees that such preferential listings can be counted only when at least half of those voting for one party express preferences.³² Such a result is not likely to occur very often, if ever.

In addition, the voter may also take the names of candidates from one list and place them on another (*panachage*).³³ As we have seen, this action does

²⁷ By 332 against 248. Against the proposal voted: 167 Communists and 16 pro-communist leftist groups, 1 Socialist, 11 Radicals, 1 UDSR, 25 right-wing Deputies, 24 RPF and 3 pro-RPF. For the proposal voted: 96 Socialists and 8 associated Deputies, 31 Radicals, 138 MRP, 47 right-wing Deputies, 2 Independents. One Deputy abstained, 20 Deputies did not take part in the vote, and 13 were absent.

²⁸ A June election is supposed to favor the government parties while an October or November date is supposed to favor the extremes, especially the Communists. In June, prices of food—an especially important issue in France—are relatively low and people are happy in the thought of the coming vacations. In October, prices are high, winter clothes must be bought, school books acquired, coal purchased, etc.

²⁹ However, several *départements* form more than one constituency. They are Bouches-du-Rhône, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Rhône, Seine (Paris), Seine-et-Oise, Seine-Inférieure, and the Gironde. Except for the Gironde, this same situation existed in 1946.

³⁰ *Apparentements* must be listed at least three days before the official start of the electoral campaign, i.e., twenty-three days before the polls open.

³¹ The fact that a list has entered an *apparentement* is announced by the prefect and should also be stated on the respective ballots. However, it is significant that ballots which omit this mention remain valid nevertheless.

³² If there are not enough preferential ballots to affect the sequence of candidates, preferential ballots are counted as supporting the "official" list.

³³ The law is poorly drafted. Art. 16 speaks of *panachage* and means preferential voting. However, true *panachage* means complete freedom for the voter to make up his own list, including substituting one name by another taken from a different list.

not affect the list to which the names have been added unless one half of the voters of that party have expressed some kind of preference; but in this case the preferential vote is not entirely lost, for each list receives the total votes cast for its candidates, even though some of those votes may have been cast for them as write-in candidates on some other list.³⁴

A party list which obtains a majority of all votes cast is declared elected in its entirety, while all other lists lose out completely. However, this will not happen very often. If no one list obtains a majority, the *apparentements* begin to play. The votes of all coupled lists are then added together; and if it is found that this total vote constitutes a majority, the *apparentement* is declared elected, other lists receiving no seats. In this case, the seats are apportioned among the member parties according to proportional representation on the basis of the method of the strongest average.³⁵ In other words, the seats are apportioned among the member-parties of the *apparentement* according to the system of 1946, with the significant exception that only the votes of the *apparentement* parties are counted. However, *apparentement* parties which obtain less than five per cent of the vote receive no seats.

If the *apparentement* has failed to obtain a majority or if there has been no *apparentement* in a particular electoral district, PR prevails, largely, as it did in 1946. However, there is one difference. If there has been an *apparentement*, albeit an unsuccessful one, it is counted as a single list, which, under the method of the strongest average, gives a certain advantage to lists that obtain a large vote.

Special arrangements are provided for the *département* of the Seine (Paris) and the adjacent *département* of Seine-et-Oise. Here there are no *apparentements* but only PR, but with a difference from the system of 1946, in that the votes are apportioned according to the method of the strongest remainder and not according to that of the strongest average. Since the method of the strongest remainder favors the smaller parties, the reason for its adoption is obvious; both the RPF and the Communists are strong in the Paris region.³⁶

³⁴ Let us assume that a certain list composed of five candidates has received 1,000 votes and that candidates A and B on that list have received 20 and 40 votes, respectively, by *panachage* on some other list. The votes are now counted together, namely $1,000 + 20 + 40 = 1,060$. This total is divided by the number of candidates (5), giving each one an average of 212.

³⁵ The method of the strongest average is applied by taking the number of votes cast for the strongest party as the basis for the apportionment of seats for the other parties. Larger parties are therefore favored. One seat is given outright to the party with the largest vote. Then the vote of that party is divided by two, and the resultant figure is compared with the total vote of the next largest party. If that party has more votes than half of the first party, it receives one seat. Then its votes are divided by two, and the resultant figure is applied to the next strongest party, and so on. When all parties qualified to take a seat are used up, the procedure begins again at the top, until all seats allotted to the electoral district have been distributed.

³⁶ Under the method of the strongest remainder, the total vote of all parties combined is divided by the number of seats to be apportioned. The resulting figure is the electoral quotient. This quotient is now applied to the votes of each party to determine how many seats

Other special regimes are also decreed for the *départements* of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion, where proportional representation and the method of the strongest remainder prevail, and for the *département* of Guyana, where a single Deputy is elected in a simple plurality election without run-off.

A significant innovation of the new electoral law is the introduction of the by-election. Under the 1946 system, a vacancy in the National Assembly was filled by simply replacing a deceased or resigned member by the next man or woman on his party's list. Now, by-elections are to be held, utilizing the system of the Third Republic, namely, *scrutin d'arrondissement à deux tours*—single-member districts, majority vote, and run-off elections. This system applies to all *départements* and has been described as a partial victory for the forces favoring the run-off election. But the truth is that no other system would have been technically feasible. Incidentally, no by-elections will be held during the last six months before the normal end of an Assembly term.³⁷

The electoral law described above guarantees that its incredible complexities will remain a book with seven seals to the overwhelming, and overwhelmed, majority of the electorate. It has neither the advantage of producing an accurate picture of public opinion nor the classical simplicity of the Anglo-American system, and it does not promise stable majorities—though that possibility may not exist in France. When the debate over the electoral reform began, the main issue was that of preventing the Communists, and to a lesser extent the RPF, from dominating the new Assembly. When the debate ended, it centered on the means by which the Deputies of an unrepresentative Assembly could continue their political lives at all costs. In the United States and England, an attempt of this kind would have resulted in an outcry of rage all over the country, in hundreds of protest meetings, in thousands of indignant letters to the Members of Congress or of Parliament and to the editors of the leading newspapers. But in France, the “gerrymandering” on a gigantic scale and by a variety of methods—this prolonged and at times ridiculous struggle which Rémy Roure, editorial writer for *Le Monde*, justly termed “*la triste comédie*—” was met only with monumental indifference.

* * *

As things worked out, the election of June 17, 1951, has proved clearly that the electoral reform, whatever its shortcomings, saved France from an anti-Republican majority in the National Assembly. The Communists and De Gaulle's RPF together polled 48.2 per cent of the vote in metropolitan France alone; the operation of the 1946 electoral law with its system of proportional representation on the basis of the strongest average, added to the vote from

each is to receive. But a party whose vote is inferior to the quotient and superior to the remainder of votes of the strongest party after the first determination of seats, also receives a seat. Under the method of the strongest average, such a party would have received no seats and the stronger parties would have received more.

³⁷ The above discussion concerns only elections in metropolitan France.

overseas France, would have given the two large parties well over half the seats in the National Assembly.

When the election date was announced and the parties entered into the confusing struggle for the making and unmaking of *apparentements*, there were times when it seemed as if nothing positive could possibly be achieved. However, as has happened before in the history of France, the Republic was saved by its enemies, in this case by General de Gaulle. The General decided that his party would not enter into any *apparentement* or list with any party or group which did not accept his leadership and the integral program of the RPF, notably the demand for drastic constitutional changes. Had De Gaulle proved himself more flexible, a number of Deputies of the "Third Force" parties, especially among the RGR³⁸ and the MRP, would have entered into an *apparentement* with the RPF, and the tendency to collaborate with the RPF would have been even greater among the right-wing independents. But the categorical decision of the General, by rendering this generally impossible, cemented the often unwilling *apparentements* between the Third Force parties, which frequently included independent, right-wing groups. The threatened disintegration of the center, which the electoral law might have encouraged, was thus avoided.

In the ninety-five electoral districts of metropolitan France (the *départements* of Seine and Seine-et-Oise not included), eighty-seven *apparentements* were registered with the various prefectures. Among them, thirteen constituted agreements between the RPF and other groups. In most of these cases, these other groups were right-wing independents; but in some *départements* local conditions enabled the formation of very unusual *apparentements*. For instance, in the *départements* of Haute-Loire, Lozère, and Haute Saône, and in the Vendée, the RPF formed *apparentements* with the local MRP list. In the Gironde,³⁹ the Vosges, and the Yonne, RPF-RGR *apparentements* were established. Most other *apparentements* were between government parties, although the composition varied greatly, frequently including right-wing independents. In fifteen *apparentements* the Socialists were excluded or excluded themselves from the arrangement; and in five *départements*, *apparentements* between Socialists and Radicals excluded the MRP.

Among the eighty-seven *apparentements*, thirty obtained complete success; that is to say, they received a majority of the votes cast and thereby garnered all seats in the *départements* concerned. But even where such a result could not be obtained, the electoral law gave the *apparentements* the advantage under the strongest average method of apportioning the seats. *Apparentements* and single interparty lists had also enabled certain leaders of the middle-of-the-

³⁸ The energetic opposition of Edouard Herriot to electoral collaboration with the RPF prevented most Radicals from leaving the folds of the Third Force.

³⁹ In Bordeaux (Gironde) a split occurred in the Radical ranks when the local leader of the party, Chaban-Delmas, broke with its leadership, especially M. Herriot, and ran on the RPF ticket while retaining his RGR (but not Radical) affiliation.

road parties to lend their personal prestige to the republican coalition. This was especially true in the *départements* of Côtes du Nord (René Pleven), Eure (Mendez-France), Corrèze⁴⁰ (Henri Queuille), and the Loire (Bidault, Pinay, and Claudius Petit). A formal change was also imposed upon the many independent right-wing candidates, who had to constitute themselves into loose, unorganized, and temporary groups in order to qualify as "national" under the electoral law.

The provisions of the law which permitted preferential voting (*vote préférentiel* and *panachage*) were without direct effect, as relatively few voters availed themselves of this right. What preferential voting there was, startled some of the government leaders by revealing popularity in some cases and the opposite in others; but its effect was personal rather than political.

In a negative sense, however, the preferential vote caused some difficulties. The law had specified that lists or *apparentements* which obtained a majority of the vote would receive all the seats in a given electoral district. In its actual operation this provision, which its draftsmen had considered quite clear, proved to be the source of some vexation. Let us assume, for instance, that a list containing three names had received 55,000 votes. Candidate A's name had never been replaced by another and he thus received 55,000 votes. Candidate B, however, received only 52,000 (the other 3,000 ballots having his name crossed out and replaced by a name from another list), and Candidate C received 50,000 votes. The vote for the list is thus $55,000 + 52,000 + 50,000 = (157,000 \div 3) = 52,333$. Yet 55,000 ballots have actually been cast for the party whose list is under consideration. Should the required majority now be counted from the total number of ballots cast (*bulletins valables*, for this list 55,000), or from the sum total of list averages (*suffrages de liste*, for this list 52,333)? In *départements* where the parties run neck-to-neck, this point makes a considerable difference. The question came up in Bas-Rhin and Seine-Inférieure and threatens to appear in other *départements* as well. The electoral commission has decided that the majority is to be counted from the total number of ballots cast. But since the MRP is going to carry this question into the National Assembly itself, the issue cannot be considered finally settled.⁴¹

As was to be expected, the operation of the electoral law resulted in a considerable disproportion between electoral vote and representation in the National Assembly. The Communists, against whom the law was originally directed, received 26.5 per cent of the vote and have 103 seats out of the total of 625.⁴² The Socialist party, which received only 14.5 per cent of the vote,

⁴⁰ Corrèze has been notable for the fact that it has given the Communists 40.7 per cent (39.8 per cent in 1946) of its vote, although 75 per cent of its population are peasants. Queuille and his list polled slightly more than the Communists without obtaining a majority.

⁴¹ Under the decision of the electoral commission the Bas-Rhin *département* has elected 5 MRP, 3 RPF, and 1 Communist. According to the other way of computing, 8 MRP and 1 Independent would have been declared elected.

⁴² Two additional seats are to be filled by Deputies from New Caledonia and Oceania, where elections take place at a later date.

holds 104 seats. The RPF, with 21.7 per cent of the vote, has received 118 seats, while the RGR, which obtained only 11.5 per cent of the vote, has received 94 seats. Within the governmental majority, the distribution of seats is also unequal. The MRP, for instance, received more votes than the RGR but is represented by fewer Deputies.

The system of *apparentement* appears to have had the further result of loosening the control of the central party executive committees and strengthening the position of local leaders, who were primarily responsible for the formation of the *apparentements*. In this fashion the newly elected National Assembly may have more similarity to the Chamber of Deputies under the Third Republic than to its predecessor. The same factor has also played a part in enhancing the stature of certain personalities of the Right, like Daladier and Reynaud, who seem destined to play an exceptional role in the next few years.

The extreme danger of a negative majority has caused many groups and parties to collaborate in regions in which such a joint effort had hitherto been considered a near-impossibility. The future will show to what extent this fact will lead to more durable alliances. Similarly the practice of the new National Assembly will reveal to what extent *apparentement* considerations will affect interparty relations in parliament.

The electoral law of May 7, 1951, was a halfway measure designed to meet a specific situation. It led to practical results because of the intransigence of General de Gaulle. What the effect of this law would be in a future election, if the opponents of the Fourth Republic maintain a more flexible policy, is quite another question. In other words, the law has all the earmarks of the provisional. If French political history is to be a guide, this characteristic may well give it a long life.

BRITISH TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING: LOCAL PARTICIPATION

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The sacrifice of local autonomy and the subordination of individual rights to the implementation of public policy have long been prominent among the charges against planning writ large. Few would deny the existence of these potentials. While a generous optimism may assume that planners are motivated by public purpose alone, the experience of our time has too often demonstrated that power corrupts. And planning is uniquely power. On the other hand, though the vesting of authority commensurate with great ends necessarily provokes the threat of arbitrary decision, the crushing economic problems which face Britain today demand solution, and great power must be ventured. Happily, however, power is negotiable. A tradition of civil freedom and a responsible Parliament provide impressive sanctions against maladministration. Nor is authority inevitably the antagonist of liberty. Indeed, one may suggest, with Kant, that far from adversary, authority is the condition making liberty possible, for law is the foundation of freedom.

From Robert Owen on, British socialists have insisted that socialism must mean a recasting of the political *Weltanschauung* of the individual. Historic concepts of individualism must be modified by a community ethic. Greater demands simultaneously are made of the individual. If planning is to succeed, he must become the perfect egoist, self-disciplined enough, virtuous enough, to forego immediate gains for those of a future he may never know. This is to ask intellectually that the dogma of automatism be abandoned in favor of a view bound up with evolution and relativity, the supereminent realities of the new science. The world becomes dynamic, pluralistic, a world in which synthesis and direction await planning.

While planners are not unaware of the anti-rationalist challenge of planning,¹ nor ignorant of the sometimes compelling logic of those who see in the expanding periphery of national control a painful constriction of individual liberty, these are lesser imperatives, the former unduly pessimistic, if not undemocratic, the latter a conditional good assigned, with Wootton's "private producer freedoms," a relatively lower priority in the national hierarchy of ends.²

¹ See, among others, H. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago, 1946), Ch. 5; or H. Simons, *Economic Policy for a Free Society* (Chicago, 1946).

² Perhaps this statement is unfair. "Individual freedom" remains a matter of definition. For socialists, political or civil freedom without economic freedom (security) remains vague conceptualism. Few socialists, moreover, would agree that "individual freedom" had in fact a lesser priority in Britain today. Indeed the opposite would be maintained, with considerable justice: one thinks immediately of frequent strikes in nationalized industry, of unrestricted and unrestrained criticism of the Government by the opposition press, etc. Nevertheless, the Labour Government, with Jeremy Bentham, appears to regard *majority welfare* as an overriding moral imperative.

Instead, planning is viewed as a collectively-oriented process, given life by that measure of rationality seen (however fleetingly) in the affairs of men. Certain limited areas of *common agreement* do exist, providing at once a substratum of consent and a delineation of the scope of planning.

I think it beyond reasonable question, for example, that by 1945 a national consensus held rehabilitation of the coal industry attainable only through nationalization.³ Today equally, a dominant political opinion appears to equate the national welfare with a positive state, increasingly responsible for the security, even the happiness, of the community. Planning without a purpose has been called a contradiction in terms, and it is perhaps the distinguishing feature of British planning that the grand ends of state can be set down in meaningful election manifestoes for endorsement by a mature electorate. Here a significant implication arises in terms of the total effect of Labor's program for town and country planning: whereas local autonomy has been held inevitably to suffer from planning on a national scale, the opposite result may occur. Local authorities may enjoy a renaissance of power. Under the 1947 statute, there has been a vitalizing delegation of authority to local planning agencies. Indeed, "the powers for positive planning that have been given . . . will mean a degree of cooperation of local governments with central government not hitherto attempted if these powers are to be used successfully."⁴

The Town and Country Planning Act (1947). The present statute reflects an experience from 1909 to 1944 wherein legislation was found inadequate to evolving needs. Part II of the 1909 Housing Act was the first attempt to carry out town planning on a scale exceeding that of the single local authority. Permissive in character, the statute made possible the creation of Joint Town Planning Commissions. The commissions possessed no executive power and their principal function became the preparation of master plans which the local authority might adopt or reject as it saw fit. Moreover, only *town* planning was authorized; not until the Planning Act of 1932 was the scope of planning extended to include adjacent or contiguous areas. In retrospect, perhaps the chief value of the 1909 legislation lay in its dramatization on a national scale of the principle of planned land-use control.

The 1932 Act, administered by the Ministry of Health, brought the county councils into the planning process. Earlier legislation had designated the county boroughs, non-county boroughs, and the urban and rural districts as the local planning authority. Development plans under the Act required approval by Parliament, and amendments to such schemes involved an especially cumbersome procedure. This rigidity and lack of authority on the part of local planning agencies inhibited participation; few local authorities took all the formal steps required in the preparation and submission of development plans. The majority

³ R. Vance Presthus, "Financial Aspects of Britain's National Coal Board," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 348-370 (June, 1950).

⁴ R. T. Kennedy, "A Ministry for All Town and Country Planning in England and Wales," *Traffic Quarterly*, Vol. 3, p. 148 (April, 1949).

preferred to grant planning permission under an Interim Development Order pending the establishment of a more comprehensive statute.

Meanwhile, the neglect of physical planning and urban redevelopment in the industrial North, and the sprawling growth of the Greater London conurbation, provided stark evidence of the need for legislation authorizing positive land-use planning. The Royal Commission of 1937 reflected popular sentiment by recommending, in the Barlow Report of 1940, the establishment of a ministry or board to deal exclusively with the related aspects of planning.

During this entire period any substantial redevelopment was prevented by the inadequacy of existing legislation in the vexing areas of compensation and compulsory acquisition. In brief, the inability of local authorities to sustain the financial burden involved in compensation and new development led either to timid, haphazard planning or to no planning at all. While advisory schemes were created in profusion, with rather excellent results in public awareness, their value was limited in the main to that of preliminary designs for the development plans to be required under subsequent legislation. It remained for the Uthwatt Committee, after examining the entire question of compensation and development rights, to present a courageous recommendation which became, in effect, the frame of reference of the present statute. It suggested

the vesting in the state of the rights of development lying outside the built-up areas on payment of fair compensation, such vesting to be secured by the imposition of a prohibition against development otherwise than with the consent of the state, accompanied by the grant of compulsory purchase power of acquiring land itself when wanted for public purposes or approved private development.⁵

The devastation of air bombing during World War II provided a final impetus.⁶ In 1943, the coalition Government established a Ministry of Town and Country Planning, directed to secure "consistency and continuity in the framing and execution of a national policy with respect to the use and development of land throughout England and Wales." From 1944 to 1946, several acts were passed treating related problems of planning. In sum, this was interim legislation designed to freeze the existing land-use pattern, negate speculative development, and generally ease the way for planning in the post-war era.

⁵ Ministry of Works and Planning, Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, *Final Report* (Cmd. 6386, London, H.M.S.O., 1942), p. 27.

⁶ "It was during the war, after the bombing of our main towns, that the public took a remarkable interest in planning. Before the war few people had realised what could be done to improve our towns and even those who did lived in despair. But the bombing tore gaps in many congested areas and it was obvious that we should have to rebuild on a large scale as well as add new suburbs. The question was how? At that time we were thinking hard about the future, though all our energies were devoted to war. They were difficult days and we had to believe we could put many things right when we got out of the immediate mess. We were going to be forced to rebuild whole districts in our towns and there was a natural and universal agreement that we could improve on the hit-and-miss methods of our fathers. We could do it through planning" (Professor Gordon Stephenson, "New Towns Policy in Great Britain," paper read at the National Conference, American Institute of Planners, Long Beach, California, September 16, 1948).

In the 1947 Act, which came into effect in July of 1948, the Labour Government created the first positive, comprehensive legislation covering town and country planning and the development of land.⁷ Extending to every acre in England and Wales, the Act is extremely complex, embracing a constellation of activity and interest ranging from the rebuilding of London to the conversion of homes to teashops. While earlier legislation was permissive, placing upon local authorities no obligation to prepare planning schemes and restricted largely to blighted or war-damaged areas, the new Act requires that local councils prepare comprehensive development plans within a period of three years. Moreover, by limiting planning authorities to county councils and county borough councils, the statute reduces drastically the number of individual planning agencies from some 1,400 to approximately 150. The vast majority of provisions found in earlier statutes are repealed, and the following innovations appear:

1. The establishment of the Central Land Board, a public corporation charged with important financial and administrative functions under the Act.
2. Powers of compulsory acquisition of land in the national interest, with proper compensation.
3. Express provision directing the preparation and implementation of development plans by local authorities.
4. The requirement of "planning permission," granted by the local authority to private and public developers.
5. The nationalization of all development values in land for a global sum of 300 million pounds, and the assessment of "development charges" against developers.

"A body corporate with perpetual succession," the Central Land Board⁸ like the other public corporations established by the present Government, is largely the creature of its parent Minister.⁸ He appoints the Board. He may summarily remove members in accord with rules and orders promulgated by himself. He enjoys a similar latitude in the power to issue "in the national interest" general directions which the Board "shall, in the performance of functions under this Act, comply with. . . ."⁹

The principal functions of the Board are three: the acquisition of land, the payment to owners for losses of "development values," and the levy of "development charges" arising from the grant of land-use permission by local planning authorities. Land may be acquired "for any purpose connected with the performance of functions under the Act." Moreover, "if the Minister is satisfied that it is expedient in the public interest that the Board should acquire any land for any such purpose as aforesaid, and that the Board are unable to acquire the land by agreement on reasonable terms, he may authorise the Board to acquire the land compulsorily. . . ."¹⁰ Land is to be held and disposed of in

⁷ For an excellent interpretative work on the Act, see J. Kekwick, *Town and Country Planning Law* (London, 1947); also *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 60, pp. 800-811 (May, 1947).

⁸ R. Vance Presthus, "British Public Administration: The National Coal Board," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 9, pp. 200-210 (Summer, 1949).

⁹ 10 and 11 Geo. 6, c. 51., Sec. 3(1).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 43(2).

accordance with directives issued by the Minister. The Board *per se*, it should be noted, has no power to carry out development; rather, it acts as intermediary, buying land, determining its most productive use under the public interest sanction, and disposing of it to local authorities, development corporations, and "statutory undertakers" (persons engaged in public utility enterprises).

In respect to the Board function of making payment to property owners for losses arising under the Act, a compensation fund of 300 million pounds has been established in accordance with Treasury estimates of aggregate development values throughout England and Wales. By this device the Government is protected against the exorbitant total sum which would result if calculations were accepted on an individual basis throughout the nation. Several criteria have been established to determine eligibility for compensation. These range from payment "in the case of all properties . . . depreciated in value by virtue of this Act," to losses arising from "disturbance" and "severance." Hardship will, for example, arise due to the freezing of the value of land at *existing use value*. In the future, when a landowner sells property, he will receive only its value for the particular use to which the property is devoted. Previously, assuming that unimproved land was being sold for building sites or agricultural development, a higher price could have been obtained. The differential between this amount and the "existing use value" of the land will under certain conditions be paid by the State to the seller.¹¹

Broadly conceived, the nationalization of development values is a means whereby effective control over a limited national asset can be maintained in the public interest. The following is an official statement:

The first assumption we have made is that national planning is intended to be a reality and a permanent feature of the administration of the internal affairs of this country. We assume that it will be directed to ensuring that the best use is made of land with a view to securing economic efficiency for the community and well-being for the individual, and that it will be recognized that this involves the subordination to the public good of the personal interest and wishes of land-owners. Unreserved acceptance of this conception of planning is vital to a successful reconstruction policy, for every aspect of a nation's activity is ultimately dependent on land. The denser the population, the more intensive the use of land becomes in order that the limited area may be capable of furnishing the services required: the more complex the productive organisation of society, the more highly developed must be the control of land utilisation exercised by or on behalf of the community.¹²

Finally, the Board assigns, with certain exceptions, a "development charge" against recipients of permission for development.¹³ Although some evidence

¹¹ This is an idealized statement of an infinitely complicated process, the ramifications of which cannot be considered here.

¹² Ministry of Works and Planning, Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹³ "Development" is defined in the Act as "the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in the use of any building or land."

indicates that citizens regard this as merely another form of taxation (the term "betterment tax" has appeared), the Government's rationale is that property value is appreciated by land-use permission and this increment should be assumed by the developer.¹⁴ At present the development charge is assessed at 100 per cent of the "increased value due to planning permission." A rather indefinite valuation formula is employed and there is no appeal against determinations of the Board. Although some improvement has been effected through Regulations, this valuation procedure remains among the creaking parts of the new legislation.

The Structure of Local Action.—The Government has clearly provided for a generous measure of local participation in the planning under the 1947 Act.¹⁵ The councils of each county or county borough are designated as the Local Planning Authority. If expedient in the view of the Minister, and after approval by all councils concerned, Joint Planning Boards may be instituted as the planning authority for two or more counties. Satellite jurisdictions are assured of expression by the stipulation that the local planning authority *shall consult* with their councils when formulating plans which affect them. The statute further provides that the planning authority may appoint planning committees. The will of local governments is expressed largely through a hierarchy of such committees, whose powers and procedure have been outlined in "schemes of delegation" prepared by local planning authorities at the direction of the Minister.

In Lancashire, the county has been divided into nineteen divisions, each with a committee comprising representatives from the county, the non-county borough and the urban and rural district councils. These committees function as *agents* of the local planning authority, granting planning permission, arranging for the conduct of proceedings in opposition to appeals, giving advice on the development plans for their respective areas, reviewing the planning decisions of local councils, and exercising such additional powers and duties as the planning authority may direct. The committees are provided with a planning staff which advises them on technical matters, assists in the preparation of briefs for appeal proceedings, and discharges routine administrative tasks of the planning authority at the divisional level.

At the apex of the committee structure is the County Planning Committee. Two-thirds of its members are from the county council, while the remainder are divided equally among representatives from the non-county boroughs and the urban and rural districts. Planning is immeasurably strengthened by this organizational facet which places the planning agency within the operating

¹⁴ The Act merely adumbrated, in a single subsection, 70 (2), the method of determination of this charge. Administrative regulations have since outlined a formula and an attempt has recently been made to set down generalizations. See W. A. Leach, "Principles of Development Charge Valuations," *Journal of Planning Law*, pp. 145-154 (March, 1949).

¹⁵ "Local participation" here is meant to include not only the activity of the local planning authority and subordinate units of government (non-county boroughs, urban and rural districts), but also the measure of influence enjoyed by local interest groups and the individual.

structure of government.¹⁶ Exclusive of the seventeen county borough councils which are autonomous planning authorities, this Committee is the final authority for land-use. Here the final disposition of plans and recommendations emanating from about one hundred local jurisdictions is effected.

While larger decisions of policy involving matters such as the location of trunk roads or the relocation of industry are set down by the County Committee after consultation with the Ministries of Transport and Health or the Board of Trade, decisions of a local nature are delegated to the jurisdiction concerned.¹⁷ If a request for planning permission occurs in an urban district, it is handled by the planning committee of that council in accord with local by-laws and plans. While this decision is subject to modification by superordinate committees and, in the last analysis, by the Minister, the burden of proof rests upon those who would overrule the local council. Such delegation is not only consistent with democratic theory, but is a matter of practical necessity. It has been shown that the planning mechanism tends to be cumbersome and dilatory in those counties where delegation is least. Here the problem is one of achieving a nice balance between speed of decision and the elimination of parochialism in the consideration of planning applications.

The most vital provision for local activism is the requirement that each planning authority prepare, by July of 1951, a development plan for its area. This plan, which must be finally approved by the Minister, is a positive statement of policy (the antithesis of zoning), outlining the allocation of land for various uses and a rough schedule of implementation in point of time. In sum the plan includes:

- (a) a survey and report which are a complete analysis of physical conditions in the area concerned,
- (b) a county map and report based on the survey data and defining the broad pattern of land-use during the next twenty years,
- (c) a series of town maps which detail the proposals in (b), indicating the areas designated for industrial, commercial, and housing purposes, and

¹⁶ For a critical analysis of American practice to the contrary, see Robert A. Walker, *The Planning Function in Urban Government* (Chicago, 1950).

¹⁷ In Lancashire County, between July 1, 1948, and December 31, 1949, the system of delegation functioned as follows: 20,960 applications for planning permission were received. The local district councils dealt with 66.5 per cent of these, mostly of a minor character. The Divisional Planning Committee handled 16.5 per cent, including those matters which (a) were likely to affect the development plan or (b) concerned questions of regional or national policy. The County Committee (after obtaining the observations of the subordinate committees) considered 7.7 per cent of the total applications, including those submitted by a local authority for development requiring authorization by a government department; those involving mining or advertizing displays; those involving cases where compensation claims are likely to arise; and those involving matters which affect the development plan or require extensive consultation with government departments, as in the case of industrial siting, the location of trunk roads, and the like (9.3 per cent of the applications were in process at the time of this review). Of 18,980 decisions made on these applications by March, 1950, 6,430 were approved unconditionally; 11,298 were approved subject to modification of the proposed development to meet objections by the committee concerned; and 1,252 were rejected.

- (d) certain large scale plans of areas likely to develop during the first five to ten years of the development plan.

The plan rests upon a substratum of research. All available data on past and present economic and demographic trends are marshaled in order to permit an intelligent prediction of the future. A multiplicity of unrelated local demands upon a limited amount of land provides additional raw material for the larger plan which must finally reflect a rational and disinterested balance. Simultaneously, national problems and objectives condition local planning. The rival claims of agriculture and industry and housing and rearmament contend, and are sometimes resolved by decisions of a short-run character, often reflecting international conditions over which the Government has no control. A principal task of the development plan is to bring about an accommodation between long range needs and the exigencies of the moment. Meanwhile the contingent nature of planning is recognized by the provision that local planning authorities shall conduct quinquennial surveys to determine the necessity for modification of plans.

In the preparation of the development plan, the power of the planning authority is limited in some ways. Although land may be designated as "subject to compulsory acquisition," thereby ensuring the comprehensive development of an area, the litigation and delay contingent upon such action tend to reduce it to a potential sanction, for use in extreme cases only. Again, the Minister's power to amend the periodic requests of local authorities for changes in their development plan may be used to negate proposed acquisitions. He must set them aside if he believes that they will not be effected within ten years. Local discretion is similarly circumscribed by the Minister's power to issue "general directions" whereby he may modify local plans if these contain provisions regarded as contrary to the national interest. Government departments, similarly, by exercising the immunity of Crown development from planning control, can ignore or override the local authority.

These centripetal influences aside, local authorities have rather complete power to determine land-use in their respective areas. They designate the relative proportions of land to be devoted to industry, agriculture and housing. They determine the location of the town hall, the shopping center, the housing estates, the open spaces, and the schools. Neighborhood densities are set down; even the design of individual homes is liable to their surveillance. Through the power of development control, the councils can channelize or subject individual interest. They can modify or reject the recommendations of subordinate governments. When all this has been said, however, no one should complain. Particularism in planning is fatal; a broad base of operations is required, at least countywide in scope. Equally, in all political organisms, if magnificent inaction is to be avoided, ultimate authority must rest somewhere. This is the purpose and the essential requisite of the comprehensive planning envisaged under present legislation.

Community participation during the preparation and submission of the development plan is ensured in several ways. The local planning authority is

required to consult with the councils of non-county boroughs and urban and rural districts when preparing plans which encompass these areas. Statutory directions provide for (a) making available for community inspection copies of the proposed plan before submission to Whitehall for final approval, (b) notice by advertisement of the submission of the plan to the Minister and (c) consideration of local objections through local inquiry before final approval. Nor is the definition of adequate publicity a matter of official prerogative: "Notice shall be given by advertisement in the *London Gazette* and in at least one newspaper in the area concerned. . . ."

The measure of local activity arising under such provisions was demonstrated recently in Lancashire when that planning authority published the preliminary draft of its development plan affecting some one hundred local jurisdictions. A document of over four hundred pages, with over sixty statistical appendices, the plan was literally a synoptic view of county Lancashire. The strains and stresses which distort the area received special attention: the unhealthy dependence of the Northeast on cotton, the problem of urban congestion, of an overspill of some 640,000 persons who must leave the great conurbations of the South, and the imbalance of areas such as Luyton, which imports each day more workers than its total population. Here, as Patrick Geddes insisted, diagnosis preceded treatment; the whole life and situation of a region had been surveyed, providing not only the basis of rational prevision, but a framework for local participation.¹⁸ The press and interest groups were immediately articulate. The tenor of local reaction, to be sure, was sometimes unhappily parochial. Was a particular area envisaged as expanding or contracting? Had it been designated as site for important industry or a New Town? If depressed and mono-industrial, was stability to be achieved through the introduction of diversified industry?

At the same time, most councils recognized that an essential purpose of the plan was to provide terms of reference for further consultation. The County Planning Committee emphasized that such consultation was a prerequisite to official status for the plan. Perhaps mainly because planning now had the statutory and financial power necessary for implementation, local councils reacted vigorously. Regressive areas, patently aware of the factors contributing to their decline, began seriously to consider the means of reversing the trend, while expanding communities determined to extend their gains. Over eighty of the jurisdictions concerned accepted the plan without reservation, less than ten offered substantial objection. It seems fair to say that citizens of Lancashire had seldom been as aware of planning potentials, of the dimensions of their particular problem, or of the interest and pride with which they viewed their own community.

Individual Participation. In planning, as elsewhere in government, individual influence on policy and administration is difficult to isolate. With few exceptions it is clear that individuals in a mass democracy must agglomerate to ensure the expression and achievement of desired ends. In Britain, a prolificacy

¹⁸ *Cities in Evolution* (London, 1949).

of interest groups has emerged, inspired by a responsive Parliament and a pragmatic recognition that "policy arises in the interstices of administration." Individuals who would influence planning may join the Council for the Preservation of Rural England to compete against the British Advertising Association or Federated British Industries for influence in the determination of land-use. A multiplicity of trade associations, civic improvement groups, and Chambers of Trade provide similar avenues of expression. Meanwhile, intergovernmental lobbying occurs: local government associations appear before Parliament to challenge the Board of Trade, sometimes seeking to attract industry, not infrequently attempting to repel developments which appear to threaten local scenic or historic amenity.

Individuals *qua* individuals, while less effective, exert pressure directly upon the local planning authorities. Such influence, inherently of decreasing strength as one ascends the governmental hierarchy, is minimal now that final authority for planning resides in the highest echelons of local government. At the national level, the individual may write his Member who, if sufficiently interested, can secure prompt treatment of his claim. Finally, intrepid citizens have appealed directly to the Prime Minister against the decisions of the local planning authority. In the last analysis, however, the ordinary citizen will probably assume a passive role, relying upon his local council to express his view and represent his interest. Like individuals who write Parliament or the Prime Minister, interest groups are minority by definition.

There remains, at the same time, a most provocative (if essentially negative) medium of individual action, that is, the appeal process carried out in local inquiry. The recurrent problem of reconciling individual desires with the needs of social life is especially compelling at this level. The controversy is immediate; the participants and issues are well-known. Appeal generally follows the denial of planning permission by the local council. The petitioner may wish to build a hotel or a public house at some opportune road junction. He may be a private contractor seeking permission to build a housing project. Less frequently exception has been taken to a fragment of a development plan or to a council's definition of "development."¹⁹

The inquiry is governed by the traditional guarantees of due process: notice, representation by counsel, provision for witnesses, evidence on oath, cross-examination, penalties for failure to honor summons and for the distortion or suppression of evidence. At the same time, a refreshing freedom from procedural *legerdemain* exists. Inspectors, the official representatives of the Minister, permit gratuitous expressions of opinion. Objections to evidence on technical grounds are rather unpopular. Letters and petitions are admitted without formal authentication and substantial latitude is permitted in cross-examination.²⁰ Expenses of the hearing are nominal, making redress practically available

¹⁹ For an analysis of the conditions under which appeal has been accepted, see H. J. Brown, "Planning Appeal Decisions," *Journal of Planning Law*, pp. 188-197 (Feb. 1950).

²⁰ *Ibid.*; also "Procedure and Evidence at Public Local Inquiry," *Journal of Planning Law*, pp. 30-40 (Jan., 1951).

to all. Meanwhile, capricious appeals or unreasonable local rulings are discouraged by the Minister's prerogative which permits assignment of all costs to one of the contestants. Following the inquiry, the site under dispute is usually visited, and the record and recommendations of the Inspector are sent on to the Minister who makes a final decision.²¹

The appeal mechanism appears to ensure the broadest possible consideration of individual objections. This is vital since the local inquiry is one of the few institutionalized media for securing direct individual participation and popular interest in planning. While the press and the public house will undoubtedly remain the focal points of informal discussion of planning decisions, a more penetrating scrutiny will undoubtedly arise from debate in an inquiry charged with conflicting interest. Meanwhile, the very possibility of appeal has proved a restraint on over-zealous local officials and a beneficial stimulus to individual morale.²²

While one might assume that the appeal would tend to be weighted heavily in favor of the planning authority, an impressive number of appeals have been upheld by the Minister.²³ Rather ironically, certain elements of the press insist on interpreting these as a "defeat for the planners," forgetting apparently that the Minister himself is, after all, the chief planner. Some criticism of the finality of the Minister's decision has been heard, but given the importance of dispatch in implementing national policy and the penultimate fact that a responsible Parliament remains the final remedy for poor planning, this is not decisive.

Some Generalizations. Although a positive balance is clearly evident, several factors tend to restrict participation. The statute and the plethora of regulations emerging under it are extremely complex, and the task of converting their necessarily technical language to concepts meaningful to the ordinary citizen is difficult indeed. The uncertainty surrounding the "existing use formula" is germane. Sellers now have no definite information as to the amount of compensation (if any) they will ultimately receive under the Act; their corresponding disinclination to sell at *existing use value* has brought about a virtual im-

²¹ An aggrieved developer may challenge the Minister's decision by application to the High Court seeking negation through orders of *certiorari* or *mandamus*. *R. V. East Kesteven Rural District Council, Exp. Sleaford and District White City Sports Stadium Co.* 63 T.L.R. 112: 1947, All E.R. 310. Similarly, an intrepid applicant believing that his proposal does not in fact constitute "development" and is therefore exempt from planning control, may proceed with the venture, bringing into operation an enforcement order against which he can appeal to a court of summary justice which will consider his plea *de novo*. If unsuccessful, however, he is liable to removal of the offending development without compensation.

²² "Fundamentally, the inquiry serves to combat any public impression that the planning mechanism is a ruthless use or misuse of power" (Charles Haar, "Appeals under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947," *Public Administration*, p. 43 [Spring, 1949]).

²³ In Lancashire County, for example, of 164 appeals submitted between July 1, 1948, and December 31, 1949, 82 were rejected, 43 sustained, and 26 withdrawn (either the applicant withdrew his appeal or the planning authority modified its original decision). Thirteen cases were pending as of March, 1950, the time of this summation.

passe wherein property will not be sold unless the buyer agrees to include the development charge (as a rough approximation of *potential use value*) in the purchase price.²⁴ The latter, understandably, is reluctant to do this as he will have to pay the development charge *again* to the Central Land Board as the price of development permission. The landowners' incentive to develop is similarly circumscribed. Having normally bought property at full market value, he is unwilling to incur the additional liability of a 100 per cent development charge against which he can set off only an indeterminate claim on the global compensation fund.

Something must also be said of the tendency for planning to be dominated by the expert. The part-time role of the local council, the expertise which the technician brings to the administrative process, and the need for expeditious decision—all encourage abdication by councils confronted with a multiplicity of planning permission requests. Many of these involve the minutiae of planning and housing laws, standards of density and the like; councilmen seldom have, nor can they be expected to have, cognizance of such detail. They must rely upon the technician. This condition, moreover, is aggravated by the pressure of time: there is generally an inarticulate agreement among councils that business will be completed within a certain limited period. Thus in order to surmount agenda which include scores of planning requests, councils tend to treat petitions solely upon the recommendation of planning staff.

It is sometimes held that a significant *cultural* barrier to community participation exists, arising largely from the inability of an individual to express an intelligent choice in respect of alternatives about which he knows very little.²⁵ For example, can a miner with experiences limited in the main to life in uninspired villages (properly called monuments of misdirected effort) contribute meaningfully to a social survey which seeks to determine required amenities or the relative suitability of apartment *vis-à-vis* single house dwellings? Although this observation has substance, especially in view of the rather primitive housing facilities existing in some of the New Town areas, a greater cultural impediment to planning occurs insofar as planning tends *generally* to come up against a pervasive traditionalism. The prevailing view that the church structure must continue as the esthetic focus of the community is illustrative.

Finally, the larger demands of national policy limit the effectiveness of local planning. The Board of Trade, which is responsible for authorizing the location of new industry in the Development Areas, sometimes proceeds without reference to the local authority concerned. The problem is compounded by a

²⁴ Thus the recent comment of the Central Land Board: "[Whereas] one of the principles underlying the Town and Country Planning Acts is that land should be sold for development at existing use value . . . evidence available to the Board of prices paid for land for development suggests that sales at or near existing use value are more the exception than the rule" (*Annual Report, 1949-50*, p. 10 [London: H.M.S.O., 1950]).

²⁵ M. Felton, "Democracy in Town and Country Planning," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 20, pp. 79-82 (Jan.-March, 1949).

similar lack of information concerning proposed economic development in those sections where private enterprise remains the mainspring of activity.²⁶ This is an anomalous situation. Industrial development is the basic factor in the planning equation. Without knowledge of its nature and scope, the local authority is denied the very information which can make its planning realistic.²⁷

On the positive side, there is a growing appreciation of planning and its objectives. The stimulus to local interest arising from the circulation of preliminary development plans cannot be over-emphasized. The program of the Ministry to increase understanding and action is also making itself felt. After criticism by the press and private planning associations, the Ministry began in 1948 to popularize the procedures and objectives of town and country planning.²⁸ In engagingly non-technical language, the problems most likely to perplex the layman were treated in "The Town and Country Planning Act: 144 Questions and Answers." Local planning authorities were provided a series of circulars outlining matters of technical detail, including research methods and the preparation of the development plan. In order to crystallize a pattern of decision for the guidance of local councils, the Ministry issued a quarterly "Bulletin of Selected Appeal Decisions." The vexing problem of the development charge, which has probably been the least satisfactory facet of the Act, was treated in "Practice Notes on Development Charges." The general effect of the statute on land values was explained, and the rather prevalent fear that the Central Land Board would exploit its monopoly position was met with the assurance that "the Board do not propose to value on this basis." The Board later demonstrated the response which calculated effort can secure. In May of 1949, after the expiration of ten and one-half months of the twelve-month period for lodging compensation claims, only 116,000 of a potential million claims had been received. The Board thereupon "intensified its publicity." By June 1 of the same year, 185,000 claims had been registered; three weeks later the figure rose to 463,000, and by the last week of June, 935,000 claims had been lodged.²⁹

These efforts have been accompanied by a substantial contribution from professional associations and disinterested commentators. Appeal decisions and interpretations have been analyzed in the *Journal of Planning Law*.

²⁶ F. J. McCulloch, "Physical Planning and Industry," *Town Planning Review*, Vol. 20, pp. 64-80 (April, 1949).

²⁷ In America the unfortunate effect of uncoordinated physical and economic planning is illustrated by the "Greenbelt Towns" which, contrary to Howard's garden city concept which inspired them, have remained suburban, expensively far from employment.

²⁸ *The (London) Times*, July 1, 1948, p. 5, for example, could say: "The authorities have so far failed to convey to the public even the most elementary facts about the new procedure . . . few yet understand the methods of community planning or the discipline which planning asks for. While this lack of understanding persists there will be fresh outbursts of anger over every proposed 'new town' and at every official attempt to pull down a 'Briar Patch' unlawfully erected by some sturdy individualist."

²⁹ Central Land Board, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Proposals to ease administration of the Act have appeared in profusion. Illustrative of these is the *Memorandum* prepared recently by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.³⁰ After a thoughtful analysis of the statute in theory and in practice, the report set down detailed recommendations for improvement in defective areas. Subsequently, when presenting Regulations in Parliament for the improvement of development charge procedure, the Minister acknowledged the assistance provided by the Surveyors.

The democratic character of post-war planning was impressively revealed in accounts of the proceedings for determination of New Town sites. In the case of Bracknell, a professional journal reported that "negotiations were characterized by considerable departures from the original scheme."³¹ These modifications, it appeared, resulted from "a political pressure so great and one-sided that we cannot feel that the Ministry has been free to make a wise and balanced judgment." Here was a clear renunciation of the view that, under national planning, decisions are necessarily formulated in some remote place with a minimum of consultation and imposed upon a reluctant community. On the contrary, the expression of local will can be of sufficient virility to compromise the "balanced judgment" of an omnipotent Government.

Despite these advances, a continuing educational campaign by the Ministry and the local planning authorities is needed. Planning is still too remote. There is too little popular understanding of the objectives of planning and of the discipline that planning requires. The persistence of the term "betterment tax" remains an index of public misconception. Certainly it is not entirely clear that control of a limited national asset, rather than revenue, is the essential purpose of the Act. Again, while statutory provision for local expression is exemplary, productive consultation has suffered from the unrepresentative character of some councils. Without a vitalizing concord of purpose, of *community interest*, formal avenues of communication become sterile. Indeed, the achievement of a truly effectual relationship between planner and client remains the cardinal requisite of the new planning, the function not only of the Ministry and the local planning authority, but equally that of the ordinary citizen who must assume an active rôle, confident "that the great hope, and the sole justification, of the new system of determining the use of land is that its decisions may be better in their economic, social and aesthetic consequences than the haphazard decisions of the past."³²

³⁰ "Memorandum on the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947," *Journal of Planning Law*, pp. 528-548 (July, 1950).

³¹ Town and Country Planning Association, "Bracknell New Town," *Town and Country Planning*, p. 97 (Summer, 1949); also M. Felton, "Britain's Model Town: Peterlee," *Journal American Institute of Planners*, Vol. 15, pp. 40-43 (Spring, 1949).

³² *The (London) Times*, July 1, 1948, p. 5.

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

A CONSTITUTION FOR HAWAII

S. GALE LOWRIE
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A convention assembled in Honolulu on April 4, 1950, to draft the constitution for the new state of Hawaii which the framers hope will soon be created by Congress. On July 22, the constitution was signed in the throne room of the old Iolani palace in a colorful ceremony. Sixty-two of the sixty-three delegates signed the document and the territorial legislature, at a special session called for that purpose, approved its submission to the electorate by a unanimous vote in the lower house and with but two opposing votes in the Senate. The voters ratified the constitution at the general election on November 7, 1950, by the substantial majority of 82,788 to 27,109. Sentiment for statehood has been increasing in the Islands until it has reached the proportion registered in the referendum on the adoption of the constitution. The minority in opposition was small, and it is probable that a number of those voting in opposition registered disapproval not of statehood but of the document as written. The only organized opposition came from the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, which is on record as recently as May, 1950, as favoring the admission of Hawaii to the Union of States.

The act of the territorial legislature of May 20, 1949, authorizing the convention may have seemed premature, since congressional approval for statehood is yet to be secured. But hope was high that the 81st Congress would admit Hawaii as the forty-ninth state; and in calling a constitutional convention before admission was assured, the territory followed the precedent set by fifteen of our states. The House of Representatives of the 81st Congress did in fact adopt H.R. 49 to grant statehood to Hawaii by the vote of 262 to 110, and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs recommended the measure for passage. The Senate was strongly urged by the President and the Secretary of the Interior to take action before the congressional session drew to a close, and a majority of the Senators expressed themselves informally as favoring statehood. However, the issue was not brought to a vote and must now be considered anew by the 82nd, or a later, Congress. But there is confidence that the events of 1950, in the Islands and in Washington, will hasten favorable congressional action.

Although several states have in recent years revised their constitutions and others have adopted amendments proposed by conventions, there have been no original documents for new states since New Mexico and Arizona were admitted in 1912. Much careful research has been given state constitutions in the intervening years, and Hawaii prepared her draft in the light of these studies. Most of the states have constitutions which have been outmoded by the technological and social changes of the last half century. Hawaii had an unusual opportunity to draft a modern document.

A striking feature of the Hawaiian constitution is its provision for a strong governor to be elected for a four-year term. In addition to the usual duties ascribed to that office—responsibility “for the faithful execution of the laws,” recommending measures to the legislature, granting reprieves and pardons, acting as commander-in-chief of the state’s armed forces—he is given important appointive power, and each principal department is placed under his supervision. Through his control over the purse, he is to possess ample authority to dominate the state’s activities. Unless the legislature should provide otherwise, no other executive officer is to be chosen by election except the lieutenant governor. Instead of organizing the administrative departments by constitutional provisions, the legislature is commissioned to establish not more than twenty principal departments in accordance with major purposes; and, unless otherwise provided, these are to be headed by single executives. These department heads are to be appointed by the governor for terms ending with his own, and they are subject to removal with the Senate’s consent. The constitution requires the governor to appoint an administrative director to serve at his pleasure.

Under the organic act which now governs the territory, the President of the United States appoints the governor and the secretary of state. The latter acts for the chief executive when the Governor is absent from the state, with authority to exercise all powers vested in the chief executive’s office. This valuable provision is to continue when Hawaii becomes a state. The lieutenant governor, who will probably serve as secretary of state *ex officio*, although other duties may be provided by law, will, in the absence of the governor from the state or his incapacity to exercise and discharge the duties of his office, have the powers and duties of the chief executive devolved on him. If the office of governor becomes vacant, the lieutenant governor will become governor.

It is made a duty of the governor to submit to the legislature a budget comprising a complete plan of operating expenditure and capital improvements, together with a statement of anticipated receipts and recommendations for new revenue from taxes or borrowing. He is given specific authority to veto or reduce items in appropriation bills. A section of the article on “Taxation and Finance” requiring that provision be made “for the control of the rate of expenditure of appropriated state moneys, and for the reduction of such expenditure under prescribed conditions,” probably contemplates a continuation of the present territorial system of “allotments.” This system clothes the governor with the power of expropriation, even with respect to those departments organized for continuing policies under board administration, such as the department of education and the state university. In their desire to hold the chief executive “accountable,” the framers have, at least potentially, set up one of the most powerful executive offices in the United States.

The office of the governor is further strengthened by the restrictions placed upon the legislature, particularly in limiting the sessions to 60 and 30 days. The legislature is to consist of two houses, a Senate of 25 members elected for 4 years, and a House of Representatives of 51 members elected for 2-year

terms. The organization of this branch of government was affected by the unique geographical features of the proposed state, which consists of eight principal islands, unequal in size, population and wealth, and so separated that passenger travel between them is principally by air. To represent the geographical areas, senatorial districts are established in the constitution, and these may not be changed except by constitutional amendment, which must be approved by a majority vote in the state as a whole and also by majority votes in a majority of the counties. Representation in the lower house is apportioned on the basis of population. The desire to give the island of Oahu (which not only is the most populous of the islands, but also is the seat of government and the economic and financial capital) equal representation without reducing existing representation from the outer islands, resulted in increasing the size of this body to 51, from its present size of 30 in the territorial lower house. Compared to the size of legislatures of other states, a legislature of 76 members is not a large one. The story is different when one considers that the Islands have a population of less than half a million. Under present conditions, there will be one member of the legislature for each 1,760 registered voters.

Regular sessions of the legislature are to meet annually, but it is only in the "general sessions" to be held in the odd-numbered years that general laws are to be enacted. The sessions held in the even-numbered years are to be known as "budget sessions," limited to consideration of appropriations for the succeeding fiscal year, capital improvements, revenue necessitated thereby, constitutional amendments, and bills to call elections. Urgent legislation may be introduced upon the demand of two-thirds of the full membership of each house. General sessions must conclude in 60 days and budget sessions in 30 days. The governor may extend any session 30 days. The governor may call special sessions, but may not limit their agenda, as he may in some states.

A provision of the New Jersey constitution which calls for the return of the legislature after 45 days to act on bills vetoed by the governor, has been borrowed and incorporated. No steps were taken to avoid the legislative jam which too often accompanies the closing days of legislative sessions, by arranging for continuing or periodic sessions. With respect to those bills which are passed during the last ten days of the session, the governor is allowed 45 days for consideration. Those he vetoes during this period are to be reconsidered by the legislature in a special veto session. The legislature is to return after this 45-day period to revise the bills to meet the governor's requests, to pass them over his veto by a two-thirds vote in each house, or, by failing to do so, to acquiesce in the veto.

Although the legislature is empowered to create administrative or regulatory boards, the only ones provided in the constitution are the board of regents for the University of Hawaii and the board of education to control the public school system of the state. Both boards are to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate and are to be representative, at least in part, of the geographical subdivisions of the state. In the appointment of members of the board of education, names are to be taken from panels to be submitted

by local school advisory councils. Central control of the educational system of the territory now exists under the provisions of the organic act enacted by Congress for the territory.

The convention is to be commended for its faith that the legislatures of the future will be competent and can be trusted to deal with the problems of their day. In consequence, it placed fewer restrictions on these bodies than are to be found in most constitutions. A controversial issue arose respecting home rule for political subdivisions. The article incorporated grants local agencies the right to frame and adopt charters for self-government, but the article is not self-executing and the powers will be exercised within such limits as may be prescribed by law. This provision, consequently, grants little to local bodies, but it is doubtful if much more local autonomy could have been established by constitutional mandate. Centralizing administrative forces are at work. Public education is already centralized; the entire island of Oahu is for most municipal purposes an administrative unit. The geographical nature of the proposed state may demand special treatment for certain areas, and technical changes affect governmental operations.

The decision to establish the judiciary on an appointive basis will be approved by many who believe that the elective system in most of the states fails to secure the most competent judges. The Supreme Court will consist of a chief justice and four associate justices. There are to be circuit courts and such inferior courts as the legislature may establish. Judges of the supreme and circuit courts are to be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the former for seven and the latter for six-year terms. They may be removed, for causes provided by law, by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature sitting in joint session. If an agency (to be set up by law) shall certify to the governor that a judge of the supreme or circuit court seems so incapacitated as to prevent performance of his duties, the governor shall appoint a board of three to make inquiries, and on their recommendation the governor may remove the judge.

No provision is made for the initiative to propose either statutes or constitutional amendments, nor for the referendum, except on constitutional amendments. Constitutional amendments may be proposed by the legislature or by conventions called for that purpose. The legislature may submit amendments which have received a two-thirds vote in each house, or majority votes at each of two successive sessions. Conventions to consider constitutional revision will be called if a majority of the voters so demand when the issue appears on the ballot. The convention issue may be submitted by the legislature at any general or special election, and must be submitted every ten years. The lieutenant governor will place the matter before the voters if the legislature fails to act during this interval. Amendments, proposed by legislature or convention, must be approved by a majority of those who vote on the issues, and, in addition, by 35 per cent of those who vote at the election, if submitted at a general election. Issues voted at special elections must have majorities on the issues and the approval of 35 per cent of the registered voters.

The voting age is set at 20 years.

No limitations have been placed on the state's power to tax, but a debt limitation of \$60,000,000 is established, which may not be exceeded except by a two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature. By these majorities, the legislature may contract debt up to 15 per cent of the assessed value of real estate. Debts of local subdivisions are limited to 10 per cent of the value of real estate in the subdivision. These limitations are not applicable to debts to raise funds to suppress insurrection, to repel invasion or to meet disasters. They are not applicable to bonds secured by the revenues of enterprises and public corporations, nor to refunding bonds. The procedures to be followed in the passage of appropriation bills and in debt administration are set forth in some detail.

The convention which framed the Hawaiian constitution, while conservative, was mindful of the social obligations of a modern state. But rather than outline constitutional procedures for the state to follow, it was content to assert the basic duties of the state, leaving it to the legislatures of the future to devise appropriate means of meeting these obligations. The state must take measures to promote the public health, provide domiciliary care for mentally or physically handicapped and assist those unable to maintain living standards compatible with health and decency. The state may assist in slum clearance, in providing housing for those with low incomes and in rehabilitating sub-standard areas. Public lands are to be used as fully as possible to encourage farm and home ownership. For the development of places of beauty and of historical or cultural interest, private property may be subject to reasonable regulation.

The constitution contains the usual guarantees to protect civil liberties. Influenced by experiences in the Islands during the second world war, the power of suspending the writ of habeas corpus, or laws, is to be exercised only by the legislature, or, in particular cases, as the legislature may expressly provide. There will be no discrimination or segregation on the basis of race or religion.

The civil service is to be governed by the merit principle, and the retirement system, which is to include the judges, is declared a contractual relationship. Public employees may organize and make known their grievances and proposals; private employees may organize for collective bargaining.

The style and arrangement of the proposed constitution are excellent. It is a brief document which contains fewer provisions of a statutory character than will be found in the constitutions of most of the states.

A COMMUNITY REGISTRATION SURVEY

PHILLIPS BRADLEY AND ALFRED H. COPE

Syracuse University

The Citizenship Program at Syracuse University has sought to develop, over several years, practical civic-participation projects for one thousand or more freshman students. These projects have included city-wide voters' registration drives; a dramatic project presenting the TVA; public surveys of local citizens' knowledge of their community; and visits to correctional institutions, political rallies, or city council meetings. During 1951, a variation was tried, involving a student survey of reasons for non-registration.

Solvay, New York, with a population of 7,667, a village of mixed racial, religious, and political elements, was selected as a project location upon the request of local residents. These requests came from representatives of both major parties who were interested in getting out the vote for an off-season village election. Before initiating the project, the officials of the parties were notified. The New York State Citizens Council agreed to co-sponsor the registration survey, together with staffs of the introductory courses in citizenship and in political science at the university. From the point of view of all participants, it was hoped that a useful technique applicable for the same civic objective in other communities could be evolved.

Prior publicity about the survey was given in newspapers circulating in the community. This publicity was to reduce possible resentment on the part of citizens against the interview procedure, and to avoid as far as possible the mild reactions to such a survey which often develop, especially when exact knowledge of its scope and purpose is not generally available. Full clearance with the officials of both political parties was considered essential and was secured.

Prior to the organization of student participation, maps of wards and districts, data on times and places of the election, information on qualifications for voting, and standard interview and report instructions and forms were assembled. Careful instructions were issued to students on doorbell ringing, the desired approach, and the recording of information upon the completion of each interview. Students were instructed to travel in pairs, not to work after sundown, and to avoid taverns and commercial establishments. Before interviewing, students were instructed to state that it was their purpose to improve the registration and vote in the village election, and that the issue of registration and voting was nonpartisan. They were told to indicate the sponsorship of the survey, as well as the names of candidates of all parties to each office. Detailed briefing, so that they could answer unexpected questions concerning the New York election law, was carried out by the staff before interviewing began.

Student interviewers were instructed that when residents were not at home, they were to leave specific instructions concerning registration at the door. For the particular election under consideration, many citizens could participate

on account of their eligibility based upon registration in the November, 1950, election, but it was found that a considerable group was not already registered. Each student was given the telephone numbers of a university instructor and a village official, to be used in the event of personal difficulties, or to obtain information on technical questions that he could not answer.¹

The instructional staff selected the more responsible students in their sections as ward and district captains. These met, discussed the project with staff members, and then spent an afternoon in visiting their districts, driving around from street to street, locating polling places, identifying locations for literacy examinations for new voters, correlating street maps with interview assignments of student teams, eliminating vacant land and factory areas from their plans, and, in general, observing hazards and possibilities for assigning student workers. District captains in turn took their team captains to observe team areas before the final canvass was begun.

Approximately one week before the actual field work, all of the 125 participants were assembled and divided into teams based upon the dates and hours in which they could work in their designated areas within the wards. Ward and district captains were told they would be rated upon their efficiency by the instructional staff, that team captains were to be rated by them, and that final ward reports (for which they were responsible) must include an efficiency rating of each individual interviewer. Students were required to do their work between March 1 and March 9, 1951, so as to antedate registration on March 10.

In addition to mimeographed instructions and information sheets for absentee residents, each student interviewer was supplied with two interview report-

¹ The form distributed was as follows:

(back)

(front)

TO VOTE FOR VILLAGE OFFICERS YOU MUST REGISTER NOW

YOUR LAST CHANCE TO REGISTER IS:

March 10, 1951 12:00-7:00 P.M.

YOUR ADDRESS IS.....

YOUR REGISTRATION PLACE IS.....

(This material is circulated by the Political Science Department and Citizenship Program, Syracuse University, in cooperation with the New York State Citizens Council. This is a nonpartisan effort to get out the vote on Election Day, Tuesday, March 20, from 6:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M.)

(over)

QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS

If you registered for the November, 1950 election you do not have to register again for this election. If you did not register in 1950, here are the qualifications:

To register and vote *everyone* must be a citizen and: (1) be 21 years old; (2) be a resident of N.Y.S. for one year; (3) be a resident of Solvay for four months; (4) be a resident of the voting district one month prior to election day (March 20, 1951); (5) if a naturalized citizen, you must have been naturalized for ninety days.

If you have *never* registered in your district before, you must present evidence of literacy either by certificate or passage of the sixth grade. If you do not have evidence of literacy you may obtain a certificate of literacy by taking a simple test on registration day, at Boyd School, 8:00-3:30. Or else call Mrs. Fitzpatrick 8-3339. Take evidence of literacy when you register.

forms. One of these required the listing of each address and floor, and whether residents were at home. For residents at home, the student was to indicate the number of possible voters, those who were already registered, those who refused to commit themselves, and those who refused to register. Insofar as possible, a record was made of those reporting failure to register for such reasons as illiteracy, inadequate residence, or lack of citizenship. The second report form included a classification of reasons for non-registration, paralleling Merriam and Gosnell's classification of reasons for non-voting.

The statistical results of the survey are given below. Despite the inadequacies of this project in the usual research sense, the reasons for non-registration which it showed, in this suburban village in upstate New York today, were strikingly similar to those which Professors Merriam and Gosnell found for non-voting in the city of Chicago around twenty-five years ago. The major variations seem to have arisen from a decrease in disbelief in women's voting and from a hesitancy on the part of persons interviewed to admit outright neglect.

INTERVIEWS OF POTENTIAL VOTERS AND REASONS FOR NON-REGISTRATION
SOLVAY, NEW YORK, 1951

A. Interview Data

Residences visited.....	1484
Residences in which people were not at home.....	523
Residences with interviews conducted.....	961
Number of eligible residents reported.....	2239
Residents who reported they had already registered.....	1637
Residents for whom a commitment to register was obtained.....	402
Residents from whom no commitment could be obtained.....	41
Residents who had not registered and would not register.....	100
Miscellaneous responses not directly indicating a refusal to register.....	59
Vote for Mayor in 1949.....	3655
Vote for Mayor in 1951.....	3554

B. Reasons for Refusing to Register and to Vote

	<i>Solvay</i>	<i>Merriam & Gosnell</i>
	No. & Per Cent (non-registration)	Per Cent (non-voting)
Physical Difficulties.....	27	25.4
Illness.....	19	12.1
Absence.....	7	11.1
Detained by helpless member of the family.....	1	2.2
Legal Obstacles.....	28	12.6
Insufficient legal residence.....	28	5.2
Fear of loss of wages in business.....		5.5
Congestion at the polls.....		0.8
Poor voting facilities.....		0.8
Fear of disclosure of age.....		0.3

	<i>Solway</i>	<i>Merriam & Gosnell</i>
	No. & Per Cent (non-registration)	Per Cent (non-voting)
Disbelief in Voting.....	11	17.7
Anti-suffragist (disbelief in women's voting)....	1	7.8
Objections of husband.....	1	1.0
Disgust with politics generally.....	5	4.3
Disgust with own party.....	1	2.0
Belief that one vote counts for nothing.....	1	1.5
Belief that the ballot box is corrupt.....	1	0.7
Disbelief in all political action.....	1	0.4
Inertia.....	29	44.3
General indifference.....	23	25.4
Indifference to particular election.....		2.5
Neglect: "Intends to but won't".....	1	8.4
Ignorance or timidity.....	5	7.1
Failure of party workers.....		0.9
Other Reasons Offered.....	5	
Illiterate.....	4	
Convict.....	1	
TOTAL.....	100	100.0

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES¹

COMPILED BY RALPH K. HUITT

University of Wisconsin

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

John T. Amendt; B.S., Loyola University of Los Angeles, 1946. *Philosophic Backgrounds of Recent American Political Theory: A Study in Deterioration. Georgetown.*

Stanislaus Belch; Theological Institute Przemysl, Poland, 1928. *Thomas Hobbes' Concept of Religion and the State's Relation to It. Notre Dame.*

Charles Blützer; A.B., Williams, 1946; A.M. Harvard, 1948. *The Political Theory of James Harrington. Harvard.*

Joan V. Bondurant; A.B., Michigan, 1942; B.Mus., Michigan, 1942. *The Socio-Political Technique of Non-Violent Action as Developed by Mohandas K. Gandhi. California (Berkeley).*

¹ Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW as follows: V, 456 (1911); VI, 464 (1912); VII, 689 (1913); VIII, 488 (1914); XIV, 155 (1920); XVI, 497 (1922); XIX, 171 (1925); XX, 660 (1926); XXI, 645, (1927); XXII, 736 (1928); XXIII, 795 (1929); XXIV, 799 (1930); XXV, 798 (1931); XXVI, 769 (1932); XXVII, 680 (1933); XXVIII, 766 (1934); XXIX, 713 (1935); XXX, 811 (1936); XXXI, 772 (1937); XXXII, 796 (1938); XXXIII, 732 (1939); XXXIV, 767 (1940); XXXV, 752 (1941); XXXVI, 734 (1942); XXXVII, 706 (1943); XXXVIII, 766 (1944); XXXIX, 779 (1945); XL, 775 (1946); XLI, 754 (1947); XLII, 759 (1948); XLIII, 787 (1949); XLIV, 689 (1950).

Items which appeared in the September, 1950, list are in general classified under the same headings in the present list, and new items have been assimilated to the 1950 classification as far as possible. In cases where classification of an item has been suggested by the institution concerned, the suggestion has been followed. Each item is listed under one classification only. Names starred are merely carried over from the 1950 list, no more recent data having been received.

This year for the first time there is appended a list of those dissertations which have been reported to the REVIEW as completed since the last listing.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science. Often dissertations are in progress in departments of economics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap or supplement dissertations in preparation in political science. Attention is called especially to the following lists: "Current Research Projects in Public Administration" (reported to Public Administration Service), the most recent edition of which appeared early in 1951; "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy in Progress in American Colleges and Universities," in the *American Economic Review*; "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History Now in Progress," formerly published by the Division of Historical Research, Carnegie Institution of Washington, but since the 1938 issue as a supplement of the *American Historical Review*; and "Higher Degrees in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Usually one list is published each year. These are in addition to the "List of American Doctoral Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most recent of an annual series published by the Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotter and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, 1949-1950," the seventeenth of a series beginning in 1933-34, compiled for the Association of Research Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Palfrey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to Bibliographies of Theses, United States and Canada" (Chicago, American Library Association, 2nd ed., 1940).

- Bernard Borning; A.B., Minnesota, 1936. The Political Ideas of Charles A. Beard. *Minnesota*.
- George Figures Brasington, Jr.; A.B., Emory, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948. Representative Government in Jacksonian Political Philosophy. *Illinois*.
- Burton Russell Brazil; B.A., U.C.L.A., 1941; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948. Loyalty Oaths in California and their Relationship to Democratic Theories of the Open Society. *Stanford*.
- William H. Brubeck; A.B., St. Johns, 1948; A.M., Harvard, 1950. American Radicalism in the Late Nineteenth Century. *Harvard*.
- Frederic S. Burin II; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1942; A.M., Syracuse, 1946. Police Against State. *Columbia*.
- Gaylon Lora Caldwell; B.S., Utah State Agricultural College; A.M., Nebraska, 1948. The Political and Social Theory of Mormonism. *Stanford*.
- Karl H. Cerny; A.B., Princeton; A.M., Yale, 1948. Catholic Social Thought in the United States. *Yale*.
- Ross Clinchy; A.B., Swarthmore, 1941; A.M., Columbia, 1948. The State and Minority Rights. *Columbia*.
- Raymond Francis Cour, C.S.C.; A.B., Notre Dame, 1937; A.M., *ibid.*, 1943. Catholic Action and Politics. *Notre Dame*.
- *Melvin Crain; A.B., Redlands, 1946; A.M., Southern California, 1947. The Theory and Practice of Functional Representation, with Particular Reference to the United States. *Southern California*.
- James C. Davies; A.B., Oberlin, 1939. An Examination of the Psychological Assumptions of Anti-Democratic Theorists. *California* (Berkeley).
- Herbert A. Deane; A.B., Columbia, 1942. The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. *Columbia*.
- George Demetriou; A.B., Hobart College, 1941. The Relationship of Political and Ethical Thought in Current American Theory. *Minnesota*.
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- Garold W. Thumm*; A.B., Morris Harvey College, 1940; A.M., Pennsylvania, 1947. The Western European Powers and International Control of the Ruhr. *Pennsylvania*.
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- Elisabeth S. L. van Dyke*; A.B., California, 1944; A.M., Columbia, 1946. The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy toward Germany, 1933-1939. *Columbia*.
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- John Peter Vloyantes*; A.B., Western State College of Colorado, 1943; M.S., Utah, 1949. The Security-Power Dilemma in International Organization with Special Reference to Article XI of the Charter of the United Nations. *Utah*.
- Austin F. Walter*; A.B., Carleton, 1940; A.M., Fletcher School, 1942. Australian-United States Relations, 1941-1949. *Michigan*.
- Melvin A. Weightman*; B.S., Haverford College, 1937; A.M., Pennsylvania, 1950. "The Present Status of the Concept of Self-Defense in International Law." *Pennsylvania*.
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- Paul Welty*; S.T.B., Mary Knoll Seminary, 1939; A.M., Chicago, 1950. Theodore Roosevelt's Concepts of the National Interests of the United States. *Chicago*.
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- Allen S. Whiting*; A.B., Cornell, 1948; A.M., Columbia, 1950. Soviet Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1929. *Columbia*.
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- Helen Lorraine Wood*; A.B., Drake, 1946; A.M., Northwestern, 1948. British Concepts of Internationalism in the Nineteenth Century. *Northwestern*.
- Herbert H. Wood, Jr.*; A.B., American, 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947. International Supervision of Colonial Administrative Unions. *Columbia*.
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- Pamela Nicholson Wrinch*; A.B., Michigan, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949. Winston (Leonard) Spencer Churchill as a Theoretician in the Field of International Relations. *Yale*.
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- Abraham Yeselson*; A.B., Rutgers, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948. The World Federalist Movement in the United States, 1939-1949. *Brown*.
- Tien-Cheng Young*; B. Com., National Fuh Tan University, 1942; M.P.A., Harvard, 1947. The Use of Scientific Management Concepts in International Administration. *New York University*.
- Alex Paul Zeidenfelt*; A.B., Brooklyn College, 1945; A.M., N.Y.U., 1946. Anglo-American Cooperation in British and American Non-Self Governing Possessions in the Carribean. *New York University*.

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

- Ross Crates Beiler*, Surveys of Political Behavior by Students in Course. *Iowa*.
Harry Rex Davis, The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr. *Chicago*.
Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, The Growth of Nationalism: Social, Political and Economic Factors, with Particular Reference to Central Europe. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Thomas I. Dickson, The Planned Society and the Democratic State with Special Reference to the United States and England. *Texas*.
William Francis Dowling, Jr., The Political Thought of a Generation of Adamsses. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Dominic Elder, C.S.C., Thomas Paine and his Philosophy of the Common Man. *Notre Dame*.
Webb Sacket Fiser, The Political Philosophy of John Quincy Adams. *Chicago*.
Peter Gay, Bernstein and Revisionism. *Columbia*.
Lester George Hawkins, Jr., The Role of Politics under Planning. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Norman Jacobson, The Theory of Equality as a Symbol in American Political Propaganda. *Wisconsin*.
G. Edward Janosik, The Political Theory of the Mormon Church. *Pennsylvania*.
Fred Krinsky, Concepts of the Renascent Jewish Nationalism. *Pennsylvania*.
Richard Dyer MacCann, Government Use of Documentary Films. *Harvard*.
Milton R. Merrill, Smoot, Utah and the Church. *Columbia*.
M. Denis O'Grady, R.S.M., The Political Philosophy of Thomas J. Walsh as Seen in His Role in Senate Contests on Confirmations and Disputed Elections, 1913-1926. *Notre Dame*.
Joseph Cornwall Palamountain, Jr., The Politics of Distribution. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Daniel P. Parker, The Political and Social Philosophy of Harry S. Truman. *Pennsylvania*.
Andrew M. Scott, The Political Theory of Communism. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Curran V. Shields, Graham Wallas's Method of Political Inquiry. *Yale*.
Alexander Smetana, A Comparative Analysis of the Best Forms of Government According to Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, and Locke. Mullen Library, *Catholic University*. Published on Microcard, Catholic University of America Press, 1950.
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- Emile B. Ader*, The Political Significance of the Dixiecrat Movement. *California* (Berkeley).
George Myron Belknap, A Study of Senatorial Voting by Scale Analysis. *Chicago*.
Winston W. Benson, An Analysis of the Arguments Used Against the Social Security Act of 1935. *Iowa*.
Louis H. Douglas, The Development of Public Policies in Water Uses in the West with Special Emphasis on the Missouri Basin. *Nebraska*.
Richard Walter Gable, The National Association of Manufacturers as the Political Expression of Industry. *Chicago*.

- Ralph M. Goldman*, The National Committee Chairman in American Party Politics. *Chicago*.
- Merrill Goodall*, Southern Solidarity in National Politics. *Johns Hopkins*.
- T. William Goodman*, The Presidential Campaign of 1920. *Ohio State*.
- Willard R. Hancock*, Public Policy in the Regulation of Union Security Provisions of Labor Contracts. *Pennsylvania*.
- Alexander Heard*, The Republican Party in the South—the Prospects for Its Development. *Columbia*.
- Marvin W. Heath*, The Civil Aeronautics Board Domestic Route Regulations. *Chicago*.
- Bryant Kearl*, Content of Wisconsin Newspapers During Selected Election Periods. *Minnesota*.
- Jarold Kieffer*, An Analysis of Sectional Voting on Appropriations for the Armed Forces, 1789–1815. *Minnesota*.
- Lawrence Joseph Legere, Jr.*, Unification of the Armed Forces. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
- Edward S. Marshall*, The Coverage of Farm Workers by Old Age and Survivors Insurance: A Legislative History. *Iowa*.
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- William J. McKenna*, A Study of the Special Legislative Session, with Particular Reference to the United States and the 48 States. *Pennsylvania*.
- Robert J. Morgan*, The Presidency under John Tyler. Alderman Library, *Virginia*.
- Wallace J. Parks*, Structure of the U.S. Executive Branch in Relation to Current Foreign Affairs Functions. *Columbia*.
- James Buhl Shahan*, A Study of Some of the Military Aspects of American Colonial Administration in the Southeast Pacific. *Ohio State*.
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- Delavan P. Evans*, The Use of the Concept of Inherent Powers by the Supreme Court of the United States. *California* (Berkeley).
- Donald G. Herzberg*, The Removal of State and Local Officers as Evidenced in the Court Cases. *Syracuse*.
- Ralph Theodore Jans*, Negro Civil Rights and the Supreme Court. *Chicago*.
- Thomas George Karis*, The Weight of Constitutionality on Congress; Some Case Studies. *Columbia*.
- Harry Veatch Klug*, An Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Federal Trade Commission. *Iowa*.
- William Russell Pullen*, Applications for a National Convention for Amending the Constitution of the United States. *North Carolina*.

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- Richard S. Atkins*, The Exercise of Optional Local Taxing Power under the New York Permissive Tax Law: A Study in State and Local Financial Arrangements. Widener Library, *Harvard*.

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- ✓ *Duncan MacIntyre*, The New York State-Aided County General Hospital Program—A Study in Intergovernmental Relations. *Cornell*.
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- William Bruce Storm*, An Analysis of the Illinois Agricultural Association as a Pressure Group for Farmers. *Chicago*.
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- Charles M. Hersh*, An Evaluation of the Activities of Public Personnel Agencies. *Syracuse*.
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Byrum E. Carter, The British Prime Minister from 1894 to the Present. *Wisconsin*.
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Herbert Neal Drennon, Dominion Control of Industrial Relations in Canada since 1939. *Duke*.
John H. Esterline, Executive Power in France and the United Kingdom, 1945-9. *California* (Los Angeles).
Peter Joachim Fliess, Freedom of the Press in Germany, 1918-1933. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
Rosendo A. Gomez, The Argentine Federal System: Its Theory and Practice. *Minnesota*.
Robert E. Hosack, A Study of Regional Government in Modern China. *Duke*.
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Henry L. Mason, "Eputation" in the Netherlands; A Study of the Treatment of the "Political Delinquents" after the Liberation of the Country. *Columbia*.
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Philip B. Taylor, Political Parties and Democracy in Uruguay. *California* (Berkeley).
John E. Turner, The Kenseikai (Constitutional Party) of Japan, 1913-27: A Study of Its History, Organization, and Domestic and Foreign Policies. *Minnesota*.
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John T. Bernhard, United Nations Reform and Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).
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Edwin Costrell, How America Viewed the World War, 1914-1917. *Clark*.
Clark N. Crane, Grancolumbia Economic and Customs Union. *Clark*.
David Russell Deener, International Law in Opinions of the United States Attorneys General. *Duke*.
Louis A. DeSanti, U. S. Relations with Italy under Fascism, 1922-41. *Columbia*.
Wilbur Edel, The State Department, the Public and the United Nations Concept, 1939-1945. *Columbia*.
Abdallah A. El-Erian, Condominium in International Law with Special Reference to the Legal Problems arising from the Sudan Condominium. *Columbia*.

- Willard Hubbard Elsbree*, *The Japanese and National Movements in Southeast Asia*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
- Harold P. Ford*, *The Far Eastern Diplomacy of Tsarist Russia, 1894-1904*. *Chicago*.
- Andrew J. Goodpaster*, *Technology and International Relations*. *Princeton*.
- David G. Hinners*, *British Policy and the Development of Self-Government in Burma, 1935-1948*. *Chicago*.
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- Louis G. Kahle*, *Deviations from the De Facto Principle in the Latin-American Recognition Policy of the United States*. *Texas*.
- Robert Eugene Lorish*, *Britain's Search for Security in the United Nations Organization*. *Fletcher School*.
- Emmanuel Margolis*, *The Socialist State in International Law*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
- John D. Montgomery*, *Military Government as an Instrument of National Policy*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
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- Richard L. Park*, *The Independence Movement in Bengal*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
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- N. B. Schoenfeld*, *The Strategic Raw Materials Policy of the United States*. *Pennsylvania*.
- John W. Schwada*, *Policy of the Western Allies toward Post-war Germany: Development and Evolution, 1941-1949*. *Texas*.
- Donald E. Smith*, *The Effect of Air Power on International Relations*. Mullen Library, *Catholic University*.
- Kurt Philip Tauber*, *The Self-Defense of States—a Critique of the Legal, Political, Ethical, and Scientific Assumptions Underlying that Doctrine*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.
- Manuel F. Torregrosa*, *United States Dollar Diplomacy in China—1909-1913*. *Georgetown*.
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- Holt Bradford Westerfield*, *The Development of Bipartisanship in the Control of American Foreign Relations since 1942*. Widener Library, *Harvard*.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND INSTITUTES

The Northern California Political Science Association held its fourth annual meeting at Stanford University on April 14, 1951. The central theme of the conference was the present world ideological conflict and its impact upon the American scene. One of the sessions of the conference was devoted to a consideration of the "Sources of International Friction," with Covey Oliver of the University of California (Berkeley) and Holland Roberts, chairman of the American-Russian Institute, presenting opposite interpretations. Another session was given over to a panel discussion of "The Impact of the International Situation upon American Democratic Procedures and Institutions." Participants on the panel included: Robert Brady, professor of economics, University of California (Berkeley); Edward L. Barrett, Jr., professor of law, University of California (Berkeley); Laurence Sears, professor of American philosophy and theory, Mills College; and Rhoten Smith, graduate student in political science, University of California (Berkeley). Officers elected by the Association for 1951-52 are: Robert A. Walker of Stanford University, president; George Bemis of Sacramento State College, vice-president; Anthony T. Bouscaren of the University of San Francisco, secretary-treasurer; and Leslie Lipson of the University of California (Berkeley), Earl Buckman of Fresno State College, and Sidney Patzer of Santa Rosa College, members of the Executive Council.

The first meeting of the Oklahoma Political Science Association was held April 20-21, 1951, at Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Stillwater, Oklahoma. The following officers were elected at the meeting: W. V. Holloway of the University of Tulsa, president; Rob Roy MacGregor of Oklahoma City University, vice-president; and Joseph C. Pray of the University of Oklahoma, secretary-treasurer. The board members of the Association include, in addition to the officers named, the following persons: Dean R. R. Oglesby of Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College; President Charles F. Spencer of East Central State College; and Elmer Edge, city manager of Cushing, Oklahoma.

The School of Government of the Principia College of Liberal Arts held its thirteenth annual Public Affairs Conference at Elsah, Illinois, April 12-14, 1951. The program topic for the Conference was "A Problem in United States Foreign Policy: Integration of Western Europe." Participants included university professors, government officials and military experts.

The third annual Conference on the Far East was held at the University of Oregon, April 23-27, 1951. The program topic for the Conference was "The Far East, Russia and the United States—Nationalism." The guest participants were Nobutaka Ike and Robert C. North of the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, and Julian Towster and Hubertus Johannes van Mook of the University of California (Berkeley). The program included public lectures

classroom talks, and student and faculty seminars. Paul S. Dull, coordinator of the Far Eastern studies curriculum at the University of Oregon, served as chairman for the Conference.

The fourth annual Institute of International Affairs, held at the University of Washington, June 25-27, 1951, under the sponsorship of the department of political science and the Division of Adult Education, was devoted to the subject "New Frontiers of American Foreign Policy." The program included the following addresses: "American Foreign Policy with Respect to Western Europe," by Schuyler C. Wallace of Columbia University; "Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations," by Hans Kelsen of the University of California (Berkeley); "American Foreign Policy and the Point Four Program," by Haldore E. Hanson of the United States Department of State; "Selling Democracy Abroad," by James W. Brown of the University of Washington; and "International Understanding through Films," by Linden A. Mander of the University of Washington.

The third annual Colgate University Conference on American Foreign Policy was held July 21-26, 1951, under the direction of Charles Ray Wilson of the department of political science of Colgate University. The general theme for discussion was "Strength for a Free World." Twenty-two nations were represented at the Conference by official delegates.

An inter-university summer seminar, composed of political scientists and political sociologists, was held at the University of Chicago from June 18 to July 28, 1951, to examine and appraise the present state of research having to do with political behavior. A series of research papers and memoranda were discussed, utilizing the concepts of multiple group memberships and interactions upon the relations between the individual and the state. Members of the seminar were: Robert Bower, American University; Samuel Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Oliver Garceau, Bennington College; Alexander Heard, University of North Carolina; Samuel Huntington, Harvard University; Morris Janowitz, University of Chicago; Dayton McKean, Dartmouth College; and David Truman, Columbia University. The seminar was made possible through the generosity of the Markle Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.

The New York State Political Science Association will hold its fifth annual meeting in New York City, October 19-20, 1951. In a program session scheduled to convene in the new United Nations building on Friday afternoon, October 19, the opening meeting will feature UN personnel in a discussion of a problem of current significance in international affairs. This afternoon program will be followed by a tour of the building, or of so much of it as may be open to visitors at the time. The evening session will be held, following dinner, in the ballroom of the Beekman Tower Hotel, where President Luther Gulick of the American Political Science Association will present an Association representative

who will deliver the principal address. The conference will end with a morning session on Saturday, October 20, also in the Beekman Tower ballroom. The concluding meeting will be devoted to an examination of the subject of civil liberties in relation to academic freedom.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

With the opening of the national headquarters of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D. C., the established practice of conducting a personnel service for academic employment has been expanded to include government employment as well. To keep the membership informed of placement opportunities, a personnel newsletter is sent to department chairmen and to members of the Association who have registered with the personnel service. Consistent with the policies of other professional societies, employment information is kept confidential. The names of colleges in which vacancies occur are not released to applicants for positions. To simplify the work of department chairmen, applications of persons meeting the minimum requirements, as set forth by the departments in which the vacancies exist, are forwarded to the chairmen. The national office emphasizes that it is most essential for department chairmen to register vacancies with the personnel service, if the service is to be of maximum assistance to the profession. Members of the Association who desire to register for placement may secure appropriate personnel forms from the national office.

The Governmental Affairs Institute, organized in 1950 and later affiliated with the American Political Science Association, sponsored the visits of a number of foreign legislators to the United States during the months of May, June, July and August, 1951. In May the Institute sponsored the visit of members of the Internal and Police Affairs Committee of the West German *Bundestag*; in June, it sponsored the visit of fourteen additional members of the *Bundestag*; and, during June, July and August, it sponsored the visits of three separate groups of Japanese Diet members. Chartered as a non-profit organization, the Institute prepares professional programs for foreign leaders who come to the United States to study various aspects of American government or politics. It is under contract with the Department of State and the Department of the Army to sponsor visits of foreign leaders, who are brought to the United States under the Government's International Educational Exchange Program. Several American political scientists, including Taylor Cole, Pendleton Herring, Edward H. Litchfield, H. Philip Mettger, James K. Pollock, Harold S. Quigley, Donald C. Stone, and Roger H. Wells, serve on the Institute's Board of Directors. The offices of the Institute are at 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.

An organization of Iowa political scientists was created on April 14, 1951. The organization, to be known as the Conference of Iowa Political Scientists, is successor to an association of political scientists and historians which existed in Iowa before World War II. Joseph Dunner and C. Edwin Gilmour,

both of Grinnell College, are president and secretary, respectively, of the new organization. In addition, the organization has an Executive Council, which is composed of the following persons: H. C. Cook of Iowa State College, Richard Dunlap of Graceland Junior College, John R. Kapp of Iowa Wesleyan College, Matthew M. McMahon of St. Ambrose College, Erma B. Plaehn of Iowa State Teachers College, Russell M. Ross of the State University of Iowa, Ralph Sayre of Parsons College, Richard C. Spencer of Coe College, H. W. Ward of Cornell College, and Russell G. Whitesel of the State University of Iowa.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has established a Social Science Institute in Germany, with headquarters at Köln. The Institute will be financed by individual, governmental or organizational contributions, and will have a building provided by German authorities. Its governing board consists of a representative of the director-general of UNESCO, six Germans, and seven non-Germans. The present membership of this board includes one American. He is Walter H. C. Laves, former deputy director-general of UNESCO, and more recently visiting professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

At its first meeting, held at Wiesbaden in June, 1951, the governing board instructed the director, Professor Schokking of the University of Cologne, to plan a research program in two possible areas of work. The first of these relates to the participation of youth in social affairs. In this area the research is intended to place emphasis on the actual extent of the participation by youth, whether as individuals or as groups, in community activities, in places of employment, and in movements of ideas, including those concerned with world organization. The second area of possible research relates to the effects of recent technological developments on the distribution of skills, on general and technical education, and on attitudes, civic behavior and citizenship. It is intended that such research will be undertaken in some German industrial and rural sections.

It is hoped that the Institute will, in addition to encouraging the development of the social sciences, promote research on subjects of international significance that are of vital importance to Germany. It is assumed that it will maintain close contact with the International Sociological Association, with a view toward possible cooperation in the international study of social stratification.

The United States Commission for UNESCO adopted a statement at its ninth meeting, held on May 10, 1951, in which it called attention to the contribution which can be made to international peace and security through efforts to increase knowledge of the history and cultures of the peoples of foreign countries. The statement emphasized the need for correlated efforts by American scientists and scholars to increase such knowledge, and stressed particularly the need for coordinated study of areas and peoples of the world in respect to which present knowledge is inadequate. Specifically, the Commission ex-

pressed the conviction that the concept of "foreign areas studies" has a vital bearing upon the problems of understanding the peoples and cultures of foreign countries. The Commission expressed the hope that such studies might "be advanced through continuing and progressive research, the development of improved methods of investigation, and the training of competent investigators," and that the results of such labors might "be communicated through the various channels of education at all levels to increasing numbers of the people of the United States."

Princeton University has announced the establishment of a Center of International Studies which is to sponsor and conduct research in foreign policy and related fields. Support for the Center has come from several sources: a gift of \$500,000 from the Milbank Memorial Fund, a grant of \$200,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation, a bequest establishing a new chair in human geography, and additional gifts. The Center is organized as a research division of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The director is Frederick S. Dunn, formerly of the Yale Institute of International Studies and first incumbent of the Albert C. Milbank Professorship of International Law and Practice. He will direct the research program and personnel of the new Center in collaboration with an interdepartmental faculty committee. The members of this committee are: Gordon A. Craig, professor of history; Dana G. Munro, director of the Woodrow Wilson School; Frank W. Notestein, professor of demography and director of Princeton's Office of Population Research; Harold Sprcut, chairman of the department of politics; and Jacob Viner, professor of economics. The Center will include, in addition to Professor Dunn, several staff members who were formerly members of the Yale Institute of International Studies and the departments of political science and international relations at Yale University. These staff members are: Percy E. Corbett, research associate with the rank of professor; Gabriel A. Almond, associate professor of public affairs; Klaus E. Knorr, associate professor of public affairs; William W. Kaufmann, research associate with the rank of assistant professor; and Bernard Cohen, research assistant with the rank of instructor. Associated with the Center in a part-time capacity will be Professor William T. R. Fox of Columbia University, and his wife, Mrs. Annette Baker Fox. In addition to its research activities, the Center will publish the quarterly journal, *World Politics*, previously published by the Yale Institute of International Studies.

A fund known as the "Henry L. Stimson Fund for Research in World Affairs" has been established at Yale University with an initial gift of \$500,000 from an anonymous donor. The announced purpose of the fund is to further "basic research in all fields of learning and endeavor significant to world peace and to all fundamental human problems underlying the causes of war."

The W. K. McClure Foundation for the Study of World Affairs, originally created as a trust at Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1941, has received a charter

under the laws of the District of Columbia as an educational corporation. This Foundation has served chiefly as a forum for students and members of the political science faculty of the University of Tennessee and for personnel of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In the immediate future the emphasis of its work will probably be upon the maintenance of one or more student scholarships for the study of world affairs and grants-in-aid for publications within the specified field of endeavor. (See this REVIEW, Vol. 36, p. 343 [April, 1942.])

✓ A research project, sponsored by the Kellogg Foundation, and undertaken by the University of Chicago with the participation of ten leading universities, the United States Public Health Service, and the Army, Navy and Air Corps nursing services, has recently been concluded. The object of the project was to determine the respects in which the study of the science of administration and certain of the social sciences might contribute to the improvement of the administration of nursing services in hospitals and public health agencies, and, consequently, to determine the respects in which the curriculum of schools of nursing might be enriched by this new province of study. The project, which was begun in October, 1950, has been under the direction of Herman Finer of the University of Chicago. A seminar conducted in connection with the project and including thirty-six nursing practitioners and educators has resulted in five reports. In addition, a general report by Professor Finer entitled "The Application of the Science and Art of Administration to Nursing Service Administration" is expected to be ready for publication in the early fall of 1951.

Ford Hall of the University of Minnesota, named for Guy Stanford Ford, former president of the University and now managing editor of the *American Historical Review*, was formally dedicated in appropriate ceremonies held April 19-21, 1951. The dedication program, held as part of the University's centennial observance, focused attention on the social sciences at mid-century, and included participants representing the various social science disciplines as well as participants representing several of the large educational foundations in the United States. The building will house most of the University's teaching and research activities in the social sciences. Serving as chairman of the dedication committee was William Anderson, formerly chairman of the department of political science at the University of Minnesota.

✓ Ten students from Germany, who will be in the United States under a Department of State grant, will study American national, state and local government for one year under the general direction of Rodney L. Mott, professor of political science and director of the Division of Social Sciences at Colgate University. The students will study on the campus of Colgate University during the fall semester of 1951, will spend the spring semester of 1952 in Washington, D. C., and will do field work in state and local government during the summer semester of 1952. They will be under the direct supervision of Paul S. Jacobsen and Ronald Stout, both of the department of political science of Colgate University.

Robert Strausz-Hupé of the University of Pennsylvania delivered a series of lectures in Europe during the spring of 1951. The lectures were delivered at the College of Europe, Bruges (April 9-14), the *Institut des Etudes Politiques*, Paris (April 24), the *Cercle Allais*, Paris (April 25), the *Instituto Francisco de Vitoria*, Madrid (May 24), and the *Instituto de Estudios Politicos*, Madrid (May 25). "Is the United States a Capitalistic Country?" was the general topic for the lectures delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges and the *Instituto de Estudios Politicos* in Madrid, while "United States Far Eastern Policies" was the topic for the lectures delivered at the *Institut des Etudes Politiques* in Paris and the *Instituto Francisco de Vitoria* in Madrid.

Karl W. Deutsch of the School of Humanities and Social Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently delivered a series of three lectures at Columbia University. The general topic for the lectures was "Communications Theory and Social Science." He has been awarded the Sumner Prize for 1951 at Harvard University for the manuscript of his book entitled "Nationalism and Social Communication."

Fulbright grants for the academic year 1951-52 have recently been awarded to Alice L. Farmer, Francis P. King and Donald R. Toussaint, all of Stanford University.

Alpheus T. Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, has been awarded a Guggenheim fellowship in connection with his biographical project on the late Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.

The Social Science Research Council has awarded three-year research fellowships to Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., of Princeton University, and Herbert McClosky of the University of Minnesota. Professor McClosky will engage in a study of political behavior.

The Haynes Foundation of Los Angeles has awarded research grants for 1951-52 to John R. Williams of West Virginia University and Ben H. Olsen, Jr., and Clarence L. Thurber, Jr., of Stanford University. Professor Williams will spend the year in England, where he will be engaged in a study of the British Conservative Party.

The Coro Foundation has selected the following graduate students at Stanford University as internes in municipal government in San Francisco for 1951-52: Justine H. Clapp, H. Glen Fishbach, Dale M. Harlan, Cynthia G. Holcomb and John K. Robinson.

Robert M. MacIver, Charles H. McIlwain and Charles E. Merriam were among twenty-five distinguished scholars awarded honorary degrees at Yale University's 250th commencement on June 11, 1951.

Frederick M. Davenport, chairman of the Federal Personnel Council, has been awarded the third Warner W. Stockberger Achievement Award in Personnel Administration. The Award, made for outstanding contribution to the

objectives of personnel administration, was presented to Dr. Davenport by the Society for Personnel Administration at its monthly dinner meeting on April 3, 1951.

Following a poll of the Board of Editors of the *Western Political Quarterly*, the Institute of Government of the University of Utah has announced that the annual Warshaw Prize of \$250 for the most significant article published in a volume of the *Quarterly* has been awarded to Denna F. Fleming of Vanderbilt University. The Prize was awarded to Professor Fleming for his article, "The Rule of Fear and Hindsight in World Politics," which appeared in the issue of the *Quarterly* for December, 1950.

For his work in international municipal cooperation, Paul V. Betters, executive director of the United States Conference of Mayors, has recently received the Knight's Cross, First Class, of the Royal Order of Saint Olav (Norway), the Order of Orange-Nassau (Netherlands), and the Star of Italian Solidarity.

Everett S. Brown of the University of Michigan represented the American Political Science Association at the formal installation of Asa S. Knowles as president of the University of Toledo.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

John Clarke Adams, associate professor of government at the University of Buffalo, is a visiting lecturer for the academic year 1951-52 at the University of Florence, Italy, where he is teaching American constitutional law under a Fulbright grant.

Bruce Adkinson, recently an instructor in politics at Princeton University, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Emmett Asseff has been granted a partial leave of absence by Louisiana State University to enable him to accept an appointment as research associate on the staff of the recently organized Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana.

Marver H. Bernstein, assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, has been appointed to one of the bicentennial preceptorships at that institution. These endowed chairs, at the rank of assistant professor, carry special research perquisites, including one full year of leave for research during a three-year term of service.

George I. Blanksten of Northwestern University taught at the University of California (Los Angeles) during the summer session of 1951.

Ralph J. D. Braibanti has been advanced to the rank of associate professor at Kenyon College and has resumed his teaching duties there after a year's leave of absence. During the year's leave from Kenyon College, he served as assistant to the executive director of the American Political Science Association,

as consultant to the Office of Occupied Areas on the reorientation of Japanese officials, and as lecturer in government at George Washington and American Universities.

Burton Brazil of Stanford University has joined the political science faculty of the University of Washington for the academic year 1951-52.

McGeorge Bundy has been appointed as an associate professor of government at Harvard University.

Fred V. Cahill, Jr., assistant professor of political science at Yale University, is on military leave for the academic year 1951-52.

Edgar B. Cale has returned to his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania after having completed his work as executive secretary of the Philadelphia Charter Commission.

John W. Chapman of Columbia University is serving as an instructor in political science at Swarthmore College for the first semester of the academic year 1951-52, in the absence of Professor Paul N. Ylvisaker.

A. N. Christensen of the University of Minnesota served as an adviser to a student group studying in Peru during the summer of 1951 under the auspices of the Student Project for Amity Among Nations.

Innis Lothair Claude, Jr., has been appointed as an assistant professor of government at Harvard University.

Frederick N. Cleaveland, formerly instructor in government at New York University, has been appointed as an assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina.

Dorothy I. Cline has been promoted to an assistant professorship in government at the University of New Mexico.

Robert A. Dahl has been promoted to an associate professorship at Yale University.

Herbert A. Deane has returned to his position as instructor in the department of public law and government of Columbia University after a year's leave of absence spent in England on a Cutting traveling fellowship.

Marshall E. Dimock is serving as visiting professor of public policy and administration in the School of Public Administration at Florida State University.

Robert Dishman, formerly assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College, has joined the department of government of the University of New Hampshire as assistant professor.

Thomas C. Donnelly, dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of New Mexico, has been appointed by the governor of New Mexico

to membership on the state's seven-man Little Hoover Commission. The Commission will study the executive branch of the state government and make recommendations for its reorganization.

Archie T. Dotson has been appointed as an assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

Louis H. Douglas is on leave from his position as professor of government at Kansas State College and is serving as a visiting lecturer at the University of Tottori, Japan, under a program sponsored by the Institute of International Education, New York City.

Leslie W. Dunbar has resigned from his position as assistant professor of political science at Emory University to accept an appointment with the federal Atomic Energy Commission.

Joseph Dunner, chairman of the department of political science of Grinnell College, was a visiting professor at the *Hochschule für Politik* in Munich, Germany, during the summer of 1951. He also delivered a series of lectures on American foreign policy during the summer, under the auspices of the political science department of the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Mario Einaudi, professor of government at Cornell University, will assume the chairmanship of the department of government at that institution on February 1, 1952. He is on sabbatical leave for the first semester of 1951-52.

Russell H. Fifield of the University of Michigan taught at the University of Maine during the summer session of 1951.

Peter J. Fliess of Louisiana State University spent the summer in Puerto Rico, where he taught one course at the University of Puerto Rico and engaged in research on relations between the United States and Puerto Rico under a research grant from the Graduate Council of Louisiana State University.

Floyd O. Flom, recently a research fellow of the Public Administration Center at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed as an assistant professor of political science at Whittier College.

Peter Gay has returned to his position as instructor in the department of public law and government of Columbia University after a year's leave of absence for research in Amsterdam.

Frank Gibson, formerly of the University of North Carolina, has joined the political science staff of West Virginia University for the academic year 1951-52. He also taught at West Virginia University during the summer session of 1951.

E. Drexel Godfrey, formerly teaching assistant in the department of politics at Princeton University, is now an instructor in political science at Williams College.

Ross Gomez was a visiting professor at the University of Minnesota during the second term of the summer session of 1951.

Robert E. Goostree, instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland, taught during the past summer in the University's new center for military personnel in Newfoundland.

Frank Grace of the University of Michigan was a visiting professor of government at Louisiana State University during the summer session of 1951.

Leo Gross is serving as visiting lecturer in international law in the department of government at Harvard University for the fall term of 1951-52.

Heinz Guradze was a member of the law faculty of the University of Cologne, Germany, during the summer of 1951.

Andrew Gyorgy of Louisiana State University taught at the University of California (Los Angeles) during the summer session of 1951.

John D. Hall, recently at Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, has been appointed to an assistant professorship in government and politics at the University of Maryland and will teach during 1951-52 in the University's educational centers in Europe.

Howard W. Hallman, a graduate of the University of Kansas, has been appointed as a research assistant in the Bureau of Government Research of that University.

Williard R. Hancock has been on leave from the University of Pennsylvania since July 1, 1951, to serve as director of the Bureau of Municipal Research of Pennsylvania.

William H. Harbold has taken a year's leave from his position as instructor in political science at the University of Washington for research in Paris under a Fulbright grant.

Robert J. Harris of Louisiana State University served as visiting professor of public law and government at Columbia University during the summer session of 1951.

Lester G. Hawkins, Jr., was a visiting assistant professor at Wesleyan University (Connecticut) for the spring term of 1950-51. During the same period he continued to serve as director for the German governmental training program at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University.

John N. Hazard, professor of public law at Columbia University, taught at Stanford University during the summer quarter of 1951.

Richard B. Henderson, graduate student in government and politics and former instructor at the University of Maryland, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at Southwest Texas State College.

Paul Heppe, recently a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed to an assistant professorship in government at Kansas State College for the academic year 1951-52.

Willard Hogan of New York State Teachers College was a visiting member of the political science staff of West Virginia University during the summer of 1951.

Charles S. Hyneman, professor of political science at Northwestern University, taught at Stanford University during the summer quarter of 1951.

Frederick C. Irion has been advanced to an associate professorship in government at the University of New Mexico.

Paul S. Jacobsen is on leave from his position as head of the department of political science at Colgate University for the fall semester of 1951-52 to conduct a research project on certain phases of the national legislative process under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

G. Edward Janosik has been appointed to an assistant professorship in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Jack T. Johnson returned to his duties as associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa in September, 1951, after being on leave for work with the federal civilian defense office in Washington, D. C.

Frank H. Jonas is on leave for the academic year 1951-52 from his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Utah to serve as security officer in the Foreign Service Staff Corps. He has been assigned to the Office of Public Affairs, Information Services Division, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt, Germany.

Henry P. Jordan, on leave from New York University during the academic year 1950-51, filled engagements as guest professor at the University of Marburg and the State Agricultural College at Giessen, Germany, and served for several months as visiting expert with the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Information Centers Branch. During the past summer, he directed a western European study tour under the auspices of the American Education Board.

Charles B. Judah has been advanced to a full professorship in government at the University of New Mexico.

George McTuran Kahin, formerly assistant professor in the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed as an assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

Gladys M. Kammerer of the University of Kentucky is serving as chairman of the Kentucky State Advisory Committee on Registration and Purgation, a committee appointed to assist the Legislative Research Commission of the

State in a comprehensive study of the State's registration and purgation laws. She also is directing the research for this study.

Kayuo Kawai, on leave from the *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, Japan, served as a visiting member of the political science staff of Stanford University during the summer quarter of 1951.

Hugh E. Kelso, associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa, reported for active duty in the United States Army on June 15, 1951. He has been assigned to work with the staff and faculty of the infantry center at Fort Benning, Georgia, with the rank of major.

Alexander F. Kiefer, an economist in the Department of State in Washington since 1946, has been named chief of the East-West Trade Group in the Office of Economic Affairs and is assigned to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

W. W. Kulski has resigned from his position as professor of political science at the University of Alabama to accept a professorship at Syracuse University.

Robert E. Lane has been advanced to the rank of assistant professor at Yale University.

C. M. Lichenstein has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Yale University.

W. Duane Lockard has been appointed as an instructor in the department of government of Connecticut College for the academic year 1951-52.

Edward McWhinney, research associate in jurisprudence and international law at the University of Sydney, Australia, will be a visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University during the academic year 1951-52.

Gerald J. Mangone, formerly of Wesleyan University (Connecticut), has been appointed as an assistant professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

John W. Masland is on leave from Dartmouth College for the first semester of the academic year 1951-52 in order to teach at the National War College.

Donald R. Matthews, formerly a teaching assistant in the department of politics at Princeton University, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of government at Smith College for the academic year 1951-52.

Edmund C. Mester, graduate student in government and politics and former instructor at the University of Maryland, has been appointed to an instructorship in the department of social sciences of the United States Military Academy.

Robert J. Morgan, recently a graduate student at the University of Virginia, was appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Nebraska, effective September, 1951.

Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago taught at the Salzburg Center in American Studies during February, 1951, and during the two succeeding months he undertook an assignment in Austria for the United States Department of State. He taught at Harvard University during the recent summer session.

W. Warner Moss has returned to his position as head of the department of government of the College of William and Mary after serving for a year as visiting professor at the University of Manchester, England, under a Fulbright grant.

Felix A. Nigro, formerly of the University of Puerto Rico, has been appointed as an associate professor of public administration at Florida State University.

James A. Norton, formerly a member of the staff of the department of political science at Florida State University, has been appointed to an assistant professorship in the School of Public Administration of that institution.

Kimbrough Owen has been granted a partial leave of absence by Louisiana State University to enable him to serve as director of research for the recently organized Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana. He resigned from his position as director of the Division of Student Life of Louisiana State University in March, 1951.

Edward R. Padgett, on leave of absence from Washington College, will serve as an instructor in government and politics at the University of Maryland for the academic year 1951-52.

Thomas Page, formerly of the University of Kansas, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Illinois, where he will serve on the staff of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs.

Joseph Cornwall Palamountain has been appointed to an instructorship in government at Harvard University.

Malcolm B. Parsons, formerly of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed as an assistant professor of public administration at Florida State University.

Jack W. Peltason, formerly of Smith College, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at the University of Illinois.

Lester H. Phillips has been promoted to a professorship in government at the University of Redlands.

Allen M. Potter has resigned from his position in the department of government of the College of William and Mary in order to accept a position at the University of Manchester, Manchester, England.

Ralph E. Purcell has resigned as assistant professor of political science at Emory University to accept a two-year foreign service appointment with

the United States Department of State. He will be stationed in Bangalore, India, as vice-consul and cultural affairs officer.

Segundo V. Linares Quintana of the University of Le Platta and the University of Buenos Aires is serving as Craige Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of North Carolina during the fall quarter of 1951.

Donald H. Riddle has been appointed as an instructor in the department of politics of Princeton University.

Charles B. Robson of the University of North Carolina left the United States in June to spend two years in Germany. He is stationed in Berlin, where he is chief of the Education and Cultural Relations Branch, Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

I. M. Sacks has been designated as a research assistant in political science at Yale University for the academic year 1951-52.

Burton M. Sapin has been appointed to an instructorship at Princeton University, where he will divide his time between teaching in the department of politics and research for the organizational behavior project supported by the Ford Foundation.

Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., member of the department of history and political science at Rutgers University during the academic year 1950-51, became assistant professor and head of the department of political science at Franklin and Marshall College on September 1, 1951.

John N. Schwada, recently a graduate student at the University of Texas, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Missouri.

Paul Seabury has returned to his position as instructor in the department of public law and government of Columbia University after a leave of absence which included several months' teaching at the Free University of Berlin.

Walter R. Sharp has resigned from the chairmanship of the department of government at the City College of New York in order to accept an appointment as professor of international organization at Yale University, effective in September, 1951.

Mulford Q. Sibley of the University of Minnesota served during the summer of 1951 as director of academic activities for one of the student seminars of the American Friends Service Committee at Woodstock, Illinois.

H. Gordon Skilling has been advanced to a full professorship at Dartmouth College.

Elmer E. Smead became chairman of the department of government of Dartmouth College on July 1, 1951, succeeding Dayton D. McKean, whose four-year term as chairman of the department expired on that date.

Richard C. Snyder, associate professor of politics at Princeton University, is the political science member of the research team which is developing the organizational behavior project at Princeton University under a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Ronald Stout, assistant professor of political science at Colgate University, served at Syracuse University during the past summer as a member of a research group which was engaged in a study of the formulation and administration of municipal building codes. The study was conducted under the auspices of the federal Home and Housing Finance Agency.

Kenneth Thompson of Northwestern University taught at the University of California during the summer session of 1951.

Harris E. Thurber, recently a teaching assistant in the department of politics of Princeton University, has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at Middlebury College.

David B. Truman, who served as visiting associate professor at Columbia University during 1950-51, has been appointed professor of government at that institution.

Henry A. Turner, Jr., instructor in political science at Santa Barbara College, taught at the University of Missouri during the summer session of 1951.

John E. Turner of the University of Minnesota served as an adviser to a student group studying in England during the summer of 1951 under the auspices of the Student Project for Amity Among Nations.

Paul W. Wager has been named chairman of the department of political science at the University of North Carolina.

H. O. Waldby, formerly of the University of Oklahoma, has been appointed as an assistant professor of public administration at Florida State University.

James T. Watkins, IV, professor of political science at Stanford University, taught at the University of California's Santa Barbara College during the summer session of 1951.

Edward W. Weidner, associate professor of political science at Michigan State College, has been appointed director of a newly established Bureau of Governmental Research at that institution.

Louis A. Weinberg, assistant professor of political science at the University of Alaska, has been appointed research consultant for the Constitution Committee of the Alaska Statehood Committee. He will prepare reports on the various topics to be considered in the preparation of a proposed constitution for Alaska, for use by the Constitution Committee if and when Alaska achieves statehood.

M. H. Wells, assistant professor of political science at Yale University, will be on leave during the academic year 1951-52 to aid in preparatory research

for the forthcoming Puerto Rican constitutional convention and to teach at the University of Puerto Rico.

Howard White of Miami University (Ohio) has been named chairman of the Board of Directors of the Citizens Committee on the Ohio Constitution, an organization which has been created to promote the study of the Ohio Constitution in preparation for an election to be held in November, 1952, on the question whether a constitutional convention shall be held.

R. G. Whitesel, associate professor of political science at the State University of Iowa, reported for active duty in the United States Army on June 20, 1951. He has been assigned to the policy section of the general staff at Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago with the rank of major.

James R. Woodworth, recently a graduate student at Harvard University, has returned to Miami University (Ohio) as visiting assistant professor for the academic year 1951-52.

Chitoshi Yanga, who has been participating in the foreign area studies program at Yale University, taught at the University of Nebraska during the Summer session of 1951.

IN MEMORIAM

Joseph Perkins Chamberlain. Joseph Perkins Chamberlain, professor of public law at Columbia University since 1923 and in active service until last year, died on May 21, 1951, in New York City at his Sutton Square home, which had always been open to his friends, to generations of students, and to the members of public bodies on which he served.

Before he joined the faculty of Columbia University, Mr. Chamberlain was prominent as a man of affairs and as a lawyer, and had established his reputation as a successful pioneer in the improvement of legislative drafting. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, on October 1, 1873, he studied abroad, at Harvard, and at the University of California. He was graduated from the Hastings Law School, practiced law in San Francisco, and held a lectureship in law in the School of Jurisprudence at the University of California.

In 1909 he endowed a Legislative Drafting Research Fund at Columbia University and was one of the Fund's trustees, serving with John Bassett Moore and Harlan Fiske Stone. In those days universities had institutes, centers, and schools, but were not proliferating them as is now the case. It was characteristic of Chamberlain's modesty that he called his legal laboratory a "Research Fund," but its achievements were far from modest. It did important work in drafting bills on many subjects, the bills being introduced in the Congress and state legislatures and enacted into law. Even more significant, it trained the draftsmen who, in 1919, were to furnish expert assistance to the United States Senate and House of Representatives. For many years, the chief legislative counsel to the Senate and House were men whom Chamberlain had trained.

In 1923 Thomas Reed Powell, then Ruggles Professor of Constitutional Law

at Columbia, proposed that Chamberlain be offered a professorship in the department of public law with a seat on the Law School faculty. Future colleagues greeted the idea with enthusiasm, but each berated himself because he had not been the one to make the proposal. In this case the trade union card—the Ph.D.—was not necessary, but it appeared that one would be readily available. Some years before, Chamberlain had passed his oral examination on subjects—not with any intention of taking a degree, but simply to demonstrate to those who knew about the work of his Research Fund that he was no dilettante. A dissertation was at hand—*The Regime of International Rivers: Danube and Rhine*. This was a monograph which had been prepared for the United States Department of State in 1917 when it was engaged in its preparatory work for the forthcoming Peace Conference, and at Paris Chamberlain had been the oracle who was always cited and consulted on the law and practice of international waterways. The State Department removed the nominal injunction of secrecy which still covered the monograph and it was reprinted in the *Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*.

Under the University regulations, a formal “defense” of dissertation was necessary. No candidate at Columbia had had before, or has had since, a larger examination committee. Friends flocked into the room to express their pleasure and to offer congratulations on two counts: to the University as well as to the candidate. The dissertation was never mentioned but the report was that the “defense” had been successful.

From then until he retired in 1950, students were Chamberlain’s primary concern. He did not want to take a salary, but the University had a rule which compelled him to take one. So there was a compromise on the basis of half salary, on the theory that he would be on half time. This meant in his case that he gave more time to the University than many of the rest of us. He was indifferent to sabbatical leave.

Hundreds of students had a unique opportunity in working with Chamberlain in the field of international organization. He had been much in Europe. He was a leading authority on international rivers and he became one on the control of narcotics. Following Aristide Briand’s proposal in April, 1927, that the United States and France renounce war as an instrument of national policy, Chamberlain and James T. Shotwell prepared a draft treaty which was widely discussed and which was an important step in the transformation of Briand’s proposal into the Kellogg Pact. From 1933 on, Chamberlain was interested in the refugee problem. In that year he was made a member of the High Commission for Refugees coming from Germany, and in 1943 he became chairman of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service. His successes in this field were notable. As one who knew his work intimately wrote after his death, “Some 300,000 homeless displaced persons have now emigrated to the United States and are living here, to a great extent the result of Dr. Chamberlain’s brilliant faculties and remarkable capacity for finding a proper middle course.”

Meanwhile he continued his interest in his Legislative Drafting Research

Fund. Because of this and his sense of responsibility as a resident of New York, he consented in 1935 to serve as counsel to the New York City Charter Commission. In 1941, as special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, he dealt with a highly complicated problem of the blocked funds of the nationals of enemy countries. In 1940 he was George Eastman professor at Oxford, which gave him an honorary degree. Columbia and Western Reserve Universities had already conferred honorary degrees on him, and the University of California was to do likewise in 1948. But students were always his primary concern—the younger men who could carry the torch—and it was with them in mind that he prepared and published his *Legislative Processes: National and State*, from which thousands of them have profited.

Joe Chamberlain never had the grim experience of straitened circumstances which is so common in the academic world. Yet he labored far harder than colleagues who found it necessary to undertake the hackwork of textbooks, lecturing and journalism. He was so modest that his great achievements and shining qualities were not as widely known as they should have been to the general public. They were, however, cherished in the several circles of his intimates, who included many in the highest posts of our own and other governments. He had read long, widely and well; his interests were far ranging and his mind was stimulating. He was gracious, considerate, and tender of heart. No colleague was ever more genuinely loved, and this was because, in addition to being a tolerant scholar, a sympathetic teacher, and an able public servant, he was also a great gentleman.—LINDSAY ROGERS.

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, NOTICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The machinery of national states for the conduct of foreign policy is a subject of sharply rising interest. In the past the study of international relations, so far as it departed from its primary concern with policies, tended to deal with such matters as diplomatic usage or the constitutional side of treaty-making. Increasingly the concern spreads to the methods by which national interest is defined and policies are framed and administered. The problems and reactions are common to most countries. Nowhere, however, is the new interest more marked than in the United States, which, amid involvements of incalculable importance, must accommodate habits of thought and governmental structure to novel multilateral relations and to a programmatic content that both brings into unwonted motion various organs of the legislature and also draws nearly every executive agency into some aspect of foreign affairs.

I

This quickened interest is shown in a freshet of publications, especially of the last year. A canvass is timely, mainly for the modest purpose of calling attention to the literature but also to permit comment on the organizational questions dealt with in this literature. The items are varied. Some are books by individual authors, among which may be included James L. McCamy's pioneering treatise,¹ Elmer Plischke's more conventional, all-inclusive and elementary textbook,² Robert A. Dahl's monograph on Congress,³ Wallace J. Parks' analysis of the economic activities that touch foreign affairs,⁴ Gabriel A. Almond's discussion of public opinion,⁵ Frederick S. Dunn's projection of a phase of the problem in a little book⁶ which incidentally reminds us that "it is no longer possible to understand international events unless one breaks through the protective language of diplomacy to uncover the turbulent streams of human desires and predispositions that somehow merge in the decisions of those who make foreign policies" (p. 17), and Harold D. Lasswell's charac-

✓ ¹ *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*. By James L. McCamy. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1950. Pp. xiii, 364, x. \$4.00.)

² *The Conduct of American Diplomacy*. By Elmer Plischke. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1950. Pp. xiv, 542. \$4.85.)

³ *Congress and Foreign Policy*. By Robert A. Dahl. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1950. Pp. x, 305. \$4.00.)

⁴ *United States Administration of Its International Economic Affairs*. By Wallace Judson Parks. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1951. Foreword by James Grafton Rogers. Pp. xxv, 315. \$5.00.)

⁵ *The American People and Foreign Policy*. By Gabriel A. Almond. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1950. Pp. x, 269. \$3.75.)

✓ ⁶ *War and the Minds of Men*. By Frederick S. Dunn. (New York: Harper and Brothers. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1950. Pp. xvi, 115. \$2.00.)

teristically exigent and inventive attempt⁷ to suggest institutional safeguards that will help "to maintain a proper balance between national security and individual freedom in a continuing crisis of national defense," since "there is no longer any doubt that we are in a world crisis of insecurity that may last for a generation" (pp. 1, 2).

In addition to these books, and of outstanding interest, are a number of reports issued under governmental auspices or prepared as virtual briefs in connection with hearings. Especially comprehensive and important is the study by The Brookings Institution on *The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations*.⁸ This elaborate and constructive analysis was made under contract, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, with financing from the President's management improvement fund. The assignment indicated (as the "Foreword" notes) that "the study should derive from, and provide an extension of, the work of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission)," which, indeed, in one of its reports had recommended a further comprehensive study of the entire problem of overseas operation and administration. Despite this focus, however, the authors could not avoid reopening fundamental questions about the structure of

⁷ *National Security and Individual Freedom*. By Harold D. Lasswell. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1950. Pp. xiii, 259. \$3.50.)

⁸ *The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations. A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, by The Brookings Institution*. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1951. Pp. xxv, 380. \$1.00.) The study was made under the direction of Leo Pasvolksy, Director of the International Studies Group, and Paul T. David, senior staff member in charge of the project, who were aided in the general drafting by William A. Reitzel and Robert W. Hartley. Among other inquiries, four staff members made field investigations in eight European countries. About 200 persons abroad and slightly more at home were interviewed on various aspects of foreign affairs administration. The volume opens with a "Summary" giving the "Scope and Conclusions of the Report," which is followed by three introductory chapters (dealing with basic factors, recent developments in government organization, and elements of administrative doctrine), leading to the six substantive chapters. In connection with these chapters, special acknowledgment is made of the role of the following staff members: Wilfred Owen in the development of chapter 4 on "Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Economic Programs"; Robert H. Connery, chapter 5 on "The Department of Defense and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs"; Charles E. Thurber, chapter 6 on "The Role of the Department of State in Program Operation and Coordination"; Earl L. Packer, chapter 7 on "Representation in Foreign Countries"; Wallace S. Sayre, chapter 8 on "Personnel Administration for Overseas Civilian Staffs"; and Seymour J. Rubin, chapter 9 on "Coordination through Interdepartmental Committees." In addition, the following unpublished memoranda were prepared and circulated among the staff in mimeographed form: Joseph W. Ballantine on "Regional Groupings in the Department of State"; H. F. Haviland, Jr., on "The United States and International Organizations"; Charles S. Hyneman on "Relations between Congress and the Executive-Administrative Branch in Foreign Affairs"; John F. Meck on "The National Security Council"; Dale Noble on "The Administration of Occupied Areas"; and Charles F. Remer on "Economic Reporting." In December, 1950, to aid in the immediate consideration of legislative proposals, the Brookings group submitted a confidential preliminary report at the request of the Bureau of the Budget.

the Department of State, as well as about the Executive Office of the President and interagency relations generally. The underlying constitutional pattern is treated as a condition, not an issue. The main chapters of the report use the technique of the "problem paper," as one expects in work by the Brookings International Studies Group.⁹ Each chapter gives enough historical and descriptive background to identify the issues, lists the alternatives under each issue with the arguments pro and con, and then states a preference among the alternatives. The chapter conclusions are repeated in the summary at the beginning of the volume. The chief structural issues are dealt with in the sections of the summary on "organization for the conduct of foreign economic programs," "the Department of Defense and foreign affairs" and the "role of the Department of State in program operation and coordination." The last-mentioned section comes nearest to an overall theory of executive-departmental relations, as well as to a forecast of the future of the Department of State. The present review can reflect only a few of the main recommendations; it cannot show their full range and texture and the factual material that, apart from the conclusions, make the report valuable as the most thorough, up-to-date description of the machinery of foreign affairs.

The immediate impetus of the Brookings report, of course, was the Administration's need to prepare for congressional action on foreign aid in 1951 by pointing out the relation between its enhanced military elements and its economic and newer technical assistance features. The impending decisions raised afresh, and in altered perspective, the issues left open by the Hoover Commission. These questions touch nearly every aspect of administrative structure and personnel in the conduct of foreign affairs. It is useful to outline the problem before examining the viewpoints of the publications of the last year, including the books already mentioned and additional items that will be cited in the course of the discussion.

II

The structural problem has two main phases, each with many angles. The first is the location of activities that have primary bearing on foreign affairs, especially those of so-called "operating" nature. How far should they be retained or absorbed, now or ultimately, in the Department of State and, when they are conducted outside of it, how far is it suitable to gather them within a single agency? The second phase is the coordination of activities administered outside the Department of State—a phase, indeed, that is a projection of the problem of its internal coordination. This phase merges in the problem of equipping the

⁹ Note, for example, the method of presentation in *Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1950-1951*. Prepared by the staff of the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1950. Pp. xiii, 416. College edition, \$1.50.) This volume signalized the growing attention to domestic factors and governmental mechanisms by including a chapter on these matters (pp. 29-62). It should be added that in 1949 the Brookings group (having taken the first step in the appendix of their 1948-49 survey) issued a brochure on *Governmental Mechanism for the Conduct of U. S. Foreign Relations*. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. Pp. 56. \$0.50.)

presidency. The head of state in any country inherently holds ultimate leadership in foreign relations, but what are the channels of his advice? How can the presidency be staffed without shortcircuiting the Department of State—a difficulty, to be sure, which is common to other departments and to which exuberant theory about the use of staff has not given enough attention? What arrangements will secure the proper concert of political and military factors?¹⁰ What arrangements will help in the adjustment of diplomatic and economic considerations in the face of the increasing interpenetration of domestic and foreign policies and programs? The political-military nexus is already partly institutionalized in the clearance of papers by the National Security Council in the presence of the President as chairman, thus performing its statutory duty “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”¹¹ The economic relationships are less clearly organized, except in such partial domains as the statutory and often-questioned role of the Treasury Department in providing the chairman and secretariat of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Should some collegial economic nexus be developed and, if so, should it be done by expanding the National Security Council, or by building on the National Advisory Council, or otherwise?

As further background for an analysis of the ways in which these structural issues are considered in the Brookings study and in certain of the books already mentioned, particular note should be taken of several intervening statements that pointed to the desirability of a relatively unified and autonomous form of organization for foreign economic operations.

A report by Gordon Gray was submitted to the President on November 10,

¹⁰ See *Concept of Civil Supremacy over the Military in the United States*. By William R. Tansill. (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. *Public Affairs Bulletin*, No. 94. Feb., 1951. Pp. 59. \$0.40.)

¹¹ A related problem of possible portent stems from the tendency to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in addition to statutory duties as “the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense”) statutory veto powers, applied by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 to the relatively technical matter of equipment, pushed very far, as to ground troops in Europe, by Senate Resolution 99, April, 1951. The question of the autonomy of the Joint Chiefs pervaded the joint hearings and public discussion on General MacArthur’s dismissal. See especially: Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on the Armed Services. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. *Hearings on the Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area*. S. Rept. 175. (Feb. 1–28, 1951. Pp. 819.) And also the *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area*. (May 3–June 27, 1951. Four pts., pp. 3133. A fifth part will consist of appendices.) The prospect for a committee report was resolved negatively on August 17 by a vote of twenty to three. The appendices will include statements by eight Republicans, and additional ones by Senators Saltonstall and Morse.

1950.¹² It had been undertaken by Gray as special assistant to the President at the latter's request on March 31, 1950. Edward S. Mason of Harvard University served as Gray's deputy, aided by a small staff. The President's initiating letter stated that "our basic purpose has been, and must continue to be, to help build a structure of international economic relationships which will permit each country, through the free flow of goods and capital, to achieve sound financial growth without the necessity for special financial aid." "Therefore," wrote the President, "it is now time for us also to look ahead and assure ourselves that our own policies are those which will serve best to reinforce our economic strength and that of the other free nations of the world." The President sought the aid which Gordon Gray and his associates could provide in determining "the nature, dimensions, and significance of this problem" and in developing "the broad lines of policy which in turn must be laid before the public and the Congress."

Events changed the emphasis. Gray's letter of transmittal summarized the shift in the following terms: "These activities were well under way when conditions were drastically changed by the aggression in Korea and the subsequent decisions to build up rapidly the defensive capabilities of the free world. This series of events did not in fact change the basic nature of the problem we were tackling. The paramount problem is not to achieve any specific objective with respect to our total balance-of-payments position but is rather how to make our foreign economic policies serve most effectively our total national and foreign policy requirements: These events did, however, markedly change the dimensions of the problem. At the same time, they increased the need for effective programming in the foreign economic field." The report did not undertake "to arrive at final judgments with respect to many program matters, particularly those of a quantitative nature," and, even on the ground covered, it noted that "much further work remains to be done within the appropriate departments and agencies to convert this policy statement into an operating program." The organizational question was dealt with briefly as the last of twenty-two recommendations, prefaced by the disclaimer that "this report does not attempt to deal with the problem of coordination at broader policy levels, or the relationship of various mechanisms which are now in existence or under discussion for this purpose." The recommendation stated: "An agency or organization should be established within the United States Government to administer foreign economic programs. Its functions should include the administration of all grant and technical assistance programs (except the provision of military equipment) and the administration of other related

¹² *Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. vii, 131. \$0.40.) On the personal side, it may be added that Gordon Gray, who resigned as Secretary of the Army to become President of the University of North Carolina, was again called back into government service on June 21, 1951, as chairman of a new interdepartmental strategy board in the field of "psychological warfare" for the "formulation and promulgation . . . of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs."

activities, such as the stimulation of needed materials production abroad." In support of this degree of unified administration, the report argued that "loans, grants, technical assistance, the production and procurement abroad of raw materials for defense, and measures to influence the international flow of goods are all closely related." It complained that "at the present time, the administration of these various aspects of our foreign economic policy is scattered throughout the Government."

This recommendation of the Gray report, among its other features, was endorsed early in 1951 by a special subcommittee on foreign economic cooperation of the Senate Appropriations Committee.¹³ The subcommittee declared the proposal "sound, and, if anything, overdue," adding that "on the basis of past findings of the subcommittee, it should be endorsed in principle, irrespective of what Congress later determines to be the scope, size, spending authorization, and functions of such a new entity." Although the words "new entity" were used, the subcommittee assumed that "the new agency should be built around the existing ECA organization and personnel."

The theme of a further combination of overseas operations was repeated in the first report of the Advisory Board authorized by the International Development Act of June 5, 1950, and set up under the executive order of September 8 with Nelson Rockefeller as chairman.¹⁴ In accepting the Gray report, the President had announced: "I am asking Mr. Rockefeller to have his Board, as its first task, consider Mr. Gray's proposals concerning our policy toward the underdeveloped areas in the context of the full report, in order that this Board will be able to give us its views early in the coming year on the types and size of programs which it considers desirable for the United States to undertake in this field." In the board's report on March 11, 1951, its nine recommendations included the suggestion (in addition to others relating to new machinery linked to the International Bank) that "a unified agency with a new point of view is needed." It would not be enough, the board said, to transfer additional activities to the ECA, since not only it but also the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs—both in the State Department—must be included in the new organization. The board believed that "the problems of economic defense and economic development must be dealt with together, hand in hand."

Meanwhile on December 19, 1950, the President had approved an interdepartmental agreement which tended to stabilize the roles of the ECA and the Defense Department in foreign assistance and, at the same time, to strengthen the leadership position of the State Department.¹⁵ It set up a Director of Inter-

¹³ *Analysis of the Gray Report*, Subcommittee Print, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 4-5.

¹⁴ *Partners in Progress. Report of the International Development Advisory Board*. (Washington: Government Printing Office. Pp. v, 120. 1951. \$0.40.)

¹⁵ *Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of State, Defense, and the Economic Cooperation Administration: Organizational Arrangements within the U. S. Government for Policy Formation and Implementation with respect to International Security Arrangements and Military and Economic Assistance for Mutual Defense*. Thomas D.

national Security Affairs in the Department of State to "represent and speak for the Department of State on matters of policy and program relating to the North Atlantic Treaty, other similar international programs, and military and economic assistance for mutual defense." He was to occupy the senior position authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as well as to serve as chairman of an interdepartmental reviewing and coordinating body called the Committee on International Security Affairs. The memorandum of understanding recognized that "the Department of Defense has primary responsibility for determining the military character of international programs, for developing and implementing the end-item and military training programs, and for developing U. S. determinations as to military requirements in the formulation of programs for military production abroad." It also recognized that the Economic Cooperation Administration "shall have primary responsibility for developing and implementing plans for economic assistance required to support an adequate defense effort abroad, and for implementing approved programs for additional military production abroad."

The virtual retention of a partially decentralized operating structure with a renewed ECA as its main element, but with accent on increased leadership in the Department of State, was further forecast by the President's identical letters on April 5, 1951, to the Secretary of State and to the head of ECA. He wrote: "The scope and complexity of foreign economic and technical assistance programs and the need for maximum continuity and dispatch in their performance warrant the continuation of ECA as a separate agency to carry on such programs." The guiding principle was that the "arrangements should insure maximum coordination of programs at the departmental level." Therefore, the Secretary of State "after recommendation from the International Security Affairs Committee, where appropriate, should make the broad decisions concerning the use of the funds as between (a) military end-item assistance and economic support and (b) major political areas." The President noted that "the Secretary of State, under my direction, is the Cabinet officer responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations, and will provide leadership and coordination among the executive agencies in carrying out foreign policies and programs." He added that, in the event of a disagreement between the Secretary and the head of the ECA about the latter's proposed policy or program actions, "no action should be taken until a joint statement has been submitted and the issues have been resolved by the President." When the text of the identical letters just quoted was published later in April, some critics complained that the proposal to vest the allocating power in the State Department was contrary to the idea of an overseas operating organization built upon ECA experience and inclusive of still other elements. This view (which may have been prompted partly by feeling against the State Department) seemed to overlook the extent to which the Mutual Defense

Cabot was named to the position established. See Robert H. Connery and Paul T. David, "The Mutual Defense Assistance Program," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 321-47 (June, 1951).

Assistance legislation since 1949 had used the State Department as a distributing channel, as well as the degree to which the Defense Department, already engaged in end-item and training activities, was likely to be still more heavily involved in a new Mutual Security Program.

At almost the same time Paul Hoffman, now head of the Ford Foundation, brought his formidable prestige, including his record as first head of ECA, to the support of a more drastic version of the idea of an autonomous operating entity. In a little book of hopeful title and tone,¹⁶ Hoffman declared that "from the standpoint of foreign aid programs I believe the most important lesson we have learned is this: to get maximum efficiency out of the dollars we spend abroad, whether they go for recovery, for development of retarded economies, or for building up military defenses, only one government agency must have the primary responsibility for allocating all funds." Accordingly, he recommended that "an Overseas Economic Administration be formed to administer all aid and technical assistance programs abroad; that this administration have a large measure of control over the policies of such lending agencies as the Export-Import Bank; that the U. S. representatives to all international organizations be responsible to it; and that this administration have equal rank with the other departments of the government such as State, Commerce, Interior and that its administrator have cabinet status" (p. 112).

The issue, obviously, was less a question of the separate existence of an overseas organization (at least for the immediate future) than of its content. It was still less a question of its content than of the degree to which coordinating leadership would be centered in the State Department.¹⁷

The President's foreign aid message went to Congress on May 24, 1951. It proposed a "Mutual Security Program," consisting of "military assistance to other free nations in the amount of \$6,250,000,000" and "economic assistance to the other free nations in the amount of \$2,250,000,000, primarily to support expanded defense efforts abroad." The new program would "bring together" (as the President expressed it) the arms aid of the Mutual Defense

¹⁶ *Peace Can be Won*. By Paul Hoffman. (New York: Doubleday and Company. 1951. Pp. 188. Cloth, \$2.50. Paper, \$1.00.)

¹⁷ Emergency controls centered in the Office of Defense Mobilization were becoming an international factor. "It was evident," observes Parks (*op. cit.*, p. 240), "that many of the basic decisions in the international economic field would be made either by ODM with its participation or subject to its direction." ODM Order No. 1 in January, 1951, set up the Committee on Foreign Supplies and Requirements, with the ECA head as chairman. An International Materials Conference was developed, with headquarters in Washington, with various commodity committees participated in by twenty-seven countries. Background information on the problem of items in "world short supply," stock-piling questions, and related matters is available in the valuable study of "Mobilization Planning and the National Security, 1950-1960" (prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, under the direction of William Y. Elliott and issued as S. Doc. 204, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.), although it was written before events in Korea changed the perspective and tempo. See also John E. Orchard, "Strategic Materials: Procurement and Allocation," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 19-40 (May, 1951). On August 1, the President created a Defense Materials Procurement Agency.

Assistance Program, economic assistance to Europe (now primarily in support of rearmament), and economic aid to underdeveloped areas under the Point Four concept. The final section of the message dealt with administrative arrangements. "The administration of military aid," it said, "will be handled, as at present, by the Department of Defense, which will be able to insure full coordination between United States production of equipment for our forces and equipment for our allies."¹⁸ The ECA would carry on economic assistance for Western Europe, and for most of the countries of the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. The message indicated that there was still an open question as to economic aid programs for Latin America and certain other countries "in which the economic aid is limited almost wholly to technical assistance . . . now administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the State Department." The program as a whole must be closely tied with the Export-Import Bank. Overall policy guidance should be provided by a key coordinating committee, which could be developed out of the existing International Security Affairs Committee and, like it, should be chaired by an official of the State Department, appointed by the President with Senate approval to the senior position authorized by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

Hearings on the proposed "Mutual Security Act of 1951" began the last week of June before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; consideration by two Senate committees jointly followed the return of a panel from a European survey. The administration bill combined the breakdown between military and economic assistance (as recommended in the message) with regional allocations of the authorized funds, naming Europe, the Near East and Africa, the Far East and the Pacific, and the American Republics. The preamble carried a statement of purpose to which were assimilated the purposes of the existing mutual defense assistance, economic assistance, and international development legislation.¹⁹ This feature was in line with the widely held belief (expressed, for example, in the preliminary Brookings report in December, 1950) that foreign aid should be put in a single package in point of authorization and purpose, even though administrative operations were not wholly unified. The bill said nothing about the administrative structure, except what was implied by the proposed repeal of the ECA termination date and by a reference to one person at a salary of \$17,000 to be named by the President

¹⁸ A pamphlet issued by the Committee on the Present Danger in June, 1951, attacked the idea of "different administrations, one dealing with military end-items and one dealing with technical or other forms of economic assistance." On July 17, Paul Hoffman expressed similar views in the House hearings then in progress. This issue, at least indirectly, interacts with the question of the amount of State Department leadership in allocation and coordination.

¹⁹ 82nd Cong., 1st sess., S. 1762, Sec. 2: "The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security."

with the consent of the Senate.²⁰ The President's plan, as explained in the hearings, included "the continued utilization of the Department of Defense for the conduct of military assistance programs" and "continuation of the role of the Secretary of State as the official who, under the President, provides the foreign policy leadership and guidance for the program." It was evident, however, that the congressional mood favored a greater semblance of singleness and autonomy.

III

Fundamental questions will remain, no matter what is done in the statute that authorizes the Mutual Security Program. The immediate controversies will relate less to the desirability of conducting activities outside the State Department than to the degree of leadership in coordination given to it. The longer-run question is whether an organization which is projected from the ECA should be regarded as the nucleus of a permanent foreign economic department, or as the nucleus of a wing in an enlarged type of department of foreign affairs. Both the immediate and the long-run aspects are fraught with the perplexities of presidential staffing; both are significant not only in the conduct of foreign policy but also in the development of national administration as a whole. Against the background that has been given, I return to the views on these matters in the publications under review.

The Brookings report finds a "basic organizational dilemma." Several factors point to the desirability of centralizing foreign economic affairs in a permanent agency separate from the State Department, especially if large-scale foreign economic programs are likely to continue for a long time. "But such a solution," the reports points out, "would fail to recognize that economic affairs are an integral part of foreign affairs; a general foreign affairs agency divorced from the economic aspects of foreign affairs would have difficulty in meeting its most important responsibilities." An eventual choice can hardly be avoided by temporizing. For a non-permanent organization of limited

²⁰ Just what was meant by ECA termination, was almost a matter of statutory semantics. Congress faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the original four-year limit set for the Marshall Plan made a decisive change of auspices desirable as a symbol, although it could be said truly that the renewed request was based on changed circumstances and an altered program content. On the other hand, nearly every one recognized ECA's advantage as a going organization, even apart from the relative friendliness with which Congressmen had come to view it. When the Secretary of State appeared as the first witness on the Mutual Security bill, Chairman Richards reminded him that a continuation of ECA after 1952 would violate the original pledge to and by Congress. The Secretary replied: "If you can work out something or other so that these people can be assured that their services will be needed for a different program after 1952, and that the program which is starting now will be continuing, you will have achieved the purpose I want too" (*Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. On the Mutual Security Program* [H.R. 5020 and H.R. 5113] [June 28, 1951], p. 70). On August 16 the House took up H.R. 5113 (H. Rept. 872), which cut the estimate by \$651,250,000. As passed the next day, the bill cut economic aid by an additional \$350,000,000. The Senate's version, passed on August 31, reduced the total to \$7,286,250,000 but rejected the House scheme for a single cabinet-rank agency.

scope would encounter increasingly the unstable equilibrium of "unsettled and potentially conflicting jurisdiction." Therefore, the report concludes that "in due course it may be necessary to decide between the permanent establishment of a Department of Foreign Economic Affairs, which would have full status as an executive department, and a concentration of foreign economic programs in the Department of State."

Such is the "dilemma." A dilemma, however, is a situation in which both alternatives are equally bad and no other choice exists. Although the Brookings report uses the word, it hardly presents a true dilemma, since the report indicates a possible compromise which in its own right may be the proper choice. It is this third possibility that the Brookings analysis favors as a long-run solution, although its endorsement is implied rather than outright. The ultimate solution would be "the establishment of a new executive department modeled somewhat on the pattern of the Department of Defense. This would be a Department of Foreign Affairs, an executive department, within which there would be a department of foreign economic affairs as one of a number of subordinate administrative departments."²¹ I think this suggestion is sound. I likewise agree that it would be premature to decide on it now.²²

In the words of the Brookings report, there are "uncertainties resulting from the present national defense emergency, and especially the uncertainty as to how long the United States Government will continue to carry on large-scale programs of foreign economic aid." The present question of organization should be decided on "the basis of short-range considerations." Accordingly, the report recommends (subject to a declaration of policy that would encompass the Departments of State and Defense as well as the economic entity) that the Economic Cooperation Administration "should be continued as an emergency agency for the administration of the economic aspects of foreign assistance and for such other closely related foreign economic activities as are of special importance during the emergency." It should not be considered permanent, although the terminal date of June 30, 1952, should be repealed and no statutory terminal date should be set. The Brookings report then lists the proposed activities—a richer array than the President's message had indicated. These activities include the completion of the European Recovery Program, the economic aspects of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and its successor,

²¹ Compare the somewhat related suggestion made by George Graham for the executive branch generally, in "The Presidency and the Executive Office of the President," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 599-621, at pp. 618-21 (1950).

²² In May, 1951, the Committees on Expenditures of the two houses began to consider several proposals to create a commission to study the administration of overseas activities and to make recommendations to Congress. See Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. *Hearings on S. 1166*. (May 31 and June 5, 1951.) S. Rept. 543. S. 1166 passed on a consent calendar on July 23, but a motion was made to reconsider. See also the House hearings, completed on August 2, on H.R. 3406 and H.R. 3697. Personally, I think that the proposed commission inquiry, if not redundant in view of the amount of work recently done in the Brookings study and elsewhere, would be premature if undertaken in the next year or two.

aid to southeast Asia and the Philippines and other forms of economic assistance there conducted by the ECA, the activities under the Technical Assistance Program carried on by the State Department and, in addition, the procurement and development of strategic materials abroad, export controls and the foreign claimancy function. The tie-in with the Export-Import Bank is dealt with cautiously; the report suggests that the head of the ECA should have "a voice in the determination of the Bank's policies" and that "if necessary, further steps should be taken." In general, the report assumes that the unity of the foreign aid program in the future should lie in its conception, duly expressed in a single statutory authorization, and in effective leadership in coordination. The program must include military and economic aid and must be "carried on jointly by the Department of Defense, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Department of State."

The Brookings report does not accept the doctrine that the State Department should never be given "operating" tasks. For example, the Department showed by its work in Greece, it is asserted, that there is no inherent reason why it cannot administer such activities successfully, or why it should not "ordinarily be the agency to administer foreign programs." The report rejects the often-heard suggestion—recently renewed in friendly spirit by Senator Benton—that the vast international information activity should be made independent; rather, the Brookings report recommends that much of the information work that has grown up under the Economic Cooperation Administration should be transferred to the State Department. Speaking in general and long-run terms, the report opposes the idea of "a new general purpose agency for the administration of foreign programs." The report flatly states that "the proposal for a new Administration of Overseas Affairs, to administer overseas programs other than the diplomatic and consular activities, should, in our opinion, be rejected." I applaud this robust conclusion.

But it must be admitted that even the multiple type of foreign affairs department suggested could not absorb all activities closely involved in modern foreign policy, let alone the threads of foreign affairs that run through the whole fabric of the government. This fact (made weightier by the acceptance of "operating" tasks as a normal responsibility) leads to the question of the standing of the Department of State in relation to other departments and to the President. The Brookings answer must be read carefully in the light of a qualification that makes it interesting and constructive. The main answer is reflected in the remark that "while the Department has certain special characteristics as an executive department, it nevertheless is and should be of the same organizational status as the other executive departments." A corollary is the belief that it is "incompatible with that status to vest authority in the Department of State to direct the work of other executive departments and agencies concerned with foreign affairs." A further corollary is the belief that it would be inconsistent with the status of the State Department as an executive department "to treat it as a staff agency of the President in any specialized sense."

I would strongly dissent from the theory in the foregoing quotations, if it were not for a wise qualification that follows them. "Every executive department," the report states, "should be regarded as having responsibility for leadership in securing coordination throughout the executive branch of the matters for which it has the primary concern. . . . Its responsibility in that regard is not the neutral responsibility of a staff agency assisting the President; it is a positive responsibility arising out of the major functions of the Department as an executive department." It is understood, of course, that "the foreign affairs aspect will not necessarily be primary in every foreign affairs matter; in those cases the Department should accept a secondary place in the coordination process." Perhaps the Brookings language, in seeking to strip the phrase "leadership in securing coordination at the departmental level" of any hint of "command authority," modifies it more than is necessary by saying that "the assignment is to secure voluntary agreement among equals who are responsible alike to higher authority," and by referring to the "further responsibility for promptly referring any unresolved disagreement to higher authority." For the realities of a leadership that can profit by departmental competence and relieve the "higher authority" lie in the latter's habitual, though not automatic, confidence and support. Such confidence and support virtually confer a government-wide command status on each department in its appropriate field. The need in foreign affairs is unique only in the degree of its urgency.

A well-taken and far-reaching warning is implicit in the Brookings treatment of departmental leadership. The overuse of special staff isolates an executive from his own organization and impoverishes the result. An executive at any level must find the chief source of his advice in the appropriate establishment below him, which in turn (though it has its own advisory organs) must derive the main upward flow from its various operating parts as the subject-matter changes. The warning applies with especial force at the level of the presidency. I venture to say this, although I am aware that the use of presidential aides for foreign affairs will probably remain the most controversial, and certainly will remain the least predictable, aspect of the problem of executive organization for foreign policy. The presidential staff for program purposes should be neutral in the double sense that it has no fixed subject-matter assignments and that its viewpoint and range of attention are as wide as those of the chief executive himself.²³ The temptations to violate this principle are strong. Nothing is easier when a problem appears than to suggest adding a person to the President's entourage to deal permanently with the difficulty. This tendency is fundamentally bad. However, these strictures do not apply to the association with the President of collegial advisory organs such as the National Security Council.

The Brookings report is sensitive to the ambiguities that would attend superimposing one virtual Secretary of State upon another. This awareness is

²³ For sagacious conclusions drawn from a pioneer study, see *Presidential Agency. OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion*. By Herman M. Somers. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.)

in line with its stress upon departmental responsibility. Its conclusions about program coordination are cautious and tentative. It believes that the existing arrangements, in the form of the Director of International Security Affairs in the Department of State and the interdepartmental committee he heads, "should not be lightly upset." But the report points out that the realization of the ideal depends upon certain conditions in the executive branch which are not easily achieved or maintained. If, in the future, the conditions prerequisite for successful leadership by the State Department in securing program coordination should prove to be lacking, "it may become necessary to give further consideration to the possibility of appointing a director of military and economic aid in the Executive Office of the President." The report is equally tentative in the following comment on a more inclusive possibility: "Consideration should also be given to the possibilities inherent in the further development of the National Security Council through the establishment of a full-time vice-chairman with responsibility under the President for executive leadership in the coordination and execution of all phases of national security policy, including the unified program of military and economic aid." This proposal has many supporters. I prefer to join the doubters who ask whether the generally favorable impressions about the Council's performance and increasing value have not been due largely to the President's more consistent personal service as chairman, along with improvements in the Council's staff work. The Council's jurisdiction and membership are another matter; they can be modified without changing the President's role.

In his book on *United States Administration of Its International Economic Affairs*, Wallace Parks is concerned with coordination in terms of the wide variety of more or less permanent economic activities.²⁴ He concludes that "no regular staff specialized primarily on this basis is needed in the Executive Office except under unusual circumstances" (p. 250). Some additional central machinery is necessary, however. Parks suggests a cabinet-level council on foreign economic policy.²⁵ He believes it could be developed from the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, which already has been broadening its scope. The chairman of the proposed council,

²⁴ Part of the value of Parks' volume lies in its detailed canvass of just how the various economic units of the government do touch foreign affairs and why, in many cases, their activities do not involve a problem of coordination with general foreign policy. In the foreign economic field, it is understood that the annual survey of U. S. international finance (beginning with the volume for 1950) prepared under the direction of Gardner Patterson by the International Finance Section at Princeton University, will give some attention to the administrative aspects.

²⁵ A different type of solution of the economic problem would be to broaden the jurisdiction and membership of the National Security Council. This viewpoint is illustrated in a statement issued in June, 1951, by a subcommittee on foreign aid of the National Planning Association. It should be noted that another type of expansion of the Council is proposed by Lasswell, *op. cit.*, pp. 80 ff. He would add three full-time civilian members, one of whom would be "responsible for reviewing the effect of security measures on individual liberties and advising the President thereon," while another would be "responsible for a more effective flow to the public of information related to national security."

however, should be the Secretary of State, not the Secretary of the Treasury. The council and its subcommittees would have "no power in their own right except to consider matters of interagency concern within their jurisdiction, to advise agencies carrying program responsibilities, and, on the basis of power specifically delegated by the President, to clear by unanimous agreement proposals made by agencies of primary responsibility which otherwise would require the action or approval of the President or a super-agency coordinator" (p. 266). On occasion, this body might be a point of prior reference for economic matters destined for consideration in the National Security Council. For the conduct of overseas operations, Parks prefers a semi-autonomous unit in the State Department. An underlying theme in the book, however, is his stress upon the development of functional fields and the legitimacy of their extension into foreign affairs. This conclusion assumes that there will be considerable reorganization—regarding which the author makes a number of specific suggestions—and also better overall management at home, with a more favorable condition through the world. Parks argues that "at such time as there is a return to a more commercial-type international economy, the Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury Departments would be the appropriate location for many international economic program functions under only general State Department direction" (p. 206).

The problem of synthesis is constantly faced in James L. McCamy's useful book on *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs*. He is, like so many of us, caught, on the one hand, between his sympathy for permanent organization and the "institutional product" and, on the other, his feeling about the creative role of transitory newcomers in government. His own five years of public service probably contribute to the latter attitude. It leads him, I think, into a little confusion, or at least it risks his being misunderstood, in his treatment of the Department of State as adviser to the President. McCamy declares that the Secretary of State is no exception to the rule that "a Secretary of a Federal department almost inevitably becomes more the agent of the permanent bureaucracy under his command than a free agent, mainly because he must rely upon the permanent officials for expert information and analysis, and the policy conclusions of any sensible man will be determined by the information and analysis available" (p. 165). McCamy concludes that "in reality . . . we should see the alternative as between a President who takes personal command in foreign affairs and command by a department composed in major influence of permanent specialists led by a Secretary whose prestige and effectiveness depend in part upon his standing with these permanent specialists" (p. 166). But what is the meaning of "personal command?" McCamy admits the risks in a President's individual judgments. In discussing coordination earlier in the book, moreover, he states that it must be achieved "below the level of the President in person, since he is as an individual too busy to take cognizance of more than a bare minimum of items" (p. 135). The limitation applies even in foreign affairs—"the President's biggest job." After surveying various methods, including the im-

portance of informal working relations among officials of good sense and good will, McCamy finds that "it is clear to a disturbing degree that these existing means have not achieved the coordination of the government in foreign affairs" (p. 150). A basic lack, he adds, is the fact that political factors at home and abroad are not introduced "at the time the agencies, other than a small sector of the State Department, are developing policies" (p. 153). Yet the search for a remedy leads McCamy again to the top. He believes that, "desperate as the need may be for a staff unit to serve the overworked President, the time for making the Department of State such a unit passed long ago" (p. 153). The reader stumbles when he comes to the words "logic of organization" in McCamy's next sentence: "The logic of organization is pushed aside by realities which have accumulated over the years." McCamy dismisses as impracticable the drastic stripping of the Department of State, which he assumes (unnecessarily, I think) to be a prerequisite step in fitting the department for a high staff role. Moreover, the "realities" he has in mind include factors other than the mere accumulation of activities. McCamy declares that "one finds almost unanimous distrust among the sophisticated practitioners in other agencies for all the policy units of the Department of State except the political affairs divisions" (p. 154).

What, then, is McCamy's answer? His prescription is a presidential staff "which would draw into the formulation of both foreign and domestic policy the various competences and interests and which would make sure that all agencies followed the President's policy in their activities" (p. 155). I question whether this emphasis is the way to achieve coordination "below the level of the President in person" and preferably "at the time the agencies . . . are developing policies." In fairness to McCamy, I hasten to say that he does not propose a specialized staff headed by a virtual super-secretary of international involvements. His treatment is not wholly clear, however. There is a suggestion of specialization in his remark that a nucleus for what he has in mind may be at hand in the persons who work for and with the National Security Council. But he also declares that the staff "would not have experts in any subject-matter but would rely upon the various agencies for specialization. It would be expert in staff work, but not in economic, social, political, military, or administrative policy" (p. 155). In his concluding chapter, McCamy mentions a prototype for the kind of staff he contemplates, although his passing allusion does not require him to examine certain points of difference. He merely remarks: "An established presidential staff office, comparable to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion of war days, serving for both the foreign and domestic policy fields, since the two are really inseparable, has yet to be established" (p. 351). However inexact the analogy, I am reassured by the breadth of the assignment as McCamy states it here.²⁶

²⁶ The Brookings report, in an interesting chapter on coordination through interdepartmental committees (including the point that "the supervision of permanent interdepartmental committees is essentially an Executive Office function and one for which definite responsibility should be fixed"), remarks that the "existing limitations on the scope of the

IV

Government-wide leadership in foreign affairs involves the State Department's internal structure and methods.²⁷ On this point the Brookings report has many useful clues to the present situation, in addition to its forecast of an enlarged department of foreign affairs; on the whole, however, it passes over the internal organization as something that the Hoover Commission had considered and that the department had carried out in its 1949 reorganization. McCamy's description of the department is accompanied by critical comments that deserve a summary. "Political affairs are dominant in foreign relations; hence the political affairs offices should be given the central responsibility for policy and conduct" (p. 64). In any case, "political relations, if they can be separated at all, will dictate military, social, and economic relations" (p. 65). McCamy deplores the understaffing of the political offices. Here, he seems to refer to the regional bureaus and to overlook the extent to which the political side of the department is developing in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. But it is not on this point that I quarrel with his treatment. His concern is well-placed when he says that "we were faced in 1948 with the reality that the dominant policies of American foreign relations were based upon the work of a ridiculously small staff of area specialists" (p. 65). I agree with the implication which recognizes momentum as the product of velocity and mass and which punctures the fantasy of sheer velocity—the notion that numbers do not matter if the quality is good enough. My quarrel begins when McCamy fails to apply this logic to the economic offices of the department. For momentum counts there, too. On them mainly falls the job of dealing with the other departments. They must be prepared to argue with these departments from the standpoint of the long-run view of national interest that characterizes foreign policy thinking, even though they draw upon the specialized expertness of the other agencies—agencies deeply set in traditional duties and domestic clienteles.²⁸ The need is especially marked in the present period of profound transition in the international position of the United States.

The State Department must possess mass as well as the velocity to defend foreign policy considerations in the course of the endless analysis and argumentation which are so important a part of the administrative process. In view

National Security Council appear to have been somewhat responsible for the establishment of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Harriman) and the International Security Affairs Committee. The relationships between the three units may appropriately be subject to a further evolution."

²⁷ An unpublished dissertation by Joseph D. Cooper, of the Department of State, on *Decision-Making and the Action Process in the Department of State*, was substantially completed in 1950, under the auspices of American University.

²⁸ McCamy suggests (as does Parks, *op. cit.*, p. 12) that, as agencies with clienteles enter foreign affairs, their presence will broaden the popular base and political support of foreign policy. But for an illustration of the problem faced in the domestic orientation of subject-matter agencies, see *The Sale of the Tankers*. By Louis S. Koenig. (A study prepared for the Committee on Public Administration Cases in 1950, which will be included in a volume of the cases to be published by Harcourt, Brace and Company early in 1952.)

of McCamy's prepossessions about this matter, he is naturally disappointed because the State Department committees set up in 1949 to make detailed inquiries and plans in applying the Hoover Commission recommendations did not find that the economic offices could be trimmed as drastically as the Commission had supposed. Their finding seems to me to teach a useful lesson; McCamy sees in it the "subtle poison" by which career staffs cripple any innovation. In these terms, he disparages the importance of the State Department reorganization in the autumn of 1949. Such improvement as came, he believes, "was due to Acheson's personal competence and leadership" (p. 80). McCamy adds: "He was, after all, the first Secretary of State since World War II who combined good mental equipment with long experience in the Department and who approached the Department with a caustic skepticism about its omniscience." McCamy thinks that "There was not enough change in the organization to insure that another and less sophisticated secretary would find conditions very different in terms of co-ordination and unity than they had been under secretaries before Acheson. The structure was still diffuse, and the authorities were too unclear."

With all respect, I fear McCamy is yielding here to another fantasy and one that can do much harm by exciting vain expectations and provoking unfair criticism: the fantasy of a clean-cut and final distribution of responsibilities among the parts of an organization, as distinguished from the realizable clarity that lies in the well-understood assignment of action papers, shifting as the subject-matter changes and with a shifting responsibility for consultation before decision. McCamy is right in saying that "the United States reached its full stature in foreign relations without having attained the administrative maturity to go with its strength" (p. 347). But isn't this immaturity partly shown in the tendency (not lacking, for example, in congressional criticism of the Department of State) to assume that some stroke of structural magic will produce simplicity, undivided responsibility, and decisiveness? I wish that McCamy, with his experience, realism, and subtlety, had gone further in combatting this illusion.

V

The question of personnel enters into every phase of foreign affairs. It is a prime factor in choosing among alternative forms of organization for overseas activities and it will remain important in deciding on their ultimate location. Apart from such operations, moreover, the personnel systems of the State Department condition its methods of work and its tone, affect its relations with other parts of the government, and thus react profoundly upon its success in policy coordination. In the spring of 1951, the report of the so-called Rowe committee²⁹ was at last made public by the State Department in connection

²⁹ *An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs. A Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel.* By James H. Rowe, Jr., Chairman, Robert Ramspeck, William E. DeCourcy and William F. Howell, Staff Director. (Aug., 1950.) The report is a processed document of forty-three pages, with separately numbered appendices running to about half that length.

with the announcement of a directive³⁰ that partially adopted and initiated the committee's recommendations. The thinking reflected in the committee report and the order may usefully be compared with the views on personnel in recent publications, especially the Brookings report.

The Rowe committee was appointed on December 19, 1949, by the Secretary of State to advise him "whether fundamental changes are required in the personnel systems and relationships of the Department of State and the Foreign Service," and as to "factors which will contribute to the morale of the personnel concerned." Some of the impetus came from the Hoover Commission's renewed espousal of the idea that the Foreign Service and the departmental service should be combined. The essence of the committee's twenty-two recommendations was incorporated in the first two: that "there should be a single, but flexible, personnel system for the Department of State and the Foreign Service instead of the separate systems that exist at present" and that "the personnel system should be established outside the framework of the present Civil Service system." The committee recommended that the unified system should be established under a flexibly drawn statute and should consist of three groups: alien employees; consular agents; and the Foreign Affairs Service, which in turn should comprise a foreign affairs officers group and a foreign affairs clerical and technical group. The officer group would "include generalists and program or functional specialists, but would exclude technicians in a narrow sense." The group would embrace, however, higher-level general and specialized administrative officers. Other departments of the government should be able to recommend persons for temporary assignment, when acceptable to the Department of State, which, in turn, should be able to assign its members for service under other agencies.

A positive personnel program should be developed, including continuous relationships with the principal educational, industrial, commercial and financial institutions. Entrance-level recruiting to the foreign affairs officer group should be based upon a rigorous and comprehensive written, oral, and physical examination. The committee believed that the present foreign service examination, though it secures persons of high caliber, is deficient in giving "insufficient weight to the social sciences and to specialized aspects of foreign relations, such as economics, agriculture, and public affairs." Therefore, it recommended that the general parts of the examination might well be supplemented by such options as economics, agriculture, public affairs, administration and political affairs. The committee looked forward to building "career ladders in the several broad occupational fields required in foreign affairs," buttressed by a promotion plan that would develop these fields on the basis of a realistic estimate of the needed numbers, and with "generalists and specialists" competing for positions of command. There should be provision for lateral entrance to the middle and higher ranges. On this point, however, the com-

³⁰ *State Department: Directive to Improve the Personnel Program of the Department of State and the Unified Foreign Service of the United States.* The processed copy bore the date "March, 1951," but the directive was not released until April 16. With it were released Departmental Announcement 47, and also a summary of the Committee report.

mittee believed that there had been too much lateral recruiting in the departmental service of the State Department, too little in the Foreign Service. It warned that lateral recruitment would do untold harm in the proposed unified service unless it was "properly geared to a qualifying process," which would include a thorough oral examination, careful evaluation of loyalty, training, education, and experience, and a physical examination, as well as a demonstration of ability in written expression. The committee indicated that certain steps could be taken without waiting for legislation, including the identification of positions in the Department of State for which dual experience is essential or desirable. It also recommended that "as many of these positions as possible" be "filled by persons with overseas experience, including, as a consequence, the assignment of more Foreign Service people to the department," and that, in departmental recruiting, an effort should be made to secure persons willing to serve overseas. The committee recognized the difficulties of transition and said it was not proposing "ill-advised haste."

The Department of State did not act with undue haste. The committee itself had already consulted the existing personnel through a questionnaire administered by the Opinion Research Center to a sample of 1,200 foreign service and 1,000 departmental people. The idea of a single Foreign Affairs Service was favored by 81 per cent of the departmental employees, 76 per cent of the foreign service staff officers, and 59 per cent of the foreign service officers (with understandable variations in terms of age and rank). Nevertheless, the limitations of a completely unified system were suggested by the fact that "60 per cent of the total number of Departmental employees place some kind of restriction on their availability for overseas assignment." The final directive, released on April 16, 1951, was drawn after further consultation in the department and was made public after an additional delay incidental to its presentation to congressional subcommittees.³¹

The directive described itself as "consistent with the objectives advocated by the Advisory Committee," although it did not go as far as the committee proposed. The objectives are to be sought, first, by administrative adjustments possible under the Foreign Service Act of 1946 and in the departmental personnel system. This experience will yield "an informed basis for possible further integration in the future of the Departmental and Foreign Services under an improved personnel career system and for utilizing this system for staffing additional civilian overseas activities of the United States." Immediately, therefore, those in charge of personnel are directed, among other steps, to "increase through voluntary means the flexible use of domestic and Foreign Service personnel interchangeably between overseas and domestic assignments, including a greater interchange with other government agencies concerned

³¹ Some alarms were heard on the House floor. (See *Congressional Record*, Vol. 97, pp. 2510-12, daily ed. [March 14, 1951].) But pressure for more drastic action came in the introduction on March 15, by Senator McClellan and an imposing list of co-sponsors from both parties, of S. Con. Res. No. 19, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., which requested the Secretary of State to submit to Congress within ninety days a plan for carrying out the recommendation of the Hoover Commission on a unified Foreign Affairs Service.

with foreign affairs and increased utilization in the Foreign Service of qualified persons not now in the Government by means of lateral appointment to the Foreign Service Reserve." In filling positions in the Department for which dual service at home and abroad is desirable, furthermore, "every effort should be made to employ persons who are qualified and willing to serve abroad." (I believe that about 1,500 such positions have been identified.) Much of the directive is a detailed and constructive challenge to the Director of Personnel to develop and recommend implementing orders and drafts of legislation.

So much is left to the future, obviously, that the ideas in recent publications are of added practical value. The analysis and recommendations in the Brookings report (prepared largely by Wallace Sayre, who also aided the Rowe committee) are especially important.³² The report devotes two chapters to personnel and related matters, first discussing representation in foreign countries (which involves lines of authority and communication control, as well as the nature and growth of overseas staffs and types of missions), and then considering personnel administration with special reference to overseas civilian staffs.

The valuable chapter on representation abroad traces the rise of the condition which, in September, 1950, saw 43 departments, agencies, or units of the United States using in their activities abroad a total civilian personnel (including both Americans and nationals of the several countries) of 74,879, of whom 15,812 were connected with the State Department, 7,863 were under other civil agencies, and 51,204 were civilian employees of the military departments. It is unfortunately impossible here even to summarize the description of the structural arrangements overseas. The report observes that "at present the major organizational problem at the country level has to do with the extent to which the various Washington agencies other than the Department of State shall send their own representatives abroad, and the relationship which such representatives shall have to the chief of the diplomatic mission." After discussing the intricate issues of centralization versus decentralization, the report concludes, among other recommendations, that the assignment of military staffs abroad is necessary and that their existing relationships to the diplomatic establishments are satisfactory, whereas the ECA country missions should be more closely connected with the diplomatic establishments, with considerable leeway from country to country. For otherwise, as time goes on, the friction that has not been altogether absent will become more serious and will be worsened by any expectation of permanence in the arrangement. The report also recommends that "many of the interests of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor can appropriately be met abroad by personnel who are

³² McCamy's distinctive contribution (apart from a good general account of the Foreign Service) lies in tables based upon an analysis of the biographies of 1,315 persons, using that unique publication, the *State Department Register*. Three things impress him: their newness in the Department (in 1948, only 12 per cent had worked there more than 10 years); their relative youth (half of the responsible officers—as McCamy puts it—were between 30 and 40 years of age); and their miscellaneous backgrounds ("One can say that the higher officials of the Department are educated in the sense of having studied in colleges and universities, and that is about all they have in common" [p. 102]).

fully under the permanent jurisdiction of the Department of State; other and more specialized interests should be met by the nomination of qualified individuals for temporary duty abroad under the Department of State with the expectation of eventual return to the nominating agency." When there is further integration under the head of the regular diplomatic establishment, the problem of communication control will largely disappear.

On the more distinctively personnel side of the matter, the Brookings report identifies and describes six major variations in personnel systems now in use for overseas staffs. After surveying the issues and weighing the alternatives, the conclusions stress three working ideals. One ideal is "greater decentralization of personnel authority and responsibility to the agencies responsible for foreign programs . . . coupled with general policy supervision from a central source." This ideal echoes the note so generally and properly voiced nowadays about personnel administration, although it must be harmonized with the need for transferability and the cultivation of government-wide awareness and outlook.³³ The second ideal in the Brookings recommendations is the approval of changes that move toward "the creation of a foreign affairs personnel system inclusive of all, or nearly all, civilian foreign affairs staff at home and abroad." The first stage would bring together the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, the home and overseas staffs of the ECA, and the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense stationed at the diplomatic missions. The third ideal is adequate attention to "program staffing," as distinguished from "career staffing," in view of the importance of operations now and in the foreseeable future. In achieving all these objectives, the immediate stress in the Brookings report is upon improvements by administrative action. In order to help in these adjustments and to formulate new legislation, the report recommends the designation or appointment, within the Executive Office of the President, of an administrative assistant to the President, with a high-quality supporting staff, who would devote himself intensively to the problems of foreign affairs personnel administration for a period of at least one to three years. The unit's future would then be subject to reconsideration, "taking into account such progress as may have occurred in the general development of the central personnel institutions of the Government."

VI

The problems of American foreign affairs administration lie to no small

³³ The clash of values implied above is probably the most troublesome feature of the proposal to develop a unified Foreign Affairs Service *outside* the present civil service system. In facing this issue, the Rowe committee (*op. cit.*, p. 15) points to the need, during the difficult period of transition to a unified system, of "freedom of action greater than is possible under Civil Service rules to build a personnel program to meet the special needs of the Department." Looking ahead, however, it adds hopefully: "If and when an improved Civil Service system provides a personnel framework for the Department of State that permits flexibility and innovation, consideration could be given at that time to including the unified service under the general Civil Service." As to the answer given in other lands, a 1947 survey by the Bureau of the Budget of 34 countries found that, in 29 of them with a combined Foreign Affairs Service, only 6 (England, notably) organized this service outside the general Civil Service.

degree in the fact that so many relations are multilateral and must be pursued through permanent international bodies and "conference diplomacy."³⁴ There is need for more attention in the literature to the ways in which delegations are selected with appropriately balanced memberships and "position papers" are prepared and cleared in the constant flow of instructions, including the use of interdepartmental committees and other devices in reconciling the various claims and in mobilizing the knowledge of the various parts of the State Department and of the government at large.³⁵ This fact emphasizes the value of Walter R. Sharp's study of these processes as they are carried on in fourteen countries.³⁶

The cooperative study of which Sharp's monograph is the culmination, had its source in a UNESCO resolution in 1947 instructing the Director-General "to encourage and assist the study by social scientists in all Member States of the problems which arise within their respective fields from recent developments in international collaboration." It seemed especially appropriate to compare the ways in which the member states administered their participation in international bodies. Walter Sharp, already outstanding for his interest in such matters,³⁷ was put in charge of the undertaking, which, after reports had

³⁴ A useful article by Lincoln Palmer Bloomfield, "The Department of State and the United Nations," *International Organization*, Vol. 4, pp. 400-11 (Aug., 1950), points out that the UN and its specialized agencies "held 428 major meetings last year with approximately 6000 individual sessions, in the great majority of which the U. S. representatives had to be prepared to state their government's position," and that, "in addition to the Department of State, there are at least 24 other agencies of the Executive Branch of the U. S. government directly concerned with U. S. participation in international organizations."

³⁵ Even so excellent and comprehensive a book as McCamy's is regrettably sketchy on actualities of choosing delegations and framing instructions. The problem of interdepartmental committees, of course, is dealt with by all the authors, notably Parks, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-67, and the Brookings report, Ch. 9.

³⁶ *National Administration and International Organization—A Comparative Survey of Fourteen Countries*. By Walter R. Sharp. (Report of an inquiry conducted jointly by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and UNESCO. Brussels. 1951. Pp. 78. \$0.50.) As for the separate national reports on which this monograph is based, permission was given to each national section of the Institute and to each of the other collaborating national groups to make such arrangements for disseminating its report as might be appropriate. That on the United States, by John F. Meck and Louis S. Koenig, was already available in mimeographed form through the Public Administration Clearing House. The first national study to appear in printed form is *United Kingdom Administration and International Organizations. A Report by a Study Group of the Institute of Public Administration*. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. \$0.75.) Studies for the following countries remain in mimeographed form under conditions of doubtful availability: Australia; Austria, by E. Verosta; Belgium, by P. de Visscher; Brazil; Denmark, by F. T. B. Friis; France, by M. Puget; Greece, by M. Dendias; India, by A. Appadorai; Italy, by U. Borsi and R. Monaca; The Netherlands, by D. C. van den Berg; and Switzerland.

³⁷ See Sharp's paper on "National Administration and the United Nations System," in the symposium edited by Rowland Egger and published in 1949 under the title of *International Commitments and National Administration*. See also his paper on "The Scientific Study of International Conferences," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 2, pp. 104-16 (Spring, 1950), in which he stresses the fact that there are "two levels of group

been secured from fourteen countries and after a preliminary discussion at the Eighth International Congress of Administrative Sciences at Florence in the summer of 1950, furnished the basis for the overall analysis. "A major assumption," Sharp remarks in the prefatory note, "underlying the inquiry was that, in a society of cooperating sovereign states, the level of *international* administration can rise no higher than in the level of *national* administration in those states" (p. 8). Incidentally, the information gathered on the structure and methods of foreign offices in other countries helps to fill a gap in the literature,³⁸ although this information is somewhat narrowed by the assigned theme of relationships to international bodies and thinned by the number and variety of the countries covered.

Despite improved clearance among the international bodies in the UN system, Sharp observes two basic difficulties: "(1) the tendency of numerous governments to express different views in different places on related international problems, and (2) the failure of all too many governments to discharge promptly and effectively their substantive obligations as participants in a cooperative international system" (p. 12). The study reveals not only that foreign affairs departments throughout the world have grown greatly in scale and complexity but also that a significant development since 1945 (noted in nine of the fourteen countries) has been the establishment of a unit to handle relations with international organizations. A further observation is that the conduct of foreign affairs "must be considered as an inseparable part of the larger problem of organization for the conduct of national affairs as a whole," since "distinct boundary lines between domestic and international problems no longer exist" and since the foreign ministry, while it "continues, and will continue, to hold a priority position as the principal foreign affairs staff arm for the political executive, . . . can no longer claim a jurisdictional monopoly" (pp. 67-68). The prevailing formula is to "assign to a specified ministry (or service) major responsibility for substantive policy recommendations relating to a given international organization" (p. 25). The study shows how universal is the dependence upon such devices as the interagency committee. Among other suggestions, Sharp drops the remark that "a strong case can also be made for the development of a permanent 'general staff' for international policy within the office of the chief executive—president or prime minister" (p. 68). I am sure the wise author (who has already referred to the foreign ministry as "the principal foreign affairs staff arm for the political executive") knows

discussion associated with intergovernmental conferences: (a) the policy-making officials of the national government must reach a decision on a given problem; and (b) the policy-making international body must also reach a collective decision on the same problem. The complex and subtle factors involved in this dual process constitute an important field for study." A closer view, he thinks, "suggests that the failure of the conference process to produce more constructive results may in part be due to factors in group dynamics concerning which little is now known."

³⁸ Kurt London (with the help of Kent Ives), in *How Foreign Policy is Made* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1949), described rather perfunctorily the foreign affairs departments of Great Britain, France, Nazi Germany, and Russia, though on the last named state the information seemed no later than the 'twenties.

that permanent staff for particular purposes under chief executives is strong medicine which requires a prescription and very exact dosage.

An underlying issue—though the word hardly fits so vague a shading of emphasis—is whether improved coordination in international bodies must be sought within national states or within the UN system itself. The Assembly on more than one occasion has urged the member states to make sure that their right and left hands keep company. A committee of the United States Congress, for its part, has repeatedly chided the UN system for lack of unity. The most recent expression is the fifth report of the subcommittee on relations with international bodies of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.³⁹

Concerned at the cost of the system, and with its anxiety sharpened by its reckoning that for the period 1946–50 the United States contribution “to the United Nations system and emergency relief projects averaged approximately 50 per cent of the total budgets and expenditures of these organizations,” the subcommittee regretted that even after five years “only slight progress appears to have been made with respect to the correction of basic structural weaknesses and deficiencies, duplication and overlapping and proliferation of bodies and commissions.” The waste that the subcommittee believes to exist in over-numerous, useless, or over-lapping projects, so far as the causes are not political and human, is attributed to the decentralized structure of the UN system. The subcommittee offers twelve recommendations. It suggests that “[to provide] authority in the General Assembly to review and modify the budgets of the specialized agencies; to vote these budgets as part of an integrated, consolidated budget for the entire United Nations system; and to strike out items where necessary, would go a long way in eliminating many of the existing weaknesses and deficiencies which are causing waste, duplication, multiplicity, and dispersion of effort and resources” (p. 71). The foregoing items from the subcommittee’s report cannot do justice to its body of fact and to the numerous favorable comments that soften the criticism. Nevertheless, the observer notes that more than two-thirds of the outlay mentioned for the period 1946–1950 was for emergency relief activities, including refugee resettlement, not under permanent UN agencies. Moreover, the sheer number of separate projects listed under these agencies may be due partly to zealous itemization as a measure of responsibility. Duplication (when suspected on the basis of titles) may be more apparent than real. The decentralized UN structure does facilitate functional relations with member states. Besides, there is a reason other than fear of dropping the basket for not putting too many eggs in one; the eggs may break each other if piled too high. It is a bit ironic to find a congressional group pleading for more administrative centralization, although it does so in the name of an Assembly.

³⁹ *United States Relations with International Organizations, V: The Internal Operations of the United Nations and Certain International Organizations in which the United States Participates*. S. Rept. 90. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. The report was prepared by Eli E. Nobleman, counsel. (Feb. 12, 1951. Pp. 114.)

VII

One comes finally to the relations of the branches of government and to the questions of partizanship, secrecy, public understanding, and ultimate popular control which are tangled in these relations.

What is the virtue of the legislative body? Is it to be prized for its responsiveness, or because it can exercise group judgment responsibly but with relative freedom from constituency pressure in foreign affairs? Can it get the facts for a true appraisal of alternatives? Can it keep facts given in confidence? And how necessary, perhaps salutary, is secrecy in the conduct of international dealings? How can the legislature and the executive collaborate under the American form of government? Within a party? Are party competition and the criticism it engenders conducive to public awareness and ultimate control, and therefore desirable even in foreign policy? Or should the collaboration involve both parties? Are bipartizanship and nonpartizanship in foreign affairs synonymous? And, as for popular control, who are the people and how much do they need to know in order to exercise control? Can they be given and can they grasp the facts, including the facts of judgment, necessary for a weighing of alternatives before irrevocable steps are taken? How can criticism after the event be so conducted that, while drawing lessons from failure, it accepts the present and strengthens rather than weakens national character and confidence? And what shall we say of the assumption that active popular control makes for peace amid the nationalistic feeling so marked in the modern world?

Within the last half-year, especially, vast storehouses of raw materials for analysis on these great issues have been laid up in congressional hearings, already or soon to be available, and in the debates, reports and documents.⁴⁰ My approach is in terms of the books already mentioned and others to which I shall refer.

Robert A. Dahl's *Congress and Foreign Policy* is a thoughtful and valuable book, though tentative at many points; one is tempted to say it is tenuous but not thin. It is based upon general observation and theoretical analysis, not on detailed inquiry—apart from some tables about partizan voting on foreign policies, comparative age of committee members and related matters. The texture of ideas is carefully woven; the style is easy and assured. The author constantly suggests more than he treats, withdrawing from his sally to a modest working assumption. This method enables him to show an awareness of underlying issues and long-run possibilities without committing himself to exhaust them. Thus, after dealing with congressmen and their beliefs, he writes: "a solution of the problem of how Congress is to act rationally on foreign policy questions must finally depend upon the extent to which the American political process recruits the more rational, non-compulsive personality types into Congress, rather than the more compulsive, irrational types" (p. 22). He is

⁴⁰ Quite apart from the fires struck by sending ground troops to Europe or recalling a proconsul, the legislative body in all its parts and relationships has become almost constantly involved in foreign affairs through the rise of what Herbert Feis has called "a new diplomacy of the dollar." See his recent book, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar. First Era, 1919-1932*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1950.)

back on safer ground when he adds: "I am inclined to believe, however, that this problem of recruiting the right personality type involves a social process so complex and comprehensive that it is doubtful, paradoxically enough, whether it can be solved at present by any *rational* prescriptions a social scientist can offer, and I do not intend to deal further with it here. I shall simply assume we are going to have Congressmen with a moderate *capacity* for rational behavior."

Dahl offers three well-conceived criteria for evaluating the methods by which public policy decisions are made. The first is the extent to which the process provides responsible leadership, in the sense of leadership that selects policies based upon the preferences of the citizens, or of the preponderant number when there is disagreement.⁴¹ The second criterion is the extent to which the process "facilitates agreement among the citizens of the community"—particularly desirable in foreign policy. The third is the extent to which the modes of decision lead to rational policies, that is, the policies "best designed to achieve the purposes agreed on."

Congress mediates between preferences and reality. The power of the executive-administrative branch lies primarily in its "capacity for influencing the Congressman's picture of international reality" (p. 114). For, unlike the situation in domestic policy, Congress gets its information from those over whom it has little or no control. This condition leads Dahl, in discussing correctives, to play with the dubious idea of requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to report to Congress as well as to the executive. Dahl concludes that, as Congress now plays its role, it "is remarkably ill-suited to exercise a wise control over the nation's foreign policy." Yet he finds this fact no reason why we should accept the trend toward presidential supremacy (a kind of plebiscitary dictatorship, after all), although one must admit that a large measure of discretion "is an ineluctable requirement of survival in modern international politics" (p. 118). The "lonely amateur in the White House" cannot do much more than accept or reject what his advisers bring him. What is needed is "confidence" between the branches of government, and we do not have to import the British Constitution in order to approximate the condition of confidence.

Dahl identifies three prerequisites for a condition of confidence between the executive and the legislature. These are: "techniques for improving Congressional competence in foreign affairs," "a greater measure of party responsibility," and—implied in the other two pre-conditions—collaboration in the formulation of basic policy. The opportunity for improved techniques lies at the crucial points of contact, that is, in the "policy specialists" developed in the committees and in small legislative staffs whose prime contribution is to know what questions to ask. These "policy specialists" perform within Congress the mediating role that Congress as a whole performs for the country. As for

⁴¹ The first criterion, as Dahl states it, almost identifies responsiveness and responsibility. To make this assumption may pass over some important subtleties. Dahl lays the basis for a qualification in a later remark: "Congressmen probably have much more discretion on foreign policy (at least within a very wide range of alternatives) than is often supposed" (p. 44).

party responsibility, the hope is made more realistic by the "tendency toward the development of parties aligned more nearly along lines of class and status" (p. 196). Collaboration, as Dahl sees it, does not necessarily mean bipartizanship, nor nonpartizanship, for "there are issues of foreign policy on which the parties are bound to take opposing stands; and this should not prevent collaboration between the President and his own party members in Congress" (p. 211). Indeed, Dahl reports with essential approval that "if we examine 26 important issues of foreign policy on which record votes were taken in Congress during the years 1933-48, we find that for a nation supposedly lacking in 'responsible parties,' a significant degree of party unity exists on important issues of foreign policy" (p. 46).

The extent of party cohesion on foreign policy is examined by George L. Grassmuck in a study of roll calls between 1921 and 1941.⁴² His focus is the assumption that "when party unity does break down, the cause is usually sectionalism." Despite many variants, increased by the tendency of Congress to vote on measures piecemeal, Grassmuck finds that "the importance of party is emblazoned in the attitudes expressed through roll call voting on foreign affairs questions." A major cause is the extent to which the party's welfare is at stake in the President's prestige. The normally leaderless position of the minority party may invite more dispersal in its ranks.

As a matter of fact, many sectional factors coincide with, rather than criss-cross, the role of the parties. On the other hand, pressures in foreign policy may come from groups that have little or no geographical concentration; their interest may be non-economic; the content may be ideological. Dahl, though he finds much party cohesion, also declares that "a large part of the history of American foreign policy since the First World War might be interpreted as a series of successful intimidations by pressure groups, of victories that occurred while the parties cautiously shadowboxed at a safe distance from the real conflict" (p. 54). Case studies of such pressures are undoubtedly needed to trace influence through its continuum, to use a word of the hour. The case approach is illustrated in Fred W. Riggs' account of the repeal of Chinese exclusion.⁴³ He does not exaggerate when he writes that "precise understanding of the manner in which Congress functions . . . becomes a matter of prime importance for the serious student of foreign policy." In point of dynamics, the issue he studies turned mainly on the role of a small and temporary catalytic group working in an already favorably predisposed situation—typical enough but not a major setting.

McCamy, in his chapter on Congress, resembles Dahl in cheerfully approving partizanship except during war.⁴⁴ Indeed, McCamy (writing without benefit of

⁴² *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*. By George L. Grassmuck. The Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Political Science. Series 68, No. 3. (Still in press as this article is written.)

⁴³ *Pressures on Congress—A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion*. By Fred W. Riggs. (New York: Kings Crown Press. 1950.)

⁴⁴ From the standpoint of the ideal of an integration of congressional advice, initiative, and good will in an Administration policy, an outstanding success-story remains the rela-

a crystal ball) chides the Republican Party because it resigned "from its duty to question proposals" of the Administration and "thus deprived the mass public of its protection from the possible abuse of executive power" (p. 345). He sees popular government in danger when politics stop, even in foreign policy. The executive has most of the information; it is the duty of the opposition party "to ask questions and challenge assumptions before reaching its decision to agree." McCamy also points out that "whatever disability is now forced upon Congress by its removal from the data of foreign relations should be offset by the demanding questions that can be suggested only by a tough-minded, independent, and experienced staff serving the members of Congress" (p. 345). There is a trace of inconsistency in his treatment as a whole, however. For, though he talks of party, mentions an opposition, and assumes the motivation of competitive politics, he also stresses and extolls the congressional tradition of fierce individualism and the "unique American practice of debating as individuals" (p. 342). The inconsistency, I suppose, is in the situation, not in the author.

The reference to congressional individualism invites me to borrow the wit and wisdom of Don K. Price from the lecture and memorandum he contributed to a cooperative study of foreign policy machinery prepared under the direction of William Y. Elliott and the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation.⁴⁵

tions of the branches of the government in preparing for and entering the United Nations. The steps are meticulously recounted, including mention of (but without stress on) congressional contacts, in the State Department's bulky publication, *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*. Written largely by Harley N. Notter. Publication 3580, *General Foreign Policy Series*, No. 15. (Dated 1949, released Feb., 1950. Pp. ix, 726. \$2.25.) Phases of the same story, approached from the angle of the State Department's relatively novel, organized, two-way attention to public relations, are examined critically but sympathetically in a monograph entitled *The Department of State, The Public, and the United Nations Concept, 1939-1945*. By Wilbur Edel. (A dissertation completed in 1951, still unpublished but available through the Columbia University Library.) A convenient record of the text of various congressional resolutions, in their setting among other historic texts, is S. Doc. 123. 81st Cong., 1st sess. Entitled *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941-1949*. Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State. (1950. Pp. xiv, 1381.)

⁴⁵ The Woodrow Wilson Foundation in March, 1950, set up a study group in the broad area of American foreign policy, to consider, as the resolution put it, "the problem of how the structure and practices of our government might be improved to permit the full discharge of American responsibilities and obligations in interrelated domestic and international affairs." In their first year, the group was to explore, for still further study, problems in the conduct of foreign policy arising from the basic structure of the government, with stress upon the issues posed for political theory. The inquiry was put in charge of William Y. Elliott, as chairman, in association with George F. Kennan, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and Don K. Price. This group has planned three publications. One is a summary of the group discussions, to be prepared by Elliott. A second will be a published version of his public lecture, under the foundation's auspices, on the question "How can we have effective coordination for foreign policy under the Constitution of the United States?" The third, a companion lecture delivered by Price, has already been issued, under the title of *The New Dimension of Diplomacy: The Or-*

In the lecture, now available as a pamphlet, Price says that "It is hard to get a unified policy in the United States less because the Congressmen are against the President, than because they are against each other" (p. 23). He pushes his point further, in his unpublished memorandum, by asking "whether our national policy lacks coordination more because of disagreement over policy between the President and the Congress, or because of the many other types of internal checks and balances that we have built into our legislative and administrative system—and which manifest themselves in disagreement between the House and the Senate, among Congressional committees, between lawyers and administrators in a typical bureau, or between executive departments and administrative regulatory agencies." A consequence, he adds, is that "this variety of checks and balances, of course, makes it possible for a legislative opposition to defeat a policy, not by direct argument against it, but by crippling its administration." Our trouble, he maintains at another point, is not that the legislature is against the executive, "but that the people—and especially the important people—are against the government." Amid this undertow, Price puts his reliance—in providing the necessary unifying force in the government as a whole—upon the President's "freedom of action to propose a policy to the country regardless of the willingness of his party leadership to support his views."⁴⁶

The legislature is pictured by Dahl, as I have noted, as an intermediary between preferences and reality, aided by an internal mediation accomplished through a few especially informed committee members and staff. Gabriel A. Almond's book on *The American People and Foreign Policy* expands the idea, though in different terms, to cover the whole field of public opinion and popular control in foreign policy. Much of his book is an essay on social theory; much

ganization of the U. S. Government for Its New Role in World Affairs. (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation. June, 1951. Pp. 29.)

⁴⁶ In his published lecture, Price indicates why most of the proposals for reform in our constitutional system seem to him irrelevant. He fears their effect upon "the one aspect of our Constitution that provides coordination and stability and protects the two-party system—the direct election and direct responsibility of the President" (p. 29). Meanwhile, certain essential ingredients of responsibility lie beyond constitutional structure. They include "a trained and disciplined group of administrators who are interested in general policy rather than in the purposes of their own bureaus or agencies, and a system of discipline within the Congress which would shape the legislative program into a coherent whole, and curb the irresponsibility of Congressional committees" (p. 27). William Y. Elliott's sense of the logic of a constitutional system (even though he might not approve it as it stands) was illustrated in his paper on "Congressional Control over Foreign Policy," in the 1949 symposium on *International Commitments and National Administration*, where he said: "There is also a definite limitation on the operation of a bipartisan foreign policy when it comes to setting up by statute, as has been proposed, a joint executive-legislative council in which Congress would choose the advisers whom it wishes the President to consult and would demand that he make available to them at every stage the most secret negotiations of this government and his full foreign policy plans." Elliott's preliminary study paper in the Woodrow Wilson Foundation group stressed a number of practical suggestions for better relations between the branches under the present constitutional pattern. I do not know whether in the published lecture he will give rein to his impatience with the pattern itself.

of it is an attempt also to show the fluctuating moods derived from the American tradition and the attitudes on foreign affairs of certain groups. I am concerned with his main theme. I find it essentially hopeful. Almond does not set the impracticable standards that cause many who attack iron laws of oligarchy in the name of such standards to end in a hopelessness that others can turn into an apology for almost any kind of fix. It is true that the polls on foreign affairs show a degree of factual ignorance and indifference which are very disturbing, even when one properly discounts the importance of scraps of information.⁴⁷ Even more disturbing is the degree of "privatization" (Almond's borrowed term) among the masses, with attendant feelings of helplessness and distrust. In considering the favorable side, Almond distinguishes the "general public," the "attentive public," and the "policy and opinion elites, the articulate policy-bearing stratum of the population which gives structure to the public, and which provides the effective means of access to the various groupings" (p. 138). The democratic prerequisites, he argues quite cogently, are formal opportunity for mass participation, autonomy and competition among the elites, and an attentive public before whom they carry on their controversies.

I do not think it is squeamishness that makes me wish, even when I follow the thought in its hopeful bearing, that there was another word than elite. Perhaps someday we shall need to discard the Aristotles who have helped the Renaissance of our social sciences but who, having liberated us, may yet limit us; maybe we should begin soon by dropping some words. Almond, I hurry to say, explains the meaning of elites in a democratic setting. There is good sense and no negation of democracy, although excusable over-simplification, in his remark that "what broke the hold of the older and grosser forms of urban political corruption was the rise of effective civic elites capable of competing with the politicians, and the broadening of the attentive public through educational opportunities and rising standards of living" (p. 228). In the field of foreign policy, Almond's belief that the effective approach to public information is "selective and qualitative" is shown, for example, in the importance he attaches to an increased use by the great interest groups of staff members who give trained attention to foreign affairs. The groups would not rise above self-interest; but the enlightenment of self-interest is constructive when the need, as in foreign policy crucially, is to see the relevance of distant, indirect, and long-run factors.

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⁴⁷ Almond writes: "Suppose all adult Americans knew the name of their Secretary of State, could locate Iran on a blank map, could identify the raw materials from which fissionable materials are derived, and could list the permanent members of the Security Council in alphabetical order, could they then make a sound decision whether military aid under the North Atlantic Pact, should be a billion dollars or a billion and half? This approach to the problem of public information operates on a kind of 'Quiz Kids' standard" (*op. cit.*, p. 230).

BOOK REVIEWS

The Nineteen Fifties Come First. BY EDWIN G. NOURSE. (New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1951. Pp. 184. \$2.00.)

Mr. Nourse's book will attract readers on many scores.

To seekers after sensationalism, it is another addition to the fifty-foot shelf of books written by high government officials after leaving office. To these, however, it is bound to be a great disappointment. There are few, if any, overtones of pique, and there is no interest in "telling all."

For those concerned with economic analysis, it has a particular interest, not only because of Nourse's reputation among economists and his deft essay-writing style, but also because of his clear presentation of a point of view that might be described as "enlightened conservatism."

For those interested in the political science problems involved in translating economic theory into action, the book is of particular importance because it puts into words a point of view on the relationship between politics and economics which is shared by many, but is seldom so fully expressed. Since I regard this point of view as one that has been insufficiently discussed, I shall confine my further comments to this aspect of the book.

Nourse's point of view on the problem of obtaining action on economic problems can be summarized in three closely-related points.

First of all, he believes that economists can provide objective analyses to guide those who are seeking answers to questions of public policy. True economics "knows no party line." Just as other sciences have helped businessmen to reduce waste, cut costs, and produce better products, the social sciences offer tools for solving social problems in an objective fashion. Economists cannot do this alone. They must enter into cooperative relations with political scientists and public administrators. But these groups can then present the fruits of their cooperative analysis to those in positions of power over our social problems. To assist in this effort, the Council of Economic Advisers should serve as "a sort of scientific clearing house" in the executive branch, and the Joint Committee on the Economic Report should be "a somewhat comparable one in the Congress."

Second, Nourse regards politics as something that can and must be kept apart from economics. He believes that economists go beyond their proper field if they undertake "political synthesis"—to use a term from a recent Nourse article.¹ In discussing agricultural legislation, Nourse tells how group pressure on behalf of seven major political crops—corn, wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, hogs, and milk—were the determining factors. It was the political log-rolling by the representatives of these various crops which undermined the functioning of the first Federal Farm Board. This broke down the "old ideal" of economic adjustment and led instead to political subsidy. The Brannan Plan is also "political tinkering with farm support legislation." What we need is a "return from

¹ "Economic Analysis and Political Synthesis," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (1950).

political agrarianism to pure agricultural adjustment." He also regards with a disapproving eye the increasing political activity of organized labor. "Can organized labor invoke political power to manipulate economic controls," he asks, "without itself falling a victim to those controls?" Our greatest hope of surmounting our problems, Nourse urges us to believe, "depends upon our ability to work out social scientific solutions rather than fumbling among the expedencies of politics."

Third, Nourse places great emphasis on the need for self-discipline by the leaders of private groups. He states that we will not escape the dangers confronting us "unless all parties to our national life accept the economic realities of today and abate their claims, if necessary, to bring them within these limitations." The leaders of business and labor organizations must make "wise administrative decisions." This means "mutually-related decisions—decisions which relate wages both to productivity and to consumers' purchasing power, and which relate prices both to operating costs and investment needs and to the absorptive capacity of the market." The use of any group's economic or political power to "hold up" a company treasury or the public treasury is self-defeating. A vital point in "the code of successful freedom" is that the economic men who live under a system of free government "will not struggle for maximum acquisition by fair means or foul," but rather will "seek to make their best contribution to maximize total production, and then will co-operate in the patterns of distribution that will do most to keep the productive processes going with both vigor and efficiency."

Each of these three points deserves careful attention. Each of them, while meritorious in some respects and inadequate in others, has important implications for future creative work in political science, economics, and social science as a whole.

1. *Economics and Objectivity.* Can economists, as Nourse suggests, provide objective analyses to guide those who must make decisions on problems of public policy?

In one respect, Nourse's affirmative answer to this question has a high degree of validity. Economists have demonstrated during the last two decades that they can perform tremendously useful services through the preparation of reasonably objective analyses of economic processes and developments. They have developed concepts which serve as valuable tools in approaching the "big blooming, buzzing confusion" of modern society and rendering it more understandable. The rather elementary tool kit of the 19th century economists has been deeply enriched by concepts which have led to a broadening area of agreement on descriptions of economic developments within and among the nations of the world.

An obvious illustration of the progress that has been made toward more objective and useful descriptions of economic developments is the work that Nourse and his fellow members of the Council of Economic Advisers established on a firm foundation during his three years as first Council Chairman. Every month the Council prepares "Economic Indicators," which presents charts,

tables, and captions involving a strictly limited amount of interpretation, in terms that have made it acceptable as a basic source of facts for use by Congressmen of both parties and by business, labor, and farm organizations. In the Council's annual and midyear economic reviews, which are transmitted to Congress together with the President's semi-annual Economic Reports, one finds an elaborate presentation of facts plus an intensive analysis of their meaning. This material also, with occasional exceptions, has been increasingly regarded as objective by persons with sharply conflicting social viewpoints—despite the fact that it is accompanied by controversial policy proposals. Further, this work is not limited to the description of isolated facts. Through the development and regular use of the "Nation's Economic Budget" concept, an adaptation of social accounting which provides a method of synthesizing important information on both private and public receipts and expenditures, great strides have been made in developing an overall analysis of the total production of goods and services throughout the country.

Even in the field of description, however, it must be kept in mind that personal values and allegiances also affect one's approach. In the physical sciences it has been recognized that value judgments enter into the selection of the scientific field to be cultivated, the statement of the problem, and the shaping of the concepts and definitions that make fact-gathering possible. As Einstein and Infeld have pointed out, "Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world." These concepts are the speculative creations of minds with recognized or unrecognized personal attitudes, preconceptions, and interests. In the field of the social sciences a still sharper qualification must be registered with respect to the objectivity of descriptive analysis. Some facts are invaluable weapons in social combat. Others are useful to no one. When only a few facts are used in descriptive work, subjective elements inevitably enter into the process of selection. When a comprehensive analysis of facts is undertaken, subjective elements inevitably assist in shaping the interpretation—although the extent to which this occurs is often masked by "the pseudo-objective terminology of economics."

Once an economist moves from the description of what "is" or "has been" to the prescription of what "should be," he enters an area where objectivity (if objectivity is used to mean that competent economists can agree and that disagreement is the result of ignorance or error) is impossible. Here normative judgments dominate. Here personality traits and social values and allegiances help determine the importance that one gives to varying objectives and approaches. This is another of the many reasons (in addition to the unequal distribution of mental inventiveness, varying tactical judgments, the bias created by subject matter specialization and the sweet delights so often found in disagreement for its own sake) why competent, well-informed economists who can often reach substantial agreement on certain statements of fact so often disagree violently on matters of public policy. This is why any "machinery of economic jurisprudence," wistfully mentioned by Nourse in passing, can be no

more objective than the wild morass of jurisprudence in the public utility field and similar realms of social conflict.

One of the difficulties in a discussion of "objectivity" is that the term lends itself to ambiguous use. At times, as in the preceding paragraph, it is used to refer to possibilities of agreement among competent observers. It is in this sense that Nourse seems to use the term. But the term can also be used to describe a quality of mind. In this sense an objective economist is one who reacts skeptically to the first set of facts that he finds and his first bright thoughts. He tries to look at the whole picture and to protect against automatic responses. In this sense of the term a truly objective economist is above all, one who frankly attempts to recognize his own biases and ethical values instead of trying to convince himself that he has none.² It is in this sense that nine objective judges can reach a 5-to-4 decision. In the same sense, the economists of the National Association of Manufacturers and those employed by the Congress of Industrial Organizations may be relied upon by their superiors and associates as objective economists. But their objectivity does not imply that, as economists, they can agree with each other on matters of public policy. In fact, their objectivity makes them more valuable aides in the prosecution of disputes between the two organizations—just as capable military technicians on both sides can help two opposing armies wipe out each other.

There is no doubt that in many situations the effective use of the skills of economists can eliminate disagreeable conflicts or pave the road toward the adjustment of specific disputes. It is also true that in many instances these same economic skills serve as weapons that help to intensify group or international combat. To expect that economics can develop to a point where competent professional economists can agree on matters of public policy is to set a totally unrealistic standard. The differences on public policy that have always existed and that exist today between competent professional economists are deeply imbedded in the growth of society. The history of economic thought has always been a process of development and redevelopment of divergent social values. The great economists of the past—from Adam Smith to John Maynard Keynes—have all been protagonists of one or another social viewpoint and have all used economics as a method not only of description, but also of indicating, however indirectly, the kind of world they would wish to live in. No great economist or school of great economists will ever come forth to usher in a millennium of objectivity, unless it serves a dominant group which uses the revolver or the gas chamber to suppress divergent conclusions.

Of course, there is the argument that a truly objective economist should advise on public policy by saying, "If you adopt Course A, the results will be

² This type of self-recognition is essential not only to the development of a scientific attitude, but also to one's peace of mind. Arthur Bentley has made the point well: "Knowledge of our group attachments and their relativities—that, and that alone, can give us the greater approximations to virile peace which is what we all most crave, and of what we all most despair in the hidden parts of our lives, while our values are given us in darkness" (*Relativity in Man and Society* [New York, 1926], p. 199).

so-and-so; if you adopt Course B, the results will be this-and-that; so you just take your choice." Many social scientists sincerely believe they would act in this fashion. But they seldom do. When called upon to advise on public policy, their adoption of this approach amounts to a refusal to advise; the judgment which is sought is withheld. Or else this approach turns out to be a persuasive method of indicating that one course of action is the greater evil and the other a lesser evil. This is an extremely effective method of giving advice, but its value does not confer upon it any dispassionate objectivity. Moreover, the idea that objective methods can be used to indicate the probable consequences of a given action is far less applicable to social relationships than it is in the physical sciences. Under controlled conditions the total result of pulling the trigger of a loaded gun can be rather well predicted. In social relationships, however, where one must appraise the shifting strategies and tactics of competing groups and individuals, the total result of pulling the trigger on a given expenditure of government funds can scarcely be appraised except from the vantage point of where an individual stands in the structure of social values and personal allegiances.

2. *Economics and Politics*. What about Nourse's idea that the economic analysis of public policy problems should be separated from political analysis?

The merits of Nourse's approach depend upon what one means by the term "politics." "Politics" is often used as a term of opprobrium. Just as "scientific" and "objective" are used to indicate high quality goods, the label "political" indicates shoddy merchandise. If you like it, it is economics; if you don't, it is politics. And the application of the label brings in overtones of corruption, scurrility, and the sacrifice of moral values in a frantic scramble to entice an extra vote. This is a form of name-calling which is good sport and is frequently indulged in by many professionals, economists more liberal and more conservative than Nourse, and politicians of all stripes.

But when one leaves semantics aside, it becomes rather obvious that any economist who proposes answers to public policy problems must make judgments which are essentially political, or at any rate must accept the political judgments of others.

A conclusion on what is "desirable" is essentially a value judgment. Any such judgment inevitably locates the judge at some point in the political process of struggle and adjustment between competing groups and individuals. The fact that it may be regarded as a constructive middle course, let us say, between the views of a business group and a labor group does not make it any the less political. Most political conflict in America, as in any country without rigid class stratifications, centers upon conflicting "middle ways" and contending mediators.

The judgment of what is "feasible" brings one even more directly into political analysis. If one is to recommend policies that will enjoy a degree of acceptance, he must appraise group reactions and the possibilities of achieving a consensus of some sort through the democratic processes of give-and-take and mutual adjustment. Whether this appraisal is oriented toward the legislative,

administrative, judicial, or electoral processes, or a combination of them all, it is essentially a political analysis. The economist who claims he doesn't think in these terms is either deluding himself or using salesmanship technique in the effort to sell his wares. The economist who says "I recommend X on economic grounds, but recognize that Y is politically necessary," is merely using these terms to indicate that he regards X as desirable and Y as feasible. Both judgments contain political elements.

If one has no concern whatsoever with whether his advice can have any acceptance, he need not consciously consider the question of feasibility. Indeed, there are some who conceive of economic analysis purely as a form of self-expression and take an inverted, almost masochistic form of pleasure in voicing advice which is always ignored. Even this, however, is a "feasibility test" in reverse.

It is certainly true that many economists do a crude and unworkmanlike job in analyzing the feasibility of their proposals. To regard political analysis as something which should be separated from economics will not push it out of the picture; it will merely make the political analysis still more the product of unchecked and uninformed hunches. If economists are to be of greater service in advising on public policy, they must recognize frankly the inseparability of economic and political analysis and gird themselves to do a better job.

Despite Nourse's critical attitude toward political economics, he has in actuality made a major contribution toward the development of the social sciences by helping to put more politics into economics. After writing his classic volume *America's Capacity to Produce* (1933), he then turned to the analysis of price policy in terms which recognized more fully than had any previous economist the positive role of various types of business organizations and business leadership (*Industrial Price Policies and Economic Progress*, in 1938; *Price Making in a Democracy*, in 1944). He has frequently recommended joint research undertakings by economists and political scientists. He has called for cooperative relationships between "sister disciplines."

Yet much more needs to be done. At present, the theoretical cleavage between economic and political science might be likened to the predicament of the biologists if they tried to understand birth by concentrating on the female's role alone and insisting that the contribution of the male was something to be studied by devotees of an allied discipline. Cooperation between economics and political science can never be very fruitful without a merger or synthesis of the two at the level of basic theories of social relations. One or more such theories are probably already in the making. Many economists are learning to deal squarely and acutely with problems of power and organization. Many political scientists have travelled far beyond a formalistic approach to government and are dealing directly with the substantive content of economic problems and decisions. It is my personal view that the most useful theory of social relations would be one which, after clearing away the wreckage of Marxism (the last ambitious attempt to theorize in this field), deals directly

with the role of organization, leadership, strategy, and tactics in the production and distribution of wealth and power.

3. *Self-discipline by Group Leaders*. What about Nourse's emphasis on the role of self-discipline on the part of group leaders?

There is a considerable amount of merit in this approach, and Nourse's emphasis on self-discipline is a welcome antidote to the individualistic credo of "the devil take the hindmost." It stands out in sharp contrast to the so-called "realism" of those who pride themselves on their obedient conformance to dominant pressures. It contributes toward the burial of the ridiculous idea that men's actions in economic affairs are guided by the "profit motive" alone, and suggests the need for considering man's motivation as a whole and for giving proper attention to the "power motive" and associated objectives of status, deference, approval and security. It recognizes that persuasion and exhortation are themselves weapons in the arsenal of power.

Above all, Nourse's approach emphasizes the interests that different groups have in common. It stresses the need for more unified action at a time in our history when, more than ever before, disunity could contribute to our physical destruction.

"The world," wrote Henry Demarest Lloyd many decades ago, "is too full of amateurs who can play the golden rule as an aria with variations. All the runs and trills and transpositions have been done to death. . . ." One variation is the theme that science, reason, or intelligence will somehow lead mankind to salvation. Another lies in the theme that we need a moral regeneration on the part of the individual, or that we need more people with "mature minds." These runs and trills, though done to death, will never see the grave. They are pleasant sources of hope in a world which suffers from a shortage of this vital commodity. They are useful background music in the advocacy of either weaker or stronger government.

Yet the insufficiency of these approaches leaves one hanging in mid-air. Upon laying Nourse's book down, one cannot help but ask, "How does he expect to obtain this moderation and self-restraint on the part of group leaders?" While an ungenerous reader might find that the answer is "by getting more people to read my book and books like it," the fact of the matter is that Nourse does not even come close to attempting an answer. "Education" is another answer that will come to the minds of many readers. But again, probably realizing that education is something undertaken by all influential groups and is a weapon available to both devils and angels, Nourse avoids a facile answer.

Perhaps some day Nourse will help his readers climb down from the suspended position in which he has left them. To do this would require a broad recognition of the interrelations between pressure and persuasion, between compulsion and voluntarism. It would require an examination of the conditions under which self-restraint by group leaders can come into being. One major factor is the existing pattern of distribution of wealth and power. Glaring

disparities with respect to these factors tend to produce immoderate demands and emotional attitudes along the lines of "the public be damned" or "we have nothing to lose but our chains." A second factor is the development of activities to change this pattern, whether through the organization of coalitions and combinations, the creation and administration of government programs, or appeals to the electorate. It seems to this reviewer that an analysis of this type, which frankly recognizes that economics can be only partially objective and that economic and political analysis must be brought closer together through comprehensive (and competing) theories of social relations, is needed to understand the conditions under which Nourse's goal of self-discipline can be obtained.

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Monopoly and Free Enterprise. By GEORGE W. STOCKING AND MYRON W. WATKINS. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1951. Pp. xv, 596. \$4.00.)

This volume concludes the Cartels and Monopoly Survey begun a few years ago by a special research staff commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund. The completed survey includes three volumes by Stocking and Watkins: *Cartels in Action*, a factual account of the origins and operations of cartel arrangements in eight industrial fields; *Cartels or Competition?*, an examination of the historical development of the whole cartel movement; and *Monopoly and Free Enterprise*, a description of the structure of the American economy and the ways in which effective competition has been limited by business practice and legislation.

The authors of this study had four major objectives: first, to relate the concentration of economic power to the theory, practice, and future of "free enterprise"; second, to show "how the free play of competitive forces has actually been limited by American business concerns and, in certain fields, by legislation"; third, to assess the economic and social effects of these developments; and, fourth, to analyze governmental action which either curbs or sanctions monopolistic practices. The authors are ardent advocates of free, private enterprise. Their basic assumption, at least by implication, is the unique relationship between private enterprise and democratic society. They argue that a democratic society can afford to entrust to private enterprise the basic economic functions of allocating resources, organizing production, distributing income, and promoting technological progress, only if private enterprise is genuinely free and competitive. The fundamental issue of economic organization in the United States is said to be between "more or less governmental control."

The most useful portions of the book for political scientists are those which summarize the current state of economic theory and knowledge about the changing structure of the American economy, the workings of imperfect competition, and those practices of the business community, including price leadership, basing point pricing, and trade association activity, which inhibit

or limit effective competition. These sections are primarily descriptive rather than analytical. The portions of the book devoted to an appraisal of the economic and social effects of concentration of economic power are more superficial.

For the political scientist, the most striking feature of this study is the failure of the authors to go beyond the confines of the traditional antimonopoly frame of reference in exploring the ramifications of antitrust policy. The authors carefully document most statements dealing with economic data but make unsupported, sweeping judgments about the American national character (p. 16), American hostility to concentration of economic power (p. 256), and the weaknesses of American regulation of business.

The rather cavalier attitude toward the materials studied by political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists is symptomatic of the essential weakness of the traditional approach of economic advocates of free competition to the study of monopoly and concentration of economic power. This approach is basically nonpolitical in character, and is marked by an uncritical acceptance of certain alleged truisms about the nature of democracy, reluctance to go beyond official documents in analyzing the role of the courts, the administrative agencies, the presidency, and the Congress in government regulation of business, and a failure to utilize scholarly materials which do not fit easily into the traditional frame of reference of the student of monopoly.

More specifically, democracy tends to be equated here with a minimum of governmental control; hence, expanding governmental powers are regarded as probably authoritarian. In the face of the universal contemporary trend toward more collectivism, the advocacy of free enterprise as an alternative to more governmental control assumes a note of tragedy. In addition the study never comes to grips with the relation between economic concentration and political power. In discussing the evolution of antimonopoly policy, the study summarizes the leading cases but never suggests that the role of the judiciary has been to rationalize and justify the *status quo*. The internal operations of the independent regulatory commissions are largely ignored. In describing the movement toward greater concentration of economic control, the discussion runs in terms of traditional economic measurements of the presence or absence of competition and monopoly and betrays no recognition of the broader significance of group organization in modern industrial society. Trade associations, for example, are described primarily in terms of those functions and activities which tend to lessen competition and also as private governments established to maintain a system of security against economic interlopers. The relative inability of Congress to clarify the public policy of antimonopoly is not touched upon. In discussing the basing point problem, there is no reference to Earl Latham's articles, and the sections on incorporation policy are not enriched by the work of Hartz, the Handlins, and Cadman on the experience of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey in regulating corporate enterprise. The authors' comments on the enforcement of antitrust statutes indicate no awareness of the problem of "white collar crime," as discussed by Edwin H.

Sutherland's study. Benjamin Twiss's book, *Lawyers and the Constitution*, might have been used to advantage in explaining "how laissez-faire came to the Supreme Court." The Hoover Commission reports and the studies of the Task Force on Independent Regulatory Commissions were not used to throw light on the current operations of the FTC, SEC, and other commissions.

The authors state that "the hostility of the American people to concentration of economic power, whether public or private, is profound" (p. 256). Yet they do not explain why this profound interest never resulted in a prison sentence for a convicted violation of the Sherman Act, nor do they explain why profound interest can exist side-by-side with "popular apathy" in respect to establishing "the conditions in which competition can regulate the economy" (pp. 517-18).

Three solutions to the problem of economic organization are set forth by the authors: business syndicalism; administrative regulation of monopolized industry; and more vigorous enforcement of the antitrust statutes. Business syndicalism is rejected on the ground that it will legalize monopoly under private control, while government regulation is rejected because it will legalize monopoly under ineffective public control. The alternative to private and public regulation of monopoly is the maintenance of effective competition, fostered by vigorous enforcing of antitrust laws, by preventing the mergers of competing businesses, by federal incorporation of companies doing business in interstate commerce, by limiting the use of the holding company, by encouraging commodity standardization and compulsory labelling or grading of certain merchandise and commodities, by fostering capital mobility through the use of monetary and fiscal powers, by reforming patent laws, by making labor more mobile, by eliminating agricultural price controls, and by repealing of laws, such as the Reed-Bulwinkle and the Miller-Tydings Acts, which legalize collective action to control markets. The authors do not seem to recognize that their proposals for fostering more competition call for a high degree of governmental activity and therefore do not meet their objective of reducing government control over the economy. It might be appropriate to suggest a rereading of Henry Simons's masterful essay on "A Positive Program for Laissez Faire" in his *Economic Policy for a Free Society*.

Some recent studies by psychologists and others raise interesting questions about the unique identification of democracy and effective competition. In an essay entitled "The Cost of Competition," Lawrence K. Frank suggests that economic competition tends to stereotype economic activity and stylize the life of the competitor and his family. Frank states that "success in competitive striving necessitates a rigid conformity to the design for living that each competitive group has adopted as its ritual" and that "with each step up the ladder of success, the regimentation of the individual and his family becomes more intense and coercive." As a society, we may find that the result of competitive rivalry in business is not the minimization of coercive controls but the gradual abandonment of individuality and the increase of pressures making for conformity.

Finally, this study does not seem to throw any new light on the relationship of government to economic life. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that economists concerned with public economic policy must deal with political forces and administrative devices as well as economic data; at the same time, political scientists, who devote attention to the relations of government to economic life, need to understand the nature and structure of the economy in addition to the operation and behavior of the political community.

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The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, 1950: Volume 1, A Water Policy for the American People; Volume 2, Ten Rivers in America's Future; and Volume 3, Water Resources Law. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1950. Pp. ix, 445; xx, 801; xviii, 777. \$3.25; \$6.00; \$2.25.)

The *Report* of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission is courageous—the product of a commission of hardy men who look forward with confidence to “up-building America.” These men, when they detect obstacles to further sound expansion of resources use, seek and find detours around these obstacles. They never erect a “Stop” sign, and hardly ever post a “Proceed with Extreme Caution.” As such, the *Report* is necessarily the product of an *ad hoc* committee; it could never have come, for example, from the President's Budget Bureau.

The national objectives of a water policy for the American people, as seen by Morris Cooke, Leland Olds, Gilbert White, Sam Morris, Paul Burgess, Lewis Jones, and Ronald Renne are:

The safeguarding of our heritage of useful resources against deterioration from careless use or neglect, thus preventing the ultimate decline of our productivity at the very time when we require an expanding base. . . .

The improvement of this heritage and its higher utilization in order to provide, through increasing production of land and water resources, a broader base for a steadily expanding national economy. . . .

The development of balanced regional economies, with particular emphasis on those which are characterized by low economic opportunity . . .

In the light of these national objectives, the President's Commission has approved a water policy in seventy recommendations; it has supported these recommendations with three heavy volumes whose titles and lengths are indicated in the heading of this review. It is a temptation, indeed, to discuss critically the Commission's important policy proposals. But most students of government and administration are likely to be more interested in the relation of the water *Report* to the proposals of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch.

In establishing the Water Policy Commission, President Truman directed that it “confine its recommendations to questions of [water] policy,” because the Hoover Commission had already made “a detailed and comprehensive study of the organizational issues involved in the water resources field.” Thus,

when the Cooke Commission evaluated water developments in the Tennessee Valley, it shied away from any commitments on the organizational advantages of the valley authority. Except for its reticence on the valley authority, however, the Commission appears to have jumped with both feet right into the center of the controversies on organization. And avid proponents of the Hoover Commission's proposals will conclude that the Water Commission has weakened or even "crossed-up" the Hoover group.

The Hoover Commission proposed, it will be recalled, that the water resources functions of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Interior (Bureau of Reclamation and various Interior power agencies) be consolidated in a Water Development and Use Service and that this Service be organized within the Department of Interior or, as three commissioners urged, within a new Department of Natural Resources. It recommended further that a review and coordinating board for resources projects be established in the Executive Office of the President.

The Hoover Commission's Task Force on Natural Resources and, presumably, the Commission itself were at first hesitant to propose transfer of Engineer Corps functions because of anticipated political repercussions. They concluded nonetheless that: "Painful as the operation may be, the case for a unification of functions of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation is so overwhelming that it ought to be effected without further delay" (Commission Report on *Department of Interior*, p. 33).

Significantly, two of the arguments which appear to have been most persuasive on the Task Force and Hoover Commission were these: first, it was argued that, without basic reorganization, inter-agency coordination and co-operation have not worked, and will not work. In the words of the Commission:

The [interagency] committees have failed to solve any important aspects of the problem . . . because the dominant members, the Corps and the Bureau, have been unwilling to permit inter-agency committees to settle their differences. . . . There is simply no escaping the fact that so long as the present overlapping of functions exists . . . , costly duplication, confusion, and competition are bound to result. *It has been demonstrated time and again that neither by voluntary cooperation nor by executive coordination can the major conflicts be ironed out.*¹

Second, it was maintained that, without basic reorganization, desirable decentralization has not, and cannot, be obtained. To quote:

The Committee feels that the unfortunate results of divided responsibility have been intensified by the necessity of referring disputes to Washington for settlement. . . . This defect impedes cooperative relations with other federal agencies and with state and local authorities, and has constituted an obstacle to basin-wide water planning and development.²

Yet the Cooke Commission, which was not to deal with organizational matters, has proposed as an alternative to the Hoover scheme that the present

¹ Commission report on *Department of Interior*, pp. 29, 31 (emphasis added).

² *Task Force Report on Natural Resources*, pp. 24-25.

interagency committee in Washington be strengthened, to achieve coordination; and that river basin commissions be set up on an interagency basis, to achieve decentralization—all without basic reorganization.

In discussing the "Administrative Aspect" of its water policies (Vol. 1, p. 49), the Cooke Commission agrees that it "is not authorized to deal with questions of federal organization." But it goes on to say: "There is no doubt, however, that if the [water policy] principles suggested . . . are to be translated into action some changes must be made in the present organization of water resources activities." The *Report* then notes the changes recommended by the Hoover Commission and proceeds to the following proposal:

If the recommended [Hoover] changes are not carried into effect [the implication is that they will not be], then, as an absolute minimum, it would seem necessary to utilize the present voluntary Inter-Agency River Basin Committee approach through congressional approval of river basin commissions, set up on an interagency basis.

This may prove a satisfactory method provided that (1) each commission is presided over by an independent chairman appointed by and responsible to the President; (2) authorizations and appropriations by Congress for river basin planning and development are revised to fit the new approach; (3) a Board of Review, composed of members with a broad understanding of the economic and social as well as the technical aspects of regional development, is set up in the Executive Branch; and (4) the States develop their resources agencies to provide a basis for cooperation with this organization.

For one, I cannot agree that further use of the interagency approach, even under the conditions laid down, "may prove satisfactory" without basic reorganization. I daresay many associated with the Hoover Commission and its Task Forces on Natural Resources, Agriculture, and Public Works will concur in this judgment. Of this we can be sure—if proposals to promulgate the Hoover Report are ever considered seriously by the President and the Congress, opponents will use with telling effectiveness the alternative suggestions of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission.

By focusing attention on the question of administrative organization, this review has not pretended to give a balanced picture of the *Report*. The invigorating courage of its authors is apparent in those portions of volume one of the Report which deal with the controversial subjects of hydroelectric power (Ch. 15) and land reclamation (Ch. 11). These chapters and others are good reading; they are filled with challenging ideas for all interested in a richer resource base for an expanding American economy.

The ten river basin case studies, which constitute volume two, contain a vast amount of valuable material, assembled to throw light on the most important opportunities for resource development in each basin. These studies suffer from the fact that the "policy problems" and the "elements of a plan for full development" for each basin are not drawn sharply. They are often bland or even murky because they are, in fact, compromises of the conflicting official positions of various federal resource agencies—compromises in which each agency and its program are likely to be spared from serious challenge or criticism. This difficulty results from the fact that each river study was prepared initially by a committee representative of the federal agencies oper-

ating in the area; and, though the studies were edited by members of the Commission staff, most of the marks of compromise remain. Nonetheless, this volume of supporting material is of tremendous value to those who desire to test the Commission's general proposals by applying them to water development under varying physical, legal and administrative conditions.

Raymond Penn, reviewing the *Report* in the journal *Land Economics*, concludes that it "probably will not be accepted as the water policy of the American people. Nor will it aid materially in resolving the issues" (Feb. 1951, p. 76). I dissent from this view. To be sure, it is unlikely that this Congress, or the next, will enact legislation incorporating in body the Commission's seventy proposals. But most of the proposals are likely to become the professionally accepted standards, against which many future legislative and administrative decisions will be judged—decisions on authorization of specific projects, on priorities in programming and in budgeting and appropriating funds for authorized projects, on the conduct of resources surveys and the recommendations which result therefrom, and on specific proposals for establishing basin accounting systems and for setting power rates. Yes, the Commission's recommendations will surely work themselves into public policy in the water field.

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Problems and Policies of Dispute Settlement and Wage Stabilization during World War II. PREPARED BY THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS. (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1950. Pp. v, 380. \$.75.)

Prepared for the National Security Resources Board, this volume serves as companion to the official histories of the National Defense Mediation Board, the National War Labor Board, and the National Wage Stabilization Board. While the histories only record, this work primarily analyzes and appraises. The presentation, convenient for a work of joint authors, is topical rather than chronological. This organization effectively points up the problem-areas, stimulates the reader's interest, and makes each chapter a story in itself. Unfortunately, some duplication results.

The work supports Nietzsche's conviction that all writing is autobiographical. Its limitations are explainable by the experience of its ten authors, each of whom wrote a chapter. Three factors in their background are important. First, lawyers wrote the chapters on "Jurisdiction" and "Enforcement"; economists wrote the remaining chapters. Thus the three boards are evaluated in a broad social and economic setting, but the basic political problems are either not recognized or ignored. Tripartitism—a device giving labor, management, and the public equal power on a governing board—is justified as a technique for policy determination, dispute settlement, wage stabilization appeals, and enforcement. Voluntary acceptance by labor and management is held essential to the success of any dispute settlement or wage stabilization program,

and tripartitism is the price to be paid for this acceptance. But tripartitism means that industry and labor can outvote the public by a score of two to one. The public interest thus becomes nothing more than a compromise between two group interests. However, since industry and labor very rarely outvoted the public, the authors apparently think the basic dilemma unimportant. Political naïveté is indicated by the authors' failure to be disturbed over the self-perpetuating nature of board membership. And the NWLB's fascinating problem of informal practices causing a formal line-and-staff field organization to degenerate into a system of dual supervision is not even recognized.

Second, each author held a highly influential position with the NWLB, and seven of the ten are partially responsible for that agency's Termination Report. Notwithstanding some footnotes and the chapter on wage-price policy, the bulk of the work gives the impression that it was written more from memory than from archives. As a result, it tends to present the boards' alternatives as the government's alternatives. For example, the authors conclude that, after the formulation of general principles, tripartite decision on voluntary wage stabilization applications is not necessary except on appeal. Yet they fail to consider Secretary Perkins' suggestion that the regional wage and hour offices rule on such applications under instructions from, and appeal to, the NWLB. More reliance on archival research would have tempered many generalizations. An illustration is the conclusion that tripartitism "provided protection against appointments by political pressure." If this is true, the NWLB's Executive Director—at an early date anyway—did not know it; he "cleared" the appointment of regional board public members "on the hill." (NWLB, *Verbatim Transcript*, Executive Session, February 5, 1943, pp. 720 ff.) This dependence on memory and experience also makes it difficult for the reader to determine where the apologia ends and where the appraisal begins.

Third, each author is currently employed in labor relations work. It is, thus, not strange that the volume almost completely neglects the influence of the men who constituted the boards and who made the policy. When a board administers a program, personality factors become more important than when a single individual administers it. But when a tripartite board administers a program affecting the delicate balance of labor-management relations, then the rôle of personality is even more dominating. Trying to understand the NWLB without evaluating George W. Taylor is like trying to understand the Supreme Court without evaluating John Marshall. The authors' reluctance to appraise the individual contributions of their former and contemporary colleagues is understandable, but regrettable. Perhaps, too, the authors' current employment, in connection with management's and labor's insistence on active participation on these boards, accounts for some of the conclusions.

Thus the reader must swallow some of the conclusions with an aspirin tablet. The boards could do no wrong! The authors are led to this position not only by their backgrounds, but also by the criteria that they use to evaluate and by the social theory that they exhibit but do not explain. They hold that the "ultimate test" of the wartime labor program is the degree to which a balance

among the competing claims of dispute settlement, wage stabilization, and manpower distribution was achieved. It becomes easy to conclude that the balance must have been satisfactory, since we won the war. But the volume does not consistently apply the same test. At times, the test seems rather to be one of "practicality" and "realism." The authors seem to argue that, given the social, economic, public, and group pressures under which the boards operated, they really had no practical and realistic choice. If this Bentley-type determinism is supported, there seems little point in applying any test. For neither can past experience be changed, nor future experience affected.

This volume represents more thought about the wartime labor program than any volume yet published. For seventy-five cents it is the best buy in labor relations literature. The chapters on wage-price policies and manpower problems explore hitherto unexplored areas. The editors' "Summary and Conclusions" is useful. The product of most joint endeavors is uneven; this volume is a notable exception to the rule. For the most part, it is comprehensive, analytical, forceful, and well-written. But measured by the standards of the OPA and, especially, by the OPM-WPB histories, it must trail the field.

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Public and Republic; Political Representation in America. BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1951. Pp. xiii, 262, ix. \$3.50.)

Under the title *Public and Republic*, Alfred de Grazia has written an interpretive history of theories of representation in England and America. The last three centuries, the period covered by the book, have witnessed great conflicts of interests among landed property holders, commercial classes, geographic sections and other groupings in society. The theories of representation which accompanied the emergence of these interests, and their relationship to contemporary currents of political belief, form in large measure the subject matter of this study. "To isolate clusters of ideas on representation, to discover their genealogy and report their birth, to trace their family history, to point out where some weakened and others grew strong,"—in these words, the author describes the theme of his book.

Professor de Grazia has made a major contribution in his analysis of conflicting theories of parliamentary representation in seventeenth century England and the impact of these theories on American experience. The seventeenth century parliamentary oligarchy of English landholders and commercial interests, upholding a theory of virtual representation, was opposed by the radical religious democracy of the period, in particular by the Leveller movement. Through such figures as Roger Williams and William Penn in the New World, the Leveller ideas of representation left a lasting mark on American political theory. To the Levellers, representation meant a system of authority delegated by the people, accompanied by strict control and ready recall. Implicit in this theory was a belief in popular sovereignty and man's inherent rationality. When men are regarded as rational beings, universal suffrage becomes logical and inevitable, and the legislative representative is considered

as a delegate of the general public, subject to close popular control. Significantly, the various Agreements of the People drawn up by the Levellers voiced a demand for manhood suffrage and the annual election of representatives on the basis of population.

Professor de Grazia points out that the populist ideas of the Levellers appeared over a century later in the writings of some of the more egalitarian-minded American revolutionaries, including Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Wilson. The theory of direct democratic representation gained full acceptance in mid-nineteenth century America, triumphing over rival theories of Puritan theological conservatives and commercial middle classes.

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the conception of representation as a means of direct majority control encountered criticism and modification arising from the multiplication of interest groups in an urban industrial society. The author examines the new ideas of representation which reflected the interest power-clusters and social pluralism of a changing environment. In a chapter entitled "American Pluralism," attention is given to the development of informal, extra-constitutional group representation.

The author's treatment of the subject of representation in more recent decades is neither as comprehensive nor as analytical as his material dealing with earlier centuries. The impact on legislative representation of the concentration of authority in the executive branch of the government, the struggle between rural and urban areas for domination of state legislatures, the establishment of unicameralism in local government, these and other developments are mentioned or given brief discussion, but at times with a panoramic rather than an intensive approach. The reader might wish, also, for a more detailed treatment of current trends in the representation of interest groups on administrative boards and commissions, which the author terms administrative pluralism. The development of administrative representation on the federal level during the last decade, and the relationship of this trend to traditional theories of representation, are topics which merit further examination and analysis.

MARGUERITE J. FISHER.

Syracuse University.

Modern France; Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics. EDITED BY EDWARD MEAD EARLE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 522. \$6.00.)

On the first four days of February, 1950, there was held at Princeton University a conference on modern France. The meetings were sponsored by several of the schools or institutes at Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Princeton, and also by the Carnegie Corporation and the government of the French Republic. The papers read at this conference, augmented by a study on population trends, are here published under the title *Modern France*. In reading the various essays one has the feeling that the numerous authors not only know objective facts but, what is more important, the social psychology of the French people. The volume is worthy of its distinguished sponsorship.

After Part I, an introductory section by the noted French scholar, André

Siegfried, there are seven additional parts containing from two to seven papers each. Part II deals with "The decline of the French *élan vital*." The first essay here, by Dr. John B. Wolf of the University of Minnesota, outlining boldly the "problem in historical perspective" appears to be especially noteworthy. Part III, of less than fifty pages, is entitled "French letters and science."

Parts IV and V contain the essays on "French politics." There are three papers on the Third Force, explaining chiefly the position of the center parties: one paper on the Christian Democrats (MRP), one on the decline of the Socialist party (SFIO), three on the Communists, and one on Gaullism (RPF). This last essay is one of the few explanations in English which catch the spirit of the movement. It helps one understand the ardent French youth who hawk De Gaul's weekly journal on the streets each Sunday morning.

Part VI deals with "social and economic problems in present-day France." The essay by David S. Landes, giving a social and cultural analysis of French business and the businessman, is particularly interesting as it is "derived primarily from personal observation." It is this essay which especially seems to throw doubt on the hopefulness of the long-term view of French economic life. For the attainment of the short-term objective of rebuilding up to the 1929 standards, there is good reason to be optimistic; but one can well wonder if the intransigence of the French will not make further progress beyond that point discouragingly slow.

The last two parts discuss the "problems of French security" (three papers) and "France in world affairs" (also three papers). These are the essays which will especially appeal to those chiefly interested in diplomacy and international affairs.

One cannot hope in a book review to do more than point out the high scholarship, wide techniques and vigor of these sympathetic papers on modern France, but perhaps one very minor illustration of the use of sociological methodology will be of interest. It deals with the place of dogma, rationalizations, traditions, and myths in modern France. Siegfried notes that a Frenchman sometimes "reveres a principle to such an extent that he occasionally becomes its slave" (p. 7). Dr. Wolf notes (p. 23) that the state as custodian of "beliefs and practices of the community" has partially replaced the church as a unifying force in modern society. On page 38 we read, in the paper by Dr. Bowditch, that "we can dismiss the revolutionary syndicalist use of the concept of *élan vital* as little more than a rationalization or a myth." Also, on page 33, he notes that French military writers fabricated "myths as a means of escape from the unpleasant task of coming to terms" with hard realities. Mr. Lorwin's paper on "the struggle for the control of the French trade-union movement, 1945-1949" says (p. 201) that France developed its myth of the quasi-total Resistance which, for the historical record, extolled the strikes, sabotage, and the *maquis* of labor. Dr. Lytle's paper on Georges Sorel, of course, discusses the "myth of the general strike"; and, in his article on "strains in the social structure," Mr. Sawyer notes (p. 310) the "heroic myth of syndicalism." Many other illustrations could be given from the volume as to how tradition, dogma,

and rationalizations have controlled thought and action in contemporary France.

Statistical methodology, with its charts and tables, is found chiefly in Mr. Kirk's paper on population trends in France. A few of the other studies have some limited statistical data.

Many important phases of French life are omitted or merely mentioned. One wishes that there would be another conference in which might be discussed such topics as social security, health, housing, civil service, taxation, budget, administrative techniques, and the educational system. The present volume is so good that it calls for more. The editor is to be congratulated on the excellent table of contents, a "who's who of contributors," a "glossary of abbreviations" and a twelve-page index.

EARLE H. KETCHAM.

Syracuse University.

The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923. BY EDWARD HALLETT CARR. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1951. Pp. x, 430. \$5.00.)

This book, the first of three volumes on the history of Soviet Russia, marks a return to the grand manner. Many-volumed history provides adequate scope for the analysis of historical complexity, and here the analysis is of a very high order indeed. The space is deserved and well used. Carr writes in a civilized manner, yet tightly and with a logical organization that makes the most of his opportunities. This deserves the greater praise, in that the author in his preface candidly reveals that he has been puzzled over the definition of his task.

The puzzle is more than a matter of presentation. One of Carr's major theses is that Lenin was a great revolutionary whose "genius was far more constructive than destructive" (p. 25). In support, Carr has chosen to write "not a history of the events of the revolution . . . but of the political, social and economic order which emerged from it" (p. v). Carr's thesis, however, cannot be proved in this volume. The reviewer holds the opinion that the social structure established by Lenin was inherently unstable, and that the uneasy compromise between old and new could have ended only with Bolsheviks ceasing to be Bolsheviks, or with a "second revolution," as actually took place under Stalin. If such is the case, it is difficult to regard Lenin as a constructive genius. How the author will handle this question remains to be seen. At any rate a central point in the present volume remains to be proved, even though signs of the groundwork for such proof are clearly visible.

Carr's treatment is an attempt to see the events of the day and the social trends of the time through Bolshevik eyes, while at the same time maintaining the traditional detachment of the scholar. In this respect, it is a welcome relief from crusading popular literature of both anti- and pro-Soviet varieties. Nevertheless, the reviewer feels that in several passages Carr's effort to understand the Bolshevik viewpoint has ended in his accepting that viewpoint where the facts do not altogether warrant it, or where another interpretation might

account for them in a more satisfactory manner. Certain slips of the tongue, as the reference to an "inglorious partnership" between Kamenev and Zinoviev in opposition to Lenin (p. 94), reflect an identification with his subject that departs rather far from objective appraisal. Although Carr has emancipated himself from the intellectual fetishes of middle-class morality, he remains at least partly under the spell of Marxist mythology.

The first four chapters present an analytical history of Lenin's tactics and their relation to the Russian socialist movement before the November revolution. Though eminently readable, these chapters present little that is new in the way of facts or interpretation. They cover ground that has been made familiar by Souvarine, Rosenberg, Wolfe, Dan and others. Carr accepts somewhat uncritically the post-revolutionary Marxist interpretation of Tsarist society. According to this view, the Russian bourgeoisie was completely incapable of carrying out a democratic and capitalist revolution. This conclusion is probably closer to the truth than the opposite view, that Russia was well on the way towards a capitalist and democratic transformation of her rickety social structure, when the process was interrupted by the war. By ignoring this argument, however, Carr puts himself at times on questionable ground in appraising the whole framework within which the Bolshevik party functioned. A great deal of Bolshevik activity is explainable on the hypothesis that Lenin feared the stabilization of capitalism, even in Russia.

The next five chapters are a study of the steps through which the party concentrated power in its own hands after the revolution. From this reviewer's standpoint, they are the best chapters in the book. As the author points out, the process cannot be regarded solely as the consequence of a predetermined design. The survey and interpretation of Bolshevik relations with other political parties is especially valuable. Carr concludes that the demise of the fiction of a legal opposition "cannot fairly be laid at the door of one party," since the "premise of dictatorship was common to both sides of the argument" (p. 183). The author's treatment weaves complex events into a suggestive and poised analysis.

The remaining two hundred pages give an account of the disintegration of the Russian Empire along ethnic lines, and of how the Bolsheviks reassembled the fragments with the help of their rapidly shifting policies toward former subject nationalities. He points out that the recognition of claims to independence derived in great measure from the necessity to "overtrump the bourgeois doctrine of self-determination," and that they provided an "excellent way of making a virtue out of necessity" (p. 259). His appraisal of the consequences of Soviet nationalities policy, however, wavers between admiration for an effective political device and praise on more subjective ethical grounds that appear to be derived emotionally, if not logically, from Marxist premises. For example, Carr sets up the unrealistic criterion of equality among nations as a yardstick to evaluate capitalist and Soviet performance in this area.

Thus, the author's sympathy with the Marxist position occasionally blinds him to the realities of power relationships, just as elsewhere it serves to enlighten him. On the whole, the author's keen insight greatly outweighs the

defects of *parti-pris*, for Carr is too much of a skeptic to swallow any doctrine whole. All students of the major totalitarian power of our time now owe him a heavy debt and will follow his subsequent analysis with warm interest.

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.

Harvard University.

Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan; A Study in Political Sociology. By S. M. LIPSET. (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1950. Pp. xii, 315. \$4.50.)

The issue of the political party has lately, and at last, entered the center of our professional concern; yet the discussion is still lacking in sharp, theoretical concepts, historical depth, and the comparative data which alone could assure a substantial delineation of this life-line of modern political dynamics. At this stage of investigation in a virgin field when spade work of concrete analysis is called for, it is equally imperative to join together the overwhelming mass of raw material in a conceptual framework and to articulate its rich pattern through a continuous recognition of its differentiations, past and present. Such a combined attack may seldom be fully attained; it will be doubly welcomed when well executed in an inaugural attempt.

Professor Lipset has presented an exemplary case study in his firsthand examination of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan. His study shows insight, circumspection and a competent collection of crucial and little-known data; above all, it asks pertinent questions which reach far beyond the special problem of Saskatchewan's experiment in "Agrarian Socialism." Here is an unexplored mine which, instead of offering a tiresome digging for irrelevant details, will eventually produce a rich ore, worthy of the effort of highly sophisticated researchers.

What gives the case of Saskatchewan its special interest is the seeming paradox of the only "socialist" government on the North American continent, unfolding within a thoroughly agrarian society which, according to classical and still prevalent views, should be basically antagonistic to radical politics. The author does well in opening his study by presenting the similar "radical" background of the one-crop regions of the Great Plains on both sides of the border. This common social frontier created its agrarian class consciousness and its movements of protest against the monopolistic grip of the eastern railroads, grain traders and elevator companies.

Dr. Lipset finds an opportunity to connect and contrast the CCF with its forerunners in the province, as well as with the neighboring political organizations, Alberta's Social Credit Party and North Dakota's Non-Partisan League. His searching analysis, well enforced by statistical graphs, should disperse the widespread, yet unfounded idea of socialism as an exclusive movement of "marginal men"—socially, economically, nationally. In fact, it is the well-to-do, indigenous, deeply rooted farmer who in the lasting economic depression of the "terrible thirties" became class conscious and politically activated. This situation leads the author to observe that "within an exploited economic group,

such as the prairie wheat farmers, those who possess economic and social status within the class are most resentful of a threat to their security" (p. 166). A comparison of the class composition of the CCF with that of European radical movements, noting the early spread and consistent appeal of radicalism to the socially threatened groups and its exclusion of the rootless *Lumpenproletariat* from a leading role in the revolutions, would testify to the wider validity of Lipset's observation. At the same time, such comparison could point out some fundamental differences in the radicalism of the Great Plains and of the Old Continent's "crisis strata."

A good part of Lipset's book deals with the CCF in control, its record in politics and administration, its limited socialist experiments in the midst of a national market economy, its shifts in ideology, program, support and leadership and, last but not least, the danger of success and its deterrent to social change. The story of the CCF illustrates the dilemmas of reform parties when they reach their goal of reform government and suddenly realize their responsibility to the whole community.

The increasing bureaucratization and consequent conservatism of a once militant organization seem to confirm Georges Sorel's warnings against institutional "vested interests" and equally Robert Michels' often quoted and rarely checked "iron law of oligarchy." On the other hand, a careful weighing of the evidence should caution against such oversimplified formulas. In fact, CCF's persistent emphasis on a genuine democratic sharing, with the promise of wide and continuous participation at the grass roots, is probably one of the major contributions of "this provincial Socialist beachhead within capitalism," as Robert S. Lynd rightly emphasizes in a suggestive foreword. How to combine social welfare with individual responsibility and freedom is the key problem of modern mass society. It may well decide the fate of our democracy. Professor Lipset's analysis presents a valuable guide to such a crucial experiment in democratic living.

One might have wished that the author had carried his research further to produce a comprehensive "study in political sociology." Such a systematic evaluation of the assembled material, however, would call for a fuller historical perception. Only against the background of Canada's whole political setting could the proper place of the CCF be decided; this approach might well modify the author's estimate of its significance for the western hemisphere. More important, it would help isolate the problems unique to Canada, in contrast to the general phenomena of party development. Such a broad approach would lead the author to more fundamental issues of political sociology: quality, selection and succession of leadership, organizational structure, social class alignments, pressure groups and public opinion control, typology of party and other concepts. These shortcomings only indicate what a wide, unexplored field is before us. In the meantime, due acknowledgment should be made to a pioneer piece.

SIGMUND NEUMANN.

Wesleyan University.

The Soviet Image of the United States; A Study in Distortion. BY FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1950. Pp. xviii, 297. \$4.00.)

From Professor Barghoorn's book we get a good description of the picture of the United States which the people of the Soviet Union receive from their government, through all of the Kremlin-controlled media of mass communications. It was Barghoorn's good fortune to have served as Press Attaché in our Embassy in Moscow at a time (1943-1947) which afforded better opportunities for the kind of observations that he has made than almost any other time since the inception of the Soviet regime. He has had not only the benefit of studying Soviet propaganda at close hand, but in addition he enjoyed the rare opportunity of having personal conversations with a goodly number of Soviet citizens.

Perhaps the most important contribution of this book is to give us perspective. The author points out that Soviet hostility toward the United States is nothing new, that it has always existed, although it was partially held in abeyance during most of World War II. Even in wartime, however, allied motives were viewed with suspicion, and nothing was published which might arouse favorable emotional responses toward America and its people. It is unfortunate that we as a people either never possessed this perspective or have failed to retain it, otherwise we might be facing the future with more wisdom and less hysteria, more steadfastness and less clamoring for a preventive war.

Americans who have not lived in a Communist country will no doubt be deeply shocked by the extent of anti-American propaganda in Russia, by its systematic, methodical and deliberate nature, and by the sheer magnitude of the falsehoods which it purveys. Moscow has no scruples in falsely accusing any party with doing the very thing of which it itself is guilty. It stops at nothing in its efforts to incite hostility, fear and suspicion of American policy and its executors.

The outlook would be downright frightening if we were to judge the effectiveness of this propaganda on the basis of our own gullibility before the printed word. But Barghoorn is more optimistic. From his personal contacts he is convinced that the Kremlin had by no means succeeded in turning the Russian people into robots or intellectual shadows. He notes that some favorable impressions about America have gotten through, that Russians remember some good American deeds, that when Americans and Russians have associated as people there was an easy and genuine friendship. He reveals, moreover, that there is much curiosity about the outside world, and especially about America. In a most interesting chapter on the Russian people, Barghoorn states that the "positive attitudes of most sectors of the Soviet population toward the United States far outweighed the negative." Yet he also notes that the stepped-up anti-American campaign has resulted in confusion, widespread apathy, cynicism about official propaganda, and in many cases despair.

The author makes clear his belief that "Soviet propaganda against the United States is one of the main instruments of the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy." The Soviet challenge, he insists, cannot be met by military defense alone. While warning us that we must avoid the pitfalls of appeasement and of preventive war, he tells us that "only a healthy society, economically strong and psychologically well-integrated, can withstand Soviet ideological pressure."

It is a pleasure to read in such an authoritative book that the State Department through its information program (Voice of America, etc.) has done a much better job of combatting Soviet propaganda than we are generally led to believe.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH.

Vanderbilt University.

Nationalism and Language Reform in China. BY JOHN DE FRANCIS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 306. \$4.00.)

John De Francis attempts to combine the problem of writing with that of modern political development in China. The author is especially interested in the efforts to replace the ideographic Chinese writing by a phonetic script, and aims at linking the various theoretical linguistic issues involved with the politics of special groups. For this combination of political and linguistic issues, the author professes to use an "interdisciplinary approach" combining "political science" and "linguistic science." The author not only argues for the need of a phonetic script to be introduced in China to overcome illiteracy, but also tries to indicate the political forms through which, in his opinion, any changes will have to be introduced. He is trying to divide the struggle for a reform of writing in China under the two political headings of Ch'en Kuo-fu, the representative of the extreme wing of the Kuomintang on one hand, and Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader on the other. The policy of Ch'en Kuo-fu is characterized as that of "unity for uniformity" or "one state, one people, one language," or "integralism," while the policy of Mao Tse-tung is seen as "unity in diversity" or "new languages for a federated China." Ch'en Kuo-fu's line is represented as "capitalist unity," not the capitalism of the "more revolutionary France of the 18th century," but that of "Meiji Japan" or of "Kemalist Turkey," both of which are "regarded by their opponents as fiercely undemocratic." Mao's approach is one of "political federalization" and "economic decentralization," held together by "the sum total of the policies . . . designated as the New Democracy." The author's sympathies are clearly on the side of what he describes as Mao Tse-tung's line and with the linguist group which, he believes, represents Mao's policy of "federalism."

It is obvious to any unbiased reader that such an attempt to subordinate all considerations of the political or linguistic aspects of this problem to such a main line of melodramatic juxtaposition of two forces, has to do violence to a great number of factors in order to force them into the political pattern of the author's thought. Among the main systems of phonetic writing developed in

China, the Gwoyeu Romatzyh system established by Y. R. Chao and other leading Chinese linguists is, for instance, simply thrown by implication into the reactionary camp of Ch'en Kuo-fu and classified as a product of that group of "integralists" who favored uniformity and refused to have anything to do with "federalism" of the dialects. This labeling is made even stronger by the exemption of certain individuals who, it seems, while following the wrong linguistic line are otherwise in disagreement with the politics of their respective side of the author's fence. In the author's words, for instance, two such men (Huang Hsüeh-chou and Lo Ch'ang-p'ei) "who as supporters of G. R. appear to agree with Ch'en Kuo-fu on the need for linguistic uniformity, in other respects are sufficiently differentiated from the Kuomintang leader to win approval even from Latinxua (Mao-linguist) supporters as fellow-reformers in the mainstream of China's nationalist revolution." This attack by insinuation leaves unmentioned such facts as the establishment by Y. R. Chao himself of the G. R. system for the Wu, Cantonese and southwestern dialects; and the author's whole classification and combined labeling of all who are not in the Communist camp is grossly unfair and false.

The author, on the other hand, clearly favors the development of the so-called Latinxua in China, a simplified toneless writing set up first under the guidance of the Russian sinologist, Alexeiev, for the use of the Chinese minorities in the Soviet Union. In Soviet Russia, Latinxua disappeared at the time when the Russians imposed their own writing on all other national languages. But Latinxua, or as it was called, Sin Wenz, had a period of sponsorship by the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1930's. Then it was suddenly dropped, and the author believes that this was because of the difficulties of the war. He does not mention that its impracticability was the main party reason. He seems, however, to be under the impression that the new Communist regime will bring a revival of the Latinxua movement. To this reviewer's knowledge, the new Communist regime had, in 1950, only organized a committee for research in simplification of the ideographic script, with a possible later development of a phonetic writing system. In this connection some Communists argue for one unified phonetic system—which means that, in the author's terms, they commit the sin of "integralism." But the author seems to think of a combination of simple phonetic Latinxua writings, for dialects of the peasantry, with an ideographic or higher developed phonetic script, a dualism, which, as one can only conclude, would serve then the controlling purpose of the new Communist elite.

The linguistic part of the author's book is equally unsound in many points. For instance, in his endeavor to destroy "the monosyllabic myth" of the Chinese language, the author has confused the problem of one-syllable words with that of the unchangeability of Chinese word syllables. (Chinese has no inner sound changes corresponding to the English "give, gave, given," etc.) This point, made by the eminent linguist, Li Fang-kuei, is dealt with by the author's questionable comment that "Chinese is at most a syllabic language, as are all other languages in the world."

Mr. De Francis' book contains some interesting material—especially on the language efforts of the early missionaries—but it has a political rather than an academic value.

FRANZ MICHAEL.

University of Washington.

The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden, 1918–1939. BY HERBERT TINGSTEN. TRANSLATED BY JOAN BULMAN. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 325. \$4.50.)

Norges Forhold Til Sverige Under Krigen 1940–45. BY DET KGL. UTENRIKS-DEPARTEMENT. (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. Vol. I, 1948. Pp. 303. Vol. II, 1949. Pp. 176. Vol. III, 1950. Pp. 616. No price.)

Handlingar Rörande Sveriges Politik Under Andra Världskriget. BY KUNGL. UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET. (Stockholm: Kungl. Boktryckeriet, P. A. Norstedt & Soner. 3 Vols. 1947. Pp. 396; 322; 204. Kr. 7.50; 6.50; 5.00.)

Professor Tingsten's book and the "white papers" issued by the Norwegian and Swedish foreign offices constitute a fairly satisfactory record of Sweden's foreign policy from 1918 to 1945. The official documents relate solely to Swedish-Norwegian relations and extend only over the years 1940–45; nevertheless, those relations reflect ideas and actions on a world scale. It might also be advisable to observe that Professor Tingsten, at present Editor-in-Chief of the liberal *Dagens Nyheter* and formerly an ardent Social-Democrat, is a sharp critic of Sweden's Social Democratic Party which is now responsible for Sweden's foreign policy. He is also a devoted internationalist and adherent of the idea of Western democratic union. An American, after reading official documents and apologiae, is much impressed by Tingsten's style as well as his comments. His attitude and forthrightness are what we would approve in one of our own commentators. This book is permeated with a glowing faith in democracy and infused with a burning intolerance of dullness and indecision. The official documents, on the other hand, are presented without comment. But even in these, the personalities of envoys, ministers, special representatives and other individuals shine through.

Tingsten's method of study has been to examine the debates in the *Riksdag*, the diplomatic communications, the articles and editorials in the daily and the periodical press, and autobiographical memoirs. From this vast storehouse of primary sources, he has drawn what appears to him to be tenable and sound conclusions and he invites the reader to accept his assurance that every care has been taken to avoid errors of judgment. This reviewer is inclined to accept Tingsten's assurance. He believes that Swedish opinion about the nation's foreign policy is set forth here competently and accurately.

Sweden's foreign policy between the First and Second World Wars consisted of attitudes and actions respecting (1) the establishment of peace at the end of World War I, (2) the League of Nations, (3) the Åland Islands questions, (4), the Scandinavian problem, (5) the problems of disarmament and rearma-

ment and (6) the world problem of anti-democratic ideologies and systems. These were the main subjects debated in Sweden from 1918 to 1939. Yet these foreign policy questions were not debated extensively or sharply in the *Riksdag*, a circumstance which Tingsten believes is partly due to such unique institutions as the Foreign Affairs Committee, and more largely to the tendency in stable democratic countries to maintain "unity" in the realm of foreign relations. An additional reason is that the general public normally does not feel the impact of international issues in anything like the same degree that it is influenced by questions of domestic policy.

Since Tingsten's book is an extremely thorough, able, and balanced analysis of the formation of opinion on international questions in a typical democratic state, it is required reading for our own statesmen and journalists who have an interest in world affairs. Naturally, we have had different policies to consider; we have different institutions, prejudices, and interests; and there are divergencies of motive and attitude. Even so, the general pattern of debate on foreign affairs is nearly the same in all countries where debate is allowed.

Although the *Riksdag* debate was scanty and foreign issues seldom played any prominent role in election campaigns, Swedish newspapers have taken a lively interest in foreign policy. Here in Tingsten's book are references to such illustrious editors as Segerstedt, Wickman, Stridsberg and Branting (as a statesman, not as an editor), and to the little-known but influential journals, *Upsala Nya Tidning*, *Eskilstuna Kuriren* and *Arbetet* (Voug's paper) which should arouse a desire on the part of the scholar to know them better.

In substance, Tingsten's work reveals two kinds of characteristics about Swedish foreign policy, one general and one special. Like many other nations, Swedes exhibit "a general self-satisfaction, a sense of moral superiority." The propensity for self-praise, even for boasting of unselfishness, humility, nobility, naïveté and excessive credulity on the part of one's own, and the constant attribution of viciousness and cleverness to foreigners are, Tingsten believes, "necessary adjuncts to the mental equipment of a modern nation." He does not think that Sweden deserves full credit for being the only modern nation to have avoided war for over a century, but he concedes that, in many crises, Sweden did take the course that was dictated by considerations of good for other nations and for the world at large.

Specifically, Sweden supported the League of Nations, stressing the aims of justice rather than security or peace. She wanted the Aaland Islands but yielded to Finland and the League; she desired Scandinavian unity, but did not insist upon it so vigorously as to alienate Norway; she wished world disarmament, but did not neglect her own defense when world disarmament bogged down. Although recognizing that she could never equal a great power in influence, she assumed a position of leadership in the fight for neutrality. Finally, while historically hostile to Russia and friendly to Germany, Sweden resisted both Communism and Nazism in a manner best calculated to serve democracy.

Although there was never any great cleavage between the parties, the Conservatives leaned toward nationalism, the Liberals and Social Democrats toward internationalism. The Right emphasized foreign policy, the Left domestic

policy. The Conservatives usually favored a strong defense and the Liberal Left, as a rule, preferred to work longer and harder at palliative measures.

The Swedish "white papers" (called *Handlingar*, etc.) are devoted to the events and communications prior to the invasion of Denmark and Norway on the 9th of April, 1940, and to the troop transit and related questions. The first volume consists of diplomatic exchanges and messages passing between the Swedish Foreign Office and its field representatives in Berlin, Paris, London, Oslo, and Copenhagen. At the present time, the exchanges of notes are well-known, including those bearing on such questions as how the Nazis (whether by chance or design) timed their invasion to coincide with the declaration of an Allied blockade of the Norwegian coast. Of most interest is the telegram of Arvid Richert, Swedish envoy in Berlin, to the Foreign Office, that Germany would invade Denmark and Norway in the next few days. It appears to be clear from Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish sources, that there were frequent, but not necessarily continuous, meetings and exchanges of information between the Scandinavian foreign service people in Berlin, Paris, Copenhagen, Oslo, and Stockholm, and telephone communications between Gunther and Koht on April 8. The Swedes gave the impression that they told the Norwegians and Danes all they knew, but whether they actually conveyed to their Scandinavian friends the urgent seriousness of the situation no one ventures to say. Boheman was in London during the four days preceding the attack and Beck-Fries was absent from his post in Oslo. Subsequent relationships proved that Sweden would do all in its power to aid her sister countries. It will probably never be known exactly what was the nature of the pre-invasion exchanges.

The other volumes in this series provide complete documentation on the questions of the transportation of troops and materials through Sweden, of the difficulties Sweden had with Germany from April to December, 1940, and of the reaction in Great Britain, Norway, and other countries. The members of the committee which prepared the Swedish documents met twice with the corresponding Norwegian committee. In view of the fact that there were some sharp issues between the two countries, this was a bold and mature undertaking.

The writer of these lines was in close touch with both Norwegian and Swedish officials during these critical years; he is not a little surprised that the written documents now give the impression of being "tougher" than the oral exchanges between representatives of both countries indicated at the time. As a matter of fact, most Norwegians understood that the Swedes never faltered in their devotion to their Scandinavian brethren, even though they appeared to do so when the Nazis applied pressure.

Although this has been alleged, there was no evidence during the War of any lingering resentment in Sweden against the Norwegians because of the tensions developed in 1905. The main difference in Norwegian and Swedish outlook is that Norway feels more strongly the necessity for an Atlantic orientation. During the first attack of the Soviet Union on Finland, all three Scandinavian countries were united in her support. But after Germany invaded and occupied Norway, there arose much friction and many small incidents. The first problem was that of the refugees who came to Sweden in embarrass-

ing numbers; it was not really adjusted until late in 1943. The Norwegians were at first aggrieved by the fact that the Swedes allowed German troops and matériel to pass over Swedish railroads from the south to Oslo, from south Norway to north Norway (the "horseshoe traffic"), and across northern Sweden. By 1944 this practice had been limited and relations improved in many other ways as indicated by the Swedish "relief" to Norway and the recognition of Norwegian diplomats in Stockholm.

Much of the story is in these volumes, but the historian will someday find it necessary to have at hand several more of the type written by Professor Tingsten. It is now too early to obtain a proper perspective on the years 1940-1945. But it is almost too late for memoirs, since men forget so soon the intangibles.

ROY V. PEEL.

Bureau of the Census.

Crimes Against International Law. BY JOSEPH BERRY KEENAN AND BRENDAN FRANCIS BROWN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1950. Pp. x, 226. \$3.25.)

In a message to Congress dated January 22, 1946, President Truman stated: "For the first time in history, the legal culpability of war makers is being determined. The trials now in progress in Nuernberg, and those soon to begin in Tokyo, bring before the bar of international justice those individuals who are charged with the responsibility for the sufferings of the past six years." It is indeed fortunate for all, especially American historians, political scientists, and lawyers, that both these historic episodes have been fully recorded in a form readily available. It is perhaps even more significantly fortunate that they have been recorded by persons intimately connected with the trials themselves.

What Telford Taylor as Chief of Counsel for the United States did for the Nuernberg Trials (see *International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 450*, April, 1949, "Nuremberg Trials, War Crimes and International Law"), Keenan and Brown have done for the Tokyo trials. And as Chief of Counsel for the United States, and Juridical Consultant, respectively, they have fashioned a record of the trial based not only on their statements made at the trial but on considerable documentary source materials. In short, they have taken the "Tokyo Transcript" of the trials which runs into thousands of pages, abstracted from it the more important problems and statements, backed them up by references to the ancient classicists on international law such as Gentili, Suarez, Vitoria, Grotius (to mention just a few), cited cases, historical precedents, and concepts from the domestic legal practices of many nations, and quoted contemporary writers on the trials, both pro and con, including A. G. D. Levy, Quincy Wright, S. Glueck and others. The result is a volume of tremendous importance, not only in understanding what went on at the trials in Tokyo but also in understanding as well the entire problem of war and international law. It is then, as the authors say, "not a study of the facts" *per se*, nor an evaluation or appraisal of the evidence, but rather a dissection of "the inner core of jural purpose, legal rationalization, and sociological consequence at the center of the trials."

One cannot finish reading the book without agreeing with the authors that

"this trial was just." (Though in somewhat of a different category, it might be well to compare *The Case of General Yamashita* by A. Frank Reel, University of Chicago Press, 1949.) Because of their intimate connection with the case, the authors have been able to anticipate and answer legalistic criticism pertaining to the "ex post facto" issue, the meaning of aggressive war, the crime of conspiracy in international law, and the inadequacy of the procedures under which the trials took place. If what happened at Tokyo (and Nuernberg as well) is really taken to heart by all nations, large and small, it will indeed go a long way to demonstrate the validity of the statement of the authors that "world society [has] vindicated the rule of law and order among nations" and insured itself with "a policy of prevention and deterrence."

Though the Tokyo Trials took place between 1946 and 1948 (the original proclamation authorizing the trials was dated January 19, 1946, and it was not until December 23, 1948, that sentences were pronounced), there is a ring of currency about the book. In the first place, there is a side of General Douglas MacArthur (other than military and/or attempted policy-making) that is presented which has perhaps been lost sight of by all but the most avid students of that complex personality. In the second place, while the only direct reference to Korea is the statement that the book goes to press as "crimes against international law are once again being committed" in that theatre of combat, one cannot help but connect Japan and Korea—will there be more such trials and how far will the Tokyo Trials act as a precedent in the future? These two factors in themselves might well make the book worth the while of all who are interested in a subject of such overwhelming importance. But, in addition, the authors have done a magnificent job of presenting a complicated legal and international problem with skill, discernment, and cool-headed logic.

BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER.

Amherst College.

UNRRA; The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. PREPARED BY A SPECIAL STAFF UNDER THE DIRECTION OF GEORGE WOODBRIDGE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. 3 vols. Pp. xxxv, 518; xii, 601; xiii, 520. \$15.00.)

This is an official history that did not have to be completed in the rush of the demobilization of wartime agencies, and it has benefited from the time and workmanlike effort spent on it in the interval since UNRRA was liquidated. It is written with detached objectivity and a wealth of factual detail. It is painstakingly documented, and has drawn to advantage on an underlying series of monographs on special phases of the agency's work. And whatever is lost in exciting narrative, with the cooling of the emotion and activity of UNRRA debates and operations, is more than made up in the breadth of perspective that has been gained. In these respects it is notable among the postwar histories of wartime civilian agencies.

The three-volume compass permits a comprehensive treatment. The plan allots two generous volumes to text, and a third to appendixes setting out a collection of the basic documents and other reference material, together with

a hundred pages of statistics of personnel, finances, displaced persons operations and supplies delivered. There are maps and graphs, a chronology, a directory of official personalities and a bibliography of documents circulated outside the agency. The scholarly apparatus alone is impressive.

The text is in eight parts of varying length, the first of which treats the international organization, its formation and controlling organs, and its financial plan for raising funds, in cash and kind, from participating governments and from private donations, to make up a common pool of resources. Altogether, nearly four billions in dollar values and dollar equivalents were distributed. UNRRA itself handled only a small fraction of that amount in cash since the contributors procured and turned over most of their shares in the form of supplies. The United States furnished seventy-three per cent of the total, and Britain and Canada together twenty-one per cent. But more than fifty countries contributed something and nongovernmental donations ran upwards of 200 millions. UNRRA's administrative expenses for the whole period of its existence amounted to forty-seven millions, or a little over one per cent of the total spent. A noteworthy feature of the discussion in this part is the argument between the contributing and the receiving countries as to the respective roles of the latter in determining supply policies and of the former in supervising the ultimate distribution of supplies furnished. National sovereignty prevailed on both counts. Students of comparative administration will note also the controversy over the degree of control over UNRRA policies and operations to be reserved to the Council, and American administrators may envy the extent of the discretion left to the Director General. For one perennial problem, however, a solution was found that may have a wider application in the future: a novel formula for measuring the amounts of the contributions to be expected from each participating country. This put the general principle of getting "from each according to his means" into the concrete terms of two successive levies on the donors of one per cent of their national incomes. It was a formula that satisfied the major contributors and was capable of rough adjustment in countries that had no statistics of national income or had never heard of the concept. Finally, this part makes clear the instability of planning in an organization that drew three-fourths of its funds from one source, in installments and at times fixed unpredictably by the passage of congressional appropriations.

The second part deals with the operating administration and its problems of organization, administrative and financial control, personnel, communications, public information, and presently liquidation. Here the stock problems of the textbooks in public administration are exemplified. Many of them were aggravated, not so much by the participation of so many people of different nationalities, as by the inescapable fact—the very reason for UNRRA's being—that nearly everything needful—time, competent personnel, money, materials and transport—was in short supply. But one organizational difficulty with far-reaching consequences stemmed directly from the British origins and the international character of the undertaking. This was the nearly autonomous European Regional Office in London, headed by three deputies drawn from the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, acting together as an Administra-

tive Council and individually as bureau chiefs. There were compelling reasons for this arrangement but it should become a classic case of a situation to avoid.

The third part takes up the supply operation, beginning with the ingenious formula devised for "equalizing the scarcities," after it became evident that the total of supplies in sight would fall far short of the original goal of furnishing "to each according to his needs." The analysis proceeds with the development of supply programs and their fulfillment, and procurement policies and problems. The individual commodity programs are then treated in turn—food, medicines, clothing, industrial and agricultural rehabilitation materials and services, and shipping. No generously disposed American can read the food account without feeling afresh some sense of shame at the degree to which UNRRA's failure to fill empty stomachs abroad in 1945 and 1946 must be attributed to the callous and shortsighted policies of our War Food Administration in 1944, under the domination of the organized food trades.

The fourth, fifth and sixth parts, making up most of the second volume, are devoted to the field operation. The terms of UNRRA agreements with the receiving countries, the scope of its services to them, and the policies as to distribution, use of the proceeds of relief commodities sold and relationships with voluntary agencies, are treated generally. Then follows an account of the program in each of the score of receiving countries, in the Middle East, in Europe and the Far East, from beginning to end. Here the topical headings previously treated are expanded in considerable detail. Special interest attaches to the story of the original Balkan mission and the Cairo office, where morale is said to have been poorest; to the Czech program, described as the most successful; and to the China effort, where least was accomplished in relation to need.

The displaced persons operation has a part to itself. In this field, UNRRA's job was originally supposed to be assistance in repatriation. As it turned out, that job was largely done, for better or worse, by the occupying armies before UNRRA entered the territory, and they continued to dominate, as well as to supply, its operations. UNRRA's task therefore became the care of those who could not or would not be repatriated immediately. The necessary redefinition of policy at the August, 1945, Council session "gave rise to perhaps the first clear disagreement that emerged after the war between the Slav nations and the other United Nations" (Vol. II, p. 486), and crystallized two questions: what was UNRRA's role, and which DP's were to be helped? As to these, the authors say (Vol. II, p. 70):

"... no questions were to take up so much time in successive Council meetings and to cause so much controversy as these two. No operations of the Administration were to get so much publicity—good and bad—as those arising from the answers supplied by the member governments. No other field operations were to require the employment of so many people. Yet in no operation was so small a portion of the funds of the Administration used. No operation was so misunderstood within the Administration, by member governments, and by the public. In no operation was the early organizational control of the Administration so unsatisfactory. Yet again in no operation did the members of the Administration show such individual initiative and, it may justly be said, display such heroism."

The final part raises the question whether UNRRA succeeded or failed. The answer is judiciously balanced. UNRRA, the international organization, work-

ed as other international bodies do, through negotiation and compromise to agreement. UNRRA, the operating administration, a pioneering venture in international operations on such a scale, worked as well as could have been expected of any agency in the circumstances, given the limiting conditions it could not control. Starting in chaos, it became an effective operation during two years of operations. UNRRA, the work of moving supplies from those who could spare them to the hungry and needy, according to equitable standards and without leaving a mountain of debts to poison future relations, was successful in delivering almost 100 per cent of its programmed quotas, as finally determined, economically in regard to cost, and at an insignificant overhead charge. The supplies were not enough to eliminate hunger and need, but they saved thousands of lives and measurably hastened the pace of postwar recovery. Finally, UNRRA the concept of international sharing, worked so long as the East and West agreed on a common approach to international problems, and dissolved when the fundamental disagreements emerged. As the authors say, the member nations did not sully UNRRA by making it their battlefield; instead, they disbanded it.

The receiving countries are now, with only a few exceptions, behind the iron curtain. The only real reticence in this monumental and admirable work (apart from apportioning impersonally such blame as is found; individuals are rarely singled out, though one action of LaGuardia's is flatly called "arbitrary," Vol. I, p. 369) is the omission of any discussion of the developing breach between East and West, or of the question whether, in a hindsight view of the breach, it was a mistake to have embraced the UNRRA concept in the first place. The authors take the breach for granted, mentioning it only casually here and there, and they leave little doubt of their basic sympathy with the one-world ideal. Five years, after all, is not much hindsight for historians on such a question. Perhaps they would still rest on Lehman's peroration to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (quoted, Vol. I, p. 114) in 1944: "It is now up to all of us to prove that it is not only for war and destruction but also for help and healing that nations can be united to act for the common good. Then will peace have her victory no less than war."

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD.

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Man and the State. By JACQUES MARITAIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. x, 219. \$3.50.)

Once again Professor Maritain has applied his philosophy of natural law to society and politics. Once again he is lucid, persuasive, and systematic. Although the theoretical background of his argument yields consequences that he does not explore, a background and consequences unacceptable to many democrats, his explicit conclusions are both a defense of democracy and a basis for cooperation against totalitarianism.

The argument is elaborated from two sets of distinctions. First there is the distinction between community and society: community is based on instinct, heredity, and common historical antecedents, and is exhibited in a common

unconscious, and in common feelings and mores; society is based on ends or tasks chosen by decision or accepted through consent, and is exhibited in reason and will. Ethnic and linguistic groups and social classes are communities. Business, labor unions, and scientific associations are societies. For Professor Maritain's purposes, it is important to show that the nation is a community and that the body politic and the state are societies.

The second fundamental distinction is between the body politic and the state. The state is only a part, the governing part, of the body politic. The differences between them are summarized toward the end of the book (p. 202):

... the basic political reality is not the State, but the body politic with its multifarious institutions, the multiple communities which it involves, and the moral community which grows out of it. The body politic is the people organized under just laws. The State is the particular agency which specializes in matters dealing with the common good of the body politic, it is therefore the topmost political agency, but the State is a part, not a whole, and its functions are merely instrumental: it is for the body politic and for the people that it sees to the public order, enforces laws, possesses power; and being a part in the service of the people, it must be controlled by the people.

Thus, Professor Maritain offers a justification of democracy and is enabled to develop a theory of world government. The idea of a superstate governing particular states is dangerous, rooted in the fallacy that there is on earth such a thing as sovereignty. What we require is an "international community," a "world political society," which is an outgrowth of individual bodies politic. Such world government would be diverse and pluralistic, but would be founded on an acceptance of a common good for all peoples.

The treatment of church and state will be reassuring to those who suspect all Roman Catholic thinkers of a desire to make the state into the secular arm of the church. Professor Maritain writes sharply and unequivocally about this issue. Not only does he envisage a christian state in which the things that are Caesar's are distinct from the things that are God's, but he insists that people be allowed the profession of any creed or of unbelief. This does not commit him, it is interesting to note, to condemnation of the church's role in the Middle Ages. Men lived then, he argues, in a sacral society; they live now in a secular society. The same natural law which issued in one type of behavior in the past justifies different behavior in the present, because the conditions to which the law is applied are different.

The book is pervaded with the sense of natural law and contains judgments about the more and less natural. National dynamism, for example, is greater than class dynamism because the nation is more deeply rooted in nature. This provides a pat enough explanation of the failure of international socialism to prevent World War I and it provides history with a stability it often seems to lack, but does it say any more than can be said without reference to natural law? In fact, the term "nature", as Professor Maritain uses it, has at least three meanings: (1) existence, (2) essence, and (3) value. Of course, in Professor Maritain's system it can be maintained that to some extent the terms are synonymous—not that whatever exists is valuable or, for that matter, natural.

Only certain deep tendencies in existence are natural, as, in Hegel, only significant events are real. And the natural, like the real, is valuable.

On occasion, the rhetoric of natural law and that of a naturalism like Santayana's have much in common. So Professor Maritain can write: "... the idea of the body politic can arise in the bosom of a national community; but the national community can only be a propitious soil and an occasion for that blossoming." But the language loses its resemblance to Santayana's when the modern growth of the nation is described, for instance, as "anti-natural."

Whatever differences in theory other democrats will have, it is clear that Professor Maritain is also a democrat. In terms of his own philosophy, he makes a powerful case for many of the ideas that today's democrats should believe. Of course, differences in theory issue ultimately in differences in practice. But that time is not now. In this political situation, Professor Maritain remains a strong and courageous ally for all other democrats.

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Studies in Leadership; Leadership and Democratic Action. EDITED BY ALVIN W. GOULDNER. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1950. Pp. xvi, 736. \$5.00.)

This volume could not have been better timed. At a period when the concern with leadership among all social sciences appears to be strongly ascendant, Professor Gouldner has assembled a series of articles, most of them specifically for this volume, that illuminate many facets of his important theme. Our sociological colleagues are represented almost exclusively among the authors, but the absence of political scientists reflects somewhat on our failure to maintain sustained interest in the subject of leadership.

The book is divided into the following five sections: "Types of Leaders"; "Leadership and its Group Settings"; "Authoritarian and Democratic Leaders"; "The Ethics and Technics of Leadership"; "Affirmations and Resolutions." Three types of leaders are considered—agitators (by Leo Lowenthal), bureaucratic leaders (by Robert K. Merton), and informal leaders (by Paul F. Lazarsfeld). Under the heading of "Leadership and Its Group Settings," there are discussions of leadership among social classes (by W. Lloyd Warner), union leadership (by Eli Chinoy), and leadership among minority groups (by Oliver C. Cox and Kurt Lewin). Political leadership is treated in papers by W. F. Whyte, Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset. Authoritarian and democratic leaders are analyzed by Daniel Bell, Kurt Lewin and T. W. Adorno. The ethics and technics of leadership are considered in a potpourri of contributions by Bernard Barber, Nathan Glazer and David Riesman, and Philip Selznick. Articles that attempt generalizing statements about twentieth century society and leadership by A. M. Lee, Jeremiah Wolpert, and Robert Nisbet conclude the volume. So much for the structure of the volume and its impressive *dramatis personae*.

In a brief review one can only comment upon a few aspects of the book. The editor contributes an excellent introduction that brings up-to-date the concep-

tion of leadership as relational, situational and group oriented. Gouldner wisely points out how much refinement of this basic conception is necessary. "The group contexts of leadership must be specified if a formalism sterile of action utility is to be avoided. Leadership must be examined in specific kinds of situations, facing distinctive problems. The opposite shortcoming must also be detoured; in other words, the similarities among *some* leadership situations or problems must be emphasized." One looks to the advancing studies on group and organizational behavior to provide the conception which Gouldner has indicated.

The reviewer was impressed with the ample space given to those who are studying leadership in small democratic action groups. That type of research has much significance for students of political behavior. Moreover, it is important in another dimension, in that through it we are testing and analyzing a normative conception of democratic leadership. Such a conception has long needed analysis and elaboration. With this formulation of what we mean by democratic leadership comes also a redefinition of the concept of power and public participation and of the role of democratic institutions. Parenthetically, it is indeed encouraging to note the importance for democratic values of such empirical study.

The treatment of political leadership leaves much to be desired. One detects in this study a deficiency existent in many sociological studies of politics. There is an almost complete neglect of institutional factors. While it is true that there does exist a yawning gap in the social sciences between behavioral conceptions and institutional presentations, the fact remains that the marriage must soon be consummated—the estrangement distresses both mates. There are some sage comments on trends in political leadership, and there is good material on leadership and mass communications, but no treatment of presidential or legislative leadership, for example.

The question of leadership types is treated on a sophisticated level. The delineation of agitational, bureaucratic and informal leaders may be a useful distillation of political types. It is noteworthy, however, that the political typologies cannot stop here if they are to be politically relevant. There is a real necessity to relate political leader types to their function in the policy process. If alongside our political types we had an adequate functional conception of policy formation, then how much more meaningful would these types be projected in terms of their role in that process.

In sum, this is an excellent treatment of a complex subject in its diverse aspects. We needed a book of this type to plot the present undulating curve of knowledge of the problem. This book indicates clearly where the frontiers of research lie and it beckons to political scientists to join with their sociological colleagues in pushing forward a provocative area of research.

LESTER G. SELIGMAN.

University of Chicago.

BOOK NOTES, NOTICES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Congressional Conference Committee, Seventieth to Eightieth Congresses. BY GILBERT Y. STEINER. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1951. Pp. x, 185. Paper \$3.00; Cloth \$4.00.)

The congressional conference committee, long the object of castigation by critics of congressional procedure, is revealed by Gilbert Y. Steiner's study to be a useful step in the legislative process. Steiner makes an exhaustive case study of conference committee action on fifty-six major bills in the ten Congresses from 1927 to 1949. His book explodes by its well-documented analysis many loose statements and assumptions made in the past by political scientists about the conference committee. It has been customary to assume a predominant senatorial influence in the conference stage. Indeed, many members of the House of Representatives have contributed to this belief in senatorial advantage. Mr. Steiner's study, however, shows conclusively that the House of Representatives has been more influential than has the Senate in shaping conference committee decisions. The House has consistently held the upper hand decisively in all cases of revenue and appropriation bills, as well as in the field of agriculture. Only on bills affecting broad fiscal policy has the Senate triumphed. Mr. Steiner's analysis also disproves the assumption that conference committees irresponsibly delete matters in agreement and introduce new matter into bills. The author found only three instances to support this generalization in the entire group of bills studied. The reason for the persistence of this belief probably arises from the fact that the striking out by one house of all matter after the enacting clause on a bill already passed by the other chamber empowers a conference committee to write a new bill. The author points up several unsolved problems respecting the organization and jurisdiction of congressional conference committees. One obvious need is, of course, to set out in more precise terms the limitation of conference committee action to provisions in actual disagreement. Another problem is whether conferees should come from the full standing committee or from the subcommittee in charge of a bill. The mushrooming of subcommittees in the last few years makes this problem a serious one, for the selection of conferees often determines the shape of national policy. The only consistent policy seems to be to allow seniority to determine selection. Even more significant is the issue of over-representation of the minority on conference committees. Political scientists interested in the problem of party responsibility have largely ignored this point raised by Mr. Steiner, but might well give some attention to it as a part of the matrix of congressional procedure and tradition impeding party responsibility.—GLADYS M. KAMMERER, *University of Kentucky*.

Congress; Corruption and Compromise. BY H. H. WILSON. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. x, 337. College \$2.00; Trade \$3.50.)

Using a collection of cases on corruption in Congress, Professor Wilson rings down the curtain on the moral callousness of our times. A chapter of analysis is devoted to each of five members of the House of Representatives and to three members of the Senate whose conduct reveals lax morals. In these and other cases more briefly noticed, the range of charges against members of Congress is quite broad: payment of members by private lobbies; accepting campaign contributions, legal retainers and expensive favors from persons seeking government contracts and licenses; using the mails to defraud; employing important committee posts to get government favors and contracts for unsavory people; indulging in thinly disguised bribery; and stirring up racial conflict to intimidate voters in federal elections. "The tragedy which this book investigates is the unwillingness of Congress to face the dangers inherent in political corruption" and its reluctance to protect its reputation by disciplining members whose conduct manifests questionable ethics. As most of these cases show, some form of punishment eventually catches up with politicians guilty

of unethical conduct, but the real tragedy lies in the loss of public faith in democratic institutions. Yet Congress is not alone at fault: public prosecutors show reluctance to prosecute men of strong political backing; men of standing often shield the wrongdoers; and even the public itself re-elects men of proven loose morals! A chapter on British practice shows differences in political standards, and the author's explanation is the best brief summary I have seen of the underlying forces which distinguish behavior in the two countries. The American cases and the British comparison point up constructive suggestions in the closing chapters. Chief among these is the development of responsible, national political parties along lines suggested by the September, 1950, report on political parties by a committee of the American Political Science Association. A more responsible party system may improve congressional behavior, but I doubt if it can clear away the moral smog of a sick society. Given such provocative subject matter, this book is remarkably temperate and reveals an understanding mind in its author. Some seventy-seven pages of annotated notes is an added dividend in a volume which can be read profitably by Congressmen and the general public, as well as by students of public affairs.—GEORGE H. E. SMITH, *Washington, D.C.*

Let's Look at the Record. By THOMAS R. AMLIE. (Madison, Wisconsin: Capital City Press. 1950. Pp. 612. \$10.00.)

The political strategy of the modern liberal-labor movement depends on the theory that "if the people know the facts," liberals will win. Liberal organizations have accordingly resorted to pamphlet publication of "the facts" as embodied in congressional votes. Thomas R. Amlie, an old hand at roll call publication, has now brought together, in *Let's Look at the Record*, 650 roll calls from 1933–1950, selected to help liberals distinguish friends from enemies in Congress. The book is arranged in twelve chapters, each of which deals with one kind of issue, such as civil liberties. The author describes each roll call from the liberal's viewpoint (including his personal observations as a former Progressive congressman), and totals the party votes on each proposal. A useful supplement gives the votes of each member of the 81st Congress on all measures selected. Mr. Amlie's conclusions are the customary liberal ones. Republicans are conservative; they have eliminated all but a handful of insurgents from their ranks. Democrats are much better, but an evil Dixiecrat-Republican coalition dominates national politics. These conclusions may be misleading. Analysis of votes before 1933 might demonstrate that Republicans can develop liberals, too, when the party is in power. The supplement demonstrates, furthermore, that most southern Democrats are liberal, by Mr. Amlie's standards, and are not usually allied with Republicans, as the text contends. The fact that this book is not an objective scientific analysis, but essentially a campaign handbook, will not detract from its usefulness to political scientists. If used with care, *Let's Look at the Record* is a good guide to congressional action since 1933.—JULIUS TURNER, *Allegheny College.*

Federal Activities in Higher Education After the Second World War. By JAMES EARL RUSSELL. (New York: King's Crown Press. 1951. Pp. x, 257. \$3.75.)

Mr. Russell explores the expanding role of the federal government in the field of higher education—the nature, scope and impact of its activities. The analysis is confined to a single year, 1947. Half of the volume is devoted to a description of specific educational activities, exclusive of research, carried on by the federal government. The remaining half views critically the performance of the federal government when itself acting as an educator, its complex and unorganized relationships with nonfederal higher education, its impact on the program and policies of educational institutions, and its tendency to assume greater and greater responsibility for underwriting higher education without formulating any policy with regard to it. In 1947, the federal taxpayers' bill for higher education was one and three-quarters billion dollars. Three-fourths of this total went for the education of individuals chosen on the basis of the part they had played, or would play, in national defense. The veterans' program alone accounted for half a billion dollars and

constituted almost exactly half the total income of our colleges and universities. Many important questions are raised here regarding the proper exercise of the government's inescapable responsibilities in this field; and the desirability of shaping wise educational policies with reference to such issues as selective service and universal military training is amply demonstrated.—LOUISE M. YOUNG, *Washington, D.C.*

Civil Rights in the United States. BY ALISON REPPY. (New York: Central Book Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xxix, 298. \$4.50.)

At a time when constitutional limitations have come to consist almost exclusively of the political and civil liberties of the individual person and when certain native sons out of irrational fears of Communism appear determined to destroy our constitutional rights before the Russians get the opportunity to do so, it is only natural that current books and articles on constitutional law should center largely about civil liberties. This book by Alison Reppy, Dean of the New York Law School, is a survey of the developments in the field of civil liberties, as reflected primarily by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower federal courts and by some of the more important rulings of State courts during 1948, 1949, and the first three quarters of 1950, with background cases introduced in order to place these decisions in their proper legal milieu. As a survey, the volume is competently done, even though it appears to have been hastily written, and the author exercises freely the prerogative of courts and deans to split infinitives. The treatment of materials is comprehensive, but as in all surveys the narration of developments precludes an adequate analysis of those that are more important, and the ephemeral nature of some of the materials gives portions of the volume a dated appearance because it is impossible for writers and publishers to issue surveys fast enough to keep pace with new judicial interpretations. Finally, like most surveys, the volume lacks a central theme. In addition to a foreword by Nathaniel Phillips, Chairman of the Committee on Civil-Rights of the New York County Lawyers' Association, and introductory remarks by Arthur Garfield Hays, General Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, the book has chapters devoted to the subordination of the military to the civil authority, civil rights proposals and the criminal code, Communism and the Constitution, the freedoms of the First Amendment, equal protection of the laws, the rights of labor, guarantees to persons accused of crime, and the status of aliens, and a concluding chapter which summarizes all that has gone before. The chapter dealing with "Civil versus Military Authority" barely touches this important issue, except insofar as it is presented in the Atomic Energy Act and the jurisdiction of international tribunals and courts martial, but consists largely of an analysis of statutes, regulations, and court decisions which bear little relevance to the central issue. Although Dean Reppy does not share the doctrinaire absolutism of the majority of the judges in cases like *Terminiello v. Chicago*, he is generally sympathetic to those decisions which have expanded civil liberties and given vitality to the equal protection clause as a barrier to racial discrimination. The value of Dean Reppy's book lies almost exclusively in its comprehensive compilation of recent cases. It is not a systematic treatment of civil liberties. Hence, it is no disparagement of the book to say that it cannot compare with Professor Chafee's *Free Speech in the United States*, and that it does not measure up to the standard of Robert K. Carr's *The Federal Protection of Civil Rights* or Milton R. Konvitz's *The Constitution and Civil Rights*. The volume contains a useful table of cases, copious citations of recent law review articles and notes, and an adequate index.—ROBERT J. HARRIS, *Louisiana State University*.

The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief. BY CLINTON ROSSITER. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 145. \$2.50.)

This study of the positions taken by the United States Supreme Court in regard to that energizing intangible, "the war power," is provocative in the conclusions reached and impressive in the evidence marshalled. Part I, "The Supreme Court and the President's Power of Martial Rule," analyzes those classics of constitutional law, *ex parte Merryman*

and *ex parte Milligan*, in the light of the realities of modern warfare and our experience in World War II. The conclusion reached is not startling to any observer of contemporary political realities: the actions of President Roosevelt from 1939 to 1945 and the Court's decision in *Korematsu v. United States* make "perfect hash of the general principles of *ex parte Milligan*." The only limits on the president's power of martial rule are "his own political and moral sense, 'the forbearance of a distracted people,' and the judgments of history." Part II, "The Supreme Court and Other Aspects of the War Powers," treats defensive war, judicial declaration of peace, judicial review of the war powers of Congress, presidential authority over courts-martial and military commissions, and his power to rule conquered territory. The findings are much the same as in Part I. Professor Rossiter's conclusions may be summed up roughly as follows: the Court has done little by way of interference with the war powers, and that little reluctantly; the Court has not been able successfully to object to the exercise of the war powers or to their expansion; the Court has been unable to prevent grants of "war power" from being extended into peacetime precedents; the Court has now retreated to the last line of defense, that the political branches of the government in exercise of their greatly augmented armory of weapons with which to fight a modern war should use them with discretion, with due concern for the moral and political doctrine of "reasonableness." "As in the past, so in the future, President and Congress will fight our wars with little or no thought about a reckoning with the Supreme Court." In wartime, the Constitution would appear to be entirely a Constitution of power and not at all a Constitution of limitations. As Professor Rossiter says, "This is a sad moral to proclaim after so long a journey, but it is one that we should have firmly fixed in our constitutional understanding."—CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR., *Knox College*.

American Democracy in Theory and Practice; the National Government. BY ROBERT K. CARR, DONALD H. MORRISON, MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, AND RICHARD C. SNYDER. (New York: Rinehart and Co. 1951. Pp. xiii, 1094. \$5.00.)

A new textbook in American national government by two Dartmouth and two Princeton political scientists. The book represents an effort to make factual information more meaningful by offering it in a context of general principles. At the end of each chapter is a bibliographic note.

American Government in Action. BY MARSHALL EDWARD DIMOCK AND GLADYS OGDEN DIMOCK. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xvi, 1004. \$5.00.)

Revised edition of text first published in 1946. Retains functional approach, with several changes in organization and emphasis.

Government in the United States. BY CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1951. Pp. xviii, 1064. \$5.00.)

Fifth and revised edition.

Introduction to American Government. BY FREDERIC A. OGG AND P. ORMAN RAY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1951. Pp. viii, 1063. \$5.50.)

Tenth and revised edition.

Government and Politics in the United States. BY HAROLD ZINK. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. x, 1008. \$5.50.)

Third edition of textbook on American national, state, and local government.

Your American Government; The Citizen's Approach. BY HELEN MILLER BAILEY, EUGENE L. LAZARE, AND CONRAD H. HAWKINS. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1951. Pp. ix, 566. \$4.25.)

A brief textbook, stressing the impact of government on the individual and the desirability of more citizen participation. The authors are members of the faculty of East Los Angeles Junior College.

State and Local Government in the United States. BY WILLIAM ANDERSON AND EDWARD W. WEIDNER. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1951. Pp. xx, 744. \$5.25.)

A new text. Among other features may be noted the emphasis on intergovernmental relations; the alternation of the functional and structural approaches; and the interesting concluding analytical section on "Public Services and the Democratic Process."

State and Local Government in the United States. BY CULLEN B. GOSNELL AND LYNWOOD M. HOLLAND. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1951. Pp. xvi, 619. \$5.00.)

New text by professors of political science at Emory University. The four parts of the book deal respectively with the state and the union, state government, local government, and intergovernmental relations.

State and Local Government in the United States. BY WILLIAM VERNON HOLLOWAY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1951. Pp. viii, 460. \$3.75.)

A new textbook designed to fill the need for a brief text combining state, county, and municipal government. Organization and treatment are orthodox.

Federal Records of World War II; Volume I, Civilian Agencies, and Volume II, Military Agencies. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1951. Pp. xii, 1073; iii, 1061. \$2.50 each.)

A general guide to wartime records, produced under the direction and editorial supervision of Dr. Philip M. Hamer of the National Archives. The guide is designed, not as a complete description of records, but as a finding aid. Arrangement is by agency. Description of agency organization and functions (designed to indicate the general nature of subject content) is followed by a summary of the various types of records, their volume and location, and by bibliographical references covering administrative reports and histories and other relevant publications. The National Archives is supplementing these general guides by more detailed inventories, special lists and other finding aids.

Indiana at War; Civilian Directory. COMPILED BY LYNN W. TURNER AND HEBER P. WALKER. (Bloomington: Indiana War History Commission. 1951. Pp. xxi, 1330.)

Volume IV in the Indiana War History Commission's proposed ten-volume *Indiana in World War II* series. The volume lists over 30,000 Indiana civilians who held positions of responsibility in official, volunteer and cooperating wartime organizations. It also furnishes brief accounts of the functions and war histories of some 1,800 agencies and organizations. The editors, one of whom is Executive Director of the Commission, are University of Indiana historians.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac; Volume VI, 81st Congress, 2nd Session—1950. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features. 1951. Pp. 847.)

Annual condensation of congressional legislation, investigations, hearings, and other activities, together with record of votes. This volume also gives key votes for members of the 81st Congress for the past six sessions, 1945-50.

The Interstate Compact since 1925. BY FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN AND MITCHELL WENDELL. (Chicago: Council of State Governments. 1951. Pp. xi, 132. \$2.00.)

This valuable monograph traces the evolution of the interstate compact; analyzes the major legal problems—the nature of a compact, its enforceability, the need for congressional consent, and compacts between states and foreign governments; outlines the procedures in the making of compacts; and discusses the present and potential role of the compact in the American political system. Carefully documented and reflecting the authors' intimate knowledge of compact procedures and problems, this study may be regarded

as doing for the period since 1925 what the Frankfurter and Landis study did for the period prior to 1925.

The Roosevelt Treasury. EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xvi, 461. \$5.00.)

This volume contains over 100 selections, approximately one-fourth from Roosevelt's own speeches and writings, and the others from the writings of friends, associates and critics. Emphasis is placed on F.D.R.'s capacities as a leader, with sections on "Preparation for Leadership," "Leadership and the Human Equation," and "Leadership in Action." The editor has provided a foreword, introductory notes to chapters and individual items, and a bibliography.

Midwestern Progressive Politics; A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1950. BY RUSSEL B. NYE. (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press. 1951. Pp. 422. \$5.00.)

Viewing midwestern progressivism as "a regional manifestation of . . . the spirit of revolt," the author, professor of English at Michigan State College, describes and analyzes its rise and decline and compares it with the more "national" progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and the New Deal.

The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson. BY GEORGE H. MAYER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1951. Pp. 329. \$5.00.)

An account, chiefly, of Olson's three terms as Farmer-Labor governor of Minnesota, 1930-1936, written by a Purdue historian.

The Attack Upon the American Secular School. BY V. T. THAYER. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1950. Pp. x, 257. \$3.00.)

A detailed analysis and appraisal of the increasingly powerful influences, emanating from widely separated quarters, which are currently undermining the already weakened principle of secular education.

U. S. A.; The Permanent Revolution. BY THE EDITORS OF *Fortune* IN COLLABORATION WITH RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1951. Pp. xvii, 267. Text, \$1.50.)

An attempt to expound the meaning of America, and the goals of United States foreign policy. Originally published as the February, 1951, issue of *Fortune* magazine.

A Manual of City Government in Michigan and A Manual of Village Government in Michigan. BY CLAUDE R. THARP. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1951. Pp. 175; 118. \$2.75; \$2.25.)

Loose-leaf manuals for public officials and students furnishing concise and, comprehensive descriptions of city and village government in Michigan.

The Organization of State Administration in Delaware. BY PAUL DOLAN. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1951. Pp. 154. \$2.50; \$5.00 for series complete in 3 numbers.)

A university of Delaware faculty member analyzes constitutional patterns, statutory organization and informal arrangements in the state's government.

Principles of Business and the Federal Law. BY FRANKLIN H. COOK. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. xxi, 563. \$5.50.)

A combination text and case book examining the application of constitutional provisions to business and labor practices, and surveying various types of federal economic legislation.

Sabotage and Its Prevention During Wartime. COMPILED BY DOROTHY C. TOMPKINS. (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California. 1951. Pp. 53. \$1.00.)

Listed as Defense Bibliographies, No. 2, this is a revision of "Sabotage and Its Prevention," published by the Bureau in August, 1942, as War Bibliographies No. 1.

The Communist Trail in America. BY JACOB SPOLANSKY. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. vii, 227. \$3.50.)

The author, a Russian-born immigrant, has been investigating the Communist party in the United States since 1918 as confidential agent in Army Intelligence and the F.B.I. and for the Un-American Activities and Dies committees. He reports the activities of Communist leaders in organizing "hunger marches," "sitdown strikes," race riots, "front" organizations, third parties, youth movements and espionage in this country.

Current Research Projects in Public Administration, 1951. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1951. Pp. 48. \$1.00.)

Ninth in series of classified listings of research projects reported to the Public Administration Service.

Economic Resources and Policies of the South. BY CALVIN B. HOOVER AND B. U. RATCHFORD. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. xxvii, 464. \$5.50.)

A detailed examination of Southern resources and economy, followed by an analysis of public finance, natural resources, agricultural, industrial, labor and international trade policies, as they affect the South. The study is an outgrowth of the work of the National Planning Association Committee of the South, with which the authors, both Duke economists, have been associated.

Defense without Inflation. BY ALBERT G. HART. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1951. Pp. xiv. 186. \$2.00.)

A study prepared for the Twentieth Century Fund analyzing the general problem of maintaining stability in a mobilized economy. Included also are the recommendations of the Fund's Committee on Economic Stabilization—John Maurice Clark, Theodore W. Schultz, Arthur Smithies, and Donald H. Wallace. Three further volumes are planned dealing in greater detail with budgetary policy, monetary and fiscal problems, and controls to deal with shortages.

Municipally Owned Electric Plants in Pennsylvania. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND CHARLES F. LEEDECKER. (State College, Penna.: Institute of Local Government. 1951. Pp. viii, 137. \$4.00.)

A detailed survey by a State College political scientist and a staff member of the Institute of Local Government. This is a companion volume to *Municipally Owned Waterworks in Pennsylvania*, by the same authors, published in 1948.

Toll Roads and the Problem of Highway Modernization. BY WILFRED OWEN AND CHARLES L. DEARING. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1951. Pp. ix, 204. \$2.50.)

An examination of the recent toll-road movement in the United States and of the factors which have brought it about, together with an analysis of alternative public policies.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

J. ALTON BURDINE AND EMMETTE S. REDFORD

University of Texas

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——— Reorganizations in the Executive Branch of the Government. Report. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. 1950.

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Political Handbook of the World; Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1951.

EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. (New York: Published by Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations. 1951. Pp. vii, 230. \$3.50.)

Annual volume of reference data prepared by the executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Cabinet Government. BY SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1951. Pp. vii, 578. \$6.00.)

Second edition, with some revision, of this study of British cabinet government, first published in 1936.

The British Constitution. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp. xvi, 220. \$2.25.)

Third and considerably revised edition of this concise study of British government, the second edition of which appeared in 1947.

Justice and Administrative Law; A Study of the British Constitution. By WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (London: Stevens and Sons Limited. 1951. Pp. xxxiii, 674. 30s.)

Third edition of this important study first published in 1928 and revised in 1947. In bringing the material up to date, the author has extensively revised the long chapter on "Administrative Tribunals" and the chapter on "The Attitude of the Judicature."

The Government of Prince Edward Island. By FRANK MACKINNON. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1951. Pp. xii, 385. \$5.50.)

This volume in the *Canadian Government Series* provides a general survey of the colonial and provincial government. The author is principal of Prince of Wales College.

Labour-Management Co-operation in France. (Geneva: International Labour Office. 1950. Pp. ix, 237. \$1.25.)

An analysis of the laws and regulations affecting cooperation among public authorities, employers, and workers in France as of the beginning of 1948.

The Estates General of 1560. By J. RUSSELL MAJOR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 146. \$2.50.)

An intensive study of the 1560 meeting of the Estates General, with a view to discovering why representative government failed to develop in France.

Germany and the Future of Europe. EDITED BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 180. \$3.50.)

A symposium on the economy, politics, and government of Germany, with chapters by Reinhold Niebuhr, Sigmund Neumann, Calvin B. Hoover, Hans J. Morgenthau, Gabriel A. Almond, and others.

Potsdam bis Bonn; funf Jahre deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte. By EMIL SCHAEFER. (Lahr: Moritz Schauenburg. 1950. Pp. 239.)

Part I sketches year by year the political developments in Germany since the Potsdam Conference, and is supplemented by a chronology of the principal events from the German capitulation on May 7, 1945, to October 8, 1950. Appendices give translations of Articles 2 to 7 and 13 of the Potsdam Agreement concerning Germany, the German version of the Occupation Statute, and the text of the Fundamental Law of the German Federal Republic. F.T.E.

Die deutsche Innenpolitik im letzten Jahrhundert und der konservative Gedanke. By OTTO ERNST SCHUEDDEKOPF. (Braunschweig: Verlag Albert Limbach. 1951. Pp. 132. DM 1.60.)

Published as No. 22 of *Beitraege zum Geschichtsunterricht*—sources and aids for teachers—by the Brunswick Circle for Research on History Teaching. The booklet deserves attention as a condensed survey of the influence of conservative ideology and party groupings on Prussian and German history, giving due attention to the influence of the press. Its bibliography and graphic tables show the conservative parties in the Prussian Diet from 1849 to 1918, the strength of the major parties in the Reich from 1871 to 1918, and a table of comparative party strength in 1898 and in 1907. F.T.E.

German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall; The Formation of the Farmers' League. BY SARAH REBECCA TIRRELL. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. 354. \$4.50.)

A study of the domestic crisis in agriculture and the parliamentary struggle over agricultural tariff reduction during Caprivi's chancellorship, viewed in their international setting. No. 566 in the *Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*.

The Multinational Empire; Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918. BY ROBERT A. KANN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. 2 vols. Pp. xxi, 444; xiv, 423. Set, \$12.50.)

Volume I, *Empire and Nationalities*, analyzes each of the national groups which made up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and discusses their interrelations; volume II, *Empire Reform*, is concerned with proposals for reorganization of the Empire on a supranational basis. The author, who received his Doctorate of Law from the University of Vienna and practiced law in Austria for several years, is now a historian at Rutgers University.

Revolution in Eastern Europe. BY DOREEN WARRINER. (London: Turnstile Press. 1950. Pp. 188.)

A survey of economic changes in eastern Europe between 1945 and 1949, based on on-the-spot observations and first-hand experiences in Yugoslavia (with UNRRA), and study in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as a consultant with the Economic Commission for Europe. The author accuses the British and American Governments of having opposed since 1945 the industrial revolution of eastern Europe at every step, and of having supported any forces with a similar objective, for the purpose of obstructing Soviet influence in this region. She sees no constructive idea behind this policy. Of special interest are Chapters 5 and 6 on planned economy and Chapters 7 and 8 on the land reforms and collective farming in southeastern Europe. F.T.E.

The Soviet Slave Empire. BY ALBERT KONRAD HERLING. (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc. 1951. Pp. xviii, 230. \$3.75.)

An exposition of the Soviet system of forced labor, in the USSR and in satellite countries. The study is based on hearings and research conducted by the Workers Defense League's Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labor, of which the author is Research Director.

Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession. BY F. BECK AND W. GODIN. TRANSLATED BY ERIC MOSBACHER AND DAVID PORTER. (New York: Viking Press. 1951. Pp. x, 277. \$3.50.)

A descriptive study of the Russian purges of 1936-39 drawn from numerous personal experiences by a Soviet historian and a German scientist, writing under pseudonyms. It outlines the developments leading up to the purge and the anatomy of the purge process, including methods of selecting victims, securing denunciations and fabricating charges as well as the extraction of confession. Finally, it classifies the many theories used by the prisoners to rationalize these methods and evaluates their effect on the political maturity of the Russian people.

Russia's Soviet Economy. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1950. Pp. xxvi, 592. \$5.00.)

The author, a Syracuse University economist, has attempted to provide "a synthesis of available knowledge regarding all major sectors of the Soviet economy."

The Soviet State and Its Inception. BY HARRY BEST. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. vii, 448. \$6.00.)

"A general sociological appraisal" of Soviet experience.

Izbrannye Proizvedeniia [Selected Works]. By M. V. FRUNZE. (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Voennoogo Ministerstva SSSR. 1950. Pp. 581.)

At one time a student in the Polytechnic School of St. Petersburg, Michail Vasil'evich Frunze (1885–1925) became a professional revolutionist, with a fanatical interest in military science. After the collapse of tsarism, he rose to the front ranks of Bolshevik military leadership and led the Bolshevik armies to victory in Russian Central Asia and in the defeat of General Wrangel. Besides biographical and autobiographical materials, this volume contains documents which throw light on his campaigns in 1919 and 1920 in Siberia, Turkestan, and the Crimea, and reprints of articles he wrote in 1918 and between 1921 and 1925; it is invaluable for a study of the Red Army's organization and doctrine in the early stages. The last hundred pages of the volume are devoted to a lengthy study of the European "bringers of civilization" to Morocco, 1924–1925. F.T.E.

Soviets in Central Asia. By W. P. COATES AND ZELDA K. COATES. (London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd. 1951. Pp. 288.)

This book is written in the same uncritical, admiring vein as all the other books by the principal champions of Anglo-Soviet friendship, but contains a sprinkling of useful information on Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. F.T.E.

The Commonwealth in Asia. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 124. \$2.50.)

The Waynflete Lectures delivered at Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1949, dealing with the social structure and governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and the relations of these countries to the Commonwealth.

Chief Ministers Speak; Being Résumés of the Activities of the Governments, Central and States', During the Three Years, 1947–1950. By THE ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE, PUBLICATIONS DEPARTMENT. (New Delhi: Ashoka Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 241.)

A concise review of the Congress administrations in the various provinces and cities, with reports on economic, social and educational conditions in sixteen independent states. Hope is expressed that the Parliamentary Board will become a clearing-house for the exchange of information about progress in the fields indicated. F.T.E.

Hindustan Yearbook and Who's Who, 1951. (Calcutta: M. C. Sarker & Sons, Ltd. Pp. 532.)

The 1951 edition of the *Hindustan Yearbook* is an indispensable compendium on India, based largely on authoritative information supplied by the Central Government and the States' Governments. A special feature is the chronology of cultural, political, social and economic events, "India in Fifty Years, 1901 to 1950." F.T.E.

Before and After Independence; A Collection of the Most Important and Soul-Stirring Speeches Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922–1950. EDITED BY J. S. BRIGHT. (New Delhi: Indian Printing Works. 1950. 2 vols. Pp. 612.)

Although there is no indication of the sources from which the complete texts or summaries of Nehru's public utterances have been taken, this collection will serve as the backbone for any work on Nehru's political thought. It is arranged topically for the period 1922–1945 and chronologically for the period 1946–1950. F.T.E.

Orient-Literatur in Deutschland und Oesterreich, 1949–1950; Sammlungen der ehemaligen Preussischen Staatsbibliothek. (Marburg/Lahn: Westdeutsche Bibliothek. 1950. Pp. 46.)

A guide to historical, judicial and economic literature on the Near East published since the end of the war, based on the holdings of the Western German Library at Marburg, which contains the undamaged Near East collection of the former Prussian State Library of Berlin. F.T.E.

With Milner in South Africa. By LIONEL CURTIS. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1951. Pp. xiv, 354. 15s.)

Diary of a member of Lord Milner's staff in South Africa, 1900-1902.

First Malayan Republic; The Story of the Philippines. By GEORGE A. MALCOLM. (Boston: Christopher Publishing House. 1951. Pp. 460. \$5.00.)

A comprehensive survey of the Philippines, approximately one-third of which deals with population and historical background, one-third with the government and international relations of the new Republic, and one-third with economic and social problems. The author held various positions in the American administration of the Philippines from 1906 to 1940, serving over eighteen years as Justice of the Supreme Court and four years on the staff of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines.

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— Assemblée Nationale, No. 11403. Annexe au Procès-Verbal de la Séance du 22 Novembre, 1950. Proposition de Loi transmise par M. Le Président du Conseil de la République. Précisant l'étendue des activités industrielles de l'Etat, des établissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial et de certaines sociétés d'économie mixte et tendant à la création de la Société Nationale pour la gestion des fonds publics. Formulée Par M. Armengaud, Sénateur.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

- The British Year Book of International Law*, 1949. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 569. \$8.50.)

Among the twenty-six volumes of the always excellent *British Year Book of International Law*, the present issue is outstanding, not only because of the scholarship demonstrated by the individual contributors but by reason of the scope and balance of the volume as a whole. Some of the most important contemporary problems of international law, both public and private, and of international organization are lucidly treated, notably in the learned editor's masterly analysis of "Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties," and in an important essay by Mr. Clyde Parry on "The Treaty Making Power of the United Nations." Professor M. Margaret Ball has written an interesting comparative study on "The Organization of American

States and the Council of Europe," and Sir Arnold D. McNair, in an essay on "Aspects of State Sovereignty," has contributed a fragment of a historical study in which the development of international law in England during the past three or four centuries will be traced through opinions of the Law Officers and other legal advisers of the Crown. There is the usual section devoted to notes on cases decided during the year by English courts, and the fourth of a valuable documentary series on the constitutions of international organs and organizations edited, with commentary, by Mr. Parry. It is appropriate that a volume evidencing such a ripe scholarship and containing such a wide range of topics should be dedicated to the dean of British international lawyers, Sir Cecil Hurst, in his eightieth year, and that it should be prefaced by an appreciation of his services to international law by one of his successors as Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, Sir W. E. Beckett. Everyone who has in any way been associated with Sir Cecil will agree in the writer's tribute to his deep integrity and sincerity, his judicious spirit and tolerant outlook. In the midst of his indefatigable labors in the British Foreign Office, on the bench of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and as first President of United Nations' War Crimes Commission, Sir Cecil was nevertheless able to find time to make substantial contributions to the public literature of international law in the form of numerous addresses and articles, selections from which have recently appeared as *International Law; The Collective Papers of Sir Cecil Hurst* (London: Stevens, 1950).—LAWRENCE PREUSS, *University of Michigan*.

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy; Vol. 1, 1917-1924. Edited by JANE DEGRAS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xxi, 501. \$7.00.)

Students of international relations unfamiliar with the Russian language owe the editor of these documents on Soviet foreign policy a great debt. This first volume is to be followed by two others which will cover the period to 1941. The material assembled represents items culled from various sources not readily available. Treaties and agreements already published in the League of Nations Treaty Series have not been included in this collection because of their accessibility. Around three hundred documents are arranged in chronological order. They give almost in themselves a running account of Soviet diplomacy from the famous "Decree on Peace" made on November 8, 1917, by the Congress of Soviets to an "Interview" by Chicherin on Anglo-Soviet Relations on January 4, 1925. Considerable material is presented on the attitudes of different Soviet leaders regarding the Brest-Litovsk Conference. There are significant documents on Allied Intervention, on Soviet policy towards the new states of Europe, on the restoration of diplomatic relations with European countries, on the Genoa and The Hague Conferences, on the background for the resumption of diplomatic relations with China and on the various problems confronting early Anglo-Soviet relations. With few exceptions, the author deliberately omits documents of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist International which deal with foreign policy on the ground that "their inclusion would extend the field too widely, making selection even more difficult." It is regrettable that such a selection was not attempted because so much of the history of Soviet foreign policy is inextricably interwoven with the history of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist International. Even with these shortcomings, the volume is a most valuable reference work for students of international relations. Used in conjunction with Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs*, which has just been republished, this volume and the next one will be the standard works on this period of Soviet diplomacy for some time.—WILLIAM B. BALLIS, *University of Washington*.

Canada in World Affairs; September 1941 to May 1944. By C. C. LINGARD AND R. G. TROTTER. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. xii, 320. \$3.50.)

Canada in World Affairs; From Normandy to Paris, 1944-1946. By F. H. SOWARD. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 359. \$3.50.)

With these volumes (vols. 3 and 4 of *Canada in World Affairs*), the Canadian Institute of International Affairs brings down to 1946 its annals of Canada's foreign relations since

1939. Prepared by competent historians for Canadian readers, these chronicles attempt to integrate the diplomatic story with military and domestic developments. They are based largely on wartime publications: government press releases, articles in popular magazines, and parliamentary debates. They are most informing when they draw on the few scholarly monographs that exist on recent Canadian history. Striking to Americans is the preoccupation of the authors with the status of Canada among the nations. Credit for military achievement has been a sore subject with Canada in both wars. Far more substantial as a Canadian grievance is neglect of her civil representatives by the major powers. This is not a mere matter of protocol or procedure; Canada resents the assumption that she will accept whatever programs Washington and London cook up. Canada does not propose to go it alone; she does ask to be consulted at the policy-making stage. This implies, of course, that Canada has and has had some specific foreign policies. The greatest weakness of both these books is the failure to state those policies. Soward, who has represented Canada abroad, is helpful on matters of air transport and communications, but is almost as vague as Lingard and Trotter on major issues. The basis of a positive Canadian foreign policy is never defined. The real problem in Canada is one of resolving internal stresses. Differences of tradition among groups in Canada have fostered an assortment of animosities to outside powers and mutual tension within. But negative attitudes towards the US, the UK, the UN, and the USSR add up to nothing except isolation. Only in crisis is the stalemate broken. The one foreign policy on which Canadians can agree is the one that promotes a lucrative export market. The economy is specialized to the export of raw and semi-processed staples. Wars and post-war recovery periods supply moral licenses to subsidize exports heavily and thus to afford Canada its only occasions for full employment of labor and capital. The chapters by Soward on Canada's economic contributions to victory and to recovery abroad contain some of the most instructive material in either volume.—THOMAS LEDUC, *Oberlin College*.

War and the Minds of Men. By FREDERICK S. DUNN. (New York: Published by Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1950. Pp. xvi, 115. \$2.00.)

"... since wars began in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed . . ."

In his *War and the Minds of Men* Professor Dunn has asked how the preamble of the UNESCO constitution can be implemented. He points out that there are two ways of organizing thought in the field of world affairs. The first is the traditional approach—it focuses attention on the relations between states. The second deals with international politics as a phenomenon involving relations between peoples. This approach is emerging. It is disorderly and, as Mr. Dunn points out, full of abstract possibilities. The author points to the many difficulties encountered in the changing of men's minds. He calls attention to the limitations of the means of communications between peoples and to the great percentage of the potential audience that lies beyond the range of mass communication. UNESCO was founded on the assumption that its activities would reach the mass of men everywhere; but because of censorship, more than one-half of the world population is removed from the range of its operations. To change the basic attitudes of individuals, it is necessary to operate principally within and through primary ties and associations. But the division of the globe into two worlds precludes operation upon vast groups of people in any primary way. "Working on the minds of one half the world's population to make them more pacific while the other half is waiting to dominate them would be an invidious occupation." The author concludes that so long as the world is split into two blocs any program aimed at building the defenses of peace must have as its initial purpose the defense of freedom. UNESCO must face many obstacles, but the author believes that, through the newer techniques of mass communication, much can be done in eliminating war through UNESCO techniques working on the minds of men.—ROYDEN DANGERFIELD, *University of Illinois*.

A Manual of International Law. By GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1951. Pp. lii, 428. \$5.50.)

American issue of the second edition (published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs) of this English text.

Constitution of the United Nations; Analysis of Structure and Function. By ALF ROSS. (New York: Rinehart and Co. 1950. Pp. 236. \$3.00.)

A professor of international law at the University of Copenhagen analyzes the UN Charter; foreword by Trygve Lie.

A Plan for Peace. By GRENVILLE CLARK. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1950. Pp. x, 83. \$1.00.)

Suggestions by a prominent lawyer for general disarmament, through world federation of universal membership, and basic revision of the United Nations Charter to that end.

Strengthening the Framework of Peace; A Study of Current Proposals for Amending, Developing, or Replacing Present International Institutions for the Maintenance of Peace. By ALAN DE RUSSETT. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1950. Pp. xiii, 225. \$4.00.)

A volume which summarizes proposals for world peace—rigidly selected but representative—by a lecturer in citizenship at the University of Leeds.

The Return From Babel. By GERALD M. SPRING. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. Pp. xxvi, 188. \$3.50.)

Presents a pragmatic approach to "one world." A revolution in social attitudes would be guided by "the interpreter class"; nationalism would be discarded for less artificial groupings; imperialism would give way to economic regionalism. The specific roles of Germany, Soviet Russia and the United States are discussed.

The Beginnings of Diplomacy; A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations. By RAGNAR NUMELIN. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. 372. \$12.00.)

A study of the social problems of diplomacy among primitive peoples, by a Finnish diplomat. Primitive customs concerning war, peace-making and alliances, diplomats and envoys, and international trade are examined. There is a fifty-page bibliography.

Unesco; Peace in the Minds of Men. By THEODORE BESTERMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1951. Pp. xi, 133. \$2.50.)

A brief account of Unesco's origin, accomplishments, aims and difficulties, by a former head of the organization's Department for Exchange of Information. In addition to a select general bibliography, a selected list of documents and publications is provided at the end of each chapter. The Appendix contains the Constitution of Unesco.

Foundations of National Power; Readings on World Politics and American Security. EDITED BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xxiv, 810. \$6.90.)

Second and completely revised edition of a book of readings on world politics and American security first published in 1945.

The United States in World Affairs, 1950. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS AND THE RESEARCH STAFF OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. (New York: Published by Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1951. Pp. xii, 500. \$5.00.)

Fifth volume in the Council's postwar series of annual surveys of American foreign policy. In addition to the comprehensive and balanced summary, the volume also contains

a twenty-four page selected, topically arranged bibliography, and a chronology of world events.

A Short History of American Diplomacy. BY L. ETHAN ELLIS. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1951. Pp. x, 604. \$5.00.)

Text for a semester course.

Current Issues in Foreign Economic Assistance. PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES GROUP OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution. 1951. Pp. vi, 103. \$1.00.)

A study of the development and operation of American foreign assistance programs, and an analysis of the key issues. This is a preliminary statement, to be followed sometime later by a fuller publication.

Career Ambassador. BY WILLARD L. BEAULAC. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. 262. \$3.50.)

Autobiographical account of twenty-seven years in the United States Foreign Service. After various assignments in Latin America, the author served as Consul General and Counselor of the Embassy in Spain from 1941 to 1944, and later as Ambassador to Paraguay and to Colombia. He has recently been appointed Ambassador to Peru.

American Imperialism. BY VICTOR PERLO. (New York: International Publishers. 1951. Pp. 256. \$2.75.)

A treatment of American imperialism from the Communist point of view, with emphasis on trusts, exploitation, and Jim Crow. Lenin's definition of imperialism is accepted on the first page, and the rest of the book is cut to that pattern.

Le Problème de l'Union Européenne. BY OLIVIER PHILIP. (Paris: Éditions de la Baconnière. 1950. Pp. 382.)

A well-documented plea for economic union of Europe under a legally organized higher political authority, with a thorough discussion of attempts at economic and political union since the days before the Second World War, such as the Briand (1929) and Churchill (1940) proposals. Also discussed are the efforts to effect regional economic unifications—Commission Économique Européenne, Benelux, Franco-Italian Customs Union, Schuman and Marshall Plans, Council of Europe, etc. F.T.E.

Documents on Regional Organizations outside Western Europe, 1940-1949. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1950. Pp. vii, 85. \$2.00.)

Texts of sixteen documents, without commentaries.

Peacemaking in Perspective; From Potsdam to Paris. BY F. W. PICK. (Oxford: Pen-in-Hand. 1950. Pp. 251.)

This diplomatic history of the last few years from the Potsdam, London and Moscow conferences in 1945 to the Paris Conference of 1949 (with several maps of disputed areas) is truly a "handbook of peace-making in our time." A good index facilitates the use of this admirable survey, written by a conscientious and gifted historian who unfortunately died soon after the completion of this work. F.T.E.

Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 1939-1945. BY PETER KLEIST. (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag. 1950. Pp. 344.)

The author worked closely with Ribbentrop for some time and played an important role in prewar German foreign relations; he was also one of the leading officials of Rosenberg's *Ostministerium*. In spite of his overweening self-confidence and righteousness, his

account of German-Soviet relations during the period of Soviet neutrality, the transfer of Germans from Bessarabia, the German policy in the occupied territory of the East, and certain Soviet attempts at peace negotiations allegedly made in Stockholm between 1943 and 1945, must be considered as a contribution to the history of Germany's Eastern policy and should not be overlooked by those who are working in this field. F.T.E.

Mémorial Antonesco; Le IIIe Homme de l'Axe. Collection "Documents Politiques." (Paris: Éditions de la Couronne. 1950. Pp. 215.)

A history of the "Conducator" and of the German-Rumanian alliance. The reports of Antonesco's conversations with Mussolini and Hitler have the ring of probability, and several hitherto unknown secret attempts to arrive at peace negotiations during the last war are revealed. But much about Hitler's alleged confidences regarding his prewar policy—for instance, Czechoslovakian-Soviet collaboration—lacks confirmation from other sources. F.T.E.

Chronique de la Guerre Froide, 1947-1949. BY CTE. CARTON DE WIART. (Bruxelles: Ad. Gomaere. 1950. Pp. 448.)

A topically arranged reprint of the author's weekly comments on foreign affairs published between May 25, 1947, and August 8, 1949, in *La Libre Belgique*. The author comments on practically every significant political issue of the years from 1947 to 1949 and emerges as a well-informed and alert observer. F.T.E.

Guerra diplomatica in Estremo Oriente, 1914-1931. BY MARIO TOSCANO. (Milan: Giulio Einaudi Editore. 1950. 2 vols. Pp. 428, 508.)

This work by Italy's leading historian on modern diplomatic history will probably long remain one of the standard works on Far Eastern diplomatic history. Besides making use of printed source materials, it is based on research in London and Paris archives, in the Library of the League of Nations at Geneva, and in the former Japan Institute in Berlin. F.T.E.

The British Territories in East and Central Africa, 1945-1950. PUBLISHED BY THE COLONIAL OFFICE. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1950. Pp. 166.)

A survey covering the Somaliland Protectorate, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Pemba, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The principal topics are political progress since the war, regional collaboration and liaison with the United Kingdom, finance and commerce, natural resources, education and community development, living conditions, and social services. F.T.E.

Freedom and Authority in French West Africa. BY ROBERT DELAVIGNETTE. (New York: Published by the Oxford University Press for the International African Institute. 1950. Pp. vii, 152. \$2.50.)

Translation of a work published in 1946 under the title *Service Africain*. The discussion is centered on the *Cercle Commandant* and his relations with the native societies. The author has had long experience in the French colonial service and was at one time High Commissioner for the French Cameroons.

De parlementaire geschiedenis van het indonesische vraagstuk. BY A. STEMPELS. (Amsterdam: N. V. de Arbeiderspers. 1950. Pp. xi, 317.)

The first part of this work traces the four years of debates on the Indonesian question in the Dutch Parliament from October, 1945, to the decisive vote on December 21, 1949. The second part is a who's who of the principal speakers—"de personen van het parlementaire drama." Contained in the appendices are the radio address of Queen Wilhelmina on December 7, 1942, the agreement of Linggadjati, and the "Uniestatuut." F.T.E.

ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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ARTICLES

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

From Wealth to Welfare; The Evolution of Liberalism. By HARRY K. GIRVETZ. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1950. Pp. xiii, 321. \$5.00.)

This is yet another learned, kindly, and painstaking "third force" book with most of the usual characteristics of its species. The organization, however, is rather unusual. The book is divided sharply into two parts. In one, "classical" liberalism is carefully dissected under a rather interesting and suggestive classification: (1) The Psychological Creed; (2) The Problem of Motivation; (3) The Political Creed (in several chapters); (4) The Economic Creed. In the second half the same thing is done all over again, though not in as clean-cut fashion, for "Contemporary Liberalism." The present reviewer has worked so much in this field and reviewed so many similar books that his appetite is perhaps unfairly jaded. But the whole school which this volume represents is so much of a pattern that what can be said of one comes close to being relevant for all. I cannot help feeling that a great deal of energy is still being devoted in this country to flogging dead horses. Who really believes in pure *laissez faire* or utilitarianism? Who is against all forms of welfare expenditure? Who considers the consumer a self-contained and wholly self-determining unit? Who thinks the system necessarily self-adjusting? Certainly not John Jewkes. I question whether even Hayek would fit my catalogue. This issue goes much deeper. And here I think we come to the basic weakness of the "third force" school—the failure to relate political analysis to economic life. For example, on page 99 it is admitted that in order to get democracy mere popular suffrage does not suffice. Among other things (in rather a good list), the "voters must be free of coercion." But what about *economic* coercion from a highly centralized state or union? "Monopoly" receives the usual lambasting. But what about union monopoly? The paradox again re-appears in the discussion of Bertrand Russell on page 222. Another typical weakness is the thinness of the economics. The *non-capitalist* sources of business cycles are wholly ignored. So also is the fact that the instinct of workmanship can be a *restrictive* force, or that war and struggle can just as often be the result of *good* intentions and understanding (on both sides) as of selfishness and greed. It is differences of opinion *as to means* that can bring two saints to blows—even though they are both agreed as to ends. Mr. Girvetz should realize that there is a wholly different school of capitalist analysis in being which does not stem from the pure utilitarianism he criticizes. It is perhaps noteworthy that his bibliography contains no mention of Professor Frank H. Knight. Much has happened since 1940 of which Mr. Girvetz does not seem aware. Events have modified many capitalist certainties, to be sure, but also many socialist ones. The task is not to be solved by amiable platitude but by specific and *informed* discussion—cast not merely in static but in dynamic terms.—DAVID MCCORD WRIGHT, *University of Virginia*.

Men of Good Hope; A Story of American Progressives. By DANIEL AARON. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 329. \$4.50.)

Dr. Aaron believes that the progressive tradition requires rehabilitation, being "currently under attack by both liberals and anti-liberals." This opinion introduces a volume "about progressives" which may raise questions in the minds of readers who do not read such works as a sedative, and wonder what their actual relationship to the present may

be. They may be interested in knowing who, precisely, these critics of the progressives treated are, and how much serious attention they merit. Dr. Aaron's pages rarely carry citations of other writers, and, for all the confidence one may have in his scholarly equipment and ability, his rather meager bibliography is difficult to assay. *Men of Good Hope* is composed of individual essays, featuring Emerson and Theodore Parker as "precursors" of the progressive tradition, and Henry George, Bellamy, Lloyd, Howells, and Veblen, as "prophetic agitators." If these worthies adequately represent progressivism, then it must be defined as a catalytic agency, rather than as a primary force. This theory—for Dr. Aaron is only moderately helpful—would seem to be supported by the third section of his work, "Latter-day Progressives," which features Theodore Roosevelt and Brooks Adams as "pseudo-progressives." Possibly Roosevelt and Adams are conceived as judgments on pre-World War I progressivism, which gave the former so much scope for development. In his "In Retrospect: 1912-1950," Dr. Aaron elects to concede the naïveté and primness of nineteenth century progressive proposals, but urges the values in their humanistic philosophy, the native tone which strengthens their analyses of social conditions. It would surely have been desirable to have a more substantial contrast with the philosophy and views of the progressives proper—that is, those who operated during the Progressive Era and who are briefly dismissed as pragmatists. Dr. Aaron brings such progressives as La Follette and Charles Edward Russell into the picture with what seems to this reviewer a striking casualness, all things considered, and Randolph Bourne in a way that is utterly unilluminating. He imagines the muckrakers to have been not particularly literate, and prone to "passionate abandon," as no doubt in the cases of Steffens, Robert Hunter, and Gustavus Myers. Now it seems generous to assume that Dr. Aaron knows that these opinions are not held by all students of the time and tradition. The point is not that he holds his confusing—and perhaps confused—ideas; they may be a matter of opinion, and he may be right. The point is that he has not deemed it necessary to join issue on such questions as involve the real energies of progressivism. Essays in the field, however skillfully organized, however felicitously phrased, must remain indecisive, so long as they tend to treat themes in liberalism as academic exercises, and steer shy of bold statement and relevant reference.—LOUIS FILLER, *University of Bristol*.

Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism. By ADAM B. ULAM. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. 173. \$3.75.)

At the outset, Mr. Ulam states that "This book is neither a history of the British Labour Party nor a systematic account of its present policies. Having entered upon a study of some of the theoretical sources of English socialism I found myself compelled to comment, however briefly, on the intellectual atmosphere, policies, and dilemmas surrounding the Welfare State as conceived and built by English socialists." At the other terminus of the book he stipulates that English socialism "represents a definite stage in the development of political democracy, a stage prepared and analysed by the idealism of philosophers and economists of whom many were nonsocialist or antisocialist in their beliefs." A further delimitation is suggested by the title. The several elements thus specified find their places in the volume. After a brief, able introduction, which is concerned with the place, meaning, and relevance of political theory *per se*, the author deals with two major ideological formulations which have resulted from contemporary conditions of political and economic relationships: the idealism of Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet, and the formulae of British socialism from the Fabians onward. Other ideological factors are briefly considered but, on the whole, selected "foundations" only are analyzed. At the same time, the nexus between idealism as a philosophical foundation and socialism remains somewhat unclear. Partly, it is established by defining idealism broadly as, for example, "a projection of man's moral self, a necessary means and implementation of his full development." A connection between the two is also discovered in the strong moral convictions of British socialists, but "a hankering after spiritual satisfaction" by the Fabians is only superficially coincidental with the idealism of a Green and may more

easily be traced to the Chapel. Indeed, Mr. Ulam notes that "The link with idealism is tenuous" and that later socialists, especially Laski, reject the link explicitly. In a chapter entitled "The State and Neo-Idealism," he does find a more specific merger in that revival of idealism for which A. D. Lindsay has been largely responsible, but this hardly outweighs the pragmatism of the more typical Labour Party member. The thesis that the book suggests thus arises from analogy rather than demonstration. It is that in spite of pragmatism, general disinterest in organic features of the state and apparent disavowal of idealism, a movement such as British socialism which is vitally concerned with moral values and with broad social attitudes and programs is perforce tinged with idealism—"... isn't the modern state, whether democratic or non-democratic, assuming functions and powers which would indicate, consciously or unconsciously, an acceptance of this basic premise of idealism [the state as a necessary implement of individual moral development]?"—THOMAS P. JENKIN, *University of California (Los Angeles)*.

An Introduction to Politics. By R. H. SOLTAU. (New York: Longmans, Green & Company. 1951. Pp. ix, 328. \$3.25.)

Accurately named, written by a Sometime Scholar of Pembroke College, Oxford, now Professor of Political Science in the American University of Beirut, this book should fill a real need in introductory college courses. It discusses the principles of politics against an informed background and in context of the present day, with none of the all too common academic aridity. It offers to the general undergraduate, in well organized and highly readable form, a generally sound orientation in fundamentals of the state as having reference both to the conflict of ideas and to the recent evolution of political structures. While not a guide to practical citizenship in the sense of taking the beginner by the hand and trying simply to interest him in elementary procedures—necessary though this task often is—it should serve the more significant aim of expounding the foundations of belief. "We are no longer told, as we were a century ago, that 'Natural Rights is nonsense upon stilts' " (p. 141). The validity of a democratic rationalism is here made clear, as against the irrational and extreme relativism which lies, for example, at the root of fascism. "The problem of politics, as Leacock says, is that of 'the unsolved riddle of social justice' . . . but the student of politics will not . . . believe that his search for right is a mere will-o'-the-wisp," or that men and women may rightly become "mere means to ends in which they do not share" (pp. 10, 14). Thus the Kantian dictate and especially the idealism of T. H. Green shine through. At the same time, and hardly consistent with the argument, is the bald assertion that "The doctrine of the general will is based, in fact, upon the assumption that there is someone—the state—who knows better than we do what is really good for us" (pp. 151-2). This is only one variation of the doctrine of the general will, much of which is, in fact, fundamental to the gist of what Soltau maintains. In the same connection may be mentioned an occasional appearance of hasty or unnecessarily oversimplified generalization, such as the statement that the idea of natural rights "originated in ancient Rome" (p. 138). The author exposes the unsound roots of totalitarianism. The tenets of Marxism receive a balanced treatment. Principles of the planning state are distinguished from those of socialism. "The chief feature of the period between the two world wars was the complete failure of free enterprise to prevent large-scale unemployment, whether in Germany, Britain or America" (p. 274). Some degree or form of planning is therefore a necessity. At the same time, "what we may call 'Green's Law,' that 'the only acts which the state ought to enjoin or forbid are those of which the doing or not doing, from whatever motive, is necessary to the moral end of society,' that end being the formation of free creative personalities" (p. 254), is accepted as a principle limiting the sphere of the state. In concluding this review, a certain excess of quoting from authorities not too eminent may be noted.—WALTER SANDELIUS, *University of Kansas*.

Measurement and Prediction; Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume IV. By SAMUEL A. STOFFER, LOUIS GUTTMAN, EDWARD A. SUCHMAN, PAUL F. LAZARS-

FELD, SHIRLEY A. STAR AND JOHN A. CLAUSEN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1950. Pp. x, 756. \$10.00.)

This volume discusses the contributions of the Research Branch of the Information and Education Division in the War Department during World War II to the theoretical and empirical analysis of problems of measurement—particularly the development of models of ordered structures or scales and practical procedures for testing their adaptability to a given area of the social sciences. It also deals with problems of prediction as illustrated by two of the major efforts of prediction made by the Research Branch. The discussion of questionnaire design takes up scalogram analysis developed by Louis Guttman and the latent structure analysis developed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Both methods attempt to scale qualitative data. Guttman regards an attitude area as “scalable” if persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks than persons who answer the same question unfavorably. Guttman “scales” a questionnaire in terms of manifest responses to the questions asked. Lazarsfeld, on the other hand, postulates a latent attitude continuum. He assumes that there exists a set of latent classes, such that the manifest relationship between any two or more items on a test can be accounted for by the existence of these basic classes. His calculations involve an adaptation of factor analysis to qualitative data. Scaling is a highly technical subject and persons without good mathematical background will find this book hard reading. The book is a notable contribution to social science methodology and its applications should be far-reaching. Scaling can be useful in defining research problems, in interpreting the meaning of questions, in describing attitudes and opinions more accurately, in studying such subjects as the “halo” effect, and in establishing the criterion or predictor in a prediction problem. The chapters by Shirley A. Star describe the stages in the construction of a pencil and paper test for screening psychoneurotics. The questionnaire designed was used in the last year of the war at all induction stations. Until this study was made, there was no uniform scoring device against which the variability of psychiatric diagnosis throughout the United States could be compared. Two chapters by John A. Clausen examine the problems involved in predicting what kind of employment men would seek upon discharge from the Army, as well as how great the demand would be for further schooling. He presented concrete data on the advantage and limitations of various types of questions for eliciting needed information as to a man's future intentions. This attempt to ascertain soldiers' plans and the relationship of expressed plans to postseparation performance is an excellent example of program planning. It demonstrates the value of trying to anticipate needs. Samuel A. Stouffer, wartime Director of the Research Branch, presents a summary of the findings and their theoretical implications in two general chapters.—HAROLD F. GOSNELL, *American University*.

Puritanism and Liberty; Being the Army Debates (1647-9) from the Clarke Manuscripts with Supplementary Documents. EDITED BY A. S. P. WOODHOUSE. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. 506. \$4.50.)

Second printing of this work, first published in London in 1938.

Clarendon; Politics, History & Religion, 1640-1660. BY H. G. WORMALD. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1951. Pp. xiii, 331. \$5.00.)

The three parts of this study by an English scholar deal, respectively, with Clarendon's attitudes, as public figure, from the beginning of the second session of the Long Parliament to the end of the first Civil War; with his views, as historian, during the period 1646 to 1660; and with his ideas concerning religion.

The Age of Terror. BY LESLIE PAUL. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. Pp. 256. \$3.00.)

An analysis of European geography, history and ideologies, with a view to explaining the increasing use and acceptance of terror as an instrument of government.

The Art of Asking Questions. BY STANLEY L. PAYNE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 249. \$3.75.)

Third of a series of studies in public opinion. Written in sparkling style and from the author's long experience in survey taking, this book gives tested advice in preparing good questions, with particular emphasis on pitfalls.

The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell: Psychopathology and Politics; Politics—Who Gets What, When, How; Democratic Character. BY HAROLD D. LASSWELL. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1951. Pp. 525. \$5.00.)

Contains two early works of Professor Lasswell and a new discussion of democratic character as it appeared in ancient Greece and as it is developing and being studied today.

Personality and Political Crisis; New Perspectives from Social Science and Psychiatry for the Study of War and Politics. EDITED BY ALFRED H. STANTON AND STEWART E. PERRY. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 1951. Pp. 260. \$3.75.)

Included are five lectures delivered on behalf of the Washington School of Psychiatry in the spring of 1950 by Harold D. Lasswell, Talcott Parsons, David Riesman, Ralph Linton, and Otto Klineberg, together with discussions which followed. Reprints of articles by David M. Levy, Renzo Sereno, and Harry Stack Sullivan are also included.

Edmund J. James Lectures on Government. BY WAYNE MORSE, IRVING DILLIARD AND LEO PASVOLSKY. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1951. Pp. 90.)

Lectures given at the University of Illinois in 1948, 1949 and 1950, respectively, on "What Do the American People Want from Their Politicians?" by Senator Morse; "The Development of a Free Press in Germany, 1945-46," by Mr. Dilliard; and "The United Nations in Action," by Mr. Pasvolsky.

Support for Independent Scholarship and Research. BY ELBRIDGE SIBLEY. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1951. Pp. xv, 116. \$1.25.)

Designed specifically to examine the administration of small grants-in-aid of research, this study also surveys the several conditions which affect research by individual scholars and scientists. Sponsored by the American Philosophical Society and the Social Science Research Council and conducted by the latter.

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
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
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